via USASpending.gov
4 days ago
Showing posts with label Contractors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contractors. Show all posts
Friday, January 13, 2012
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Meet the 0.01 Percent: The War Profiteers, the Super-Elite Kind
Via the Brave New Foundation:
There’s the top 1% of wealthy Americans (bankers, oil tycoons, hedge
fund managers) and there’s the top 0.01% of wealthy Americans: the
military contractor CEOs.
If you’ve been following the War Costs campaign, you already know that these corporations are bad bosses, bad job creators and bad stewards of taxpayer dollars.
What you may not know is that the huge amount of money these companies’
CEOs make off of war and your tax dollars places them squarely at the
top of the gang of corrupt superrich choking our democracy. These CEOs
want you to believe the massive war budget is about security — it’s not.
The lobbying they’re doing to keep the war budget intact at the expense
of the social safety net is purely about their greed.
In many areas, including yearly CEO salary and in dollars spent
corrupting Congress, these companies are far greater offenders than even
the big banks like JP Morgan Chase or Bank of America.
Egregious Military Contractor CEO pay
The top 0.01% of earners make at least $9.14 million per year, a rarefied strata of income that includes defense company CEOs and Wall Street bank chieftains alike. But a deeper dive demonstrates how defense companies outpace the big banks’ knack for enriching themselves at the expense of everyone else.
Military Contractor CEO Pay in 2010
- Northrop Grumman CEO Wes Bush: $22.84 million.
- Lockheed Martin CEO Robert Stevens: $21.89 million.
- Boeing CEO James McNerney: $19.4 million.
Financial Sector CEO Pay in 2010
- JP Morgan Chase CEO James Dimon: $20.81 million.
- Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf: $18.97 million.
- Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan: $1.94 million.
Want to know how much they're spending for lobbyists? Read in full here.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
PRT Farah - Nine Count Indictment For Former Army Contracting Officials and DOD Contractor
Via DOJ:
WASHINGTON—A former member of the U.S. Army employed by a private security firm was arrested at Miami International Airport today on charges of bribery, fraud and theft of government funds, in connection with the award of a contract to provide services to a U.S. government provincial reconstruction team in Farah, Afghanistan.Read in full here.
[...]
Raul Borcuta was arrested in Miami today when he tried to enter the United States from Europe. Upon Borcuta’s arrest, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois unsealed a nine-count indictment charging Borcuta and his co-conspirators, Zachery Taylor and Jared Close, with mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, bribery, and theft of government funds.
According to the indictment, Borcuta, 32, defrauded the U.S. government in connection with a contract to provide two up-armored sport utility vehicles to be used by an official in the government of Farah Province, Afghanistan, who had received death threats from insurgent groups. The indictment alleges that Borcuta bribed U.S. Army contracting officials Taylor, 40, and Close, 40, with $10,000 each to award him the contract and to make full payment to Borcuta before the vehicles were delivered. Taylor and Close, formerly U.S. Army staff sergeants assigned to the provincial reconstruction team in Farah, allegedly authorized a payment of approximately $200,000 in U.S. government funds to Borcuta. According to the indictment, Borcuta received the payment and never delivered the vehicles required by the contract.
The defendants face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each mail fraud count, 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count, 30 years in prison for each conspiracy count, 15 years in prison for each bribery count and 10 years in prison for each theft of government funds count.
An indictment is merely a charge and defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Injured War Contractors Sue Over Health Care, Disability Payments
by T. Christian Miller, ProPublica, Sep. 27, 2011, 10:11 a.m.
Private contractors injured while working for the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan filed a class action lawsuit [1] in federal court on Monday, claiming that corporations and insurance companies had unfairly denied them medical treatment and disability payments.
The suit, filed in district court in Washington, D.C., claims that private contracting firms and their insurers routinely lied, cheated and threatened injured workers, while ignoring a federal law requiring compensation for such employees. Attorneys for the workers are seeking $2 billion in damages.
The suit is largely based on the Defense Base Act, an obscure law that creates a workers-compensation system for federal contract employees working overseas. Financed by taxpayers, the system was rarely used until the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most privatized conflicts in American history.
Hundreds of thousands of civilians working for federal contractors have been deployed to war zones to deliver mail, cook meals and act as security guards for U.S. soldiers and diplomats. As of June 2011, more than 53,000 civilians have filed claims for injuries in the war zones. Almost 2,500 contract employees have been killed, according to figures [2] kept by the Department of Labor, which oversees the system.
An investigation by ProPublica, the Los Angeles Times and ABC2019s 20/20 [3] into the Defense Base Act system found major flaws, including private contractors left without medical care and lax federal oversight. Some Afghan, Iraqi and other foreign workers for U.S. companies were provided with no care at all.
The lawsuit, believed to be the first of its kind, charges that major insurance corporations such as AIG and large federal contractors such as Houston-based KBR deliberately flouted the law, thereby defrauding taxpayers and boosting their profits. In interviews and at congressional hearings, AIG and KBR have denied such allegations and said they fully complied with the law. They blamed problems in the delivery of care and benefits on the chaos of the war zones.
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Project Unsustainable: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Need to be On Reality Teevee Now
Well, just about everything is reality teevee now, why not our reconstruction project centered on the Afghan National Security Forces? The United States and donor countries are paying for it and it's kind of like the hollywoody equivalent of army and police training. There are well meaning good guys, and bad meaning bad guys, insurmountable challenges, military toys, guys learning to shoot straight, contractor reps on near heart attacks, and gazillions of money floating around for this or that. There's gotta be drama in all that, don't ya think?
