Showing posts with label US Embassy Baghdad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Embassy Baghdad. Show all posts

Saturday, January 14, 2012

Senator Nelson's Reasonableness Test: US Should Bill Iraq for US Embassy Security

Last year, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, the 12th term Republican congressman from California's scenic 46th District and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee made the news when he called for Iraq to repay a portion of the "mega-dollars" that Washington has spent since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.  Mr. Rohrabacher for the record did not actually say we should ask for a repayment now but once "Iraq becomes a very rich and prosperous country..."

This past week, it was Nebraska's retiring Democratic Senator Ben Nelson turn at bill collection (TSB has a post on this here) Below is a letter sent by Senator Nelson to Secretaries Panetta and Clinton telling them that the Iraqi government should be responsible for shouldering the cost of US Embassy security in Iraq:

Dear Mr. Secretary and Madam Secretary:

As you know, the United States concluded its military mission in Iraq in 2011. With that end, the U.S. Department of State now assumes responsibility for the civilian mission, which I understand will be heavily reliant on private contractors for security. I support ensuring the success of our efforts in Iraq, but am concerned about continuing to provide assistance to Iraq’s government, with the total cost being borne by the United States.

As a nation, our government continues to look for ways to reduce spending and find efficiencies within the U.S. Department of Defense. Therefore, I believe it is completely reasonable and in line with our agreements with other nations for the Government of Iraq to pay for the security of our remaining State Department personnel.

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in November 2011, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke about the costs of retaining an American presence in Iraq. He noted that “in any nation in which [the United States is] present diplomatically, the first responsibility for security is the host nation.” Thus, if Iraq is unable to provide security for U.S. personnel, then the Iraqi government should pay for the cost of doing so – rather than our nation’s taxpayers. Therefore, I encourage your departments to enter into an agreement with the Iraqi government to underwrite the costs associated with our continued diplomatic presence there.

During that same hearing, I also asked General Dempsey whether it was possible to enter into an agreement with the Iraqi government for cost-sharing in order to continue providing for the security training of Iraqi troops and every other mission we might accept to help the country secure, stabilize and self-govern. General Dempsey responded that such agreements are possible and that there is always a negotiation on the cost and who will bear it.

I want to ensure that the burden of such operations is placed primarily on Iraq, in line with those agreements we share with other nations when we conduct multilateral or bilateral exercises around the world. The Iraqi government is more than capable of sharing or underwriting costs associated with a U.S. advise-and-assist presence, as the Iraqi economy continues to grow and government revenues are beginning to increase to that of pre-war levels.

While I understand there are many challenges facing the Government of Iraq, it is important for the United States to make it clear that we expect the new government to be responsible for shouldering the cost of security in their nation. I would, therefore, greatly appreciate learning from the Administration what agreements are being made with the Government of Iraq for further missions and how the cost of those missions will be covered. Thank you both for your consideration in this matter. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

E. Benjamin Nelson
United States Senator

It is true that the host country is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 22(2) says that "The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity."

One could argue that Syria did not lived up to its responsibility to prevent "impairment of its dignity" when it allowed a mob to attack our embassy in Syria in July last year. But other times, the local police protecting diplomatic and consular premises can pay dearly with their lives. During the February 2003 attack of the US Consulate in Karachi, for instance, the gunmen killed two police officers and wounded five other policemen in front of the consulate.  The 2008 American Embassy attack in Yemen resulted in 19 deaths and 16 injuries including six Yemeni policemen. 

Iraq is responsible for the protection of the US Mission in Iraq, just as the United States is responsible for the protection of all diplomatic premises within the United States. But while the host country is expected to provide the outermost security of diplomatic missions, it cannot be expected to provide guard services for the embassy compound. 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, of course, is like no other diplomatic mission in the world.  According to Stratfor's assessment of diplomatic security after the troops withdrawal,  there are some 16,000 personnel, 5,000 of whom are security contractors working inside our heavily fortified embassy and consulates in Iraq.  The remaining 11,000 include diplomats, intelligence officers and analysts, defense attaches, military liaison personnel and aid and development personnel.

If the Government of Iraq decides that it should have a corresponding number of personnel - 16,000 Iraqis -  attached to its embassy in Washington, D.C., how would that work?  Congress would be up in arms!

But perhaps the more tricky part is Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which says that "1) In the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mission, the receiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission; 2) The receiving State may equally, within similar bounds and on a nondiscriminatory basis, refuse to accept officials of a particular category."

With that number of personnel, there probably is a specific agreement in place. But let's just say that there is none and Senator Nelson gets his way and bill Iraq for the cost of diplomatic security in Iraq.  The Iraqi Government may just decide that 16,000 diplomatic, security and support personnel at U.S. Mission Iraq is a tad too much. Due to ongoing security challenges in the country, it may just decide that a, say 150-member US staff is all it could support. Which would actually save the US Government money, and would allow the State Department to reallocate its tight resources to other areas not considered the center of the bureaucratic universe.

 



 
 
 

Wednesday, January 4, 2012

Quote: US Mission Iraq - Off the Radar Screen Until ...

"What is going to be the will of our country and our Congress to support our activities there in the out years? [...] Once the troops are really gone completely, other than security cooperation folks, but once they are completely gone, this turns into just another diplomatic post. And until there are some tragic events there, I think it is off the radar screen."

Grant Green

Under Secretary of State for Management, 2001-2005
in With Huge Embassy, U.S. Still A Presence In Iraq


Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Insider Quote: 'Getting off the X' in Iraq

"My security colleagues would call it 'getting off the X'. [...] We run. We go. We do not stand and fight. We will execute a high-speed J-turn and we will get as far away from the attackers as we possibly can."

