Former DS Special Agent Pleads Guilty to Transportation of Child Pornography

James Charles Cafferty
Federal mug shot

I last blogged about Mr. Cafferty in October 2011 (See Diplomatic Security Special Agent Indicted for Possession and Receipt of Child Pornography).  On January 6, the FBI/Tampa Division announced that Mr. Cafferty pleaded guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson of Florida. Mr. Cafferty previously worked as an RSO at the US Embassy in London.  The US Embassy in London is one of our mega-embassies although not in the Baghdad scale.  It has approximately 950 employees including about 450 direct-hire American employees, a couple dozens employed EFMs, and some 465 locally employed staff.

WASHINGTON—A Largo, Florida resident pleaded guilty yesterday in the Middle District of Florida to one count of transportation of child pornography, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida Robert E. O’Neill and Special Agent in Charge Steven E. Ibison of the FBI’s Tampa Field Office.

James Charles Cafferty, 45, pleaded guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson.

According to court documents and proceedings, Cafferty, who was a special agent for the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, purchased memberships in several child pornography websites. A subsequent search warrant executed at Cafferty’s home revealed hard drives containing thousands of child pornography files. Cafferty admitted during an interview that he had shipped these hard drives from London to his home in Largo.

Cafferty faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, as well as the possibility of lifetime supervised release. Cafferty also faces a fine of $250,000.

This case was investigated by the FBI, the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Largo Police Department.

I don't know if Mr. Cafferty quit or was fired.  This presumably is a firing offense under "notoriously disgraceful conduct" that which, were it to become widely known, would embarrass, discredit, or subject to opprobrium the perpetrator, the Foreign Service, and the United States:

"Disqualification of a candidate or discipline of an employee, including separation for cause, is warranted when the potential for opprobrium or
contempt should the conduct become public knowledge could be reasonably expected to affect adversely the person’s ability to perform his or her own job or the agency’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. "

The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing has put together a guide on the problem of Internet child pornography. It notes that "users of Internet child pornography are not necessarily involved in hands-on sexual abuse of children." The guide says that it is not known exactly how many people may access child pornography on the Internet without ever physically abusing a child. Before the Internet, between one-fifth and one-third of people arrested for possession of child pornography were also involved in actual abuse.

Apparently offenders also come from all walks of life and show few warning signs: "[U]sers of child pornography on the Internet are more than likely to be in a relationship, to be employed, to have an above average IQ, to be college educated, and to not have a criminal record. Those arrested for online child pornography crimes have included judges, dentists, teachers, academics, rock stars, soldiers, and police officers."

Related articles

• State department employee pleads guilty to child pornography charges (examiner.com)
• Stung By FBI, Perverted State Department Employee Pleads Guilty In Child Porn Case (gangsgoonsandgunz.com)

State Dept Seeks Aviation Advisor for Iraq Rescues 58 Days Before Liftoff?

Via Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman:

The State Department has already requisitioned an army, part of the roughly 5,000 private security contractors State is hiring to protect diplomats stationed in Iraq. Now, State is hiring someone to provide a little help from the air: an “Aviation Advisor” responsible for “Search and Rescue (SAR), medical evacuations (ME), transporting Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to respond to incidents, and provid[ing] air transportation for Chief of Mission personnel.” It’s not a familiar job for the diplomatic corps, which is why State is seeking to bring in someone from the outside.

The State Department put out this notice on Nov. 4. That’s 58 days before the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Fifty-eight days before State has the skies over Iraq to itself.
[..]

Air operations are not as simple has hiring skilled pilots to put well-maintained machines in the skies.

The military has long-standing procedures in place for designing and executing aerial missions. An experienced chain of command maintains order, discipline, coordination and success. This is what the military does.

It’s not what the State Department does. Only a relatively few officials go into the U.S. diplomatic corps to oversee security operations.
[...]
Inevitably, things will go wrong in these complex air operations. A functioning chain of command exists to minimize those mistakes and mitigate their impact.

The State Department still does not have someone atop that chain, with fewer than 60 days before it finds itself alone in the skies.
[...]
Until State can figure out its chain of command for air operations, its employees in Iraq — some 17,000 of them, according to current plans — had better hope they don’t need air support. There’s not much time to put one in place.

Continue reading, U.S. Hiring Mercenary Air Force for Iraq Rescues.

Anyway -- even if you do find the right person for this job in 57 days, how fast can that person get medically cleared, obtain a security clearance, get administratively processed and get a plan together?  A plan is important; of the 75 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 36 were downed by enemy fire (source).

There is, too, the contractor run and led-medical supply chain. If somebody is hurt, and is airlifted to one of the embassy district hospitals in Iraq, is the embassy blood program even in place and functioning as the military's? 


I have posted previously about Embassy Air Iraq here, and the Embassy Baghdad General Hospital here.  I've also posted about the transition and the medical support functions here, here, here and here.

In one of those posts about hospitals, a reader commented that it's strange that the subject wasn't mentioned in the Afghanistan-Iraq-Pakistan bidding cables for foreign service officers.

Somebody who writes as NewtonCM2 said "It wasn't mentioned in the AIP bidding cables because it's not true. There will be continuous, full medical coverage through the entire military to State transition. The OIG got this one wrong."

As far as I know, the OIG never corrected that report on the Iraq transition.

I hope that the State Dept is advising its contractors and employees bidding on Iraq jobs that its air operation in the country responsible for search and rescue, medevac, etc, etc. is still up on the air.  So they have the option to pack their broomsticks. 