And the best part is, this reality show may have better longevity prospects as teevee show goes, because hey, we might actually be in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (when we're supposed to leave). If rumors are true that negotiations are underway for the United States to stay in Afghanistan until 2024, that would fit perfectly with the IMF's prediction that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.
Afghanistan is in fact, playing a double game to suit its interest -- badmouthing the United States when it suits it's need and negotiating behind the lime lights to get the United States to stay to protect its interest. If we're asked to stay beyond 2014, don't mistake it for true love; we have the juice, that's all (even if that juice was bought on credit); we're like the deep pocket sugar person that the dysfunctional individual with a sweet habit can't live with and can't live without - a very messy relationship.
 |
| DynCorp trainer with Afghan National Police recruits. (U.S.Air Force photo cited by CWC) |
Between FY 2006 and FY 2011, Congress appropriated nearly $39 billion to set up and maintain the ANSF; the fiscal year 2012 budget request would add almost $13 billion to that total. Nearly half of the FY 2012 request—over $5 billion—would go toward clothing, equipping, and paying the ANSF.22
Prospects for the Afghan government’s sustaining the ANSF are dubious. The entire country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for FY 2011 is about $16 billion at the official exchange rate, and the national government’s domestic revenues are about $2 billion.23 The Afghan Ministry of Finance budget proposal for 2011-2012 indicates that given the increased security costs from the increase in size of the ANSF, the Afghan government is expected to continue to depend on donor grants for up to 30% of its operating budget.24
The outlook for sustaining the Afghan army and national police is complicated by several factors:
▪▪The ANSF, currently numbering about 305,000 personnel, is growing toward a newly authorized strength of 352,000, which will increase sustainment costs.
▪▪The Commission has received a preliminary U.S. military estimate of ANSF sustainment costs for just the period 2014-2017 in the neighborhood of $30 billion.
▪▪The International Monetary Fund has concluded that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.25
▪▪Donor-community support depends upon unpredictable political decisions that may be heavily influenced by severe fiscal pressure on most developed countries’ budgets.
In a similar vein, the Acting Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission, “The Government of Afghanistan has never had the financial resources to sustain ANP [Afghan National Police] salaries at either the current or projected levels.”
Besides spending billions on contracts to train, clothe, and equip the ANSF, the United States has also committed $11.4 billion since 2005 to build bases, police stations, border outposts, and other facilities for the ANSF. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded two contracts in 2010 for ITT Corporation to provide $800 million in operation-and-maintenance services for 663 ANSF facilities over a five-year period.
The Afghan government has already indicated that it cannot pay such costs from its resources.29 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission at its January 24, 2011, construction hearing that “the entire $11.4 billion [in construction spending] is at risk,” and “both contracts are expected to exhaust their funding well before [the end of ] their five-year performance period.”30
Anyway, if we end up spending the next 12-13 years in Afghanistan training its armed forces, I only have one request. Please, please, please -- can we please have this on teevee 24/7, 365 days a year so we can watch this project continue to unfold in real time? And if SIGAR needs to make arrests, can we do that with cameras rolling, too? Because why not?
Pardon me? Why do we need to see this 24/7, 365 days until the 2024 season? Um, silly -- so we can see on teevee just how stoopid we've all been in allowing a sugar old baby with a bad habit to play us this well.
Michele Bachmann's Soviet Union must be laughing its head off right now.
Related posts:
On to 2024: Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan -- Not/Not a Laughing Matter | Aug 22, 2011
Cops Kabul Edition: Building Afghanistan's National Police at $1.26 Billion | Jul 29, 2011
US Mission Afghanistan: Ambassador Crocker returns, assures everyone "There will be no rush for the exits..." and that's okay since our soldiers for 2023 will start kindergarten this fall | Tuesday, July 26, 2011 |
$6 Billion Later, Afghan Cops Aren't Ready to Serve | Diplopundit | Mar 22, 2010
Weapons Accountability in Afghanistan | Diplopundit | Feb 16, 2009
WASTED in Iraq and Afghanistan: $12 million every day for the past 10 years, true story!
The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has released its 240-page final report, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, ” this morning.
The full report is here. You can also download the report by section/chapter here. We're trying to read fast but we have interruptions, more on the details later. Quick excerpts below:
At least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much more will turn into waste as attention to continuing operations wanes, as U.S. support for projects and programs in Iraq and Afghanistan declines, and as those efforts are revealed as unsustainable.
[...]
Contract waste, fraud, and abuse take many forms:
▪▪An ill-conceived project, no matter how well-managed, is wasteful if it does not fit the cultural, political, and economic norms of the society it is meant to serve, or if it cannot be supported and maintained.
▪▪Poor planning and oversight by the U.S. government, as well as poor performance on the part of contractors, have costly outcomes: time and money misspent are not available for other purposes, missions are not achieved, and lives are lost.
▪▪Criminal behavior and blatant corruption sap dollars from what could otherwise be successful project outcomes and, more disturbingly, contribute to a climate in which huge amounts of waste are accepted as the norm.
[...]
The number of Department of Defense (Defense), Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has varied, but exceeded 260,000 in 2010. The contractor-employee count has at times surpassed the number of U.S. military personnel in the two countries. Most contractor employees are third-country nationals and local nationals; U.S. nationals totaled more than 46,000, a minority of those employed.
[...]
The United States will not be able to conduct large or sustained contingency operations without heavy contractor support. Avoiding a repetition of the waste, fraud, and abuse seen in Iraq and Afghanistan requires either a great increase in agencies’ ability to perform core tasks and to manage contracts effectively, or a disciplined reconsideration of plans and commitments that would require intense use of contractors.
