Snapshot: Top Reconstruction Contractors in Iraq as of 9/30/2011

SIGIR: Top Reconstruction Contractors in Iraq as of 9/30/2011
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• David Isenberg: State to SIGIR: Take Your Oversight Questions and Shove Them (huffingtonpost.com)
• Report: Prosecutions Up Against Americans for Stealing Iraq Reconstruction Aid (foxnews.com)
• Reports: Prosecutions going up for war zone crime (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
• Iraq Projects to Need 'Robust' Oversight (online.wsj.com)

PRT Laghman Inspects Projects from Air Due to "Unforgiving Terrain" and "Known Insurgent Activity"

According to its FB page, PRT Laghman which was founded in 2006 "executes counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and International Security Assistance Forces in Laghman Province, Afghanistan in order to assist the Laghman Provincial and District governments in securing the pop."

The PRT brings a wide variety of capabilities and skills to the fight; ranging from engineers, civil affairs experts, vehicle maintainers, medical personnel, administrative support and security forces. The team is aligned to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the provincial level.

Laghman Province, made up of six districts, is approximately the size of Rhode Island. The terrain is mostly mountainous, with three rivers forming a "Y" providing the main geographical features of the area.

Methar Lam, the capital city, sits at the confluence of the rivers - the middle of the "Y", and this is where the PRT's Forward Operating Base (FOB) is located.

The PRT's media outreach is handled by the RC-East Public Affairs team. The team assists with "the free and open reporting by the media through engagement with international, regional and local media in a planned, timely and accurate manner. Media opportunities, embeds, and interviews will be conducted wherever appropriate within the rules of operational security." [See RC-EAST PAO | Email: BagramMediaCenter@afghan.swa.army.mil | DSN: 318-431-4356]

The RC-East PA team recently posted in its blog about PRT Laghman's participation in air recon.  Some photos below:

So -- 10 years of war, and five years since the inception of this specific PRT and our PRT folks have to conduct their inspection of schools and roads (both presumably USG funded) by air because of the "unforgiving terrain" and "known insurgent activity in the area."

I'm really not sure if the inspection is to see how the projects are having an impact on Afghan residents from the air or is it simply to check which projects have not yet been blown up?

There are good, rational reasons why aerial surveys bother greatly the Kabul Hipster of Hamsters on the Titanic. Read more here.

State Dept Angst Over Peter Van Buren's Book - It Never Got to Give an Affirmative Clearance

I just posted an update on Peter Van Buren's book saga in Could Not Stick to "No Comment," the State Dept Finally Has Nothing and Something to Say on Peter Van Buren's Case

Also, on September 30, the Public Intelligence Blog had this to say about Peter Van Buren's book:

"This is a great book, an important book, and I salute the Department of State people with integrity that approved it for publication, while scorning the seventh floor craven autocrats that have bullied the author for telling the truth."

Well, hold off on that salute, will ya?

Under 3 FAM 4172.1-3(C) the Review Office for State Department employees in the United States is, you guess it - the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA).

Now PA reportedly is in great angst over this book because the folks there perceive that the FSO-author did not act "in good faith in getting clearance."  A State insider who is not authorized to speak about this matter said that Mr. Van Buren submitted the book, and when 30 days had elapsed without a response, the author took that as State Department clearance per regulations in the Foreign Affairs Manual. 

And PA folks are now grousing that they never got to give an affirmative clearance. Oh, dear!

Hey, stop laughing over there!

Prior to the book's publication, I posted a scenario in my blog where somebody at the State Dept forgot that the manuscript of this book was in his/her inbox and did not take action during the "reasonable period of review" indicated in the FAM "not to exceed thirty days."

I don't know if forgetfulness was the culprit here, but if the 30-day comment period lapsed without a response from Public Affairs, how is that the author's fault or why would that be considered as not acting in "good faith"?

For the FAM brainiacs out there, here are a couple of relevant sections for good reading:

3 FAM 4172.1-5 Materials of Official Concern Prepared in an Employee’s Private Capacity: Duration of Review
(CT:PER-584; 11-03-2005)
(Uniform State/USAID)
(Applies to all Employees in the United States and Abroad)
All public speaking, writing, or teaching materials on matters of official concern prepared in an employee’s private capacity must be submitted for a reasonable period of review, not to exceed thirty days, to the office specified in 3 FAM 4172.1-3(C). In the case of time-sensitive materials of reasonably brief length, the period of review should be abbreviated in an effort to accommodate the interests of employees.

3 FAM 4172.1-7 Use or Publication of Materials Prepared in an Employee’s Private Capacity That Have Been Submitted for Review
(CT:PER-584; 11-03-2005)
(Uniform State/USAID)
(Applies to all Employees in the United States and Abroad)
An employee may use, issue, or publish materials on matters of official concern that have been submitted for review, and for which the presumption of private capacity has not been overcome, upon expiration of the designated period of comment and review regardless of the final content of such materials so long as they do not contain information that is classified or otherwise exempt from disclosure as described in 3 FAM 4172.1-6(A).

But here's the funny thing.  Apparently, the State Department is quite serious about respecting that 30-day timeline when the situation calls for it. In fact, when Condolezza Rice's book was being circulated for clearance around the Department a year or so ago -- the Executive Office at State reportedly sent that around with "very tight short fuze clearance taskers" so that the 30 day timeline could be respected.

Obviously, they could have done the same with Peter Van Buren's book, but did not. I don't know if that's simple incompetence or if it's because a mid-level official is presumed not to have a whole lot to say?

Whatever it is, that salute may be uncalled for. And that's too darn bad.

For Contribution to the Rehabilitation of the Massacre of Poultry

You almost feel sorry for the chickens on this one. Must point out that the most important person in the processing plant managed to cut himself during the plant opening as shown in the video below getting bandaged later on.

It is advisable to watch the video and read the Chicken Shit chapter (p.140) of Peter Van Buren's book to get the full flavor of our rehabilitation of the massacre of poultry in Iraq or read this one.

I wonder what it was like over there before we rehabilitated their massacre process?

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• World's appetite grows for U.S. chickens (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
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Peter Van Buren: How the State Department Came After Me

Image via Wikipedia

The State Dept probably need FSI to create a training module later on how to deal with FSO-Os with funny bones, sharp pens, acerbic tongues; particularly those who also have the talent for pillar and punch and bright red boxing gloves in the wordy world.

