An FSO's 'Valedictory Dispatch' -- Realities of the Foreign Service

The UK Foreign Office used to have a diplomatic tradition called, "valedictory dispatches," the final letters sent home before ambassadors wrap up their duties and move on.  That tradition now dead, of course, killed by electronic mail. We wondered once if it might be replaced by 140 characters in the foreseeable future soon.

Although the final dispatch is not a tradition practiced in the U.S. Foreign Service even by ambassadors, this past year we have seen a First Person account from a border post and a goodbye from an EFM and FSO in a public blog.  Another resigned FSO, Dave Seminara is now writing A Traveler in the Foreign Service series for Gadling.com.  But MG Edward's instructive post below reminds us more of a valedictory; a crisp final note from the trenches about real life in the Foreign Service.

Michael Gene (M. G.) Edwards served as a diplomat from 2004 until resigning from the U.S. Department of State in 2011. His overseas assignments included working as a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea; as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay, where he focused on political-military affairs and human rights; and as a political-economic officer at the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia focusing on democracy, governance, and human rights. He writes books and stories in the mystery, thriller and science fiction-fantasy genres as well as travel adventures. Visit his website here.  Below is an excerpt from his blog, I am no longer a Foreign Service Officer (used with the author's permission).

Most of what you read online about the Foreign Service is rosy and, in my opinion, defends it to a fault. Perpetual sunshine about the Foreign Service does not tell the full story and does a disservice to those who are interested in becoming Foreign Service officers and need a more realistic picture of what to expect.

If you are interested in a career as a Foreign Service officer, you should seriously consider these points before embarking on the lengthy and competitive application process. I do not want to dissuade you from pursuing your dream, but you should be aware of some realities of Foreign Service life that are not well publicized. These views are my own but have been reinforced by years of firsthand observations and conversations with peers. Many of my colleagues shared these sentiments.

1. Worldwide Availability. You are expected to be available for service worldwide, and your personal preferences may not be taken into account. You may be called to go somewhere you don’t want to go that could put your life at risk. The needs of the service supersede yours. Expect to serve in places you may not want to be.

2. Separation. Be prepared at some point in your career to be separated from your family and serve unaccompanied. If your spouse or partner also works for the Department, expect to do separate tours at least once in your career, possibly more. As of last year, over ten percent of all posts were unaccompanied. If keeping the family together is your raison d’être, you may be disappointed.

3. U.S. Interests. Expect to promote U.S. foreign policy. There is little room for altruism and idealism if it does not coincide with U.S. interests. These interests depend on the administration in office, and whatever you advocated may change at any time. You do not serve your country. You serve the Federal Government and hope that it is doing what’s best for your country.

4. Frequent Moves. Be prepared to move frequently. In some cases, this may mean a short tour of one year or less in a conflict zone, a short-term assignment, an evacuation, or a reassignment to another post. You will move from place to place every two-to-three years, or sooner, unless you can find a different assignment at the same post. While moving from country to country may seem exciting to some, relocation ranks as one of the biggest headaches for Foreign Service families.

5. Bureaucracy. Get used to working in a bureaucracy. You work for the Federal Government. It may be “cool” being a diplomat, but you are still a member of the bureaucracy. Expect decisions and paperwork to move slowly through the system, if at all. Often they will be “overcome by events,” a fancy term that means you did a lot of work for nothing. You will do an immense amount of paper pushing in the office until you’re senior enough to have support staff to do it for you.

6. Unfair Rules. “Fair” is a four-letter word. Do not expect justice or fairness. The rules are written to be equalizers and may make no sense. Expect “no” as an answer to even the most logical requests and massage the rules until you get to “yes.” You are subject to the Foreign Affairs Manual and federal regulations. In a rule-based organization, those who know the rules and how to work the system tend to do better. Those who expect fairness, justice, or hold firm in their resolve often go wanting. The Foreign Service has few options for those who want to pursue a complaint because the rules were written with the Department’s interests in mind.

7. Multiple Clearances. Do nothing until you have cleared with everyone who needs to approve whatever you’re doing or face potential consequences. Your superiors are ultimately responsible for your actions under mission authority and can take disciplinary action if you misstep. If you’re a free spirit or like to do things your own way, think twice. Measure as many times as it takes to get full clearance and then cut.

8. No Privacy. Do not expect to have any privacy. Your life is on public display, and you are expected to lead yourself in public responsibly. Do nothing privately you would not want to see end up in the pages of the Washington Post. Everyone wants to know what you’re doing. Everyone, inside and out.

9. Unhealthy Work Environment. Expect to work with a variety of personalities from many cultures. Given its high-pressure working environment, the Foreign Service has elevated levels of stress that can negatively influence behavior. While many employees are excellent colleagues, the Department has its fair share of bad bosses and nasty coworkers. The Department’s hierarchical clearance and promotion systems are designed to give leverage to those in positions of authority. They can make your life miserable if you’re not compliant or simply rub them the wrong way. Try to get along, even if it goes against every fiber in your being, because with perseverance you too will rise to a position of authority and eventually exert your own leverage.

Read in full here.

Related articles

• A Traveler in the Foreign Service: My rock star elevator in Skopje (gadling.com)
• A Traveler in the Foreign Service: The list, the call, the flag- assignments in the Foreign Service (gadling.com)
• A Traveler in the Foreign Service: Can a guy who didn't get high get a security clearance? (gadling.com)
• A Traveler in the Foreign Service: Escape from a rock-star elevator in Skopje (gadling.com)

Secretary Clinton's Sounding Board, Primarily a "Cathartic" Outlet for Employees?

ca·thar·tic [kuh-thahr-tik]

1. of or pertaining to catharsis.

2. Also, ca·thar·ti·cal. evacuating the bowels; purgative.

3. Psychiatry

a. psychotherapy that encourages or permits the discharge of pent-up, socially unacceptable affects.

b. discharge of pent-up emotions so as to result in the alleviation of symptoms or the permanent relief of the condition.

An FSO once called the Sounding Board, "one of the greatest things to come from Secretary Clinton's reign over the foreign affairs."    He explained that it is "a message board where people can post ideas on ways to improve the State Department and other people can viciously shoot them down.  It is high entertainment." 

I don't know about "high entertainment" but according to a December 2009 issue of State Magazine, the Sounding Board, at http://soundingboard.state.gov (behind the firewall, sorry!) provides Secretary Clinton a window into employee concerns at the State Department, but that it also serves another valuable purpose: "It promotes communication between employees, alerts management to problems and concerns and gives management the opportunity to provide feedback or dispel myths."

Here is how it works (extracted from State Magazine):

• First, employees submit ideas about how to better achieve our foreign policy goals (with an emphasis on the “how,” not necessarily the “what” or the “why” of foreign policy). The ideas should discuss the impact or cost savings, resource requirements and any obstacles or challenges. Colleagues can then comment on the ideas, adding perspective, highlighting concerns and filling in details that may be missing.

• Unlike an e-mail suggestion box in which only a few people see an idea, question or response, an online forum such as The Sounding Board opens the conversation to everyone who is interested. The interactive dialogue fosters a community of ideas where employees can share thoughts and best practices.

• Since its launch in February [2009], employees have logged more than 250,000 visits to the site and submitted more than 900 ideas, which have generated more than 3,200 follow-up comments. The response has been so overwhelming that The Sounding Board staff has been unable to keep up with submissions.