Failure by Congress and the Executive Branch to heed a decade’s lessons on contingency contracting from Iraq and Afghanistan will not avert new contingencies. It will only ensure that additional billions of dollars of waste will occur and that U.S. objectives and standing in the world will suffer. Worse still, lives will be lost because of waste and mismanagement.
The Commission says $31 to $60 billion but also note that given the often chaotic environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a conservative estimate of the money that has been lost through contingency contracting. The Commission estimates that at the mid-range, waste and fraud during contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan averaged about $12 million every day for the past 10 years.
That's right. An average of $12 million every day for the past 10 years.
Whiskey-Tango-Foxtrot -- how the heck do you spend $12 million a day? Read the report. It's a true story, real enough to make you weep!
Thursday, August 18, 2011
State Department Seeks Advisors for South Sudan Armed Forces Transformation
Image via WikipediaThe State Department has recently posted a solicitation for a contractor to "Enhance capacity of the South Sudan Ministry of Defense by providing a team of advisors, facilitating planning conferences, and procuring equipment." The place of performance is Juba, South Sudan. The period of performance for the resulting contract will be "a base period of 12 months plus three (3) twelve (12) month option periods."
Below are more details excerpted from the Statement of Work posted at fbo.gov:
Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Bureau of African AffairsNot only has the State Department got itself a new private army in Iraq, we now will also be training and mentoring the Ministry of Defense of the world's newest country.
South Sudan Armed Forces Transformation
Ministry Advisory and Training Team (MATT)
Statement of Work
During the last eight years, Sudan has been the highest-priority country in sub-Saharan Africa, and one of the highest U.S. priorities worldwide. The United States Government played a major role in brokering the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the twenty-year civil war between the government in Khartoum (Government of Sudan) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a southern Sudanese rebel movement. During his June 2005 visit to the United States, the SPLM Chairman John Garang appealed to administration and Congress for support to transform his guerrilla forces into a modern military. Among other initiatives, the support outlined in this request for proposal addresses this appeal.
In January 2011, as stipulated in the CPA, citizens of Southern Sudan voted in a referendum for independence from or unity with the North. The overwhelming majority chose independence; on 9 July 2011, the South became the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS). The Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan (USSES), with the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) at the U.S. Department of State, plans to continue assisting in the transformation of the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) from a largely guerrilla force to a military force operating under the RoSS’ Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The purpose of this Statement of Work (SoW) is to outline the requirements for advisors embedded in the South Sudan Minstry of Defense (MoD). The advisors will be managed by the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, and the U.S. Embassy in Juba. The purpose of the advisors is to provide support to the Minstry in the areas of policy planning, human resources, financial management, acquisition and procurement, military production, inspections, public affairs, and veterans affairs, or other functions as necessary, to enhance the Ministry’s ability to effectively manage the transformation of the South Sudan Armed Forces from a largely guerrilla force to a regular military operating under the MoD as the civilian authority within the RoSS. As part of this assistance, the U.S. Department of State will support the Management Advisory and Training Team (MATT) in Juba, South Sudan to provide training and mentorship to MoD management staff and leadership. The MATT will support the Ministry leadership, but will not be directly involved in the day to day decision making activities of the MoD. Advisors will assist MoD senior management and staff at all levels, in their role as mentors and trainers, to perform key functions at appropriate standards.
The USG will work with Ministry of Defense to identify counterparts for each of the advisors listed in this Statement of Work. Contractors will report to the Minister or their ministry counterparts, but might also work with other South Sudan civilian agencies as required.
The overarching purpose of this initiative is to support the MoD with advisors in nine areas; 1) Defense Policy, 2) Human Resources (2); 3) Military Production; 4) Civil-Military and Public Affairs; 5) Inspections; 6) Finance and Budget; 7) Acquisition, Procurement and Logistics, and 8) Veterans Affairs. [Note that support to Human Resources will include two positions; one to focus on personnel readiness and management, and the second to focus on force planning and resource allocation.] To that end, this program will focus on enhancing the overall effectiveness of the MoD staff and leadership by addressing fundamental weaknesses in existing MoD staff procedures and planning efforts, and strengthening the MoD staff and leadership to effectively manage the transitioning guerilla force into a regular military through supporting effective staff policies and procedures.
I'm sure we're all relieved to learn about this.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
AGNA PR: ArmorGroup North America Reaches Settlement and Oh, There Has Been No Finding or Admission of Liability
I have recently posted about the settlement reached by AGNA with the U.S. Government relating to allegations about its U.S. Embassy Kabul guard contract (read Armor Group North America (AGNA) and Affiliates Pay $7.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations on US Embassy Kabul $189 Million Guard Contract | Friday, July 8, 2011).
AGNA has now released a statement about the settlement, not only disputing the Government's assertion, but also says its former employee's allegations lacked merit and points to the terms of the Settlement Agreement -- that "is is entered by the parties to avoid costly and disruptive litigation – and that there has been no finding or admission of liability."
Via PRNewswire:
ArmorGroup North America Reaches Settlement with Dept. of Justice Resolving Former Employee's Allegations
PALM BEACH GARDENS, Fla., July 7, 2011 /PRNewswire/ -- Today's settlement with the Justice Department involves conduct by personnel of ArmorGroup North America ("AGNA") prior to acquisition of ArmorGroup by G4S plc – and marks an end to the Government's inquiries regarding AGNA's performance of the US Embassy Kabul ("USEK") contract.Nick Schwellenbach, POGO's Director of Investigations writes: "The settlement is a victory for accountability, but ultimately may be unsatisfying for critics of the government's less-than-robust oversight of contractors. Can we really expect other contractors to see this settlement as a wake-up call? The State Department fell asleep at the switch with AGNA and still has yet to prove that it's serious about contract oversight and enforcement of trafficking in persons regulations."