Patrick Kennedy
Under Secretary of State for Management, U.S. Department of State
in As soldiers leave, U.S. diplomats face huge Iraq challenge


Friday, December 16, 2011

Iraq Operation New Dawn End of Mission Ceremony

Below is the U.S. Forces - Iraq Operation New Dawn End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad on December 15, 2011. Includes a brief speech by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey (at approx 7:30 mark) and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (at approx 9:08), as well as other military officials. Length: 40:27 min






 
 
 

Thursday, December 15, 2011

U.S. Consulate General Basra: "Dangerously Exposed" but Under Iraqi Protection

Ted Koppel recently had a piece on our "exit" from Iraq for NBC's Rock Center.  In an interview with NPR, Ted Koppel noted that  all our troops will soon be out "save 157 who will be guarding the embassy, and a few hundred U.S. military trainers."

In his interview with Ambassador Jeffrey, Ted Koppel  asked the ambassador what happens if our folks there come under direct attack.  The ambassador responded that this is the responsibility of the Iraqi government.  When pushed if he was confident that the Iraqis would respond, Ambassador Jeffrey said "yes." Of course, can we really expect our ambassador there to say "no" on teevee? I am having a really bad tummy ache over this.

I posted the opening of U.S. Consulate General in Basra in this blog last July. The clip below talks about ConGen Basra with 1320 people (apparently also known as Fort Apache), which is rocketed two or three times a week. Also piece here on Shalamcha, Iraq’s southern border crossing into Iran, a stone throw from Basra:







Here are the rest of the clips from NBC's Rock Center:
No Exit: US military leaving Iraq but presence remains

No Exit: Iraq's oil and Iran's influence

No Exit: Ted Koppel's reflect on Iraq's future





Monday, December 5, 2011

US Embassy Iraq: Severely Restricts Movement of Employees Within the Green Zone

There was an explosion inside the International Zone (aka: Green Zone, aka: Ultimate Gated Community) last week. The first since 2007. According to the McClatchy Newspapers,  Iraqi officials at first attributed the explosion to a rocket that had landed in a parking lot. Later they admitted that it was a suicide car bomb that detonated at the entrance to the parliament building and killed five people. McClatchy notes that "as the drawdown has continued, violence has risen steadily. More than 100 people have been killed in violence in Baghdad in November; the number for October was 65."

On 1 January 2009, full control of the International (formerly "Green") Zone was handed over to Iraqi security forces.  So-- if entry into the Green Zone, where Iraqi government offices and the U.S. Embassy are located, is strictly controlled, how did the suicide car bomb made it past the gate? Is this a prelude of what is to come in 2012?

Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki denies that the explosion signals a deterioration in Green Zone security ahead of US forces' planned pullout. In fact, the PM down playing the attack says, "It was a very simple operation." One apparently meant to kill him.

"The preliminary intelligence information says that the car was due to enter parliament and stay there and not to explode. It was supposed to explode on the day I entered parliament," he told the Associated Press.

Mr. al-Maliki  was also quoted in the Guardian saying that the bomb was probably assembled inside the Green Zone and was not very powerful. He reportedly also blamed al-Qaida in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party for the violence.

Uh-oh! Shouldn't this give you some pause or something?  How many more car bombs out there can be assembled inside the Green Zone?

In the meantime, just days before the last of our troops leave Iraq, and the Iraq headache is officially transferred from DOD to the State Department, the US Embassy in Baghdad released escalating warnings about kidnapping of U.S. citizens throughout Iraq including the International Zone. The most recent warning includes a notice that the movement of its employees within the IZ is restricted.

On November 22: Possible Increased Kidnapping Threat

The U.S. Embassy wishes to apprise all U.S. citizens of the potential for increased kidnapping operations by militant groups throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad.  The U.S. Embassy recommends that U.S. citizens in all areas of Iraq maintain a heightened sense of security awareness and take appropriate measures to enhance personal and operational security at this time.

On November 28: Significant Threat of Kidnapping of U.S. Citizens
The U.S. Embassy wishes to notify all U.S. citizens of the existence of severe  threats of kidnapping operations and attacks by terrorists throughout Iraq.  These threats also exist within the International Zone in Baghdad.  The U.S. Embassy recommends that U.S. citizens in all areas of Iraq maintain a heightened sense of security awareness and take appropriate measures to enhance personal and operational security.      
On December 3: Continued Severe Threat of Kidnapping of U.S. Citizens
Due to severe threats of kidnapping operations and terrorist attacks throughout Iraq, including the International Zone (IZ), the U.S. Embassy has greatly enhanced the security posture for U.S. Government employees.  This enhanced security posture includes severely restricted movement within the IZ.  The U.S. Embassy recommends that U.S. citizens in all areas of Iraq, including the IZ, maintain a heightened sense of security awareness and take appropriate measures to enhance personal and operational security at this time.  U.S. citizens are advised to keep a low profile; vary days, times, and routes of travel; and exercise caution while driving and entering or exiting vehicles.

It's December 5, 2011 and that's the way things are. How long can the International Zone remain "green" might be a good question. And if movement within the IZ is severely restricted, how much work can our folks realistically do over there? Also what about State Department folks outside the IZ, which bunker can they hunker while staff movement is severely restricted?

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

US Mission Baghdad: Who will taste-test the locally sourced food for the cafeteria?