The article includes a couple of its touted results:

"The Bureau of Administration implemented a bike-share program to facilitate local trips to interagency meetings and will also build more showers for bicycle commuters. The Harry S Truman Building and the Foreign Service Institute cafeterias introduced “greenware” disposable food packaging and committed to reducing non-biodegradable waste."

Also, some nine months after it was launched, the Sounding Board reportedly was recognized as "a model for employee outreach and was one of three innovative programs studied by the National Economic Council and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy."  Apparently, other agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, were looking to the Sounding Board for good ideas as they launch their own initiatives.

Fast forward to December 2010.  Below is an excerpt from Everything Is Broken: My Two Years at the U.S. Department of State, written by Brendan O’Connor, a master’s student in Community Development and Action at Vanderbilt University. He worked in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations from July 2008 to July 2010:

"[B]efore resigning to attend graduate school in the summer of 2010, I had the chance to meet one-on-one with a high-level manager (and now ambassador) involved in oversight of the Sounding Board. He stated that the Sounding Board, which had been sold to us as a bottom-up tool for employee ideas in early 2009, was primarily a “cathartic” outlet for employees. Someone might want to explain that to the mass of State employees who cropped up to suggest specific, often in-depth ideas online — over 1,500 by the summer of last year. Indeed, when I left there was no meaningful process in place to review and take appropriate action to either reject or on some level adopt these employee suggestions."

Read in full here.

So hundreds of ideas later -- a senior official of Secretary Clinton's staff called the Sounding Board a "cathartic" outlet?"  Cathartic as in "purgative," as in "strongly laxative."

Sounds dirty.

We have a few nosy questions concerning this new model of employee engagement:

How many ideas have been submitted to the Sounding Board since its launched in Feb 2009?

How many submitted ideas are currently under official consideration?

How many ideas have been implemented?

How much cost-savings have been realized through the implemented ideas?

Is the amount of the cost-savings more than or equal to the cost of manhours to run and manage the Sounding Board?

What process is used by the Sounding Board Team to screen the submitted ideas for review and action?

Since the Board provides Secretary Clinton "a window into employee concerns" how many ideas have been brought to her attention?

If you had luck getting your idea to stick using the Sounding Board, we'd like to hear from you - on the record or on background.



Related Post:
Oh, No! The Sounding Board is in WaPo's In The Loop

Why the FS Should Be More Like the Army -- Esprit de Corps, Taking Care of Troops ... Hey, That Includes EFMs, Right?

The November 2011 issue of the Foreign Service Journal includes a Speaking Out column by Jon P. Dorschner on Why the Foreign Service Should Be More Like the Army. Don't worry, it's not about pumping more testosterone on the Service that's already "deployed" as "boots on the ground" without uniforms in various "expeditionary" war zones. 

Excerpts below on some basic ideas and concepts that he wrote could benefit the Foreign Service plus, our comments, of course! Mr. Dorschner recently retired from the Foreign Service after a 27-year career that included two years on the faculty at West Point, a year with a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq, and a stint as political-military adviser in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, among many other assignments. His last posting was as an economic officer in Berlin.

Excerpts from Mr. Dorschner:

Esprit de Corps
[T]he social base of the Army is broad. Elites are largely absent, and personnel come from a wide variety of social backgrounds. In that sense, the Army is representative of the general American population. I have never heard esprit de corps mentioned in the Foreign Service context. Instead, the Foreign Service emphasizes individuality over collegiality, exclusivity over inclusiveness.

This is a hangover from its earlier history, when its membership was largely restricted to East Coast elites who were “male, pale and Yale.”
[...]
Yet class prejudices still linger and the Foreign Service often continues to connote elitism. What individual officers bring in the form of social class, elite education and family connections can still play a big role in placement and career advancement.

There are several fissures in the Foreign Service whether you want to acknowledge them or not. Just a sampling:

Foreign Service vs. the Civil Service. If you doubt that, read the rants here.

FS officers with their conal designations vs. the FS specialists and their specializations

Political cone officers vs. all other cone-officers

Consular Officers vs. "Just EFM" Consular Associates

Eligible Family Members vs. Foreign Service Nationals

Not surprisingly, esprit de corps is not found anywhere in the Promotion Precepts that will be in effect for the 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 rating cycles. These precepts are the core precepts which provide the guidelines by which Selection Boards determine the tenure and promotability of U.S. Foreign Service employees. 

More from Mr. Dorschner:

The Mission Comes First
The goal comes first and units are told to work cohesively to ensure successful completion of the mission. Individuals who showboat and subordinate the mission to their individual ambition do not do well and are singled out for correction. By contrast, the Foreign Service spends little or no time explaining to its members why they are doing what they are doing. Instead, duties are often performed mechanically. The mission becomes subordinate to the procedures. This is a common curse of bureaucratic organizations, and State Department bureaucracy is legendary.
[...]
Just as takes place in the Army, Foreign Service personnel should be told how their efforts fit into broader U.S. foreign policy and how their hard work and sacrifice benefit the nation. Otherwise, there is often no sense that a mission has been accomplished.

Officers are expected to follow instructions and not ask too many questions, huh? Some time back, a first tour officer designated as a visa line chief told a second tour officer which window she should sit when she conducts her interviews.  The second tour officer, having recently arrived from a visa mill post asked why? No particular reason. The visa line chief wanted to exercise the boss muscle. And having just spent two years at a visa mill post, where the Consul General occasionally conducts visa interviews with the junior officers, Ms.Second Tour Officer inquired how come their own Consul General never conducts visa interviews with them. Apparently, this did not please the boss.  She was eventually counseled for the things she was not doing right. Perhaps it was for asking too many questions, for refusing to change interview windows, for talking loud and scaring the cucarachas, for telling Halloween jokes when it wasn't Halloween and scaring the FSNs, who knows? She was lucky she did not get involuntarily curtailed for [fill in the blank], the guy next door was curtailed, for reportedly asking too many questions and telling a shooty-shooty joke. [Thanks A. for the story].

I'm sure others out there have more interesting stories about mission first, or not.  You can also read about bureaucracy (and wet paint) from Eduardo Galeano's Book of Embraces. A most delightful rendition of the function of a mission within a bureaucracy. [Thanks M. for sharing the book]

Also from Mr. Dorschner:

Transparency
Foreign Service members who serve repeatedly in hardship posts are not provided a career advantage. Those who demonstrate dedication, hard work and technical expertise are not necessarily rewarded with regular promotions or choice assignments. This vagueness leads to accusations that “it is not what you know but who you know,” and erodes morale.

Likewise, the Foreign Service seems to assume that everyone in the ranks wants to become an ambassador. Officers who do not aspire to enter the Senior Foreign Service are often regarded as slackers, rather than individuals with their own specific career goals and objectives who make a positive contribution.

“it is not what you know but who you know”

Well, if performance appraisals are meant to honestly show what folks know and how folks work, and are not just an exercise in artful, inflationary rhetoric, then why do folks need to tap what leaks from that infamous hush-hush "corridor reputation" pipe?  Pardon me? The EERs are needed for promotions but not for your next job? So for getting the next job, you need to tap the "who you know" network.  And if you've written somebody's 360 review or put in a good word on behalf of somebody bidding at your post, you certainly can request that somebody to be your 360 reviewer or also ask him/her to put in a good word if you are bidding at his/her post. Tell me again that this is not an elite version of you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.

