Showing posts with label Civilian Surge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civilian Surge. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

US Mission Baghdad: Who will taste-test the locally sourced food for the cafeteria?

Department of Defense Photo
Via WaPo's Walter Pincus:
The State Department, seeking to cut costs in Iraq, is looking to locally purchase some of the food its personnel eat, potentially breaking from the U.S. military’s practice of importing all food and fuel.

American diplomats ate in a cafeteria in one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces until 2008, when a new U.S. Embassy compound was completed. The embassy cafeteria has served food imported by the military.

Military commanders required that, for sanitary and security reasons, all food and fuel be trucked in from Kuwait in convoys protected by soldiers or private security contractors.

The State Department’s undersecretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy, said he will continue using the Defense Logistics Agency to bring in food and fuel after January.
[...]
While the military did not seek to purchase food or fuel on the Iraqi market, Kennedy said in an interview last week that he had asked the logistics agency to begin looking for reliable local sources for those commodities.

“It will never get down to zero,” Kennedy said about the need for imported goods, but he said that State had already been purchasing some fuel on the Iraqi market. Buying food and fuel locally, Kennedy said, would cut the overall cost and reduce the need for convoy security guards.
Read in full here.

I'm not worried about our diplomats acclimatizing to the local bacteria, mind you.  All FS folks do that with every country they are posted to.  They buy local food and shop in local stores; they buy fresh fruits and veges from the corner green grocer or the open market next door (often seasoned with Clorox at home).  Except in war zones.

And oh, I'm sure the State Department can save quite a bundle from buying fuel and food locally. Maybe I should applaud such fiscal creativity?  I just want to point out to Mr. Kennedy that folks do not drink fuel, see? If they procure food locally, will the embassy hire some supertasters? According to this account, the late King Hussein I of Jordan relates in his 1962 autobiography that he uncovered a Syrian spy plot involving his cook to poison his food. The tip-off?  Apparently, the untimely deaths of the palace cats, victims of the assassin's try-outs. In this neighborhood where America is quite hated, this is not beyond the realm of possibility. 

This is Iraq, and the embassy, the largest in the world with potentially over 15,000 personnel by end of the year. They all need to eat.  And not MREs.  The military, with its command and supply chain structure in place (and never short of staff) did not try to procure food locally in all its years of operation in Iraq. And the State Department which does not have comparable structures or staff, will now buy local to feed its staff. Frankly, the thought of that is giving me a rather queasy stomach.

Of course, given that we have had several outbreaks of foodborne illness in the United States, perhaps I shouldn't worry too much?

Except that -- way back in October, the National Iraqi News Agency reported that Muqtada Al Sadr, leader of the Shiite al-Sadr Trend, considered all US embassy employees in Baghdad as “occupiers”, stressing that resisting them after 2011 is an obligation.
"In response to a query of one of his followers about the increase of the embassy employees' number from 5000 to 15000 after the expiry of SOFA, Muqtada said “they are all occupiers and resisting them after the end of the agreement is an obligation.”

That's a special mention from an Iraqi leader who commands not just powerful religious and political influence but also has his own army. We may think this war is over, but it's not.  Iraq is still a war zone. And make no mistake about it.  Our soldiers will be home but our diplomats and their guards will be in the crosshairs even as they try to continue "reconstructing" that country.







Tuesday, November 15, 2011

State Dept Seeks Aviation Advisor for Iraq Rescues 58 Days Before Liftoff?

Via Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman:

The State Department has already requisitioned an army, part of the roughly 5,000 private security contractors State is hiring to protect diplomats stationed in Iraq. Now, State is hiring someone to provide a little help from the air: an “Aviation Advisor” responsible for “Search and Rescue (SAR), medical evacuations (ME), transporting Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to respond to incidents, and provid[ing] air transportation for Chief of Mission personnel.” It’s not a familiar job for the diplomatic corps, which is why State is seeking to bring in someone from the outside.