Peter Van Buren may be the first, but he won't be the last. The Afghanistan-PRT Experience Project is a book just waiting to happen. And it's not because the State Department has adopted DHS' "If You See Something, Say Something™" campaign.  It will happen, it's just a matter of time, because folks can only tolerate beings hamsters on wheels for so long.  The PRT model started in Afghanistan and was exported to Iraq. Now that the Iraq-PRT Experience has turned into a book, the Afghanistan book is bound to happen. It's only a matter of time, and we've got time between now and 2014 and between 2014 and who knows when ...

As I was getting ready to post this, I also received a note from a Diplopundit reader and long-time State insider who pointed out that this is not the first time that Peter Van Buren has put himself in the crosshairs.  Remember the 2007 passport fiasco that got everybody all up in arms?  Apparently, back in late 2006, Mr. Van Buren sounded the alarm to his top boss in Consular Affairs that "she was going to need a lot of extra bodies to handle the coming surge in passport applications."  According to my source, Mr. Van Buren's "reward" was to be transferred from the Consular Bureau to Public Affairs. That is obviously fine and good if you're a PD officer, but not so good if you are a Consular Officer. So, perhaps the April Foolly-press guidance is not too off the mark after all. I am republishing the piece below in full. It seems like an important thing to share with others. I am sympathetic with Mr. Van Buren's plight but not sure the Big House will be as sympathetic; pies are hard to clean up.

How the State Department Came After Me
For telling the truth about what I saw in Iraq

by Peter Van Buren
[Reprinted with the author's permission.  The original is here. Also cross-posted in Foreign Policy here]

I never intended to create this much trouble. 

Two years ago I served 12 months in Iraq as a Foreign Service Officer, leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team. I had been with the State Department for some 21 years at that point, serving mostly in Asia, but after what I saw in the desert -- the waste, the lack of guidance, the failure to really do anything positive for the country we had invaded in 2003 -- I started writing a book. One year ago I followed the required procedures with State for preclearance (no classified documents, that sort of thing), received clearance, and found a publisher. Six months ago the publisher asked me to start a blog to support the book.

And then, toward the end of the summer, the wrath of Mesopotamia fell on me. The Huffington Post picked up one of my blog posts, which was seen by someone at State, who told someone else and before you know it I had morphed into public enemy number one -- as if I had started an al Qaeda franchise in the Foggy Bottom cafeteria. My old travel vouchers were studied forensically, and a minor incident from my time in Iraq was blown up into an international affair. One blog post from late August that referenced a Wikileaks document already online elsewhere got me called in for interrogation by Diplomatic Security and accused of disclosing classified information. I was told by Human Resources I might lose my job and my security clearance, and I was ordered to pre-clear every article, blog post, Facebook update, and Tweet from that point out. A Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs wrote, without informing me, directly to my publisher, accusing me in writing of new security violations that had apparently escaped the sharp eyes at Diplomatic Security, and demanded redactions. The publisher refused, citing both the silliness of the actual redactions (everything was already online; one requested redaction came from the movie Black Hawk Down, and another from George Tenet's memoirs) and the First Amendment.

It seemed kind of sad, kind of desperate, and maybe a little bit unfair. I always took my obligation to protect information seriously, and all my material went through a careful vetting process with the publisher as well as with State to make sure nothing had slipped through.

I wrote about all this on the blog TomDispatch, and before I knew it, the story went viral. I found myself returning calls to the New York Times, the ACLU, Reporters Without Borders, CBS, NPR, and about a million blogs and radio stations. I had hoped to promote the book I had written, which came out yesterday, but the story ended up being about me and the State Department instead.

I never intended this to be a fight against my employer of 23 years, and I never intended to become a poster child for the First Amendment. However, I'm not one to back down when bullied, and I am afraid that in their anger and angst, the Department of State has acted like a bully. In addition to false accusations of security violations, State has used its own internal clearance requirements as a blunt weapon.

The State Department, on paper, does not prohibit blogs, tweets or whatever is invented next. On paper, again, responsible use is called for -- a reasonable demand. But this rule must cut both ways -- responsible writing on my part, responsible control on State's part.

And responsible standards for clearance. The department's "pre-clearance" requirements are totally out of date. Originally designed for a 19th-century publishing model, its leisurely 30-day examination period is incompatible with the requirements of online work, blogs, Facebook, and tweets. But the department has refused to update its rules for the 21st century, preferring instead to use the 30 days to kill anything of a timely nature. What blog post is of value a month after it is written, never mind a tweet?

In addition, the pre-clearance rules are supposed to be specific in their goals: to prevent classified or privacy protected information from going out, stopping info on contracts and procurement, and blocking private writing that seeks to pass itself off as an official statement from the Department. In my case, however, any attempts to pre-clear blog posts ran into the Department of Silly Walks. My bland statements about the military in Iraq made using easily Googleable data were labeled "security risks." When even those were clipped out, everything I wrote was labeled as possibly being confused with an official statement, even though my writing is peppered with profanity, sarcasm, humor, and funny photos. Say what you want about my writing, but I can't imagine anyone is confusing it with official State Department public statements. As required, I always include a disclaimer, but the pre-clearance people simply tell me that is not enough, without explaining what might be enough other than just shutting up.

So instead of using pre-clearance as it is on paper, a tool to guard only against improper disclosure with which I have no disagreement, it is used as a form of prior restraint against speech that offends State. Me, in this instance.

We have been battered to death with public statements from the Secretary of State on down demanding the rights of bloggers and journalists in China, Burma and the Middle East be respected. While the State Department does not lock its naughty bloggers in basement prison cells, it does purposefully, willfully, and in an organized way seek to chill the responsible exercise of free speech by its employees. It does this selectively; blogs that promote an on-message theme are left alone (or even linked to by the Department) while blogs that say things that are troublesome or offensive to the Department are bullied out of existence. This is not consistent with the values the State Department seeks to promote abroad. It is not the best of us, and it undermines our message and our mission in every country where we work where people can still read this.