Department of Defense Photo
Via WaPo's Walter Pincus:
The State Department, seeking to cut costs in Iraq, is looking to locally purchase some of the food its personnel eat, potentially breaking from the U.S. military’s practice of importing all food and fuel.

American diplomats ate in a cafeteria in one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces until 2008, when a new U.S. Embassy compound was completed. The embassy cafeteria has served food imported by the military.

Military commanders required that, for sanitary and security reasons, all food and fuel be trucked in from Kuwait in convoys protected by soldiers or private security contractors.

The State Department’s undersecretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy, said he will continue using the Defense Logistics Agency to bring in food and fuel after January.
[...]
While the military did not seek to purchase food or fuel on the Iraqi market, Kennedy said in an interview last week that he had asked the logistics agency to begin looking for reliable local sources for those commodities.

“It will never get down to zero,” Kennedy said about the need for imported goods, but he said that State had already been purchasing some fuel on the Iraqi market. Buying food and fuel locally, Kennedy said, would cut the overall cost and reduce the need for convoy security guards.
Read in full here.

I'm not worried about our diplomats acclimatizing to the local bacteria, mind you.  All FS folks do that with every country they are posted to.  They buy local food and shop in local stores; they buy fresh fruits and veges from the corner green grocer or the open market next door (often seasoned with Clorox at home).  Except in war zones.

And oh, I'm sure the State Department can save quite a bundle from buying fuel and food locally. Maybe I should applaud such fiscal creativity?  I just want to point out to Mr. Kennedy that folks do not drink fuel, see? If they procure food locally, will the embassy hire some supertasters? According to this account, the late King Hussein I of Jordan relates in his 1962 autobiography that he uncovered a Syrian spy plot involving his cook to poison his food. The tip-off?  Apparently, the untimely deaths of the palace cats, victims of the assassin's try-outs. In this neighborhood where America is quite hated, this is not beyond the realm of possibility. 

This is Iraq, and the embassy, the largest in the world with potentially over 15,000 personnel by end of the year. They all need to eat.  And not MREs.  The military, with its command and supply chain structure in place (and never short of staff) did not try to procure food locally in all its years of operation in Iraq. And the State Department which does not have comparable structures or staff, will now buy local to feed its staff. Frankly, the thought of that is giving me a rather queasy stomach.

Of course, given that we have had several outbreaks of foodborne illness in the United States, perhaps I shouldn't worry too much?

Except that -- way back in October, the National Iraqi News Agency reported that Muqtada Al Sadr, leader of the Shiite al-Sadr Trend, considered all US embassy employees in Baghdad as “occupiers”, stressing that resisting them after 2011 is an obligation.
"In response to a query of one of his followers about the increase of the embassy employees' number from 5000 to 15000 after the expiry of SOFA, Muqtada said “they are all occupiers and resisting them after the end of the agreement is an obligation.”

That's a special mention from an Iraqi leader who commands not just powerful religious and political influence but also has his own army. We may think this war is over, but it's not.  Iraq is still a war zone. And make no mistake about it.  Our soldiers will be home but our diplomats and their guards will be in the crosshairs even as they try to continue "reconstructing" that country.







Tuesday, November 15, 2011

State Dept Seeks Aviation Advisor for Iraq Rescues 58 Days Before Liftoff?

Via Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman:

The State Department has already requisitioned an army, part of the roughly 5,000 private security contractors State is hiring to protect diplomats stationed in Iraq. Now, State is hiring someone to provide a little help from the air: an “Aviation Advisor” responsible for “Search and Rescue (SAR), medical evacuations (ME), transporting Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to respond to incidents, and provid[ing] air transportation for Chief of Mission personnel.” It’s not a familiar job for the diplomatic corps, which is why State is seeking to bring in someone from the outside.

The State Department put out this notice on Nov. 4. That’s 58 days before the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Fifty-eight days before State has the skies over Iraq to itself.
[..]
Air operations are not as simple has hiring skilled pilots to put well-maintained machines in the skies.

The military has long-standing procedures in place for designing and executing aerial missions. An experienced chain of command maintains order, discipline, coordination and success. This is what the military does.

It’s not what the State Department does. Only a relatively few officials go into the U.S. diplomatic corps to oversee security operations.

[...]
Inevitably, things will go wrong in these complex air operations. A functioning chain of command exists to minimize those mistakes and mitigate their impact.

The State Department still does not have someone atop that chain, with fewer than 60 days before it finds itself alone in the skies.

[...]
Until State can figure out its chain of command for air operations, its employees in Iraq — some 17,000 of them, according to current plans — had better hope they don’t need air support. There’s not much time to put one in place.
Continue reading, U.S. Hiring Mercenary Air Force for Iraq Rescues.

Anyway -- even if you do find the right person for this job in 57 days, how fast can that person get medically cleared, obtain a security clearance, get administratively processed and get a plan together?  A plan is important; of the 75 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 36 were downed by enemy fire (source).

There is, too, the contractor run and led-medical supply chain. If somebody is hurt, and is airlifted to one of the embassy district hospitals in Iraq, is the embassy blood program even in place and functioning as the military's? 


I have posted previously about Embassy Air Iraq here, and the Embassy Baghdad General Hospital here.  I've also posted about the transition and the medical support functions here, here, here and here.

In one of those posts about hospitals, a reader commented that it's strange that the subject wasn't mentioned in the Afghanistan-Iraq-Pakistan bidding cables for foreign service officers.

Somebody who writes as NewtonCM2 said "It wasn't mentioned in the AIP bidding cables because it's not true. There will be continuous, full medical coverage through the entire military to State transition. The OIG got this one wrong."