The State Department put out this notice on Nov. 4. That’s 58 days before the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Fifty-eight days before State has the skies over Iraq to itself.
[..]
Air operations are not as simple has hiring skilled pilots to put well-maintained machines in the skies.

The military has long-standing procedures in place for designing and executing aerial missions. An experienced chain of command maintains order, discipline, coordination and success. This is what the military does.

It’s not what the State Department does. Only a relatively few officials go into the U.S. diplomatic corps to oversee security operations.

[...]
Inevitably, things will go wrong in these complex air operations. A functioning chain of command exists to minimize those mistakes and mitigate their impact.

The State Department still does not have someone atop that chain, with fewer than 60 days before it finds itself alone in the skies.

[...]
Until State can figure out its chain of command for air operations, its employees in Iraq — some 17,000 of them, according to current plans — had better hope they don’t need air support. There’s not much time to put one in place.
Continue reading, U.S. Hiring Mercenary Air Force for Iraq Rescues.

Anyway -- even if you do find the right person for this job in 57 days, how fast can that person get medically cleared, obtain a security clearance, get administratively processed and get a plan together?  A plan is important; of the 75 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 36 were downed by enemy fire (source).

There is, too, the contractor run and led-medical supply chain. If somebody is hurt, and is airlifted to one of the embassy district hospitals in Iraq, is the embassy blood program even in place and functioning as the military's? 


I have posted previously about Embassy Air Iraq here, and the Embassy Baghdad General Hospital here.  I've also posted about the transition and the medical support functions here, here, here and here.

In one of those posts about hospitals, a reader commented that it's strange that the subject wasn't mentioned in the Afghanistan-Iraq-Pakistan bidding cables for foreign service officers.

Somebody who writes as NewtonCM2 said "It wasn't mentioned in the AIP bidding cables because it's not true. There will be continuous, full medical coverage through the entire military to State transition. The OIG got this one wrong."

As far as I know, the OIG never corrected that report on the Iraq transition.

I hope that the State Dept is advising its contractors and employees bidding on Iraq jobs that its air operation in the country responsible for search and rescue, medevac, etc, etc. is still up on the air.  So they have the option to pack their broomsticks. 







Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Photo of the Day: If this is over $50, I'll have to file a gift report

The photo below is from the photostream of the U.S. Embassy Kabul in Flickr. I don't know how many folks have their hands on the embassy's social media platforms. But for a while now, the photos uploaded to Flickr either have no captions or includes one caption for all the photos in the set. Which kind of defeats the purpose of having a photo gallery up, because viewers need to have some context on what they're looking at. 

The photo below, as well as all the 67 photos included in the set has the following caption:

The Acting Minister of Higher Education Sarwar Danish, together with NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Kolinda Grabar and U.S. Embassy Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy Eileen O'Connor, joined university chancellors and others at the Ministry of Higher Education in Kabul to celebrate the progress of the PAS-funded NATO SILK Afghanistan Program on Tuesday, Oct 11, 2011.(Department of State)


It does not matter that NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Kolinda Grabar is not in this photo. You get the idea; these folks were all there according to the caption.  During a big do on Silk Afghanistan.  I have no idea if this is a dressmaker's program or a silkworm propagation program either, hard to know without context, see?  The Silk Road? I really don't know.  Some 68 photos of smiling people but no photos of silk dressmakers or silkworm, or the Silk Road, for that matter, which is rather confusing to tell you the truth. 

The photo above shows the U.S. Embassy Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy Eileen O'Connor receiving a gift. I imagine she's saying, "Thank you very much for this gift; if this is over $50, I'll have to file a gift report."

Of course, that's probably not what she said to the gifter, but without context, we're left to our own imagination.