We sharply dispute all the Justice Department's assertions that there was a violation of the False Claims Act. When G4S acquired ArmorGroup, it was aware that AGNA had difficulty in successfully performing the USEK contract. Following the acquisition, WSI (a G4S subsidiary) took the necessary steps to improve AGNA's performance on the USEK contract and to rectify any outstanding issues. At all times, the Embassy was secure. The company conducted an extensive investigation of AGNA's pre-acquisition conduct – and worked closely with Justice Department lawyers, providing them thousands of pages of documents and the opportunity to interview ArmorGroup personnel. We know that the evidence does not support the Government's allegations of a False Claims Act violation.
We are adamantly opposed to any form of human trafficking, including use of prostitutes. The Government alleges that, in 2007, AGNA was four months late in implementing the specific anti-human trafficking policy required under federal regulations and claims that some unidentified AGNA personnel frequented prostitutes during this 4-month period. At all times AGNA prohibited any form of human trafficking, and did not tolerate violations. Importantly, the specific policy required by Federal regulations was implemented by AGNA prior to the ArmorGroup's acquisition by G4S. The sole individual confirmed to have frequented prostitutes was fired by AGNA in normal course when his conduct became known. Further, the Government's allegations regarding the hiring of third country national guards and AGNA's compliance to FOCI requirements are not supported by the facts – nothing in AGNA's conduct violated the False Claims Act.
This case involves allegations made by a former employee. The company's investigation and the investigation of the Government both confirmed that these allegations arose largely from a personal animosity of that former employee toward AGNA's supervisor of the work at the Embassy – another former employee who is named specifically in the Complaint, Mr. Nick Du Plessis. Based on the company's review conducted as part of this case, Mr. Du Plessis was, in fact, an effective leader who played a key role in keeping the Embassy secure, and has been disparaged unfairly by the allegations. The former employee's allegations are set forth in a Complaint filed with the Court in 2009 and also in the Settlement Agreement released by the Government today. The company's investigation confirmed that the former employee's allegations lacked merit.
The Government declined to intervene generally in the former employee's allegations. Disappointingly, the Government decided that it would intervene in the case with regard to three specific issues which are narrowly described in the Settlement Agreement. The settlement resolves with finality the three Government issues – and includes a release by the former employee of all of his allegations.
The terms of the Settlement Agreement make clear that it is entered by the parties to avoid costly and disruptive litigation – and that there has been no finding or admission of liability.
Not sure I'd call it a wake up call. Just that the "get out of court" card can be expensive.
Friday, July 8, 2011
Armor Group North America (AGNA) and Affiliates Pay $7.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations on US Embassy Kabul $189 Million Guard Contract
I have posted here previously about the lawsuit filed by James Gordon, the former ArmorGroup North America (AGNA) Director of Operations under a False Claims Act whistleblower retaliation case against his former employer relating to the U.S. Embassy Kabul guard contract (see Lawsuit Filed Against US Embassy Kabul Contractor AGNA (Friday, September 11, 2009).
Today this statement was released by the Justice Department's press shop:
WASHINGTON - Armor Group North America Inc. (AGNA) and its affiliates have paid the United States $7.5 million to resolve allegations that AGNA submitted false claims for payment on a State Department contract to provide armed guard services at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Justice Department announced today. The settlement resolves U.S. claims that in 2007 and 2008, AGNA guards violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) by visiting brothels in Kabul, and that AGNA’s management knew about the guards’ activities. The settlement also resolves allegations that AGNA misrepresented the prior work experience of 38 third country national guards it had hired to guard the Embassy, and that AGNA failed to comply with certain Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence mitigation requirements on the embassy contract, and on a separate contract to provide guard services at a Naval Support Facility in Bahrain.
The settlement resolves a whistleblower suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit was initially filed under seal by James Gordon against AGNA, ArmorGroup International plc, G4S plc and Wackenhut Services Inc. under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private individuals, called “relators”, to bring lawsuits on behalf of the United States and receive a portion of the proceeds of a settlement or judgment awarded against a defendant. Mr. Gordon will receive $1.35 million of the settlement proceeds. During 2007 and early 2008, Mr. Gordon was employed by AGNA, as its director of operations.
The case remained under seal to permit the United States to investigate the allegations and determine whether it would join the lawsuit. Under the False Claims Act, the United States may recover three times the amount of its losses, plus civil penalties. On April 29, 2011, the United States joined the suit.
“These contracts are put in place to provide essential support to personnel who are serving in our missions overseas,” said Tony West, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division. “The Department of Justice will actively pursue its legal remedies where contractors falsely claim taxpayer dollars for services that fall short of material requirements in their government contracts.”
“Americans deserve to know that their tax dollars are being spent wisely and consistent with our values,” said U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr. “Our office has targeted government contractors who fail to meet their obligations to the American people. With this settlement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia has now recovered more than $140 million in False Claims Act cases so far this year.”
“The Department of State appreciates the work done by the Department of Justice and the Office of the Inspector General in bringing this case to resolution. The Department of State takes any allegation of contractor misconduct seriously and works as part of the inter-agency community to ensure it is adjudicated properly,” said Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security.
The Deputy Inspector General for the Department of State, Harold Geisel, said, “We’re pleased with the successful resolution of this case, and I commend the dedication of our OIG investigators. Our efforts should reinforce to American taxpayers that oversight of their tax dollars is taken seriously.”
Assistant Attorney General West and U.S. Attorney Machen thanked the joint investigation team, which includes Special Agents with the Department of State Office of Inspector General, and representatives from the Department of State and the Department of the Navy, for their efforts in the investigation of this matter.