And seriously, when folks write their EERs about how great they are, cribbing occasionally from FSN or EFMs successes at work, doesn't that make folks blush just a tad in the privacy of their own conscience?  The folks are thinking ....  um, what?  Not really? Sometimes? But no opportunity should get wasted on the road to promotion.


More from Mr. Dorschner:

A Rule Is a Rule
In contrast, the State Department issues rules and then almost immediately makes exceptions to them. There are limits on how long personnel can serve in Washington, D.C. Those who do not serve in hardship posts are supposed to face negative consequences. Those who do not fulfill their language requirements are supposed to pay the price.

Like the military, we must staff positions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan that are dangerous and require separation from family. Everyone is supposed to pull their fair share, but for some reason it just doesn’t happen. There always seem to be people who are able to manipulate the system. They stay in Washington longer than they are supposed to and avoid hardship tours, yet continue to be promoted.
[...]
A rule is a rule and must be enforced. Otherwise, the perception grows that the institution is not interested in fairness.

Aha! And some even get to be ambassadors, like I said, without ever getting Baghdad dust on their shoes. Somebody please start a list of ambassadors who got their ambassadorships without the fast-tracked lanes through Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While you're at it, somebody please start a list of all senior officers who got mandatory retirement waivers, too.  If I were your HR person, I would put those lists up online.  For clarity sake, for goodness sake! Since I'm not your HR person, go write to DGdirect@state.gov and ask your top HR person about these; what national security excuse is there not to make this information available to the public?

Also from Mr. Dorschner:

Restrain That Ego!
West Point cadets with large egos, who constantly tell their peers that they will become generals and who seek as much “face time” as possible with officers, are known as “tools.” Being a tool is not a good thing. This does not mean that the military does not reward strong personalities, of course. Ambition is the first requirement for anyone aspiring to make the higher grades, after all. But the system teaches such individuals to rein in some of that egoistic behavior.
[...]
West Point cadets learn that the most egotistical general is not always the most successful, and that an effective institution must make room for different leadership styles.  Or, to put it another way: A little humility is not a bad thing. Perhaps the Foreign Service could benefit from a similar teaching model.

It is perhaps telling that Mr. Dorschner's piece came soon after retirement. This reminds me of the Brits' valedictory address, a final cable only this one is in the Speaking Out column in our diplomats' trade publication.  Read it in full here.

But my most favorite part from Mr. Dorschner piece is saved for last. It's the One Army idea of taking care of your troops.

Take Care of Your Troops
Officers and NCOs so egotistical and wrapped up in their own advancement that they do not show concern for the well being of their subordinates receive poor evaluations and do not progress in their careers. From the outset, Army personnel are taught this essential component of leadership. By contrast, concern for subordinates is not part of the State Department evaluation process. Nor is there much emphasis on families. Instead, officers are taught to look after themselves and their careers first and foremost. This can lead, rightly or wrongly, to a perception by subordinates that “successful” Foreign Service officers are those willing to do anything to get ahead, including letting down colleagues and disappointing subordinates.

These allegations arise out of the fact that such self-centered behavior is seldom punished in the Foreign Service. Selfishness and excessive egotism
are not viewed as indicators of poor leadership and a lack of esprit de corps, but are often seen as the norm.

I'll let you chew on that. But this brings us to one of this blog's pet peeves -- on the subject of EFMs --who by the way, I am told, should really be extra grateful for finding work at our embassies/consulates overseas. 

Hey, did you hear about that EFM whose child had sudden dental issues -- broke the tooth, or something? Anyway, she asked her boss, a first tour officer assigned as visa chief for leave so she can bring the child to the dentist one morning. Leave request denied. Because the EFM/Consular Associate should have known better than schedule a dental appointment during visa hours when she was needed at the window; to take saliva samples or something.  Can blame the first tour officer for lack of compassion but the larger blame belongs to the consular manager for absence of leadership by example.  This is not how you take care of the troops, even if you're paying the EFM gazillion dollars to get a security clearance and for the opportunity to contribute to her Social Security. [Thanks L. for the story].

Most jobs for spouses and partners in the Foreign Service are located in consular sections. It must be said that some consular managers do know what it means to take care of their troops, not just their FSOs, but also their EFMS and FSNs. But others have no effing clue. Unfortunately, those who have no idea how to take care of the troops as well, are also given leadership and managerial gigs they try hard to fail. One section chief was huge, huge on outreach to help junior officers develop some important skills until the boss got an award of some sort for that. With that box checked and the next assignment in the bag, the next group of junior officers who arrived at post, poor sods, were all left on their own to  figure out how to do outreach. A great example of taking care of your troops as long as you get something out of it. And then the end. That kind of example, unfortunately rubs off on the more impressionable troops, sometimes. [Thanks E. for the chieftain story].

In some consular sections, EFMs get their performance reviews late or never, get awards or never. Because hey, they're "just EFMs" -- no matter how great they are, how hard they work, they can't get promoted, anyway. So why waste time writing up their EERs or bother with awards?

Not making this up, you guys.  The OIG has actually a catalog of how the State Department take care of its troops particularly its EFMs or eligible family members and partners:

At the US Embassy in the Dominican Republic:

In most instances, American and LE staff evaluation reports and work requirements statements are being completed within the appropriate time frame, but many of the 34 EFM evaluations were not. The EFMs believe that they are being overlooked, Supervisors claim that reminder notices are not sent to them. However, some supervisors were reminded but still did not prepare evaluations by the required due date. Some evaluations were still outstanding at the time of the inspection.

At the US Embassy in Germany:

In some instances, supervisors fail to provide EFMs with evaluation reports within the appropriate time frame or do not complete them at all. EFM evaluations are not tracked with the same regard as American officers and local staff, [REDACTED]

Department guidelines do not currently require supervisors to complete performance evaluations for EFMs. This confusion is even found in the mission’s human resources office, where one supervisor left his position without preparing evaluations for seven EFMs. OIG teams have also found this problem at other inspected posts. This lack of clarity may affect the 2,687 EFMs employed worldwide. It is a detriment to EFMs not to receive an evaluation and impacts their prospective employment.

Also in its Berlin report, the OIG explains why EFMs are cheap, affordable resources, they are practically a sale. Add to that the fact that they all live in a captive labor pool. 

Because they are hired under differing salary schedules and differing authorities, EFMs receive lower salaries than local staff performing comparable duties. They accrue 4 hours of annual leave and sick leave per pay period while their counterparts receive 6 weeks’ vacation and unlimited sick leave. The salaries of EFMs from foreign affairs agencies include Washington, DC, locality pay but not the cost-of-living adjustment their spouses receive. Spouses from non-foreign affairs agencies receive neither locality pay nor the cost-of-living allowance. London and Tokyo have been granted an exception to the rule that employed EFMs are ineligible for cost-of-living allowances.

At the US Embassy in India:

A major impediment to optimizing the contributions of professional associates is the lack of training requirements, and suggested or desired training sometimes comes at personal expense. Distance learning courses are not sufficient in all cases. While there is no cost for FSI courses, the Department does not pay per diem, and the employee must take training during home leave, rest and recuperation, or personal travel. The Department acknowledges that these options may not be feasible for many individuals. Professional associates who have not yet traveled to post to begin employment do not receive salary for time spent in training. Although it is understandable that the Department wants to allocate shrinking training funds to permanent employees, this policy comes at the expense of equipping professional associates to perform as effectively as possible. The Department may want to explore alternatives to the current policy.