Monday, October 17, 2011

Thanks to a Hardworking Congress, Some Feds in the Garden Countries of I'Af/Pak to Lose Some Benefits

Stephen Losey of Federal Times reported last week that federal employees deployed to the I'Af/Pak region who are not in the Foreign Service have now lost numerous travel, medical and leave benefits because those benefits were not renewed by Congress after they expired Oct. 1. Excerpts:

The following benefits, which are available to Foreign Service officers, will no longer be available to non-Foreign Service personnel posted in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, according to the Office of Personnel Management:

  • Reimbursement of travel costs when going home on leave.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when obtaining necessary medical care when such care is not available locally.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when evacuating family members who are in imminent danger.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when transporting furniture and other personal effects when moving to another duty station.
  • Mandatory leave for employees who have returned home after a three-year deployment. Agencies also will no longer have the option to offer leave to employees who had served in a war zone for 18 months.
  • Medical examinations, mental health care, inoculations, vaccinations and other preventative care.
  • A death gratuity equal to one year's salary when an employee dies of injuries sustained while supporting military operations.
Read in full here.

I have not read the OPM notice but I am presuming that these changes applies to non-Foreign Service and non-Defense employees serving in those three priority countries.

The 2010 OIG review of US Embassy Pakistan indicates that there are some three dozens non-State and non-DOD personnel in that country (DEA: 16, FBI: 7, DHS: 4, BBG:1, DOE: 1, NAS: 8, Treasury: 1).

On the U.S. Embassy Iraq staffing -- well, trying to pin down the staffing number over there, is of course, rocket science and I simply do not have the brains for it. Also, with the military withdrawal and the embassy taking charge, a whole lot of big numbers are bring thrown around - 5,000 - 17,000.  Security people is a big component but not sure how many non-State/USAID and non-DOD personnel will continue to deploy in Iraq and our consulates there when all is said and done in 2011. 

Due to the recent "flavor of the month" in Afghanistan, the civilian uplift staffing picture there is a bit more clearer.  Seven civilian agencies (State/USAID excepted) account for about 26% of the total civilian uplift.  So all those folks, plus some three dozens in Pakistan and an undetermined number in Iraq will be affected by Congress' non-renewal of warzone benefits.

In short, if they need mental health care after service in the warzones, they're basically out of luck?

This will have an impact to the employees already deployed there, but may have a larger impact on recruitment of employees for the 2012 assignment and onward.


From SIGAR/State OIG

Below is an excerpt from the SIGAR/State OIG review of the civilian uplift in that country:
[...] State increased its civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan from 192 in January 2009, to 501 in March 2011—an increase of 309 personnel.

State has an additional 81 authorized full-time equivalent positions for the civilian uplift as of May 31, 2011, but the positions are currently unfilled. According to State officials from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), they will continue to place additional civilian personnel in these positions through fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

USAID had the second largest presence of any agency prior to the start of the uplift. USAID personnel increased from 85 in January 2009 to 307 as of March 2011, an increase of 222 personnel. USAID has an additional 80 authorized positions for Afghanistan that are currently unfilled. According to USAID officials, they will continue to place additional U.S. civilians in these positions in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

As of June 2011, the other seven civilian agencies with a presence in Afghanistan accounted for an increase of 189 personnel, or approximately 26 percent of the total civilian uplift. These agencies provide personnel at the request and direction of the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and State officials in Washington in order to meet the mission’s strategic goals. The Chief of Mission determines the number of authorized civilian uplift positions in consultation with each department.

DOJ accounted for an increase of 78 personnel, or 11 percent, of the total civilian uplift. The majority of these uplift personnel are employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration who work on mentoring and training Afghan law enforcement entities in an effort to promote the rule of law. In addition, they provide leadership and guidance in the conduct of bilateral counternarcotics investigations and operations. USDA has deployed 59 civilian uplift personnel as of June 2011, representing eight percent of the total civilian uplift. These employees primarily mentor Afghan government officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

The remaining five agencies account for approximately seven percent of the total civilian uplift. DHS personnel advise, mentor, and train Afghan border, customs, and related entities to enforce Afghan customs and immigration law. Treasury places technical experts at Afghan government ministries where they provide assistance in four areas: strengthening budget and financial accountability, combating economic crimes and corruption, building internal audit capacity and increasing non-tax revenues, and achieving debt relief and improving debt management. Transportation personnel advise officials at the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation on issues such as civil aviation law and surface transportation planning. HHS personnel work on health programs, such as programs to strengthen maternal and child health services in Afghanistan. Finally, Commerce personnel assist with efforts to promote Afghanistan’s economic development and trade. 