Senate documents indicate that on March 12, 2007, the State Department awarded a $189 million contract to provide security services at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, to ArmorGroup North America, Inc. (“AGNA”), a subsidiary of the British-owned ArmorGroup International. Under the contract, AGNA is required to provide “a highly-trained, professional security force” to “protect life and property, prevent unauthorized access, maintain order, and deter criminal activity in and around the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan.”
So -- $7.5 million to resolve allegations with Mr. Gordon receiving $1.35 million of the settlement proceeds. For a contract worth $189 million dollars, that's a pretty good deal.
In fall 2010, Danger Room notes that a task order issued by the State Department under the Worldwide Protective Services to protect the U.S. Embassy in Kabul went to EOD Technology, "a global firm which has in the past guarded the British and Canadian embassies in the Afghan capital:
"And that means ArmorGroup North America — last seen with its guards taking tequila shots out of each others’ butts and engaging in extracurricular sex trafficking — has lost a contract worth nearly $274 million over five years."
In March this year, Knoxvillebiz.com reported that the State Department has fired EOD Technology, based in East Tennessee less than six months after the company won the $274 million job and three months after federal agents raided its headquarters.
The State Department said then that ArmorGroup will be extended for at least the next four months while it assesses options for replacing EOD Technology. Which means the State Department is struck with ArmorGroup North America until this month. Or longer if there is a search for a new contractor.
Related posts:
Kabul Embassy Security Force contract now combined with Baghdad Embassy contract and WPPS II into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract (Thursday, October 28, 2010)
Lawsuit Filed Against US Emb Kabul Contractor AGNA (Friday, September 11, 2009)
POGO writes to Secretary Clinton about US Embassy Kabul Guards (Tuesday, September 1, 2009)
Security Contracts at US Embassy Kabul (Friday, June 12, 2009)
Related item:
New Information About the Guard Force Contract at the US Embassy in Kabul | Majority Staff Analysis | Prepared for Chairman Claire McCaskill
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
USAID/OIG: USAID Air Afghanistan "Safe and Reliable" but No Show Passengers Cost $14 Million/Year
Image via WikipediaUSAID OIG reviewed USAID/Afghanistan's Portion of the Embassy Air Program and reports that the $361 million air ride 2-year contract was providing "safe and reliable service" in support of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and other U.S. development assistance programs in Afghanistan. The report also says that the no-show passengers are costing the government roughly $14 million annually. It recommends a no-show charge of $50 - $100 per occurrence, which USAID/Afghanistan disagrees with. Excerpts below:
Because of Afghanistan’s poverty and decades of war and neglect, much of the country’s infrastructure, including roads and air transportation infrastructure, is in very poor condition. Therefore, USAID/Afghanistan, which needs safe and reliable air transportation to carry out foreign assistance, contracted with a private company for transportation and freight services.
On January 4, 2010, USAID/Afghanistan awarded Aircraft Charter Solutions Inc. a $361 million, 2-year contract to supply passenger, cargo, and combination air transportation. The contract runs through February 1, 2012, with an option to extend for the next 3 years. As of March 29, 2011, the mission had disbursed $54 million of the $59 million obligated under the contract.
The contractor is providing turnkey fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, personnel, equipment, tools, material, maintenance, spare parts, and supervision necessary to provide air transportation between various locations in Afghanistan. Aircraft provided by the contractor include seven 18-passenger Beechcraft 1900s, three 8-passenger Beechcraft Super King Air 200s, two Bell 412 helicopters, and four MI-8 helicopters.
[...]
The review found that USAID/Afghanistan’s portion of the Embassy Air program was providing safe and reliable air service in support of provincial reconstruction teams and other U.S. development assistance programs in Afghanistan. The review also found areas in which the Embassy Air program could be improved:
- No-show passengers increased costs to the government (page 4).
- The environmental requirements in the contract with Aircraft Charter Solutions Inc. are ambiguous (page 5).
- Unapproved international travel led to questioned costs (page 6).
- The contractor did not meet branding and marking requirements (page 7).
- The contractor did not provide required terminal-to-aircraft transportation (page 9).
- The contractor did not report required performance information to USAID (page 9).
To address these findings, the report offers some recommendations including the following:
- Implement a nominal charge for no-show passengers (page 4).
- Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, unsupported questioned costs of $525,467 representing international travel (including premium-class travel of $31,902) by contractor officials that was not approved by USAID as required (page 7).
[N]o-show passengers obligate the contractor to operate aircraft with empty seats and impede the efficiency of the USAID portion of the Embassy Air program. A total of 9,573 (20 percent) of the 48,960 passengers with reservations on Embassy Air between February 1, 2010, and January 31, 2011, did not appear for their flights or did not cancel their reservations 24 hours in advance as required, and were not penalized.
The seats reserved for no-show passengers could have been made available to other passengers. In some cases, smaller aircraft could be have been used if no-show passengers had canceled their reservations as required, and in a few cases, flights could have been canceled entirely. We estimate that the cost of making air service available to no-show passengers is roughly $14 million per year (this represents 20 percent of the annual contract cost).
Implementing a nominal fee, on the order of $50 to $100 per occurrence, to be paid by no-show passengers would significantly reduce their number. Of course, to be effective, the fee should not be reimbursed by the U.S. Government except in rare cases where the passenger’s failure to cancel a reservation or appear for a flight is beyond the passenger’s control. This practice would be consistent with current commercial and government practices that impose charges on travelers who negligently fail to cancel reservations.
According to the OIG report, USAID/Afghanistan did not agree with their recommendation for two reasons:
- The mission estimated that up to 50 percent of no-shows were due to security restrictions and were largely beyond the control of individual travelers.