I have a job now at State that has nothing to do with Iraq, something I enjoy and something I am competent at. To me, there is no conflict here. I'd like to keep my job if I can, and in the meantime, I'll continue to write. I have no need to resign in protest, as I don't think I've done anything wrong absent throwing a few pies at some clowns and bringing to daylight a story that needed to be told, albeit at the cost of some embarrassment to the Department of State. That seems to me compatible with my oath of office, as well as my obligations as a citizen. I hope State comes to agree with me. After all, State asks the same thing of governments abroad, right?

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• State Department's search for a WikiLeaks scapegoat | Peter Van Buren (guardian.co.uk)
• State Department Employee Faces Firing for Posting WikiLeaks Link [Wikileaks] (gawker.com)
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PRT Farah - Nine Count Indictment For Former Army Contracting Officials and DOD Contractor

Via DOJ:

WASHINGTON—A former member of the U.S. Army employed by a private security firm was arrested at Miami International Airport today on charges of bribery, fraud and theft of government funds, in connection with the award of a contract to provide services to a U.S. government provincial reconstruction team in Farah, Afghanistan.
[...]
Raul Borcuta was arrested in Miami today when he tried to enter the United States from Europe. Upon Borcuta’s arrest, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois unsealed a nine-count indictment charging Borcuta and his co-conspirators, Zachery Taylor and Jared Close, with mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, bribery, and theft of government funds.

According to the indictment, Borcuta, 32, defrauded the U.S. government in connection with a contract to provide two up-armored sport utility vehicles to be used by an official in the government of Farah Province, Afghanistan, who had received death threats from insurgent groups. The indictment alleges that Borcuta bribed U.S. Army contracting officials Taylor, 40, and Close, 40, with $10,000 each to award him the contract and to make full payment to Borcuta before the vehicles were delivered. Taylor and Close, formerly U.S. Army staff sergeants assigned to the provincial reconstruction team in Farah, allegedly authorized a payment of approximately $200,000 in U.S. government funds to Borcuta. According to the indictment, Borcuta received the payment and never delivered the vehicles required by the contract.

The defendants face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each mail fraud count, 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count, 30 years in prison for each conspiracy count, 15 years in prison for each bribery count and 10 years in prison for each theft of government funds count.

An indictment is merely a charge and defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Read in full here.

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• Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah Assists Villagers After Fire (waronterrornews.typepad.com)

 

 

 

The State Dept Gets Van Burened While the Spokesman Talks About Our $3 Billion F-16s Fire Sale to Support a Peaceful Iraq

Image via WikipediaI was expecting a tsunami to hit Peter Van Buren's cubicle in Foggy Bottom today.

Apparently, the tsunami ordered is on hold perhaps because Mr. Van Buren is on leave?

Instead, the State Department got Van Burened today with Peter Van Buren's story splashed across multiple media outlets. The State Department spokesman made the best possible response with a "no comment" to media inquiries; or she would have been there till midnight answering questions on pages x, and xx, and xxx and on and on. Too bad, I would have like to know if the Green Grass ambassador also ordered frangipanis?

Tomgram: Peter Van Buren, WikiLeaked at the State Department

CBS: When freedom's not free at the State Department

HuffPo: The Only Employee at State Who May Be Fired Because of WikiLeaks

Salon: Interrogated by the State Department

The Guardian

SpyTalk: State Department Harassing Officer Who Revealed Iraq waste

Mother Jones: The Only State Dept. Employee Who May Be Fired Because of WikiLeaks

Wired: State Department Employee Faces Firing for Posting WikiLeaks Link


A couple of days ago, NPR did a radio interview with Mr. Van Buren and it also did an accompanying piece entitled, The Greedy Battle For Iraq's 'Hearts And Minds'. Quick excerpts below:

Van Buren says many of his State Department colleagues who have read the book agree with him in private but have publicly shunned him for speaking out about what he saw in Iraq.

"Many of them accused me of picking on them or ... blaming them for things that I knew were institutional," he says. "They didn't make these decisions because they were stupid. I didn't make these decisions because I was stupid. We all knew we were told we were to do these things, and they're a little angry at me for labeling them as complicit in this when they knew that they weren't."
[...]
"Everyone in Iraq was there on a series of one-year tours, myself included," he says. "Everyone was told that they needed to create accomplishments, that we needed to document our success, that we had to produce a steady stream of photos of accomplishments, and pictures of smiling Iraqis and metrics and charts. It was impossible, under these circumstances, to do anything long term ... We rarely thought past next week's situation update. The embassy would rarely engage with us on a project that wasn't flashy enough to involve photographs or bringing a journalist out to shoot a video that looked good. The willingness to do long-term work ... never existed in our world."

Check it out here.

The good news is the New York Times has so far ignored the book.  That is always a good thing, see because landing there can get you usually toasted according to an early warning system. The book also has not made an appearance in WaPo or in Al Kamen's In the Loop column, landing there can also get you toasted with garlic. We are hoping that the Colbert Report would come knocking on Mr. Van Buren's door. The tragicomedic account with a dash of abrasive seems appropriate in that format. But one can hope.

Since there was no tsunami, we had to look around and see what else is going on in Iraq. Apparently, the United States of America is selling Iraq a dozen and a half of those F-16s at a total cost of $3 Billion. Well, at least some folks will be happy, and working, and putting together those planes. And this should calm some worries about the future of the F-16s.

Here is the Spokesman talking about "the cornerstone of the kind of cooperation that we hope to have in the future to support the secure, peaceful, democratic development of Iraq." Stop laughing, you over there!

QUESTION: Yes, two quick ones. One – I think this came up yesterday – an advisor to the Iraqi prime minister said that Iraq has signed a contract to buy 18 F-16s. Any comment on that?

MS. NULAND: Yes. Iraq has now made its first transfer payment for the purchase of 18 F-16 fighter aircraft, initiating this foreign military sale. These aircraft are going to help provide air sovereignty for Iraq and to protect its territory and deter or counter regional threats.

They also, as a significant military sale between us, are a symbol of the commitment that we’ve made to the Iraqi Government to have a long-term strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq on equal, sovereign terms.

And we expect foreign military sales of this kind, including items like the F-16, to serve as the cornerstone of the kind of cooperation that we hope to have in the future to support the secure, peaceful, democratic development of Iraq.

QUESTION: A couple things. How much was the first transfer payment?

MS. NULAND: I don’t have a number on the first transfer, but the total value of the sale is approximately $3 billion.

QUESTION: And then are they – and this displays the full extent of my knowledge about F-16s – but are they the A/Bs or the C/Ds?