Related item:       
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift | September 8, 2011










Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Details: Costs to Deploy One Person to Afghanistan for One Year


Excerpted from SIGAR Audit-11-17 and State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

It typically costs the U.S. government between $425,926 and $570,998 to deploy a civilian employee to Afghanistan for a 1 year tour. Costs vary due to differences in salary, travel expenses, and whether an employee works in the Embassy or in field locations. This estimated range does not include agencies’ headquarters support costs for Afghanistan positions, 15 days of transitional leave or home leave if the employee will be deployed for another year-long tour in Afghanistan, and any other expenses that the deploying agency may incur in the process of transitioning the employees back to their previous jobs within the government, if applicable.

We constructed the total cost range estimate for deploying one position to Afghanistan based on the following expenses:


Salaries: Civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan are compensated for their work either by the U.S. government Civil Service General Schedule (GS)26 or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule. U.S. agencies told us that they prefer to deploy civilians with considerable background experience to Afghanistan. Therefore, agencies typically deploy civilians at the higher end of the U.S. government pay scale (GS 14 and FS 1). In budget planning, State uses the amount of $110,000 as base salary for either the civil service or the foreign service positions, and USAID uses the amount of $122,733 as base salary for their Afghanistan positions in general.

Danger Pay: Danger pay is additional compensation above basic salary for service at designated danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees. The U.S. government sets the danger pay level for Afghanistan at 35 percent of base salary (based on a standard 40 hour workweek) prorated for the number of days while deployed in Afghanistan. Danger pay compensation begins on the day of arrival in Afghanistan (the employee must be in country for 4 hours or more to qualify) and ceases on the day of departure for both permanent or temporary employees deployed to Afghanistan.
or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule.

Post Differential: Post differential is additional hardship pay over basic salary for employees deployed to serve at foreign areas where conditions or the environment differ substantially from conditions or the environment in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. State provides post differential for civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan at the maximum level of 35 percent of base salary. All civilian employees assigned for a 1 year tour, detailed, or on temporary duty to Afghanistan must spend 42 consecutive days at post before the post differential is activated; the differential is retroactive to the day the employee arrived at post.


Sunday Differential: The U.S. government provides full-time civilian employees in Afghanistan with additional compensation for hours of work on Sunday, as it is the start of the regular workweek at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Sunday premium pay is equal to 25 percent of the employee’s rate of basic salary for each of the 8 hours of Sunday work, which means 5 percent of base salary.

Overtime: The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines overtime pay as pay for hours of work officially ordered or approved in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek. Civilian employees in Afghanistan are entitled to overtime compensation depending on their position and level of appointment. USAID sets its personnel overtime at the rate of 25 percent of base salary. State sets overtime at 20 percent of base salary. USDA follows U.S.Mission policy and allows for civilians working in Kabul to work 35 hours of overtime per pay period and for civilians working in the field in Afghanistan to work 45 hours of overtime per pay period. The overtime compensation rate is an employee’s base salary and an additional percentage based on the employee’s GS level.

Special Differential: A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.


Separate Maintenance Allowance: The U.S. government provides this  allowance to assist a Foreign Service employee in meeting the additional expenses of supporting family members located outside the employee's foreign post of assignment. The U.S. government applies this allowance to Foreign Service employees working in Afghanistan. The maximum amount used to plan a position’s budget in Afghanistan is $17,300 for State and $12,516 for USAID. A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.