At the US Embassy in Pakistan:

Neither of the consular EFMs in Islamabad has work requirements statements or has received a performance evaluation.

EFM personnel files included job announcements, position descriptions, and resumes, but did not include EFM work requirements or evaluations. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that work requirements and evaluations be prepared for all EFMs.

At the US Embassy in Afghanistan, several anomalies, including nepotism "reviews":

The OIG team found several other anomalies: an occasional lack of EFM personnel files, missing EFM work requirements statements, inappropriate procedures to document the superior qualification rate process, and, in one instance, a position description that had not been updated when the employee was assigned to another EFM position. Finally, the selection process could be improved.

Although the Embassy has been requesting the requisite nepotism reviews from the Bureau of Human Resources, the inspectors found that the information the Embassy provided to the Bureau of Human Resources has not been comprehensive or detailed enough for some positions, including those involving EFMs of senior-level officers. The Embassy does not have a standard formal process for developing the information that is needed to conduct the nepotism reviews. A standard checklist that applies to all nepotism reviews, especially those for spouses of senior-level officers and section heads, is a useful tool.

Oops, that's a long section on taking care of the troops.  But that's all good. If you sleep with your EFMs at night, this should make you wonder why the State Department and its hiring, rating, supervising officers do not treat them better? And oh, have you sat in some of those job interviews they conduct with EFMs? Goodness gracious, some of those folks have no idea they could be taken to the EEOC for asking illegal interview questions.  Might you also wonder what you can do to improve their bureaucratic treatment?  Please wonder.  And if you are the FSO, the next EFM denied leave, passed up for performance evaluation, or training (what training?), subjected to inappropriate job interview questions, etc., etc, could be your very own family member. Think about it.

HBR: Why You Should Question Your Culture - Three Simple Questions

Ron Ashkenas, a managing partner of Schaffer Consulting and a co-author of The GE Work-Out has an article in the HBR Blog Network on Why you should question your culture. Excerpts below:

I often hear executives reassure me that projects will get done because "we have an execution culture," or that customers will be well taken care of because "we have a culture where the customer comes first." At the same time, culture is also one of the great rationalizations for managerial shortcomings. Many times I've heard that a project was delayed because "we don't make quick decisions around here," which is the managerial equivalent of "the dog ate my homework."

But the problem with all of these statements — both positive and negative — is that they don't really mean anything. Worse yet, they can't be translated into any kind of action. At best these declarations are vague generalizations; and at worst they are misleading stereotypes.
[...]
Any management team can assess its culture by asking these kinds of simple questions across a range of organizational behaviors. For example: To what extent do we reward individual vs. team results? To what extent do we share information broadly or parcel it out narrowly? To what extent do we encourage or discourage risk?

Asking these kinds of questions can smoke out the differences in expectations that people have about the organization. Not everyone experiences culture the same way, so a structured way to discuss those differences can increase alignment and the ability to take collective action. In practical terms, culture is not an intangible cloud that hangs over a company, but an outcome of the way people behave on multiple dimensions. Better understanding of these behavioral patterns — and how each person experiences them — makes it possible to decide whether to continue them or not.

Read in full here.

The three simple questions sound like great questions to ask if you're inside the State Department in general, and the U.S. Foreign Service in particular. Great questions, not sure you'll find your answers.



 

Related articles

• Why You Should Question Your Culture (blogs.hbr.org)
• Ron Ashkenas: The Art of Asking Questions (huffingtonpost.com)
• Ron Ashkenas: Why Leaders Play Chicken (huffingtonpost.com)

Peter Van Buren's "We Meant Well" and the Disresponsibility in Iraq Reconstruction

I received a pre-publication copy of Peter Van Buren's book,“We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle For the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People” (Metropolitan Books, 2011). The author is a career member of the United States Foreign Service and served a tour at a PRT in Iraq from 2009-2010.  I spent the last few days reading the book, which is bitingly funny, snarky, sad, all of the above.  The author is an engaging storyteller of our unfortunate misadventures in Iraq.  When I asked the author what made him write this book, he said, "I wanted to tell people back home what I was seeing ... I wanted to bring home with me a record of what America was doing in Iraq. I wanted to remember everything."

In addition to being an engaging storyteller, the author was smart enough not to fill his book with too much government jargon and acronyms that you need a dictionary just to read it. People back home, if they'd bother to pick up the book will find it a fast read.  It is also a book that will be a helpful addition to our understanding of what is wrong in Iraq, provided that we care and want to know. For the plenty squeezed and suffering American taxpayers, this would be a hard book to read.

At some point in the book, he asks:

"How many PRT staff members does it take to screw in a lightbulb? One to hire a contractor who fails to complete the job and two to write the press release in the dark. We measured the impact of our projects by their effect on us, not by their effect on the Iraqis. Output was the word missing from the vocabulary of developing Iraq."

It's easy to see why the folks in Foggy Bottom will be none to pleased with the stories in this book.

Learning from one's mistakes is one of life's most important skills. And if we are really serious about learning the mistakes of nation building in Iraq, Peter Van Buren's book should be required reading not just for decision makers but for everyone heading to those PRT gigs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan and where ever else it is we are conducting reconstruction and stabilization efforts these days.

Required reading of this book is not in great danger of happening soon. Although if my readers at the Executive Office of the President is are interested, I will personally ask permission from the author and publisher to send them my digital copy of the book as a public service. Email me here, you guys!

About the lack of comfort in Iraq, Peter Van Buren writes, "We lacked a lot of things in Iraq: flush toilets, fresh vegetables, the comfort of family members nearby, and of course adult supervision, strategic guidance, and common sense."

Well, I'm glad somebody finally came around to admit that one.

Of Deaths and Absurdities

This is a book about his reconstruction experience at a PRT in Iraq, a country that we broke and have failed to put together again like Humpty Dumpty. In the sad chapter entitled Missing Him, he writes about death -

"In Iraq, I saw a girl crushed when a wall collapsed, her face looking like a Halloween pumpkin a few days too late. There was a drowned man in an irrigation ditch, gray and bloated, no eyes, no fucking eyes."

And about that third suicide in his FOB:

"A young Captain rose without notes. “I was his team leader but I never really knew him. Brian was new here. He didn’t have no nickname and he didn’t spend much time with us. He played Xbox a lot. We don’t know why he committed suicide. We miss him anyway because he was one of us. That’s all I have to say.”

I must confess I cried reading that chapter. I can't say why. I just did.

All sorts of absurdities abound in the book including the fact that FSOs undergo defensive driving skills when none of the FSOs ever drove on the streets of Iraq and they don't go anywhere without a driver and tons of security escorts; a weapons familiarization course when all FSOs in Iraq never carried guns. I thought you learn those things and you practice to get better at them; it's not like you get an embedded chip and you just go on operation mode.  So if the only time FSOs fire a weapon is during a week of training (coupled with crash and burn driving) at some farm in the U.S. can FSOs really be expected to fire a weapon, hit their targets and keep themselves alive when under fire at month 10 in Iraq? I hope to god they did more than a table top exercise of that scenario; and you'd be surprise at what they were not taught.

Pasting Feathers ... Hoping for a Duck

The book, of course, is also a sad catalog of our failed nation building, excuse me, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. The author did not excuse himself for his role in Iraq's reconstruction. In fact, I have a nagging suspicion that perhaps part of the reason this book got written was a desire for some sort of civic penance.