MS. NULAND: I’m going to take that one. Actually, you know what I’m going to do? I’m going to send you to the military on that one to DOD.

QUESTION: Oh, come on. Oh, come on.

MS. NULAND: I don’t have which kind of F-16s we’ve got here.

I suppose some of our soldiers will be left in Iraq teaching them to fly those planes, do airplane maintenance, and such other things. Will they buy tanks, too, and drones, etc.,etc?  I think we know how this will end, sort of --- no permanent bases, just visiting.

Forever?

What the State Department Spokesman Said to NPR/Fresh Air ...

In speculating about the fallout post publication of that book, I suggested that if somebody has already read the book, the Spokesman could say something like, let's see -- "We know this books is coming out. We do not agree with Mr. Van Buren's views but his views are his own. We have nothing further to say about this issue."

NPR reported that Fresh Air contacted a spokesman for the State Department, who declined to respond to Van Buren's book except to say that the author's views are his own, and not necessarily those of the State Department.

Will the State Dept Declare FSO Peter Van Buren Persona Non Grata For His Book on the TragicComedy of PRT Iraq?

In April, I wrote New FS Blog: We Meant Well, Plus a Book Coming Out This Fall  

In July, I wondered out loud, Peter Van Buren: Oh, dude -- WHO did you get "more than upset" at the State Department?

It's now September. Next Tuesday, the 27th, his book,“We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle For the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People” (Metropolitan Books, 2011) will hit the stores.

And a tsunami is forecast to hit Peter Van Buren at his cubicle in Foggy Bottom.

DiploPundit will try to cover the event when it happens. Although if State is smart, as it is full of smart folks, it probably should not order a tsunami on the same day that the book comes out. People might think the tsunami is intentional wrath from god.

I had the opportunity to read the book this weekend.  I'll post my review separately.  I can, however, tell you that the 267-page book carries the following notice:

The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the US government. The Department of State had the chance to review this book in manuscript form before publication, as required by 3 FAM 4170.

The Department of State does not approve, endorse, or  authorize this book. With the exception of historical figures (e.g., President Bush, General Odierno), I have changed all names. The events depicted in this book are true, however, although some details have been changed and the timing of some events has been altered or obscured. Except as noted, I was present at any event reported on and at any conversation repeated.

Information from the SIGIR Web site is in the public domain and may be used without further permission, provided such use is not reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by SIGIR. SIGIR did not approve, endorse, or authorize this book.

The curious phrase, "The Department of State had the chance to review this book in manuscript form before publication, as required by 3 FAM 4170."

Which could mean a couple of things. 1) Somebody at State had reviewed this book and found it free of classified materials. Which is well and good, no tsunami will be ordered. Somebody has read the book and the Spokesman can say something like, let's see -- "We know this books is coming out. We do not agree with Mr. Van Buren's views but his views are his own. We have nothing further to say about this issue." This would be bad for the folks who want Peter Van Buren's head on a platter.

Or 2) Somebody at State forgot that the manuscript of this book was in his/her inbox and did not take action during the "reasonable period of review" indicated in the FAM "not to exceed thirty days." In which case, there are taskers now on what the Spokesman should say about the contents of the 200-something page book. And no, you can't read my copy.

I'd like to believe it is the former, but I would not be surprise if it is the latter. That said, 3 FAM 4172.1-7 on the Use or Publication of Materials Prepared in an Employee's Private Capacity That Have Been Submitted for Review appears clear enough:

"An employee may use, issue, or publish materials on matters of official concern that have been submitted for review, and for which the presumption of private capacity has not been overcome, upon expiration of the designated period of comment and review regardless of the final content of such materials so long as they do not contain information that is classified or otherwise exempt from disclosure as described in 3 FAM 4172.1-6(A)."

Because clearly, it's not like they want to gag anyone, particularly on a contentious subject like Iraq that has been sucking up the U.S. Treasury, right?

Of course, what is clear to you and me, may not always be clear to the officially-paid interpreter of regulations. Remains to be seen what happens. After all, State's cousin, the DOD back in 2010 reportedly bought some 9,500 copies of Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer's 299-page memoir "Operation Dark Heart" after its publication was green lighted by the Army Reserve Command then proceeded to burn them. Burn all the books, seriously.  So then you know, nobody could ever read that book ever again. 

Pardon me? WikiLeaks has obtained a copy of the unredacted book?  Oh, dear.  Okay, sorry, I meant to say, they have bought and burned 9,499 copies of the Colonel's book.

Peter Van Buren book carries a special acknowledgement of "Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, who led an organization I once cared deeply for into a swamp and abandoned us there."  

A visit from the new SecState in 2009 made it into the special acknowledgement page, too:

"On our last day of PRT training, the facility was put into lockdown for a visit from the new Secretary of State (it’s cool that when she visits her own staff the Secretary’s security puts us into lock-down). She greeted and congratulated the Afghan PRT class down the hall from us Iraqis, then left. We didn’t even rate a walk- on. Our war no longer really mattered, though it would take me a long year in the desert and writing this book to fully figure that out."

I understand from a couple of news interviews online that Peter Van Buren is now subject of internal investigations at the State Department.

So since it appears that Peter Van Buren went through the clearance process as required by the FAM, and if it turns out that the somebody in the higher pyramid pay-grade have not done the actual reading and clearance thingy, would that then be the author's fault? Really?

I get searches in this blog for "Who hates Peter Van Buren?" Seriously.

Apparently there is also a rumor going around in the FS community that the reason Foreign Service bloggers are having a tough time these days is, you guess it -- Peter Van Buren!

Well -- there was a 7.3 earthquake in the Fiji region four days ago, must have been Peter Van Buren's fault, too!

And that all made me think that the somebodies may have a tsunami order on speed-dial specifically for Van Buren's cubicle. Which would be very bad for Peter Van Buren, indeed, but would certainly be great for book sales.

I must add here that although I have a digital copy of the book, I am buying additional copies to send to my State Department pals for the holidays, at least those still talking to me. 