As far as I know, the OIG never corrected that report on the Iraq transition.

I hope that the State Dept is advising its contractors and employees bidding on Iraq jobs that its air operation in the country responsible for search and rescue, medevac, etc, etc. is still up on the air.  So they have the option to pack their broomsticks. 







Wednesday, August 3, 2011

US Missions Iraq and Pakistan: Job Creation Surge Also On

Via US Mission Pakistan:


  • 11-128, Dispatcher (In-House Candidates Only), Islamabad, Closing Date: August 15, 2011 (100 KB)

  • 11-124, Automotive Electrician & A/C Mechanic, Islamabad, Closing Date: August 14, 2011 (PDF 57 KB

  • 11-127 Engineer (In-House Candidates Only), USAID Pesahwar, Closing Date: August 11, 2011, (PDF 63 KB)

  • 11-125 Acquisition Assistant, USAID Islamabad, Closing Date: August 11, 2011 (PDF 63 KB)


  • 11-122, Economic Specialist (In-House Candidates Only), Karachi, Closing Date: August 10, 2011 (PDF 49 KB)

  • 11-123 Consular Investigations Assistant (In-House Candidates Only), Islamabad, Closing Date: August 10, 2011 (PDF 49 KB) 

  • 11-121 Engineer (Electrical), Peshawar, Closing Date: August 9, 2011 (PDF 66 KB) 

  • 11-112 Electrician (Two Positions), Peshawar, Closing Date: Augsut 9, 2011 (PDF 64 KB)  

  • 11-116, Political Specialist, Islamabad, Closing Date: August 4, 2011 (PDF 49 KB)

  • 11-118, Engineer, USAID Peshawar, Closing Date: August 4, 2011 (PDF 60 KB)

  • 11-119, Budget Analyst, USAID Islamabad, Closing Date: August 4, 2011 (PDF 63 KB)

  • 11-120 Nurse (Part Time), Lahore, Closing Date: Open Until Filled (PDF 50 KB)

  • 11-113 Information Assistant (Social Media Coordinator/Webmaster),  Islamabad, Closing Date: August 3, 2011 (PDF 50 KB)   

  • 11-127 Engineer (In-House Candidates Only), USAID Pesahwar, Closing Date: August 11, 2011, (PDF 63 KB)


    Via US Mission Iraq:
    Vacancies at the US Agency for International Development (USAID)  

    US Mission Iraq | Third Country Nationals







    Monday, July 11, 2011

    US Consulate General Erbil Officially Opens, Embassy Baghdad Posts One Postage Sized Photo as Proof

    US Embassy Iraq
    Website Photo
    Now they're talking - via US Embassy Baghdad on July 11, 2011. I know it opened over the weekend, but, but ...the work week in Iraq is Sunday through Thursday:
    On July 10, U.S. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides officially opened the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil, Iraq.  In attendance at the ceremony were Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani, Iraqi First Lady Hero Talabani, Iraqi Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Barham Salih, Legal Director of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Arshad Tawfik and Director of Consular Affairs Ambassador Ismet Ageed, along with Ministers and Members of Parliament, civil society representatives, media, business leaders, and members of the diplomatic corps.

    The U.S. Consulate General covers the three provinces of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region; Erbil, Sulymaniyah, and Dohuk, and succeeds the U.S. Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT), which has operated in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region since 2007.  Civilian U.S. agencies, working in partnership with military colleagues in the RRT, have made memorable and lasting contributions to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, including projects to provide water treatment, schools and other educational facilities, and an orphanage.

    In remarks during the ceremony, Ambassador Jeffrey said “It is our fondest wish that a strong and vibrant Kurdistan Region within a democratic and federal Iraq arise from the tragic history of this region.  Our goal is to build an Iraq for all its citizens... Arabs and Kurds, Sunni and Shia, Christian and Muslim, Yezidi and Shebak, one that respects all its citizens and one which is governed by the rule of law.”  Ambassador Jeffrey also announced the appointment of Mr. Alexander Laskaris to the position of Consul General.

    Today’s event also marked a celebration of the 235th anniversary of U.S. independence.  Noting the date, Ambassador Jeffrey said “I believe there is no better place to celebrate our Independence Day than here in a partner country fighting for its democracy.”

    For further information please contact Selim Ariturk, Public Affairs Officer, Consulate General Erbil (phone 0770-443-0117, email: AriturkS@state.gov.)

    Active links added above.  Um, would somebody please, pretty please inquire with the PAO at US Embassy Baghdad why they bother posting one postage sized photo of the event when no one can tell who's who in that snapshot? That rightmost guy in the photo above looks like Leon Panetta; sure does look like the new SecDef, doesn't he? And why post only one photo? Are they all camera-shy or something? Or are they afraid the Iraqis would stick pins at their photos?

    Oops, wait, wait -- I'm told that the rightmost person in the photo is not Leon Panetta but the new Consul General of ConGen Erbil, Alexander Laskaris. See below, the same photo posted on its Facebook page:

    Photo from US Embassy Iraq/FB
    Sorry, it's not Leon Panetta! How in heaven's name could I have made that mistake?

    The largest US embassy in the universe, and they don't have on-time, fresh from the oven news? And they can only share stamp-sized photographs? And the new consulates have yet to have an online presence ... minor things done badly.  I feel much better thinking about the transition to a civilian-led mission already.



    Friday, June 10, 2011

    Cover Your Eyes - Congressman Rohrabacher Wants Iraq to Repay US for Our Nutsy and Klutzy Iraq Invasion & Reconstruction!