Deployment Travel: The U.S. government pays for civilian employee travel to Afghanistan, primarily including airfare, hotel, meals and shipment of household effects. State estimates this cost at $25,000; USAID estimates it at $48,983.


Mandatory Afghanistan Training: State requires all civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan to attend Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training (at the cost of $3,895) and Afghanistan Familiarization training (at the cost of $960). Civilian personnel deployed to locations outside of the U.S. mission in Kabul receive extra training, including the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Orientation (at the cost of $960) and the Interagency Integrated Civilian-Military Training Exercise for Afghanistan (at the cost of $5,880). Some individual departments and agencies require additional specialized training for their employees deployed to Afghanistan; for example, Department of Justice civilian employees attend specialized training for their job assignments in Afghanistan.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) and Regional Rest Breaks (RRB): The U.S. government provides civilians deployed to Afghanistan designated rest breaks after they have spent a certain number of days in country. For R&R, the government pays travel costs for employees to return home for 22 days, including travel time. For RRB, the government pays to transport employees to regional locations for quick breaks, including 5 days of paid administrative leave and no more than a total of 7 days, including travel time. There are two options for taking these types of leave during a 1-year deployment: three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three RRBs. State estimates $21,000 per year for the cost of these breaks, while USAID estimates $5,785.


International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): ICASS is the principal means by which the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at its diplomatic and consular missions overseas. U.S. government agencies operating in Afghanistan pay ICASS charges for each of their civilian employees to benefit from services provided by the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, such as motor pool operations and vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services, and reception and telephone system services. ICASS fees range from $100,000 to $150,000 per person.


Residential Housing for Uplift Personnel: State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provides housing for the uplift personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Near East Asia and South and Central Asian Affairs Bureaus provided Overseas Building Operations (OBO) $41,616,000 to accommodate uplift personnel in Afghanistan. State budgets $45,000 for housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) for a single position in Afghanistan.


DOD Life Support in the Field: U.S. Force-Afghanistan provides security for uplift personnel located in the field in Afghanistan. DOD charges State $3,044 each month (or $101.47 per day) for each civilian deployed to a DOD-controlled provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan.


Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS): The U.S. agencies that establish a civilian presence at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person basis, to State to provide new, safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace vulnerable facilities currently occupied by the mission. The CSCS program charges the departments and agencies for each authorized or existing position in the U.S. diplomatic facilities and for each projected position above current authorized positions in new Embassy compounds. State estimates the CSCS costs for a Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is processed) at $22,657, Non-Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is not processed) at $8,803, and for
Non-Office Areas, such as housing, at $1,626.


Field Life Support Kits: The U.S. government issues kits to civilians deployed to work at field locations in Afghanistan, which include key life support supplies, such as satellite phones and protective equipment. State estimates the cost of these kits as $15,000.









Thursday, September 15, 2011

Snapshot: Cost of One Civilian Employee, One Year in Afghanistan? $425,926 - $570,998

Estimate of costs to deploy a civilian employee to Afghanistan for one year. I'll have the details in a separate post:

Source: SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift



Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Civilian Surge/Uplift in Afghanistan Costs Nearly $2 Billion So What Are You Complaining About? It's Not Exactly $2 BILLION!

SIGAR and the State Department OIG released last week their audit of the civilian surge, aka uplift in Afghanistan. The bad news is, the whole civilian shebang apparently costs the USG nearly $2 billion. The good news is, the whole civilian shebang costs the USG no more than $2 billion. Although don't hold your breath over that good news. The cost will certainly go up.

Excerpts below:

Since early 2009, U.S. agencies have nearly tripled the number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority at a cost of nearly $2 billion. The number of U.S. civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan increased from 320 in early 2009 to 1,040 personnel by June 2011. As the primary agency responsible for funding the civilian uplift and providing safe and functional working and living conditions for all agencies, the Department of State (State) incurred the majority of the $1.7 billion obligated to support the uplift, in addition to security costs.