I've never meet Peter Van Buren in person but this seems like the least I could do for a public servant whose career will most certainly be over, and who will be ostracized by most folks big and small in the Big House.  If I see him down some corridor, I will not take the nearest exit or pretend to be busy with my phone thingy.  It is not hard to imagine that not too long ago, he is like all other wide-eyed newbies in A-100 hoping to change the world. Iraq has been our mess since we broke it, Peter Van Buren did not break it. I would thank him for putting his career on the line to tell these stories that the American public needs to know. Perhaps if we learn all the details, we'd demand next time that our elected representatives think harder, ask serious questions, and have the spine to have convictions before allowing our country to blunder into another war.

Any how, I'd definitely love to be wrong on this one, the tsunami and all, including the stealthy shunning.

I would also like to formally request (that is, if the tsunami doesn't get him), that they send Mr. Van Buren to Afghanistan so he can write about PRT-Afghanistan, too. I seem to be developing gastroesophageal reflux disease every time I consume something served by the US Embassy Kabul on Facebook and Prilosec is no damn help!

The Afghan Plan: Where Dakota Gets Warrior of the Month Award and Then "Abandoned" by His PRT-mates in Farah

Our favorite FS blogger in Afghanistan who may or may not pen a book about his PRT adventure in that country writes in his blog about the departure of his Second PRT (November 2010-July 2011) and saying goodbye to his teammates. I'll miss reading Dakota's stories about these guys but I'm glad they're coming home.

The Godfather -- also known affectionately as Commander Killjoy; the new PRT Commander.

Commander Quixote -- AKA Doc Quixote, the infectiously enthusiastic but somewhat ADHD head of PRT Medical. Hobbies include stargazing, playing the electric cello and tilting at windmills.

Captain Adventure -- the tall and self-assured head of SecFor; the only person thus far allowed to pick his own nickname.

Engineer Lovesalot -- a Navy lieutenant whose geographic separation from the female species appears to be causing him physical pain; Captain Adventure's roommate.

Captain Harmony -- the musically talented, multi-lingual Air Force officer from Public Affairs.

Captain Tomcat -- the laid-back officer from Operations whom I wanted to name "Captain Peachy" for his habit of responding requests with "that's peachy."

Lieutenant ______ -- A Navy Lieutenant who hounded me for months about getting a nickname; I refused -- and continue to refuse -- to bow to that pressure.

Lieutenant Granola -- a midwesterner with a firmly crunchy-granola-esque Seattle mindset.

Lieutenant Dracula -- the officer in charge of Supply whose first name -- Vlad -- was far too Transylvanian not to inspire his nickname.

Warrant Exasperated -- a good-natured but habitually grumpy Warrant Officer from Public Affairs.

Sergeant Major Moralekill -- the Senior Enlisted man from the maneuver unit we share the base with. Had the hoops removed from the basketball court to prevent injury.

Senior Chief Intimidating -- the terrifying Senior Enlisted

First Sergeant McGruff -- The PRT's Rule of Law guy and second highest ranked Enlisted man, a 30-year veteran of the Michigan Police Department with a gruff, no-nonsense attitude.

Chief Blackboard -- the PRT's Communications Officer and Liaison to the Department of Education; an elementary school principal in Oklahoma City.

Chief Hammersmith -- the PRT's Seabee and resident all-around handyman; great with a hammer and a nice guy to boot -- the kind of person you'd kill to have as a neighbor.

Petty Officer Moonshine -- a Navy NCO in Supply who owns a distillery (which I always screw up and call a brewery) in Breckenridge, Colorado.

Sergeant CapsLock -- A sergeant from Civil Affairs whose wife tends to update his Facebook page on his behalf, writing exclusively in caps.

Sergeant DoubleD -- an NCO from SecFor; the DoubleD is for Domestic Dispute, taken from his habit of having protracted fights with his wife in the public arena of Facebook.

Specialist Masai -- a Kenyan-American from SecFor, born and raised on the outskirts of Nairobi.

Wishing them all smooth landing back home.

And -- before they left, they gave Dakota the following award, which he writes is "easily the greatest award that I have ever received."

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM FARAH
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
COMMANDING OFFICER OF PRT FARAH HAS AWARDED THE

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM FARAH WARRIOR OF THE MONTH

TO

[DAKOTA]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR

Professional achievement as Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah's resident Master of the English Language and all things superfluous from February 1 through February 28, 2011. If wars could be won with ink, foes slain with the precise application of commas, comrades shielded by the eradication of dangling participles, and the disenchanted masses enthused by the transformation of dysfunctional phrases into self-sustaining sentences, then [Dakota] would be granted a place in the pantheon of American military heroes. However, since this is not the case, he is instead recognized as PRT Farah's Warrior of the Month for February 2011. His expeditious and near perfect editing of 94 command awards ensured their smooth and timely progression through the military approval channels. If not for [Dakota]'s selfless dedication to the team, three times the number of man-hours would have been expended while producing inferior results. [Dakota]'s accomplishments reflect great credit upon him, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Navy.

(signed)
COMMANDER J.P. KILLJOY
CDR, USN
COMMANDING OFFICER

Read the whole thing here.


Although Dakota is leaving PRT Farah before the summer is over, I'm looking forward to reading the nicknames of the new PRT members before he leaves; not sure he will have time to do that as he wraps up his assignment.  The question is -- can he top, as nickname goes "Commander Killjoy" or "Engineer Lovesalot?" Stay tuned.   Follow him here.

Related articles

• New Team Arrives at PRT Farah (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• Joint Unit PRT Farah Takes Charge Outside Farah City (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• Farah ANP Officers Graduate Training Academy (waronterrornews.typepad.com)

 

 

 

US Consulate General Basrah, Iraq - Opening: Videos, Reax

I have previously posted about the opening of the new Consulate General in Al Baṣrah, Iraq (see Newest US Consulate General Opens in Basrah, Iraq | Wednesday, July 6, 2011). See below a couple of videos on ConGen Basra. 

The Basrah Provincial Reconstruction Team transitions to a diplomatic post as US Consulate General Basrah.  Video is produced by DOD | Spc. Lisa Soule:

DOD's 362nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment reports that the new Consul General, Piper A. W. Campbell, addressed the reception’s guests:

The consulate general in Basrah is a significant step forward in the transition from the civilian-military footprint the PRT had to a more diplomatic presence, said Campbell.

“The opening of the consulate today in Basrah is a huge step forward in the military-to-civilian transition,” said Cambell, “which people in the United States, as well as in Iraq, are eagerly watching and waiting for. So as we see the U.S. military drawing down in Iraq, it is very important that there is still a sense of connection and a sense of continuity. And the establishment of the consulate is a huge part of that.”