    Dana RohrabacherImage by Gage Skidmore via FlickrDo you know who held a gun to our heads to invade Iraq? The Iraqis!

    Do you know who forced us to do reconstruction in the billions over there? The Iraqis, who else?!

    The simplistic way of looking at this is -- we went into the Iraqi Barn, trashed it, paid for it and dear god, we are still paying for it!

    After eight years of this -- logic dictates that the Iraqis should now pay for it. And that's exactly what one of our long-term elected reps is talking about, during a visit over there, no less.

    Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, 12th term Republican congressman from California's scenic 46th District and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee - wants the Iraqi Barn to repay the US Treasury for the mega-dollars the US spent on our nutsy and klutzy invasion and reconstruction of that poor country.

    We liberated them remember?  And turned them into a democracy, did we not? So isn't it only fair that we should get some sort of repayment for that?

    Hold on to your brains, this is going to be a rough ride!

    Via AFP:

    A US congressman called on Friday for Iraq to repay a portion of the "mega-dollars" that Washington has spent since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, at a news conference in Baghdad.
    [...]
    "Once Iraq becomes a very rich and prosperous country... we would hope that some consideration be given to repaying the United States some of the mega-dollars that we have spent here in the last eight years," Rohrabacher told journalists at the US embassy in Baghdad.

    "We were hoping that there would be a consideration of a payback because the United States right now is in close to a very serious economic crisis and we could certainly use some people to care about our situation as we have cared about theirs."

    He said he raised the issue in a meeting with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Rohrabacher, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the US House of Representatives, declined to give specifics on how much should be paid back, or over what timeframe.

    Yawrg! Heeeeelp! I just lost my brain ....!

    Mr. Rohrabacher had previously announced that he plans to hold a hearing to investigate the April 8th massacre of Iranian civilians at Camp Ashraf in Eastern Iraq and "what role the U.S. State Department may have played in a cover up of the crime." 

    Of course, while he's at it, investigating the "cover-up" that is, he must have also thought why not kill two birds with one big rock and deliver the" repay us for invading you" collection receipt.

    Why, it's the most thoughtful thing to do, I don't know why no one thought of this before. If you'll excuse me, I need to go and put a brown bag over my head now.



    Iraq Transition: Horrible Deadline, Rough Schedule, But -- The Army Is Leaving! Really. Really?

    giant AspirinGiant Aspirin - Have One
    Image by duncan via Flickr
    I do not think replacing DOD's gigantic footprint in Iraq with a smaller footprint by the Department of State (smaller compared to DOD but the largest in State's universe) would transform that country into a democracy that our then leaders imagined in la-la land.

    That said, what I think obviously, does not make a difference in the scheme of things. Our Iraq project is a runaway train that has ran out of brake fluid; and who will put a stop to it?

    The notion out there that we should pour more resources into that country even as we withdraw our troops so that the deaths we suffered in that foreign land would not be in vain is understandable.   But it also borders on emotional blackmail and is code blue depressing.  If the dead could speak up, would they really tell us -- if you love me, go off some more people over there? Would they? If the answer is "yes" -- this is going to be a war with no end, because as more deaths are avenged, more deaths will occur .... and we'll be in Iraq for 20 years more, 50 years, who knows -- a hundred years? There will be no basing rights, of course, so we'll be doing this on one-year TDYs for the next several decades.

    But combat is over; we'll be doing our reconstruction there! Of course, we are; the real question is -- why are we doing it there instead of here? And let's not kid ourselves. The body bags will not stop coming home just because combat operation is over.

    How many more of our young men and women must pay the price because we are too stupid to recognize when to stop?

    But like  I said, what I think obviously, does not make a difference in the scheme of things. I expect that the State Department will take over the Iraq headache as planned whether the giant aspirin is handy or not.

    Not much I can do about this; but blogging about this, I sure can do. I figure good preparation is half the battle. If the civilians must now take over this mission, I'd like to know that State has won that part of the battle, or has it?

    U/S Patrick Kennedy during his appearance at the Commission on Wartime Contracting last June 6 states that "a medical contract was awarded to Medical Support Services – Iraq on May 15, 2011 for $132 million for five years."

    But according to FedBiz the medical support services contact (Number:SAQMMA11D0073) in the amount of $61,427,699.00 has been awarded to CHS Middle East LLC, a company based in Reston, Virginia on May 19, 2011.

    So I went digging for the contract solicitation for the med services at FedBiz. I wanted to know what work can we expect from this medical support contract in Iraq. I have seen the statement of work posted online and will post that separately because the following distracted me.

    During the pre-solicitation period,  the Defense and State Departments did answer some questions about the work required from the prospective bidders.  I've highlighted some of the questions and answers below extracted from materials publicly posted in FedBiz. This will give you an idea what the bidders were interested in and what the medical services might look like after contractors take over the function:

    Third Country Nationals in Their Minds

    Q: “Any U.S. citizen prime or subcontractor employee who will deploy to Iraq in conjunction with this contract, regardless of purpose of visit or duration of stay, must have a favorable investigation, no older than 2 years, resulting in issuance of a Final Secret or Top Secret personnel security clearance from Defense Security Service (DSS) or must have a favorable Moderate Risk Public Trust (MRPT) investigation conducted by the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Only employees with current clearances or whose MRPT’s are favorably adjudicated will be allowed to travel to Iraq.”  Will the Government accept non-US citizen Third Country Nationals as employees on this contract?

    A: If they can be cleared and will be acceptable to the Government of Iraq.  