"Of those thousands of acts of waste and hundreds of mistaken judgments, some portion was made by me and the two reconstruction teams I led in Iraq, along with my goodwilled but overwhelmed and unprepared colleagues in the State Department, the military, and dozens of other US government agencies. We were the ones who famously helped paste together feathers year after year, hoping for a duck."

And paste feathers they did, the list is long, many pages long but a few quick examples below ...

• My Arabic Library , a Bush- era, US government–wide project to translate classic American books like Tom Sawyer, The House of the Seven Gables, Of Mice and Men in Arabic worth $88,000.  No one wanted the library until the PRT arm-twisted a principal into accepting the donation, who failing to sell the books on the black market, dumped them behind the school. $88K flushed down the drain.

• There was the $25,000 for Iraqi widows to raise pregnant lambs.  Which turns out to be one local sheik's job creation for his extended family. 

• There were microgrants of $5,000 in actual cash for Iraqis to “open a business,”no strings attached. Gawd! I wish they did that in Detroit.

• There was $700,000 spent in Babylon to build the rest rooms and a gate near the ruins, $300,000 to create the Baghdad Tourism Institute, $2 million for the Habbaniyah Tourist Village.

• For $200,000, we apparently funded a large medical gases factory in south of Baghdad. Except that the owner was later unable to transport the gas cylinders past Army checkpoints because terrorists used such cylinders as bomb casings!

The Green Grass Ambassador and the Whys of an Iraq Tour

Perhaps one of the more glaring contents of the book is the part where the American Ambassador to Iraq ordered green grass to grow in front of the Embassy building and  apparently the grass refused!  The Ambassador who did not want to admit defeat ordered sod to be imported into Kuwait and then trucked by armored convoy to Baghdad. Price tag? No one knows but the estimate for the green grass project reportedly varied between two and five million dollars. Holy crap! Didn't anyone had the guts to tell him that they were in a WTF war zone and that green grass does not come with the territory?  The Green Grass Ambassador is mercifully not named in the book but he is the one who apparently considered himself a sportsman and has now decamped from Iraq. Would make for a great question in Jeopardy-Iraq.

Peter Van Buren was not short on confession about the "perks" of serving in the war zone or his motivations for going there:

"The new rules boxed me into serving or seeing my career flatline. Less cynically, despite my reservations about the war, I still believed in the idea of service (love the warrior, hate the war) and wanted to test myself. I also needed the money, and so the nexus of duty, honor, terrorism, and my oldest daughter’s college tuition (hopefully there’ll be another war when my youngest is college age) led another FSO into semivoluntarily joining The Cause."

About that Waste of $12 Million a Day Every Day the Last 10 Years

If one has been following the reports through the years from the State OIG, SIGIR, GAO, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting about our Iraq Project (which was supposed to pay for itself but did not) perhaps this book won't really be much of a shocker. But unlike those reports written by officials who conducted their reviews for a variety lengths of time, this one is written by career diplomat who got a T-shirt that says, "Been There, Done That and Here to Tell About It In 285 Pages"

When the Commission on Wartime Contracting released their final report last month, I wondered how it is possible to waste $12 million a day in Iraq and Afghanistan, everyday for the last 10 years?  Peter Van Buren's book help explains what made that $12 million a day possible. And he gets a medal in my book just for that, because dammit, I get these lousy headaches trying to figure out how you waste $12 million a day everyday in the last ten years when there's so much that needs fixing at home.


Rank Downgrade to FSO-O?

Remember that big news flash when Matthew Hoh resigned from the State Department in 2009 over our strategery in Afghanistan? Well, some folks were quick to point out to me that Matthew Hoh was not a real Foreign Service Officer. Yep, some folks are quick to make that distinction sometimes. That is, he was not in the career service.  Which actually begs the tricky question of where the career professionals were on the subject and debate about Afghanistan. If there was dissent over our policy and strategy over there, we have not heard about it. But that's for another post.  

With Peter Van Buren who is a 20+ year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, folks cannot make the same claim. And for that same reason and the very fact that he published this highly critical book, he will quickly be downgraded to the rank of FSO-O (O for "other" or outgroup).  He has committed the cardinal sin in the bureaucracy. Remember that one that says - "thou shall not throw pies at your own agency?"

No one comes out of this book without pie splatters on his/her face. And that is an unforgivable offense that will put you in a dog house like forever.

Of course, the old hands in the Big House would shake their heads and whisper, "if only Van Buren thought this through."  FSOs who disagree with official policies can use the Dissent Channel to register such disagreements.  Of course, we need to point out that those dissent messages are considered not for public consumption and therefore not ever accessible to the American public. One blog pal called the Dissent Channel "a format that can be buried so deep, no one has to know about it."  So had the old hands got their way and had Van Buren went through that channel, I would not be writing about this book.


Fair and Balanced and the PRT Documentary

There will be those who will predictably complain that the book tells a one-sided story of PRT work, well, that's why he is marked down as the author, silly. This is his story. At least, he did not call his book a "documentary."

Below is a video floating around online about the legacy of PRT Iraq. It appears to be put out by some unidentified office in DOD (see military ranks in the credit list) but has walk on parts by PRT team leaders in Iraq, the former spokesman of U.S. Embassy Baghdad, and the current U.S. Ambassador there. This one, by the way, also tells a one sided story of just how great are the PRTs and had the gumption to label it a "PRT documentary."

Since this is in English with no Arabic subtitles, one can only presume that the target audience is not in Iraq.  I get a pretty bad feeling that the video is aimed at winning hearts and minds in the United States of A.  When I inquired from U.S. Embassy Baghdad what role it played in the production of this not fair/not balanced/too happy presentation of the PRTs in Iraq, my "contact" whose main job includes responding to press and public inquiries and had no problem "talking" to me in the past, told me to ask somebody else as he was leaving post.

Which did not surprise me. A tour is done, on to the next one. In We Meant Well, the author invented a new word, "disresponsible: 

"In our reconstruction efforts there was no question about our courage in the face of personal danger, but we lacked the courage to be responsible. It was almost as if a new word were needed, disresponsible, a step beyond irresponsible, meaning you should have been the one to take responsibility but shucked
it off."

That is probably one of the saddest words in a bureaucracy.



We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle For the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People (Metropolitan Books, 2011) available in bookstores near you on September 27.


Related post:
September 20, 2011 | Will the State Dept Declare FSO Peter Van Buren Persona Non Grata For His Book on the TragicComedy of PRT Iraq? 

US Mission Pakistan: Who should get points for botched handling of Raymond Davis case?

I'm sure somebody would send me a nice email after this blog post saying the embassy handled the Raymond Davis case quite well.  After all, wasn't Mr. Davis pardoned, released, and now presumably back in the United States?

Sure, sure... but see now, I'm wondering how much goodwill the United States earned in the aftermath of the Pakistani floods remains after you subtract the Raymond Davis incident? The RD case will certainly have repercussions for years to come in that part of the world where the United States is already viewed as an enemy by a large swath of the population. Just how badly this was handled, let me count the ways.     

On February 15, SFRC Chairman John Kerry in Lahore expressed sorrow for the loss of lives in the Raymond Davis incident. Below is an excerpt.

“I’m here, because in the middle of events that seem to be focusing people narrowly, we need to remember and think about the things that we care about and that we’re both fighting for the bigger, the bigger strategic interests: stability in the region, opportunity for jobs for people, the right for people not to have their lives disrupted or ended suddenly and violently by radical extremists. This is in all of our interest. And these are the bigger issues that we need to be focused on and working hard. And we cannot allow one thing or another that might divide us in a small way to take away from the things that unite us in a big way.”