- The mission believed that imposing nominal charges on no-show passengers would not be feasible, although the mission did not identify any specific feasibility issues.
The mission also disagreed with our estimate of funds that could be put to better use by reducing the number of no-show passengers. The mission noted that there may be no significant difference in cost between flying a plane that is fully loaded with passengers and one with a number of empty seats.
In response to the mission’s first point, the Office of Inspector General/Afghanistan undertook an analysis of the reasons for no-shows and determined that only 6 percent of no-shows were due to security restrictions, while 94 percent of no-shows were unrelated to security. In response to the second point, without further details, we do not see any insurmountable obstacles to charging no-show passengers some nominal amount to encourage them to honor their reservations or cancel them as required.
Active links added above. Read in full: Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Portion of the Embassy Air Program (Report Number F-306-11-004-S)
Related post:
Embassy Air Iraq: Tickets Available Soon...In the Meantime, Fire Up Your Brooms | Thursday, June 2, 2011
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Attack on American Convoy in Baghdad Kills USAID Contractor, Wounds Three
The State Department has now released the name of the the USAID contractor killed in the June 23 attack on a US convoy in Iraq. The three individuals wounded have not been identified. From the Spokesman:
Iraq: Terrorist Attack on American Convoy in Baghdad | June 23, 2011
The United States condemns a terrorist attack in Baghdad today that claimed the life of international development and finance expert Dr. Stephen Everhart and wounded three others. Dr. Everhart was an American citizen who was working in Iraq for an implementing partner of the United States Agency for International Development’s Mission in Iraq. He was killed while working on a project to introduce a new business curriculum to a Baghdad university in a program supported by the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education. His support of efforts to advance a modern and efficient financial sector has benefited the people and business enterprises of Iraq and his lifelong dedication to public service has improved the lives of countless people around the world.
We are saddened by this tragedy and extend our thoughts and prayers to Dr. Everhart’s family and loved ones, and to the three other injured victims and their families.
According to an Iraqi police official cited by AP, the American contractors were visiting a satellite office of Mustansiriyah University in eastern Baghdad when they were hit by a roadside bomb. .
This is the second time in several days that a civilian convoy was attacked in Iraq. On June 20, a French embassy convoy was hit by a roadside bomb in Baghdad, wounding at least seven people.
Two is not a trend, but this is worrisome; how much worse can this get post-military withdrawal?
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
KBR Subcontractor Gets USAID/Iraq Contract Despite Labor Trafficking Allegation
The Najlaa Episode Revisited
Documents Reveal Details of Alleged Labor Trafficking by KBR Subcontractor
By David Isenberg and Nick Schwellenbach | Jun 14, 2011
Originally published by the Project On Government Oversight
(used with permission)
“DOD contractors and their subcontractors in Iraq have victimized more than 250,000 men. That number does not include other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, which uses TCN-contracted labor in support of its operations.”
In December 2008, South Asian workers, two thousand miles or more from their homes, staged a protest on the outskirts of Baghdad. The reason: Up to 1,000 of them had been confined in a windowless warehouse and other dismal living quarters without money or work for as long as three months.
In a typical comment made by the laborers to news organizations at the time, Davidson Peters, a 42-year-old Sri Lankan man, told a McClatchy Newspapers reporter that "They promised us the moon and stars...While we are here, wives have left their husbands and children have been shut out of their schools” because money for their families back home had dried up.
The men came to Iraq lured by the promise of employment by Najlaa International Catering Services, a subcontractor performing work for Houston-based KBR, Inc. under the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III contract.
Now, a cache of internal corporate and government documents obtained by POGO offer insight into this episode of alleged war zone human trafficking by companies working for the U.S.—and suggest that hardly anyone has been held accountable for what may be violations of U.S. law.
The men came to Iraq lured by the promise of employment by Najlaa International Catering Services, a subcontractor performing work for Houston-based KBR, Inc. under the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III contract.
Now, a cache of internal corporate and government documents obtained by POGO offer insight into this episode of alleged war zone human trafficking by companies working for the U.S.—and suggest that hardly anyone has been held accountable for what may be violations of U.S. law.
The subcontractor, Najlaa, appears to have suffered no repercussions for its role in luring hundreds of South Asian workers to Iraq with promises of lucrative jobs only to turn around and warehouse at least 1,000 of them in dismal living conditions without work—and pay—for several months. In fact, Najlaa continues to win government contracts.
Despite strongly worded “zero tolerance” policies against human trafficking, the U.S. has directly awarded contracts to Najlaa after the December 2008 protests, including one contract that lasts through 2012.
The Najlaa Incident: An Accountability Case Study
The Najlaa Incident: An Accountability Case Study
The freshly unearthed documents show that for several months, KBR employees expressed exasperation at Najlaa’s apparent abuse of the laborers and said the subcontractor was embarrassing KBR in front of its main client in Iraq: the U.S. military. But despite its own employees’ strongly worded communications to Najlaa, to this day, KBR continues to award subcontracts to the company.
The documents also suggest that Najlaa rehired former KBR employees who were terminated for what appear to be trafficking-in-persons violations. It is not clear what, if any, repercussions these employees faced besides their termination.
Additionally, the documents raise questions about government officials’ response in the wake of the 2008 protests by Najlaa employees. Although, at the time, the press reported that the U.S. government was investigating alleged trafficking by Najlaa, it has not led to any prosecution or termination of the subcontract. A Sri Lankan company that supplied laborers to Najlaa told POGO it complained about Najlaa’s abusive practices to both KBR and the U.S. government, but said that U.S. law enforcement agencies never followed up.
[…]
Revisiting the December 2008 episode isn’t just a historical exercise. Besides its continuing work with KBR, Najlaa is still winning government contracts, such as a recent $3 million contract to provide food services for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad from February 2010 to February 2012.