Congress authorized State to transfer funds to other agencies to support operations in and assistance for Afghanistan, and SIGAR and State OIG found that State has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that State funds transferred to other agencies are used for their intended purposes. The Foreign Affairs Manual indicates that obligations should be supported by evidence of binding agreements in writing between U.S. agencies regarding the use of funds. In addition, government-wide internal control standards highlight the importance of agency monitoring to ensure funds are expended for their intended purposes. However, we found that State had neither established formal mechanisms with other agencies regarding their use of civilian uplift funds nor monitored how agencies spent funds and instead relied on informal communications such as emails and meetings. As a result, this increased the risk that funds would not be spent for their intended purpose. In one instance, we determined that the Department of Transportation (Transportation) did not know whether $3.5 million in State transfers were authorized for training or other purposes, and as a result Transportation cancelled plans to utilize the funding.

State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces significant challenges in planning to address these costs. First, the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan will likely lead to cost increases for State due to key military security functions that State will assume. Second, a legislative proposal to standardize pay and benefits for all civilians deployed to Afghanistan could also result in increased costs for civilian agencies. Third, the opening of two consulates in Afghanistan could increase costs due to security and housing requirements. Although officials in State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs have started planning to address the costs of supporting and sustaining the civilian presence in Afghanistan, they face a number of planning challenges, such as budget uncertainty and the absence of details on the expected size of the civilian presence in Afghanistan in coming years.

The report made it clear that "civilian uplift personnel are defined as U.S. government civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority after January 2009 to support the campaign for Afghanistan."

How much does it cost to send one government civilian to Afghanistan? Here's what SIGAR/OIG says:
Typically, the U.S. government spends between $425,926 and $570,998 to support the deployment of one U.S. government civilian to Afghanistan for a 1-year assignment. Actual agency costs vary depending on factors such as the salary level of the deployed employee, fees for life support services at the Embassy and in the field, and individual agencies overtime policies. These costs are broken down in table 1 and described in more detail in appendix II.
Back in June, I posted in this blog,  Afghanistan, the Way Forward -- You Know What's Coming -- Send In the Expeditionary Ones.  I don't think I'm so far off.  No talks on how many more civilians will be roped into going there but State officials have now confirmed to SIGAR/OIG that they expect their costs to increase as the military pulls out of Afghanistan.
State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces challenges in planning for these contingencies. The U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, targeted for 2014, will likely lead to cost increases similar to those experienced by State after the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq. A legislative proposal to standardize pay and benefits for civilian uplift personnel from all agencies could also result in increased costs for civilian agencies, which have not consistently provided the same level of benefits that State accords its employees. Finally, the opening of two new consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan could increase costs. Although SCA officials have initiated planning to address these matters, they face a number of planning challenges.
State’s Undersecretary for Management's letter to DOD on April 7, 2010 was also cited in the report.  In that letter to DOD, the U/S for Management said that State would have “a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that was unprecedented in the history of the Department of State.”

He was referring to Iraq, of course, but that could easily apply to Afghanistan after the military "drawdown" in whatever shape or form in 2014. Which means, the State Department has some 2-3 years to get it right in Iraq before it has to go at it all over again in Afghanistan. My confidence in that prospect is overwhelming!

About those two consulates in Herat and Mazar?
Embassy management officials noted that two consulates were established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in 2011, and OBO has developed temporary facilities to initially house the consulates. According to OBO, the temporary Herat consulate was to have 20 desks and 30 beds; however, the plans were modified to accommodate 100 desks and 70 beds due to the civilian uplift. Similarly, the temporary Mazar-e-Sharif consulate was to have 20 desks, but the plans were redesigned to accommodate 37 desks. According to SCA officials, State has not yet determined whether permanent consulates will be established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. However, OBO officials told us these temporary consulates may be replaced by permanent consulates. If established, these posts could represent substantial additional costs for State. For example, according to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, State would have to pay for supplies and services, including food, motor pools, vehicle repair, air traffic control at the airport, crash and rescue, medical evacuation, and hospital services, among many others. The State official said that these items would likely constitute a significant cost increase.
So, something like 97 more personnel in both consulates not counting the XXX number of personnel all over Iraq in 2011? In 2012? In 2013? In 2014? In the year forever more. And there is of course, the rest of the world that needs staffing, too.