The reception’s guests included Jeffrey D. Feltman, assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Dr. Khalef Abdul Samed, Basrah provincial governor, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, U.S. Forces-Iraq commander, Iraqi dignitaries, and other Iraqi and U.S. officials.

Video below is via Al Jazeera with Iraqi reactions:

Related articles

• Panetta to push Iraq on US military presence - Aljazeera.net (news.google.com)
• Kuwait plans to open consulates in Erbil and Basra to the development of investment projects (currencynewshound.wordpress.com)
• From Basra to Bari, Britain's diplomats to close their doors (independent.co.uk)
• Four people killed in Basra suicide blast (independent.co.uk)

The Afghan Plan: Where Dakota Writes About the Eradication of Hope in a Thousand Cuts

Photo from USIP

From The Afghan Plan (used with permission):

We swung by the Provincial Council last week. The Council is the only democratically-elected institution in the province, and every single other person in the provincial administration -- the Governor, the Provincial Ministers of Education and Health and Finance and Economy and everything else, all the way down to the District Sub-Governors -- are chosen by Kabul.

The equivalent of this system would be if the Governor of, say, Texas, were chosen by the President of the United States instead of by the people of Texas. The President or someone else in Washington would also get to choose all of the State's Gubernatorial cabinet-type positions covering everything functional within the State -- tax collection, school administration, road construction and maintenance, policing and law enforcement, judicial implementation including the penal system, the whole shebang. Washington's influence in this hypothetical extends all the way to the county level, with county administrators chosen by Washington, albeit with some consultation from the Governor.

In this hypothetical, if the good people of Texas do not like their Governor or one of their administrators, they have no means of getting rid of him. "Can you imagine if we tried that in the States?" I asked my language training classmates. "There would be riots," one responded.

And yet, this is the arrangement written into the Constitution of Afghanistan.
[...]
"We don't get a budget," the Provincial Council president told me. "Kabul doesn't give us anything. You need to give us fuel so we can work."
[..]
("Who on EARTH designed this system?" I asked the Embassy budgeting and finance specialist, a plucky woman from the Department of Treasury who had once written Arkansas's State budget. "It's not QUITE as bad as it seems," she said optimistically. "Well, kind of, at least").
[...]
Getting the Afghan Government to function as it should, with money flowing from the appropriate places to fulfill existing budget gaps, is one of the primary goals of the PRT. The act of connecting the budget people in Kabul, who should ostensibly have money for the Provincial Council, with the Council themselves is an act in Making Bureaucracy Function. But getting money from Kabul is a long and annoying process, and the PRT is seen as a gigantic, camouflage-swathed ATM. It feels like we've had this discussion in almost every meeting I have ever attended.
[...]
We've been through this, a thousand times with a thousand different people. It just seemed so hopeless.

Continue reading, It's just not working.

Related articles

• Ambassador Eikenberry's pushback against Karzai: Will it make a difference? (csmonitor.com)
• Senators press Obama for deep Afghan withdrawal (cbsnews.com)
• Kunar PRT opens Bar Narang School (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• PRT Brings Stable Electricity to Kandahar (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• NATO tries to win Taliban homeland, profit center (seattletimes.nwsource.com)

New FS Blog: We Meant Well, Plus a Book Coming Out This Fall

From We Meant Well Blog

The new FS blog, We Meant Well is by FSO Peter Van Buren and is a companion to his forthcoming book (coming out this fall from MacMillan), We Meant Well, How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People.

One of his new blog posts -- Bureaucratic Chlamydia: What to Wear to a War?

The first part of my book details the half-assed nature of preparing people like me to live and work in a war zone. State Department personnel are recruited for Iraq without much attention to their background, physical fitness or experience. This is not much of a problem for the majority who will serve at the World’s Largest Embassy in Baghdad, a $1 billion dollar complex constantly referred to as “bigger than the Vatican,” a really odd comparison until you remember the Vatican burned people at the stake for believing the earth was round.

In yesterday's post in FP's The Best Defense, Tom Ricks writes about playing the Iraqi base bingo and this --  

Here a Foreign Service officer speculates on which bases the United States government might like to keep in Iraq after this year. But I disagree with his notion of forward bases on the doorsteps of Iran and Syria.

Ricks was talking about Van Buren's picks on locations of permanent bases --FOB Hammer, Victory Base Complex (VBC) and  Al-Asad Airbase.

The book presumably received clearance through the appropriate State channels, but  Mr. Van Buren told me that the book was cleared as per 3 FAM 4170. I expect that the book and the blog will get a lot of eyeballs from Foggy Bottom and elsewhere. USIP has a collection of personal accounts on the PRT experience in Iraq and Afghanistan with the latest from 2009, but I think this is the first book to come out from a State Dept officer assigned to one of those PRTs.      

In 2009, Mr. Van Buren, a Foreign Service Officer with two decades of experience received a nod to go to a PRT in Iraq only to have the offer rescinded by MED. It turned out, he actually did go to that Iraq PRT assignment in 2009-2010. We have yet to read his insider account of that experience, but below is a pre-publication review from Library Journal:

Van Buren, Peter. We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. Metropolitan: Holt. Oct. 2011. 288p. ISBN 9780805094367. $25.

A Foreign Service officer for more than two decades, Van Buren led the State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team in its effort to win over the Iraqis through invigorating social projects—like sports murals in violence-wracked neighborhoods and pastry-making classes to help folks supply goods to nonexistent cafés on rubble-strewn streets without water or electricity. Talk about the arrogance of trying to remake a world in our image without even knowing the world we are trying to remake. Billed as bitingly funny, though I’m not sure I’m laughing; an important book from someone who was there.

More about the book from the website:

From a State Department insider, the first book recounting our misguided efforts to rebuild Iraq—a shocking and rollicking true-life cross between Catch-22, Dispatches and The Ugly American.

Charged with rebuilding Iraq, would you spend taxpayer money on a sports mural in Baghdad’s most dangerous neighborhood to promote reconciliation through art? How about an isolated milk factory that cannot get its milk to market? Or a pastry class training women to open cafés on bombed-out streets without water or electricity?