“So let me say, I know that in recent days emotions have been very stressed by an extraordinarily unfortunate incident involving a diplomat assigned to the United States Embassy. We’re all aware of that. And I want to come here today to express our deepest regret for this tragic event and to express the sorrow of the American people for the loss of life that has taken place. Personally, I’ve been through these kinds of losses. And I know the pain that the families of lost loved ones feel. I understand that…It is important, I think, and I express this on a very personal level, to understand the degree to which we really do feel the sorrow of what has happened and we express our sympathies to those families.”

“I’ve come here to listen. I haven’t come here to order anybody to do anything; I haven’t come here to dictate. I’ve come here to listen carefully, to meet with your leaders and have an opportunity to find a path forward so that we can all live by the law and hopefully find a way to deal with some really urgent pressing issues for both of our countries.”

Full text of Mr. Kerry's statement is here. I thought that was a just the right tenor with enough heart and empathy.

Photo from US ConGen Lahore

Why it took three weeks for somebody to say this out loud, I don't know.

Two days before the Lahore incident, Ambassador Cameron Munter and his wife, Dr. Marilyn Wyatt had a conversation with university students broadcast by PTV.  The American-style "town hall" titled "We Really Believe in You" was part of a series of efforts by the US Ambassador and his wife who now works for USAID to "meet Pakistanis from different walks of life and discuss their concerns and aspirations."

{Note to PAS Islamabad: whoever thought of that title ... that is a fantastically bad, cringy event title. Can't you hear how kon-duh-sen-ding that sounds? And please stop making the first couple at the mission do duet in videos. That is so Sonny and Cher!}

Anyway,, now that I got that off my chest -- the day after the Lahore incident, the embassy issued this very brief statement (01/28/2011):

January 28, 2011
Islamabad - A staff member of the U.S. Consulate General in Lahore was involved in an incident yesterday that regrettably resulted in the loss of life. The U.S. Embassy is working with Pakistani authorities to determine the facts and work toward a resolution.

 

On January 29, 2011, the U.S. Embassy Calls for Release of American Diplomat. In the same statement it says, "we regret that this incident resulted in loss of life."

It was an official statement, but there was no face to go with the regrets. Somehow the people-to-people diplomacy failed right there.

Then we had the State Department spokesman saying from the podium that Raymond Davis is not the correct name.  Pakistani press had previously identified the person arrested as Raymond Davis and Mr. Crowley said, "The name that’s out there is wrong."  That's the agency spokesman, folks; can't get more official than that. 

Which confuses the heck out of everyone. And led some local Pakistani papers to accuse Mr.Davis of using a fake identity, which in turn added fire to the blaze already burning hot in the streets of Pakistan. 

Heck, I even believed PJ, until I didn't.

Later, an embassy spokesman reportedly walked back Mr. Crowley's comments. That was super bad, okay?

On February 11, the US Consul General in Lahore, Carmela Conroy said, "This incident was a tragedy, and we feel tremendous sorrow over the loss of life. We extend our deep sympathy to all the family members who have been affected."

So almost two weeks after the incident, we finally had a face to go with the sorrow.

Then, of course, on February 15, we had Senator Kerry.

Two days after that the US Embassy in Pakistan issued a statement by U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter largely borrowed from Senator Kerry:

Islamabad - Reacting to today's hearings in Lahore, U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter said the United States is disappointed that the Government of Pakistan did not certify that Raymond Davis has diplomatic immunity. He added that the U.S. has made its position on this case clear.

 "Senator Kerry's visit to Pakistan manifested our intention to work with the Government of Pakistan to resolve this issue." Ambassador Munter said. "As the Senator said during his visit, we want to work together as two countries that have a common interest in the same goal and find a path forward."

Echoing Senator Kerry, the Ambassador added, "I would also like to convey to the people of Pakistan our deepest sorrow for the loss of life that occurred in the tragic incident in Lahore.   We all feel the pain and the anguish of families who have lost loved ones."

So, exactly three weeks after the incident, we had that odd, mostly borrowed statement. Like no one at PAS Islamabad had the time to write something a bit more original under the ambassador's name? Anyway, an official statement nonetheless. But. Three. Weeks.     

Which left us wondering -- how is it that the chief of mission and personal representative of President Obama in Pakistan was not the main public face expressing regret over this tragic incident?

Would an earlier expression of sorrow have helped this case? Perhaps not. But it's impossible to know that now.  Still, if you have watched the events unfolding in Pakistan, you would also see that the perceived bitter taste on how this incident played out will not be forgotten anytime soon.

Al Jazeera had an excellent rundown on the Raymond Davis case in Spy game: The CIA, Pakistan and 'blood money' . It may be that this was self defense, it may be that those killed were small pawns in a spy game gone sour. We'll never know now. But three people were dead, and soon there were four. And there was one man in jail. I doubt very much that Mr. Davis would have gotten a fair trial in Pakistan, there were dozens ubber ready to testify against him. There were more who wanted to just put a rope around his head and call it quits.        

Still -- I think that by not responding quickly and addressing the obvious human loss in understandable emotional terms, we allowed the anti-American forces in Pakistan to hijack the Davis case.  It made what was already a murky case, a public theater in wide angle with apportioned losses all around.  It gave those who hate America in Pakistan one more excuse to point at us and and claim arrogance of extreme proportion.  It was not a difficult sell in a country that already viewed America in unfriendly terms.

And by  they way, whoever feed that item about Raymond Davis as an incorrect name to the State Department spokesman, should be made to write a thousand times on the white board "I will not feed false information to the person who stands at the podium."  Because we all know that a few more things like that and the official spokesman's credibility would be a freakin' gaping hole in the dark.

And if that's not enough --  local news surmised that the US Embassy knew as early as March 10 that Davis would be released, as this was the date of Ambassador Munter's statement that was sent to the media when Davis was released on March 16.  The embassy spokesman later clarified that this was 'inadvertently' included in the statement.

Tzao gao! Mistakes were made!

In any case, I have to wonder out loud --  whatever happened to the embassy's huge public affairs "team?"  Islamabad is totally brimming with about a dozen public affairs professionals.  The constituent posts of Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar each has its own PA team.  Altogether, I am told a total of 23 public affairs personnel for US Mission Pakistan.  But the response to the Davis affair feels like a ...like a lumbering, smelly Bigfoot; far from smart, and far from agile engagement. Rapid response this was not, in the response that really mattered.  In fact, this was painfully slow, awkward and evasive. And it looks so tightly controlled you could see -- hey your purple slip is showing!

I call them teams but teamwork, of course, is more often, aspirational than reality in a place where strong individualism and competition can be called institutional DNAs.  Constituent posts do tend to lose their seats at the table, especially in high profile cases like this.  Was that what happened here?  Zzzzend me an email if you know the answer.      

And if this were the military, somebody would have already distributed a lessons learned memo or an After Action Report on the handling of the Raymond Davis affair.  But since this is State ... one gotta ask... anybody out there thinking about lessons learned or an FSI course? What? Speak up, I can't hear you. 

Finally, the old cynic that I am have to point out that April is just around the corner.  Regardless of how this played out, somebody lucky (could be somebodies) will have the RD affair etched in his/her/their EER/s! Ya'betcha!