[…]
Revisiting the December 2008 episode isn’t just a historical exercise. Besides its continuing work with KBR, Najlaa is still winning government contracts, such as a recent $3 million contract to provide food services for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad from February 2010 to February 2012.
According to a 2006 State Department report on human trafficking, a “DOD investigation, prompted by late 2005 media allegations of labor trafficking in Iraq, identified a number of abuses, some of them considered widespread, committed by DOD contractors or subcontractors of third country national (TCN) workers in Iraq.” The State Department said in response to the investigation that the “Department of Defense has responded swiftly with a number of measures to closely monitor the hiring and employment of foreign laborers.” The DOD’s response, the State Department assured, would “ensure the U.S. employs a ‘zero tolerance’ policy against human trafficking.” But clearly having policies on the books alone did not ensure anything -- besides the Najlaa episodes, there have been many instances of alleged trafficking and third country national worker abuse. Is it really “zero tolerance” when there are no repercussions?
Read the whole report here.
David Isenberg has been an observer and commentator on private military and security contracting since its modern birth in the 1980s. He is the author of the book Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq. His blog The PMSC Observer is the leading online resource for news and current events pertaining to subject of private military and security. Nick Schwellenbach is POGO's Director of Investigations.
Read the whole report here.
David Isenberg has been an observer and commentator on private military and security contracting since its modern birth in the 1980s. He is the author of the book Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq. His blog The PMSC Observer is the leading online resource for news and current events pertaining to subject of private military and security. Nick Schwellenbach is POGO's Director of Investigations.
US Embassy Tajikistan: $318,913 to Build Rec Center, $1.5M to Demolish, Redesign, Reconstruct Botched Rec Center
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) Semiannual Report to the Congress for the Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) recently went online. This most recent report covers the period ending March 31, 2011.
 |
| US Embassy Dushanbe, Tajikistan Photo from US Embassy/Facebook |
Limited-Scope Review of the Design and Construction of a Recreation Center at Embassy Dushanbe, Tajikistan (MERO-I-11-04)
In December 2006, Embassy Dushanbe and RPSO awarded a contract, valued at $318,913 for construction of a post-managed recreation center, to a local contractor, PIR-5 LTD (PIR-5). OBO approved the initial design and issued a building permit in October 2007. In July 2008, RPSO issued a notice to proceed, and construction began in the fall of 2008. In May 2009, PIR-5 ceased site activities and walked off the job when RPSO withheld payments. The contract was formally terminated on July 15, 2009. The swimming pool facilities must be demolished, redesigned, and reconstructed at an estimated cost of $1.5 million—five times the original cost.
OIG found a number of deficiencies in the design and construction of the recreation center, including RPSO’s and the embassy’s failure to assess the reasonableness of the proposed price. PIR-5 did not design and construct the Dushanbe recreation center according to required building codes and guidelines. Required designs were not submitted by PIR-5, nor were design issues resolved prior to starting construction. RPSO failed to limit U.S. Government risk because the contractor was not required to purchase payment bonds and insurance. CORs did not properly monitor the contractor’s performance or progress, failed to establish quality assurance measures, and did not ensure the contractor submitted required documents. Invoices were approved and paid although the work was unacceptable. COR turnover and a shortage in management staff led to a lack of continuity in contract management.
OIG recommended that an employee with construction engineering experience chair the managed project technical evaluation team and that the contracting officer obtain an OBO audit before awarding a contract varying more than 20 percent from the Independent Government Cost Estimate. OIG also recommended that OBO fully review and approve designs, management plans, and quality assurance plans before beginning construction; review construction progress and identify risks; and establish COR guidance.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Snapshot: Top 10 State Department Contractors FY2010
According to the Prime Award spending data from USAspending.gov, the State Department had 81,323 transactions in the amount of $10,949,985,424 in FY2010 (October 1, 2009-September 30, 2010). Below are the Top 10 Contractors at State.
 |
| Screen capture from usaspending.gov |
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
US Mission Iraq: Not DOD's Giganotosaurus Footprint, But a Super Embassaurus For Real
Image via WikipediaThe State Department Under Secretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy was before the Commission on Wartime Contracting on June 6. The fourth item he discussed in his testimony was the status of transition in Iraq from DOD to State, including "major challenges and progress." Excerpt below on the security and facilities, which are mind-boggling:
Security: All U.S. personnel and contractors in Iraq will be under Chief of Mission authority. However, security will be a shared responsibility, with the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) responsible for all State Department sites and DoD responsible for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) personnel. As such, DoD will be staffing and funding its security operations. At those locations where OSC-I is collocated with State, DS and DoD security will closely coordinate movement security, but DS will have sole responsibility for facilities security. 9
On September 29, 2010, the Department announced the award of a base contract for Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) to eight companies. Task orders under the WPS contract are being competed among base contract awardees and awarded on the basis of best value. Potential duration for these contracts is five years, including a base year plus four options years.
Awarding to multiple companies allows for increased competition for each task order, thereby controlling costs and providing for increased capacity to perform crucial security services in environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan if/as requirements expand. It also gives the USG timely options in the event a company fails to perform.
Several task orders for static and movement security have been awarded.
- For Embassy Baghdad, a Static Guard task order was awarded on September 29, 2010 to SOC for $ 974 million for a five year period. A movement security task order was award on February 10, 2011 to Triple Canopy for $1.5 billion for a five year period.
- For Consulate Basrah, a WPS task order for static and movement security was awarded March 1, 2011 to Global Strategies Group for $401 million for a five year period.