According to Peter Van Buren, we bought all these projects and more in the most expensive hearts-and-minds campaign since the Marshall Plan. We Meant Well is his eyewitness account of the civilian side of the surge—that surreal and bollixed attempt to defeat terrorism and win over Iraqis by reconstructing the world we had just destroyed. Leading a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team on its quixotic mission, Van Buren details, with laser-like irony, his yearlong encounter with pointless projects, bureaucratic fumbling, overwhelmed soldiers, and oblivious administrators secluded in the world’s largest embassy, who fail to realize that you can’t rebuild a country without first picking up the trash.

Darkly funny while deadly serious, We Meant Well is a tragicomic voyage of ineptitude and corruption that leaves its writer—and readers—appalled and disillusioned but wiser.

We're looking forward to reading the book.

Related articles

• Graham: Iraq may "go to hell" without U.S. troops (cbsnews.com)
• Service members build, deliver wheelchairs to Iraqi children (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• 'Wolfhounds' bring potable water to al Alam Nahiya, Iraq (waronterrornews.typepad.com)

US Mission Afghanistan: Amb. Eikenberry Visits PRT Farah

U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry visited Farah Province and met with Governor Amin, PRT Commander Joseph Bozzelli, PRT lead civilian Mark Thornburg and PRT USAID Ben Kauffeld and Marsha Michel. They visited an agricultural market and also a newly built Appeals Court for improving Rule of Law in the province.

Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr

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The Afghan Plan: Where Dakota goes on R&R and almost forgot to take off his consular hat

Dakota finally went on his well-deserved R&R trip, a brief break from his PRT post in Afghanistan.  He went to Europe with two sets of clothes but almost forgot to take off his consular hat. Excerpt:

Good god I loathed the Red Light district. I, Mr. No-Fun from the Embassy, felt like I was surrounded by dozens if not hundreds of potential American Citizens Services cases, people who could stroll into the Embassy at any time with no money or documents, no recollection of where their hotel is, and a pending court date for wanton theft of munchies-type food. I wanted to grab the people around me, glassy eyed from the coffee shops at 11 a.m., and shake them by the shoulders and tell them not to lose their passports.

My distaste at the roaming hordes in the Red Light district dovetailed with an assumption, innate and unshakable after six years at State, that all female sex workers are the victims of human trafficking. Even in a city as well-regulated and up-and-up as Amsterdam, it was all I could think of. I had to fight the urge not to ask strangers if they needed help in contacting the Embassy of their home nation.

Poor dude, probably had drafted one too many Trafficking in Persons Reports since joining the service ...

And there's a reason why he was in the Red Light district, okay? 

Continue reading, Fear and Loathing in ....

ePRT Iraq: Hope and Do No Harm, Poor Planning Methods

Image via WikipediaWe have previously posted here an excerpt from a piece written by Marc Grossman (former "P" and number #3 State Department official during G.W's. first term) where he floated the idea of the creation of a new personnel specialty, that of the expeditionary diplomat." He writes:

"Experience with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lessons learned with S/CRS, and the example of diplomats who have pursued careers in the toughest posts should lead State leadership to conclude that this is a step worth taking."

We are not for or against the idea but do have one question. Is it really? A step worth taking? 

You can read the oral histories from members of the Iraq and Afghanistan PRTs in the links below:

• Oral Histories: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams | February 2009
• Oral Histories: Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams | November 2005
• Oral Histories: The Iraq Experience Project | October 2005

In the very same issue of Prism is also an article by Blake Stone (Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT).  Blake Stone is Adjunct Professor of National Security Decision Making in the College of Distance Education at the U.S. Naval War College. His article according to the piece represents the author's observations based on his experiences in an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq during a specific period. He served in Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mahmudiyah in early November 2008 and was assigned to ePRT Baghdad 4 (later redesignated Baghdad South).

The article is not a pretty read but we think it's a must-read and ought to be discussed particularly in relation to the idea of a new personnel specialty.  The editors of Prism, by the way, has extended an invitation to interested Department of State Bureaus to submit their perspectives in subsequent issues. Editorial contact info here -- http://www.ndu.edu/press/prism.html


We hope the somebodies write back to Prism so we all can read it in the next issue.

Mr. Stone's article starts with a polite note --

While much of what is contained in this article is critical of both the Department of State and Department of Defense, it is in no way meant to deprecate the personal efforts, sacrifices, bravery, or character of those who volunteered to go into harm's way by serving on these teams in a dangerous place during a critical time in U.S. history. Neither is it designed to take away from the personal sacrifices and exemplary character of the men and women who voluntarily wear the uniform of our country and daily put their lives on the line in the name of furthering both national security goals and the American way of life.

The purpose of this article is not to cite an extensive list of organizational miscues, which would only raise the question, "What did you do to remedy the situation?" Rather, my hope is to focus on how future attempts at postconflict stabilization and reconstruction may be better planned and executed. More important, I hope these observations and suggestions will drive a more focused analysis of the operational and tactical planning and execution that must occur as preconditions for achieving our strategic endstate. This article also suggests the absence of a clearly defined provincial level plan from Embassy Baghdad for the achievement of U.S. national security and foreign policy goals in Iraq. From the local level, where my team worked in the "Sunni Triangle of Death," there was absolutely no sense of linkage between the reconstruction efforts we were executing and the stated goals of either Presidents George W. Bush or Barack Obama. "Hope," it was once said, "is not a [planning] method."3 At our ePRT, all we had by way of guidance was hope and the Hippocratic oath of "Do no harm."

Excerpt:

[...] lack of specific planning guidance stemmed from the inherent inability of the State Department to engage in this sort of work—executing what essentially amounted to the last two phases of a military operation. State Department Foreign Service Officer (FSO) skill sets are much too passive—the collecting and reporting of information, for example, were the professional stock-in-trade of both of our political cone FSO team leaders. The primary interests of both our team leaders and OPA generally were good reporting and submitting weekly reports to Washington. The absence of the ability to plan, execute, and lead stability and reconstruction operations was painfully apparent—it just was not a required skill set or core competency within State. For those of us who came to the State Department directly from the military, this nearly universal truism was a constant source of frustration and disappointment. Our State Department leadership failed either to plan effectively or to lead the civilian reconstruction effort.
[...]
While the State Department was wholly incompetent to lead our national reconstruction efforts, the Army brigades we worked with operated in only a slightly less incompetent manner. The Army brought numerous assets to the table: a significant number of personnel for the task, a very significant budget, and the logistical and mobility assets that allowed it to be nearly everywhere in the operational environment at once. The downside to this well-intentioned Leviathan was organizational inertia on a grand scale that had no outlet (save reconstruction operations) in the post–June 30 Security Framework Agreement Iraq. Precluded from conducting combat operations, the Army focused on nonkinetic effects—its shorthand for reconstruction operations.