    Q: H.1.1 lists countries from which no person may work on the contract in any capacity.  Does the tem “any capacity” preclude the contractor from assigning work to any person from these countries who have the legal right to work in the U.S. performing “back office” (e.g., Accounting & Finance, Human Resources)?  Does this clause only prohibit the contractor from assigning work in Iraq to persons from these countries?

    A: The Government of Iraq is setting restriction regarding country of origin.  This requirement restates that requirement/restriction.  To the extent that we can determine the intent of the GOI, working in Iraq means any employee or person performing more than 30 days in Iraq.  Experience shows that interpretation is often performed by the individual by the inspector on site on the given day.  Therefore, until more specific definition is provided. it would be wise for the contractor to not incur cost to provide an employee that may not be acceptable to the GOI.
    At this point, I must note that the private security contractors and static guards at our posts in Iraq are already made up of U.S. citizens and a host of third country nationals. We probably should not be surprised if the health units turn up with a medical crew made up of third country nationals.

    The Fitness Question with a Troubling Answer


    Then there is that fitness question and the troubling answer. I don't know how often military personnel must now do a drug test; at one point, it was twice a year, they all pee in a cup and get checked. The USG seems to be saying, we don't care, it's up to you. Remember the contractors here will be working for the health units and the diplomatic support hospitals; there will be drugs/controlled substance/pharmaceuticals.
    Q: “The Contractor shall provide technically competent Health Care Providers (HCPs) that are “medically and dentally fit” in the time frame stated in the task order award notice.”  Will candidates be undergoing a Pre-Medical screening?  Does the Pre-Medical screening include a drug test? If so, who will pay the cost and are the requirements similar to those deploying to the CRC at Ft. Benning, GA?

    A: (We are not familiar with the CRC at Ft. Benning.)  Contractor is responsible for providing personnel who are medically fit and able to perform their duties.  If they are unable to perform due to drug impairment, either because they are not physically and mentally competent or because they are unable to receive and maintain an MRPT clearance, they will be found unacceptable.  
    If you're thinking about DOD residual support, there will be NONE
    Q: Will the military have no residual support in Iraq to provide for service members?  Evacuation of service members?  And only until December 2011?

    A: USF-I will provide support, in some areas only, until the end of 2011.  Where support is not available, active duty military will be deemed to fall under the DoS eligible population and will be supported by the Contractor. Beyond 12-2011, all military will fall under the Chief of Mission authority as applicable to eligibility.
    How about medical malpractice insurance?
    Q: The cited clause does not contain the minimum malpractice insurance required.  Will the government specify the minimum amount of malpractice insurance?

    A: The RFP has been amended to include the following:  a) Malpractice Insurance—for non-surgeon doctors, nurse practitioners, and physicians assistants, $1 million/ $3 million (per occurrence/total).  
    There will be blood...will there be blood?
    Q: For these blood and blood products, will the Government also provide transportation support through the TOC?

    A: The contractor will be responsible for procuring blood and blood products from Qatar; Transportation to Baghdad will be made available from Kuwait and Amman via Embassy supported flights.  Within Iraq, Embassy Air Operations will support further movement.
    I'm sorry I can't help myself -- must point out that the Q&A include an item indicating that 84 binders are NOT/NOT required for the proposal:
    Q: Please confirm that the Government’s intent is for offerors to submit a total of 12 binders for each of the five Task Order Proposals. The total number of binders each offeror would be submitting is 84. Would the Government change the requirement to have all task order Technical Proposals in a single binder and task order Price Proposals in a single binder? The total number of binders would be reduced to 30.

    A: No, it was not the Government's intent to require 84 binders.  The language has been clarified, both in L.10 and in the attachments.  

    I must note that this Q&A is dated months ago. Recent news report seems to indicate that Iraq will request our troops to stay past December 2011.

    I have posted previously about Embassy Baghdad General Hospital based on the OIG report which reviewed the embassy's transition preparation. I will have a related post to follow on this subject.




     
     
     

    Thursday, June 2, 2011

    Embassy Baghdad General Hospital, the Spinoff - Catch It This Fall or Winter But Don't Forget Your Kevlar

    General Hospital, the only ABC soap opera still in production after January 20, 2012, will be joined by a spinoff, Embassy Baghdad General Hospital to debut in the 2011-2012 season.  While head doctors, nurses, oh, and construction crews are still to be recruited, please try your best not to get hurt over there.

    Why?

    Because it's not teevee over there!  According to the OIG a "fully staffed medical facilities may not be in place by the end of the year and and will be costly to establish and sustain.[REDACTED]"

    Holy mother of goat and all her crazy nephews!

    So if our folks are IED'ed over there between October and December, they're supposed to do what, go band-aid or something?

    Here's the story -- by October 1, 2011, the State Department will assume full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq, as DOD withdraws its remaining 50,000 troops by December 2011, based on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. 

    But, but .... that's only four months away --

    Don't be anxious because the embassy has plans!

    Via the OIG report on Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq Performance Evaluation, fresh from the oven:

    Embassy Baghdad plans to establish a network of contractor-supported medical facilities to provide comprehensive medical care after the U.S. military’s withdrawal. A concept of operations has been developed and excess military medical equipment has been requested from DOD, but the Department is still in the contract solicitation phase (emphasis added).

    Senior embassy officials told the OIG team there is a risk the embassy will not have a fully mission capable medical operation prior to the military’s departure. For example, a contractor needs to be selected; doctors, nurses, and medical technicians identified and deployed; facilities constructed; and a host of logistical operations settled.

    The embassy plans to develop its own medical care operations because all but two hospitals (in Erbil) cannot be used due to security concerns or inadequate medical care.