Assignments in Afghanistan are for one-year tours which beg the question on where are you going to get XXX number of people year in and year out to serve there in perpetuity?  



Related item:

SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift







Thursday, August 25, 2011

US Embassy Kabul: All U.S. workers in Afghanistan deserve praise

The August 23 issue of WaPo includes the following letter from Ambassador Crocker:

Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s story about State Department representative Carter Malkasian [“Walking the walk to win Afghans’ trust,” front page, Aug. 14] properly praised the work of such civilians in the transformation of Afghanistan. Mr. Malkasian was an outstanding officer, and the department was proud to have recruited, hired and trained him — first for Iraq and then for Afghanistan.

However, it is important to note that there are hundreds of foreign service officers and other federal agency workers doing similar work in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Foreign service and civil service officers are highly regarded by the military and the Afghan people. More than 400 U.S. government civilians live and work with the military in more than 80 locations outside of Kabul, under conditions of danger and hardship. Our field personnel come from the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development and other federal agencies.
Even in Kabul, where 750 U.S. civilians live and work, there is nothing easy about service in Afghanistan. Our civilians volunteered to come here and are motivated by a deep sense of patriotism and service. Many go on to other difficult assignments, in the region or elsewhere, including back-to-back tours in Afghanistan.

We appreciate that The Post featured the good work of one civilian in Afghanistan but want to make it clear that he is by no means alone.

Ryan C. Crocker, Kabul




Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Civilian Surge in Afghanistan: Authorized and Filled Positions

We are unable to republish or embed the SIGAR report on the civilian surge in Afghanistan here but we are  still able to snag parts of it for posting. See below a table of the positions authorized and filled by location and agency. The civilian surge has been split into two phases, the first one ending in December 2009 and Phase II from January 2010 to December 2011.

According to the SIGAR report, a reported 418 personnel have deployed to Afghanistan, including 227 personnel in the field as of September 9, 2010. Approximately 1500 civilians are expected to be deployed in country by January 2012.

State, USAID, and USDA contribute the greatest number of civilians to the uplift, accounting for almost
91 percent of the total number of uplift positions identified. Personnel from these 3 agencies have filled 375 positions, or 90 percent, of the total 418 positions filled as of September 9, 2010.  No surprise there.

HHS and DOC have 100% filled positions since both agencies only have one authorized/filled position.  DHS also has a 100% filled for 11 authorized and filled positions. 


 
(Table extracted from SIGAR report
Click here for larger view)
We have previously  questioned the sustainability of staffing the FS given the troops drawdown in Iraq, the civilian surge in Afghanistan and the persistent staffing gaps in the Foreign Service. Below is what the report says about sustainability:
"One goal of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy is to sustain increased civilian staffing levels in Afghanistan beyond July 2011. Nevertheless, concern has been expressed that the civilian presence in the field may not be sustainable at planned levels. This is particularly true for USAID, which is drawing personnel from a decreasing pool of qualified applicants, many of whom are recruited externally. Furthermore, USAID is already facing difficulties recruiting career personnel for assignments in Afghanistan as many have already completed tours in the country. A July 2010 Embassy cable expressed similar concerns about State’s limited pool of Foreign Service Officers, noting that approximately 20 percent of the Foreign Service Officers posted overseas are already serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan. In addition, the cable noted concerns with USDA’s reliance on its domestic workforce to fill its positions.

The SIGAR report is available here.