While the State Department was the lead Federal agency for reconstruction and stabilization operations,11 the BCTs we were embedded with had their own separate agendas. This lack of coordination was compounded by our team leaders' willingness to cede primacy to the military in the name of "maintaining good relations with the Army." The first brigade we worked with, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division (2/1), viewed the ePRT simply as a "brigade enabler" and expected the civilian efforts of the ePRT to be subordinate to the overarching brigade concept of the operation. This caused friction on numerous levels. First, the brigade's deputy commanding officer ran his own set of engagements with numerous civilian Iraqi governmental officials, often without any coordination with the ePRT governance team, whose role it was to engage with, train, and mentor the same set of officials. This often led to the embarrassing situation of unwittingly meeting with the same official the day after the Army met with them, sometimes regarding the exact same issue.

Programmatically, the ePRT and 2/1 Armored Division's differences stemmed primarily from two wellheads—first, a difference of opinion regarding where we sat on the operational continuum; and second, different timelines. The net effect was an almost complete lack of unity of effort and the Army and State Department working from two completely different playbooks.
[...]
Lessons Learned
There are numerous things we need to do better in future stability operations. While this list is not exhaustive, it is representative of the problems faced during our ePRT operation over 18 months, three BCTs, and three FSO team leaders.

• State Department FSOs should not lead ePRTs. FSOs are talented and dedicated public servants, but they lack the skill sets to be effective leaders of ePRT operations. First, they seem to lack the leadership experience required to effectively direct the efforts of what amounts to a small unit. Second, they lack the military experience to effectively conduct phase four and five operations with our military partners. State Department skill sets are passive (for example, political reporting) and not well matched to the realities of the job; thus, ePRTs would be better led by "3161" Excepted Service, direct-hire term appointees (which currently comprise the bulk of the State Department's complement on both ePRTs and PRTs) who often possess a better mix of significant and relevant military experience and civilian-acquired skill sets necessary for postconflict reconstruction/international development work. The 3161s with prior military experience have the ability to keep one foot firmly planted in each camp—Defense and State.

• Military leaders need more training in interagency reconstruction and capacity-building operations. Most of the military leaders at the BCT level lacked a fundamental understanding of what "the interagency" brought to the warfight, how to harness its vast capabilities, and even more basic concepts such as "who was in charge" (that is, the lead Federal agency). Lacking this understanding, what should have been a symbiotic relationship was fraught with friction. Most military leaders viewed the ePRT as merely a "brigade enabler" rather than at least a partner in its operations or, more realistically, the lead agency within the unit's operational environment for postconflict reconstruction and capacity-building. This turf battle was a constant driver of inefficiency. The military needs to make the mandate of Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05—that it be as proficient in stability operations as in combat operations—a reality.13

• Lead Federal agencies need to actually lead. We received precious little by way of operational guidance from PRT Baghdad, the Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs, or the two Ambassadors I served under. To the extent there was "front office" involvement in PRT/ ePRT issues, it primarily focused on the PRT drawdown plan. While much time and energy were expended in determining the size and composition of the subnational civilian footprint, what seemed absent from the calculus was the fact that civilian assets were drawing down at a quicker and more significant pace than the military component. This seemed rather counterintuitive, in that most reconstruction models call for a corresponding increase in civilian capacity (that is, a "civilian surge" of sorts) as the military presence draws down. This left gaping holes in our overall ability to continue reconstruction operations as we approached the post-election transition of power.

• Reduce the rate of military area of operations turnover (that is, "my school needs to be rebuilt . . . again"). The rate of battlespace turnover between military units ("transfer of authority") was probably too frequent to build good civil-military relationships with our Iraqi interlocutors. Every 9 months or so, Iraqi governmental officials as well as tribal and business leaders with whom we would regularly engage would have to learn a whole new panoply of military commanders, Civil Affairs personnel, and other personalities. This also gave the Iraqis, who were astute opportunists, the ability to pitch their wish list to successive commanders on at least a yearly basis. This led to many otherwise unnecessary projects being started or funded in the name of "building relationships."

• "Money as a weapons system" is probably the preeminent tool in a counterinsurgency. It has the unparalleled ability to independently influence decisionmakers, provide access to them and to other "levers of influence," and turn enemies into allies (as exemplified by the Sons of Iraq movement). Efforts to build governmental capacity, on the other hand, often benefit from not leading with money. The government of Iraq became conditioned to look to the U.S. Army particularly and the U.S. Government more generally as the bill payer of first resort. We were often unable to get the government of Iraq to move forward on its own until we convinced it that we lacked or were otherwise unable to provide money to apply against whatever the problem of the day happened to be. Once the government was forced into that position, it would actually start coordinating and breaking bureaucratic stovepipes

In future conflicts, the civilian/interagency contribution will undoubtedly be critical to achieving the strategic endstate. It should be better utilized. To do this, it will need to be better led (presumably by civilian leaders) and better understood by its military counterparts. To "win the peace," we must be just as effective in phases four and five as we are in decisive combat operations. Until we make such successes a priority in our doctrine, training, and resourcing—to include requiring proven competency in the skill sets required for such operations (especially proven leadership abilities)—we will simply remain the "blind leading the blind" down an uncertain path.

Read the whole thing here (PDF).

We must note that the original estimates placed the cost of Iraqi reconstruction from 2004-2007 reportedly at $56 billion.   As of March 31, 2010, nearly $162.83 billion had been made available for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.  And if that's not scary enough -- we're now in Afghanistan with a similar troops surge. And civilian surge. And a reconstruction surge.

Related articles

• The Way Forward in Iraq (atwar.blogs.nytimes.com)
• Civilian Skills Key to CA Mission in Laghman (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• Adjusting Sight Picture: BCTs Address Changing Needs As AABs (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• State Department to Assume Lead on Civilian Effort in Iraq (blogs.abcnews.com)