I would like to note that for Afghanistan, the task order for static guards at Embassy Kabul was awarded to EODT in September 2010. Unfortunately, we soon found that we needed to avail ourselves of the new contract terms for timely options in the event a company fails to perform. Due to issues that arose during transition, the EODT task order was terminated in March 2011, prior to the commencement of performance. The static guard incumbent, ArmorGroup North America, will continue providing services until a new task order is awarded, expected to be the first week of July 2011.
On April 29 the Department notified Aegis Defense Services, LLC that it was selected for award for the task order for protective security services for movement security at Embassy Kabul.
Facilities: To the maximum extent possible, we are repurposing existing DoD infrastructure and property for each of the Consulates General and Embassy Branch Office sites. The status of contracts by location is:
Consulate Basrah
*Phase III construction contract for the unclassified work was awarded March 14, 2011 (with notice to proceed issued March 22) to Perini for $107 million.
Basrah Aviation Hub
*Current design is at 35% and moving to 65%.
*Estimated completion is 200 days after ground breaking.
Consulate Erbil
*Phase III construction contract for the unclassified work for the Contingency Operating Site (COS) was awarded April 22, 2011 (with notice to proceed issued May 2) to PAE for $ 57.8 million.
Erbil Aviation Hub
*Reviewing 65% design.
*Estimated completion date is 240 days after ground breaking.
*Negotiations are ongoing with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) regarding temporary facilities at the old Airport Terminal, paving of roads and connection to City of Erbil power grid.
U.S. Embassy Heliport
*Current construction estimated completion date is July 2011.
*Required upgrades are programmed under the INL/A Aviation Support Services Contract at an estimated value of $6.7 million. Work is expected to begin in September of 2011.
Police Development Program Hub – Shield
*The Phase III construction contract for Shield was awarded to Pernix on April 12, 2011 for $92 million (with notice to proceed issued April 29) for design, long-lead procurement and mobilization. Full NTP pending resolution of land agreements.
Sather Aviation Hub
*We have reduced the foot print of the aviation hub and are in the process of re-working the scope of work. The award for the aviation operation/camp at Sather will follow discussions with the technically acceptable lowest cost bidder and is anticipated to be on or before June 8, 2011.
*Construction of the Kirby hangar that will house fixed-wing maintenance operations is complete.
*Expansion of the North Fingers aircraft ramp and moving the current Sprung hangar from the South Fingers to the North is 10% complete. Estimated completion by the end of July 2011.
*Final ramp extension, movement and erection of the Stryker office and logistics complex, and erection of required overhead cover. Estimated completion is February 2012.
Other contracts have also been awarded:
A medical contract was awarded to Medical Support Services – Iraq on May 15, 2011 for $132 million for five years.
We are leveraging DoD resources in theater where DoD has superior capabilities. An example is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or “LOGCAP,” which is a tested, proven support mechanism with strong, mandatory contract management requirements. Use of LOGCAP, on an interim basis, is giving the Department sufficient time to solicit for and award a life support contract of its own. Another example is use of the Defense Logistics Agency prime vendor contracts for food and fuel.
Additionally, for the LOGCAP contract, we are supplementing our oversight with subject matter experts from DoD and we are currently discussing our need for a deployed contingency staff with the Defense Contract Management Agency.
DS has funded a vetting surge capability which provides a temporary increase in polygraph operators, investigative assistants, and interpreters to the Regional Security Office. The capability will aid this office in more rapidly vetting the life support contractors required for the transition.
Active links added. Most of these contracts are good for five years, so presumably we are there to stay until 2016.
Holy mother of god and all her wacky nephews!
And that's not it. There's the four option years, dudes. If all options are exercised, that would take us to 2020.
It'll be your new normal diplomatic one-year deployments with no end.
And I'll have grand kids by then, dammit! May I go see my shrink now?!?
Monday, June 6, 2011
State Dept's Counternarcotics Programs: Over $1 Billion, Five Countries And ...
The GAO released its report on the Department of State’s Counternarcotics Performance Management System recently. Excerpts:
The Department of State (State) received over $1 billion in its fiscal year 2010 appropriation for international counternarcotics assistance programs. The vast majority of this funding—about 90 percent in fiscal year 2010—supports counternarcotics programs in five countries—Mexico, Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is primarily responsible for implementing U.S. assistance programs involving eradication of illicit crops, interdiction of drug trafficking, and drug demand reduction, which represented about 85 percent of State’s counternarcotics appropriation in fiscal year 2010.2 INL implements a large share of its funding through contractors, primarily for aviation support for eradication and interdiction efforts.
The chart below includes funding from Economic Support Fund and Development Assistance accounts, implemented by USAID for alternative development programs, but excludes centrally managed accounts and Overseas Contingency Operations funding.
 |
| Extracted from GAO report |
According to INL officials responsible for contract management, INL generally does not link the performance of individual contracts to its overall program performance assessments, in part because performance measures in contracts relate specifically to fulfillment of contract requirements rather than broad program goals. For example, performance measures in the aviation equipment and support contracts define targets for availability of aircraft and the number of flights to be conducted, not drug interdiction or eradication targets. In addition to aviation equipment and support, which constitute the bulk of contract obligations related to counternarcotics efforts, other INL counternarcotics contract activities include meal services and lodging for counternarcotics personnel, and commodities, such as fuel and vehicles. According to INL officials, State does not have a centralized inventory of counternarcotics contracts.
Overseas posts are generally responsible for setting contract requirements and conducting contract oversight of counternarcotics activities.
Help me out here -- isn't this a tad confusing?
If the performance of the individual contracts are not linked to the overall program, and if each post is responsible for contract requirements and oversight, how are all these activities tie together into a coherent and effective counternarcotics program as a whole?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)