Related articles

• U.S. thanks Pakistan after contractor pardoned (reuters.com)
• CIA spy escapes murder case in Pakistan after US pays 'blood money' (guardian.co.uk)
• Official: U.S. government to pick up payment to Pakistani families (cnn.com)
• 'Blood Money' Deal Frees CIA Contractor From Pakistan (abcnews.go.com)

Love Letters to Congress and Who Gets Magic Dragoned Between FSI and First Post

I added a new tab in this blog for Love Letters to Congress and Other Notes. I will try to update the page as I am able with appropriate selections. But I hope somebody out there will volunteer to curate the online collection and give it the attention it deserves, a sort of an oral history, the blog edition for the Foreign Service.  

I must add that I have now gotten off this joy ride to nowhere -- for real -- so whatever Congress do to the locality pay will have no effect on my household income. But I still look at this as a fairness issue for those who remains in the Service. I just hope you all don't get get stuck in the OCP fight. If you are a member of the FS community, your main mission if you decide to accept it -- ta-da! --is to to help educate Congress and the American public about your work and your life abroad in the service of this country. Congress is not the enemy, ignorance is.                

The U.S. State Department as an organization has never been good at explaining its work to Congress and the American people. You don't believe me? Ask your neighbors what they know about Foreign Service Officers, and they'd probably ask which foreign country these officers serve. If you tell them, the United States of America, they'd probably ask if these officers are, you know ... real Americans, being foreign and all. And those who are able to identify them as American diplomats would inevitably bring up the words, "pinstriped, cookie pushers," "cocktails", "elite" and most recently, of course, "voluptuous blond" and "WikiLeaks." To others they are nothing more than visa stampers and passport shufflers. A good number of the American public who travel overseas have no reason to see them at US embassies or consulate unless they have lost their passports, marry or adopt a foreigner, lands in the foreign hospital or jail, survives a plane crash, is a victim of crime, is evacuated, or in a host of other emergency crises abroad.

It is a sad truth but the American public know diddly squat about the work diplomats do overseas.  You are in Iraq for a year, and what exactly it is you do there?  You drone on, and the public switches their teevee to American Idol.You will hear officials insisting that State is full of really smart, really talented people. But you just have to take their word for it because the officers themselves, smart as they are, are not allowed to have their own opinions or tell their stories. Even in their private capacity.

What? Like we're afraid FSOs would wikileaked themselves in their blogs? C'mon, now, as the kids say, that is so lame.  Diplomats back from overseas are allowed to do gigs called hometown diplomat or something, but who the heck has heard of those? 

21st century diplomacy, anyone? Why, of course, that seems popular these days.  In real life, this is what it means:

I saw this blog post from an FSO codenamed, Diplochick. She presents us with a new acronym -- "BNA" for "blogs not allowed" and writes:

"So I’m taking down this site – or at least changing the topic of the blog forever more. Maybe i’ll write about gardening or baking…

I love blogging about our crazy new adventure, but the word about town is that Big Brother does not like it at all. Now I could rise up and rebel, but I’m chicken."

You think Diplochick just got an earful at an A100 training session? Show of hands? Can't blame her for being chicken.

Just so sad.... you see all these wide-eyed newbies entering the service and then puff, their blogs get magic dragoned between FSI and their first posts. But being chicken, I'm sure is better than having trouble as your last name before you even get to your first post. 

Still, that's one less "live" connection between the institution and the public. She's not the first, and she won't be the last. 

Telling the story of the Foreign Service is not an easy thing. You walk that fine line of either coming across as too whiny or as too bland if you've got nothing else to blog but brown grass in your backyard due to drought. A good thing that the FS has some talented writers who are able to straddle the fine line.  May your ranks multiply.
 
Check out my Love Letters to Congress and Other Notes here.

  

Houston, we have a problem ... at USAID

Whether you like it or not, USAID is a poor shadow of its old self.  Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN) which provided a background paper to the Obama-Biden Transition Project had stark things to say about USAID staffing:

The number of employees at USAID has dropped from 4,300 in 1975, to 3,600 in 1985, to 3,000 in 1995. As of September 2007, USAID was staffed with 2,417 direct hire staff (1,324 foreign service officers and 1,093 civil servants) and 908 staff with limited appointments (628 personal services contractors and 280 Pasas, Rasas, and others). In addition, the agency employed 4,557 Foreign Service nationals at missions overseas. While staffing levels have declined, program responsibility has increased from approximately $8 billion in 1995 to approximately $13 billion in 2007 (in 2005 dollars). USAID has set a target of a contracting officer managing a range of $10-14 million per year, but the current level is at an average of $57 million.

There are inadequate numbers of experienced career officers; as a result, management oversight of programs is at risk. Fifty percent of Foreign Service officers were hired in the last 7 years. One hundred percent of Senior Foreign Service officers will be eligible to retire in 2009. Of 12 Career Ministers, six will reach the mandatory retirement age of 65 in 2010. Mid-career Foreign Service officers in their mid-40s have less than 12 years of service. Until 2007, 70-80 members of the Foreign Service would leave the service annually, 85% for retirement; that rate has fallen to 45-55%. Of 122 new hires in 2007, only 10% were experienced mid-career hires. While the Foreign Service union recognizes the need for mid-career hires, its membership has responded negatively to hiring at the level of FS 03 and 02.

Despite DLI, a new administrator and an ongoing QDDR, the organizational future does not look bright to me. Unless Congress wades into this issue forcefully, USAID is stuck in a big guacamole swamp.

In a related note, the USAID AFSA VP has just released a survey on the State Department's ICASS operation with some troubling results on the State Department and USAID relationship:

"In countries where the consolidation has taken place, the tension between Embassy and USAID staff has increased. USAID employees feel ignored and upset at the treatment they have received from their State counterparts. There is no longer a team concept in these countries and Ambassadors and DCMs do not seem supportive of their complaints. Although each country has a Joint Management Council under ICASS, their one vote is not enough to make changes to decisions which are hurting USAID. A large amount of USAID funds go to subsidize Embassy operations and USAID staff does not believe they are getting their money’s worth. USAID executive officers are spending an inordinate amount of time checking and objecting to the poor support, equipment and services provided by the Embassy. It is an unequal relationship and the situation is deteriorating."

The survey provides a quick background of the ICASS operation at the State Department:

On March 15, 2010, the USAID AFSA office asked overseas Mission Foreign Service Officers, US Personal Service Contractors, and Foreign Service Nationals to respond to a survey regarding the State Department's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) operation. The ICASS process, which is being phased in worldwide in countries where USAID and the U.S. Embassies exist, involves the consolidation of overseas agency administrative operations such as motor pool services, warehousing, administrative supplies, maintenance, leasing, and many other operations with the purpose of improving efficiency and reducing administrative costs. Input to this survey, which closed on April 2, 2010, was requested anonymously to better understand the real life impact on those most closely affected by significant administrative changes under ICASS.

Initially, the ICASS was sold to non-State Department agencies based on three key “pillars”: transparency, local control and voluntary participation.  In theory, ICASS leadership was to be assigned to the most competent and skilled agency. USAID, normally the second biggest operation after the Embassy in these countries, was encouraged to participate in this system. In practice, over time, a clear mandate from Washington, developed that forced most USAID Missions to accept the State Department as the agency in charge regardless of the fact that perhaps USAID was the best suited for such a role and was operating very efficiently and effectively. The concept of transparency, local control and voluntary participation evaporated. Control of administrative operations shifted to the Embassy in these countries.