    Plans call for establishing an undetermined number of medical units to provide on-site primary and initial emergency care for general medical, surgical, orthopedic, gynecologic, and mental health conditions to personnel at embassy sites. There are also plans to set up an undetermined number of diplomatic support hospitals to provide medical/trauma care and overnight bed capabilities. The largest of the diplomatic support hospitals will be located within the U.S.-controlled area at the Baghdad International Airport. This hospital will have the staff and equipment to manage two surgical patients, as well as post-operative/intensive care to stabilize up to six patients until they can be medically evacuated.

    The cost to develop and sustain medical care operations is currently unknown, but according to embassy officials, it will be considerable. Further, based on interviews with embassy management, security, and medical personnel, and review of available planning documents, the [REDACTED]

    Although embassy medical plans do not currently include the capability for handling a mass casualty event, embassy officials stated that even the U.S. military’s current combat support hospital can be overwhelmed by a large number of casualties. The embassy won’t have the resources that are currently available at the military’s hospital; however, embassy officials stated that they are developing scenarios and will continue to explore possibilities for mitigating the impact of a mass casualty event, such as moving surgeons, employing fixed wing embassy planes, utilizing a civilian air ambulance service, or calling upon possible military resources to transport casualties to advanced trauma care facilities in Amman, Europe, or the Gulf.
    I have friends deploying to Iraq this summer.  I can't understand why we continue sending unarmed civilians over there to do "reconstruction." And even if I can convince part of my brain as to the reason we're sending unarmed civilians over there to do "reconstruction," I still can't understand why this is coming down the wires with four months to go. 

    Can you imagine sending our soldiers to battle without a fully functional medical support nearby?  Nope, I can't. But apparently, it is perfectly imaginable and doable to send our diplomats and civilians to a hot zone without the same support. 

    But wait, combat operation is over in Iraq. Right, except that they're still shooting folks over there and bombs are still going off everywhere.

    May I puke perfectly now?






    Embassy Air Iraq: Tickets Available Soon...In the Meantime, Fire Up Your Brooms

    Martin Le France (1410-1461)
    The things you find out in govies reports!  I am aware of the air fleet the State Department is putting together (see our post on the new helo fleet here). I just did not know the exact number or that it officially has a name.  Below is an extract from the OIG report on Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq Performance Evaluation, just released.

    As of January 2011, Embassy Air Iraq consisted of 19 aircraft based in Baghdad.

    The plan is to expand up to as many as 46 aircraft by December 2011, to include:
    • 18-20 medium lift S-61 helicopters

    • 14-18 light lift UH-1N helicopters

    • Three light observation MD-530 helicopters

    • Five Dash 8 fixed wing aircraft (50-passenger capacity)
    The future quantity and mix of aircraft are under review, in conjunction with pending decisions on the future of the U.S. mission in Iraq and the size and scope of the Department’s police training program.

    The fleet will be based and maintained in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil and will service ring routes transporting personnel into and out of Iraq, internally from Baghdad to Basra and Erbil, and to and from helicopter hubs in support of embassy branch offices, police training centers, and OSC sites.


    In addition to putting in place an air operation with more than 20 aircraft supporting a 7-day-a-week mission load, the embassy is facing a number of other challenges in the months ahead.

    First, the Department must finalize agreements with the Governments of Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait authorizing Embassy Air Iraq flight plans.

    Second, the Department needs to finalize land use agreements with the GOI to base aircraft in Basra and Erbil and use landing zones at the hub sites.

    Third, flight and landing zones, maintenance hangars, operation buildings, and air traffic control towers need to be renovated or constructed. Construction is in the initial stage in Baghdad and is only in the planning stage in Erbil and Basra. According to INL officials, completing these construction tasks by December 2011 will be difficult.

    Finally, the embassy must develop an independent aviation logistics operation for maintenance and refueling. Maintenance hangars with cranes are not available and Iraqi commercial aviation fuel delivery capability and dependability is poor.

    So if the air operation is not in place by the time DOD  withdraws from Iraq, our State Department folks will just have to fire up their brooms?

    The report is now posted online:
    -05/31/11   Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq Performance Evaluation (MERO-I-11-08) May 2011  [1258 Kb]



    State Dept's Transition to a Civilian-Led Mission in Iraq, Whassup?

    The Office of the Inspector General will release today its performance evaluation of the Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq (Report Number MERO-I-11-08, May 2011). It does not look good.

    Four months to go and a lot of large items are still on the to-do list.

    Why we'd stay in Iraq with 17,000 civilian personnel in 15 sites across the country with questionable support from the Hill after our military withdraw, under current fiscal reality is foolish. But it looks like we're doing this, this ambitious Future of Iraq Project II and I fear that the results will be just as costly. And I'm not just talking dollars.

    Excerpts:

    By October 1, 2011, the Department will assume full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq, as DOD withdraws its remaining 50,000 troops by December  2011, according to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.1 This withdrawal will require the Department to provide security, life support, transportation, and other logistical support currently provided by the U.S. military in Baghdad, at consulates in Basra and Erbil, at embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul, and at other sites throughout Iraq.

    The transition from a military to a civilian-led mission in Iraq is an unprecedented undertaking, highly complex in nature and scope, with extensive requirements for staff, budgets, and organization—all taking place in an operating environment that is still violent and unpredictable.