SIGAR recommends US Ambassador in Kabul do something about dat civilian surge ...

Robert Gates and Karl Eikenberry, Bagram.Image via WikipediaAnother one of those light-touch reports from our friendly SIGAR office.


SIGAR has just released its 36-page audit on the civilian surge in Afghanistan -- U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as Implementation Continues (SIGAR-Audit-11-2 | October 26, 2010 | 36 pages).  We were was going to republish the document here for easy reading but the report is in a restrictive PDF format that made it, at least for now, unpublishable in ScribD. Below is an excerpt from the press statement: 

The SIGAR audit shows the "civilian surge" is being implemented in two phases and will take U.S. government civilian capacity from 320 civilians in January 2009 to approximately 1500 civilian employees by January 2012. Additionally, the audit finds that U.S. agencies have deployed nearly 67% of the civilian personnel for this "surge".

While auditors found that housing and operational needs have generally been met across the field locations, there are issues in civil-military integration and coordination. Civilian and military officials report that there are challenges in developing the integrated working relationship, stemming from differences in organizational cultures and perspectives.

Additionally, civilians have told SIGAR auditors there is a lack of clarity from their agencies on various aspects of their work in the field, including position roles and responsibilities; reporting and supervisory relationships within the field structure; and the role of the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs as it applies to work at the field locations.

Civilians involved in the "surge" report receiving limited information on their roles and responsibilities before arriving at their assigned locations. They also cited lack of information on national development programs that are being implemented in their areas of operation. SIGAR auditors report when civilians cannot provide quick responses to their military counterparts, they are viewed as being ineffective, which can strain efforts at civilian-military integration. This lack of information is also deemed to compromise effectiveness on program oversight, according to the report.
[...]
The SIGAR report provides two recommendations to ensure that the interagency review of the civilian uplift is comprehensive. In particular, SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing, and applying lessons learned and best practices, to include the design and implementation of a series of comprehensive field surveys.

Read the whole report here.

First, we have to say that putting restrictions on a USG government is not unheard of, but disabling the copy and paste function is not nice SIGAR people! Even the GAO doesn't do that to their reports, and they have been around longer than you guys. Not only that, SIGAR has also "encrypted" all contents of the document so search engines will not have access to this document's metadata.  We should be grateful that we can at least print and read this "public" document, huh?  

Second, read the report's recommendation closely. Is it just us or does it come across like whoever wrote this report seem quite detached from the reality of a 24/7 operation of a US mission in a warzone? Where are these folks coming from?  Must the "U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing, and applying lessons learned and best practices, to include the design and implementation of a series of comprehensive field surveys?" Holy mountain goat -- field surveys??? We fell off our chair when we read those recommendations.  We quite understand the need for lessons learned and best practices, field surveys and all that -- really -- but dude, do you have to give that job to that poor man in Kabul who already has to deal with looniness in Afghanistan and Wash DC, work even on his one off day of the week, tele/video conference during ungodly hours, and play guide to war tourists and VIPs, in addition to running the US mission?
 
Wouldn't it make more sense to have the data collected at the conclusion of the Afghanistan assignment back at the big house during an outbrief -- either at S/CRS, or at the Af/Pak "bureau" or whichever alphabet soup is responsible for the inbrief of all employees heading to Afghanistan?  The office responsible for the inbrief of all civilians hearing over there could also be responsible for the outbrief of civilians coming home, regardless of their home agency, and the responsible office then ought to get face time with FSI and other training arms to improve the deployment preparation of civilians.  
    
Also, just wondering -- where's the recommendation on how to address the challenges in "civil-military integration and coordination?"  How many of the nearly 67% deployed civilian did SIGAR talked to? For instance, there are 35 DSTs in the country, and SIGAR talked to 4 during their June/July field visits.


It's a good thing this report is free; we would have asked for our money back had we paid for it.

Um wait -- we did pay for this; that's our tax dollars at work! Aaaaahhhhrggggg!