There were 1,073 responders reporting from overseas USAID Missions of which 43% were Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), 13% were U.S. Personal Services Contractors (USPSC), and 44% were Foreign Service Nationals (FSN). About 72% of the posts are already consolidated with their Embassy or in the process. Only 27% reported that consolidation had been fully or somewhat participatory and transparent and only 6% reported that USAID interests were considered a priority in the move to consolidate.

The obvious conclusion we can make based on the results of this survey is that there IS a problem. Without question, development programs are being harmed by the forcible consolidation. There is also a clash of cultures between State and USAID. It is even possible that State employees are feeling the stress of taking on more and incompatible activities they would prefer that USAID continue administering. The ICASS implementation was not collaborative and there is a very good possibility that costs have increased and that productivity has decreased.

One has to ask what was the problem that ICASS was aiming to fix? USAID administrative services were not broken and yet they were targeted to be FIXED. ICASS principles were not followed and the end result has been widespread dissatisfaction and even anger. While there may be some administrative services which make sense to combine, this can be a highly individual country team decision and should never be forced on any one Mission.

The USAID AFSA survey summary suggests that the best solution is to stop the consolidation:

"The best solution is to stop the consolidation, do a scientific review, audit or investigation by a neutral party, and return back to USAID control those services whose "consolidation" is causing financial or operational harm. We have a new Administration at USAID which is looking at bringing us back to being the world's premier development agency. These will be empty words, unless we listen to the needs of our staff. Staying the course will only be detrimental to our mission."

Read the entire survey here.

This consolidation partly gobbles USAID (did you hear that buurrp?)  Nobody would probably put it politely that way.  But the concern and anxieties are real.  Not too long ago, the State Department, did chew and gobble the entire USIA. And we know what happened to that one.

State Dept IRM’s IT Consolidation Gets a Screaming "F"

Image via Wikipedia

A lot of stuff in the bureaucracy gets started that often ends up with bureaucrats working like hamsters on wheels; lots of energies expended with no forethought or real planning.  As the saying goes, it is about the journey, not the destination, a most apt description in the bureucracy.  It is about getting there but not so much about where or what "there" is.  Former Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy and global repositioning programs were just two of the grand wheels that generated much energy and  press ink.  But recently, the OIG released its report on IRM’s IT Consolidation efforts at the State Department.  

I almost fell off my chair when I read the report, except that I now have my seat belt on when I read reports on management reforms (oops, sorry, that's my jaded slip showing).  In the private sector, if you had no defined project requirements to measure project progress, how do you even get funding or keep your job?  How could a project like this even crawl forward when it has holes all over the place? If this were a boat, this would have sunk already before the somebodies left their 7th floor gigs! Oh, but it's not a boat, just sorta management reform flavor of the month, dudes. 

Here’s part of what the OIG said:          

On July 18, 2007, the former Secretary of State announced the decision to consolidate the Department of State’s desktop computer services and support under the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) within 2 years. This decision was one of a series of eight major management reforms made by the former Secretary intended to improve the Department’s information technology (IT) effectiveness. According to IRM, IT Consolidation will allow for an optimized and cost-effective IT infrastructure supporting agency missions and customer-centric services. Included in the stated goals of the IT Consolidation initiative are improving customer service, enhancing IT security, and reducing IT costs.

During recent reviews and inspections, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) became aware of frustrations from the executive offices and IT management of various bureaus regarding the implementation of the IT Consolidation Project. According to the IRM IT Consolidation Schedule, 25 bureaus and offices had consolidated their services as of October 1, 2009. Consolidation for the remaining participating bureaus and offices was intended to be completed by the fourth quarter of FY 2009; however, IRM has experienced delays attributable to bureaus’ resistance in consolidating their desktop services and to moving forward with the discussion process. IT Consolidation for the remaining nine bureaus is now expected to be completed by the second quarter of FY 2010.

The IT Consolidation Program Management Office (PMO) stated that its number one priority in pursuing IT Consolidation was customer service. However, OIG found a significant level of customer dissatisfaction among bureaus about the quality and timeliness of IT services after consolidation. OIG was unable to substantiate these claims because the Department did not maintain customer service baseline information prior to consolidation and bureaus did not have documentation to support their claims of better customer service prior to consolidation. Because of the inability to have a customer service baseline, OIG distributed customer service surveys to bureau executives, IT staff, and end users. Of more than 700 survey comments received by OIG on its survey from executive directors and users, more than 80 percent of respondents reported that they were more satisfied with the IT support provided by their respective bureau IT staff prior to consolidation.

OIG found that the Department did not have actual or comparative cost information to demonstrate whether consolidating services resulted in reduced costs for desktop support services and systems maintenance, which was one of the primary goals of the Project. The inconsistent manner in which bureaus accounted for IT services costs was one element hindering IRM’s ability to make a comparative cost analysis. The limited cost analysis performed by IRM prior to bureau consolidation and the lack of transparency between bureaus and the IT Consolidation PMO further contributed to cost data shortcomings.

As a result of these issues, the Department has not met some of its intended consolidation goals—improving customer service and reducing IT costs. For example, with the perception of poor customer service, end-users addressed service problems by using resources within their own bureaus rather than by requesting assistance from IRM. Therefore, IRM may have an inaccurate sense of bureau satisfaction with consolidation efforts, as well as an inaccurate picture of staffing requirements and IT costs, which ultimately affects the bureaus. Further, the IT Consolidation PMO cannot ensure that the consolidation effort is and remains aligned with Department goals, since there are no defined Project requirements to measure Project progress. The lack of a thorough understanding of costs by bureau officials and staff has diminished the staffs’ overall support and commitment to the IT Consolidation Project.

Holy molly guacamole!

It's not that I do not understand the need for reform.  I'm not that dumb, okay?  I do get it, I really do -- belt-tightening and all that "doing more with less" chip that has been embedded in my head since the 80's methinks. What I don't understand is how these things get done flying by the seat of the somebodies' pants.  But I see how this can happen.  Not too long ago, one new officer under pressure from his/her boss to deliver "a project" necessary for the boss' impression management strategery was once overheard saying, "I don't care if it's done right, I just want it done." It was sad; that new offficer was overseas on a first tour, barely six months and all; but a very quick learner on how things are badly done.  Multiply that by a dozen, a couple dozen, more -- there's the boss as a force multiplier, and did not even realized it!? An MHA in this corner, please! 

In any case, this IT consolidation seems like another flavor of the month management reform that has become too sour to enjoy. Perhaps it could have been avoided if somebody had the courage to say “hey, this idea is full of sh*t.” But that’s only like, well like committing career hara-kiri, and nobody does that too often in the bureaucracy. Because when you "die" in a bureaucracy, you don't necessarily get kicked out, you just get ignored in your cubicle until you, well -- dry out, crisp as autumn leaves and get swept out by the char force one night when nobody is looking.... 

"Never be the first to say that an idea is bad," is already memorialized in the bureaucrats' corridors of influence.

Only idjits do things like that, see?

And like Albert Einstein once said, "If A equals success, then the formula is  A = X + Y + Z. X is work. Y is play. Z is keep your mouth shut."    


Must admit that is charming!








Related Item:

Evaluation of the Information Technology Consolidation Project at the Department of State (AUD/IT-10-11) Feb 2010