    The OIG inspectors, bless their hearts, know how to give brownie points:
    The Department of State (Department) and Embassy Baghdad have put in place planning and management mechanisms to effectively transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. However, several key decisions have not been made, some plans cannot be finalized, and progress is slipping in a number of areas. The lack of senior level Department participation dedicated to the transition process, which has been a weakness, may be alleviated by the Secretary of State’s appointment of an Iraq Transition Coordinator.

    The report enumerates the many challenges of a civilian-led mission:

    Establishing a viable diplomatic mission in Iraq without Department of Defense (DOD) support and funding will require considerable resources. However, challenges to transition planning make it difficult to develop firm or detailed budget estimates. The Department faces many challenges in transitioning to a civilian-led effort in Iraq, including:
    • Transfer of police training from DOD to the Department is generally on schedule, but plans for the size and scope of the mission have had to be revised and land use agreements have not been confirmed. Protective security for contractor personnel working for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will be provided by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). INL and DS are working on a protective security plan, which they intend to conclude soon.
    • Establishment of an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) is behind schedule,and full mission capability is unlikely by October 2011.
    • Construction of four planned provincial posts has been delayed by the inability to decide on scope, size, and land use; and uncertain future funding. In addition to cost, security and safety concerns at the current facilities in Erbil make that location particularly problematic.
    • To meet air transportation requirements, the Department will need to procure additional aircraft, obtain agreements on flight plans and land use,construct or renovate air facilities, and maintain aircraft. (see separate post)
    • Losses in protective security capability for U.S. Government personnel caused by the military’s withdrawal will need to be mitigated through closer working relationships with the GOI, as well as access to DOD security-related information and equipment. In addition, there are still weaknesses in Iraqi military specialty units.
    • Fully staffed medical facilities may not be in place by the end of the year and will be costly to establish and sustain.[REDACTED] (see separate post)
    • Embassy housing is nearing full capacity, and it may be difficult to absorb the expected influx of personnel. In addition, necessary generator maintenance will decrease available electric power at the same time as demand increases.

    FY2011 Iraq Request: 2.7 Billion; FY2012: 6.3 Billion

    Establishing a viable diplomatic mission in Iraq without the considerable support and resources of DOD will almost certainly require years of effort and the investment of significant resources. However, difficulties in making final decisions and completing plans have hindered the ability to derive firm, detailed budget figures for completing the transition and sustaining operations. The administration requested $2.7 billion for Iraq in FY 2011 and has requested $6.3 billion in FY 2012.

    Future American Consulate in Erbil
    The embassy plans to construct temporary facilities by upgrading three provincial reconstruction team (PRT) structures and the regional reconstruction team (RRT) facilities in Erbil. Locating a future consulate in Erbil will be costly, and the security and building safety of the current facilities are problematic. Colocating a temporary consulate at a contingency operations site (COS) near the Erbil airport, which has existing DOD infrastructure, may be a viable alternative.[REDACTED]
    Note that the Erbil province covers an area of 5,570 square miles in the north of Iraq, with an estimated population in 2001 of 1.13 million. It is largely populated by Kurds with Assyrian, Arab and Turkoman minorities. From 1974 onwards, the province of Arbil formed part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region of northern Iraq.

    Going to Iraq? Bring Your Tent. And Hand Fan!
    Embassy Baghdad is nearing its full housing capacity with nearly 4,000 beds, but will need to accommodate an influx of civilian personnel, which is currently planned to increase to around 8,000 by the end of 2011. The embassy is negotiating with the GOI to obtain more property currently occupied by the U.S. military, but there are no contingency plans if these property leases are delayed or denied. Further, OIG finds NEA’s proposed accommodation solutions neither optimal nor sustainable in the long term. In addition, the electric power generation system is already operating at full capacity using all generators full time. These generators will have to undergo maintenance sooner than planned, which will decrease the amount of electricity when demand is increasing.
    [...]
    NEA officials told the OIG team that creative ways would be found to accommodate and provide life support for more civilian personnel, including “hot bunking” (creating shifts for use of sleeping rooms), adding more containerized housing units, or requiring private contractors to find accommodations off of the embassy compound in nearby neighborhoods. OIG agrees with the embassy that none of these options is optimal or sustainable in the long run.

    Ready or Not: 5,405 Projects Valued at $15.2B Transferred to Iraq

    Embassy officials cited the difficult security environment and poor contractor performance as the major hindrances to project completion. In addition, embassy officials noted the challenge of getting local and provincial governments and GOI ministries to readily assume responsibility for some transferred projects. Despite these challenges, embassy officials noted that, to date, they have been able to transfer 5,405 projects valued at $15.2 billion to local and provincial governments or GOI ministries. Current projections call for completing and transferring the final, remaining 83 projects between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012.

    US Mission Iraq: 17,000 personnel; 15 sites

    The Department’s current plan for Iraq calls for approximately 17,000 personnel under chief of mission authority at 15 sites throughout the country. The goal is to have political, economic, and security personnel throughout the country, especially in key areas, such as Mosul and Kirkuk, to engage daily with their Iraqi counterparts, help defuse crises, and develop long-term solutions to problems. This ambitious diplomatic plan is constrained by competing budget priorities and pressures to restrict overall federal spending.
    The OIG report concludes:
    Establishing a viable diplomatic mission to maintain Iraq as a strategic partner will almost certainly require years of effort and the investment of considerable resources. The Department has requested $6.3 billion in FY 2012 for its programs and activities in Iraq, but recent congressional debate foretells a tightening fiscal situation that may require hard choices in the years ahead. Managing the transition in Iraq is an unprecedented effort as is the Department’s transformation into an expeditionary organization working in an overseas contingency operational environment.

    Do you fell like playing the Awful Mess Mystery album, like now?