Related articles

• White House Confident State Department Can Manage Enormous Private Security Contractor Force in Iraq (news.firedoglake.com)
• U.S. Hiring Mercenary Air Force for Iraq Rescues (wired.com)
• Military Post Offices in Iraq to Close Nov. 17 (waronterrornews.typepad.com)

Diplomatic Security Special Agent Indicted for Possession and Receipt of Child Pornography

Via DOJ/FBI:

TAMPA—United States Attorney Robert E. O’Neill announces that James Charles Cafferty (45, Largo) was indicted on October 19, 2011 for possession and receipt of child pornography. Cafferty faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in federal prison on the charge involving the receipt of child pornography, and up to 10 years in federal prison on the possession of child pornography charge. At the time of his arrest, Cafferty was a special agent in Diplomatic Security with the Department of State.

This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Largo Police Department. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Colleen Murphy Davis.

The case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov. For more information about Internet safety education, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov and click on the tab “other resources.”

The Smoking Gun covered this case in late September here complete with a mug shot. The special agent for Diplomatic Security was reportedly stationed at the U.S. Embassy in London when he was named in an August 29 felony complaint charging him with possession of child pornography.

GPS Tracking for State Dept Staffers in the Danger Zones of Iraq, Af/Pak and Yemen

Wapo's Walter Pincus recently wrote about a new high-tech system to track U.S. staff on risky tours:

The State Department is installing advanced, classified security systems in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen to monitor staff movements in those countries where moving among local populations remains dangerous, according to department budget and contract documents.

The Blue Force Tracker system uses a small transmitter mounted on a vehicle, an aircraft or an individual that sends continuous signals to a Global Positioning System satellite and back to a computer in a secure command post. The command post computer shows precise locations within a 10-foot radius of tracked individuals, vehicles or aircraft on ever-changing map displays.

“This critical technology provides department personnel with the confidence to travel into highly dangerous areas, knowing there is an over-watch and a reaction capability to help them at the push of a button,” according to a State Department fiscal 2012 budget document presented to Congress. About $9.4 million was being sought to support the tracking system in Iraq next year.

No State Department official would discuss the systems on the record.

Read the whole thing here.


It's supposed to give staff confidence because the watchers will be able to pinpoint their location -- and give the State Department an "over-watch and a reaction capability to help them [(staff] at the push of a button."

So -- if we have another Raymond Davis incident in any of those four countries, this would allow for a quick extraction of personnel in danger, is that the idea? Because -- really, unless you can retrieve/extract the personnel in danger, pinpointing location is just that - a dot on the screen. 

The report did not say what type of GPS system this might be -- a wearable item like a watch, a smart phone with GPS locator, an implantable device more or less the size of rice, a waist-clip on GPS enabled thingee like a pager or I don't know -- a fake eye, a third eye, an earing, an anklet ....


If a GPS rice implant is available, that might be the best choice - nothing to remember, nothing to forget, nothing to misplace or pack or hide when you travel. And if you ever get into a tussle with overly excited security agents of the host country, nothing that may break (that Uncle Sam can then charged you with). Of course, since this is the government, they probably will have somebody check out your GPS rice implant every year for the annual inventory. Be prepared to be scanned like Ms. Kitty.

It does look like the Blue Force Tracker Program (BFT) is deploying into the hot zones of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen since Olgoonik Global Security, LLC is hiring Security Specialist IIs for all four countries; it says so online:

Subsidiary:     Olgoonik Global Security, LLC
Location:     Pakistan
Organization:     BFT
Requisition Number:     2010759

Overview:

The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Office of Security Technology (ST), is responsible for the Department's Blue Force Tracker Program (BFT). BFT utilizes GPS satellite tracking for personnel, vehicles and aircraft. It is designed to maximize visualization of designated assets traveling and conducting operations in hostile or hazardous areas.  This position will be responsible for working with DS/C/ST and Embassy personnel on-site and providing technical guidance on both the BFT tracker hardware and monitoring software.

Among other things, it requires that applicants have "Bachelor’s Degree plus seven years of experience preferred; High School Diploma plus 12 years of experience can substitute for a Bachelor’s Degree." Also the following:

Security Clearance:                                       

TOP SECRET Clearance with SCI Access Required

• Must have a current US Government TOP SECRET Personnel Security Clearance and be able to qualify for SCI access

• Must have a current US Government Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) (less than 4-1/2 years old) or be able to successfully complete a U.S. government administered Single Scope Background Investigation.

• Must be a U.S. Citizen.

• Must be eligible for and able to obtain and maintain required Security Clearance/access approvals.

Physical Demands:

The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met by an employee to successfully perform the essential functions of this position.  The employee must be able to stand, walk and sit for a prolonged period of time; use hands and/or fingers to handle or feel objects, tools or controls; operate office equipment; reach with hands and arms; climb stairs; balance; stoop; kneel; talk and hear. Specific vision abilities required by the job include close and distant vision.  The employee must occasionally lift and or move up to 50 pounds.  Medical conditions or physical impediments may disqualify candidates from overseas work where comprehensive medical care may be limited or unavailable, or where the condition or impediment would put the individual at unacceptable risk.  Duties may be performed in an active combat zone where the employee would be required to seek shelter. There may be stress, psychological and physical hardships, and the possibility of living in field conditions associated with this position.

Travel:

Overseas travel will be required up to 90% of the calendar year in high-threat areas.  Domestic travel may be required for training and program coordination.
Work Environment:  Full-time, 84-hour week usually under hazardous conditions when deployed in a theater of operations.  Personnel meeting the provisions of Department of State Standardized Regulations, Chapter 650 – Danger Pay Allowance, and performing in a location determined a hazardous duty area are eligible to receive danger pay up to 35% over basic compensation.

Living Environment:  Lodging, meals, medical and basic life support services will be provided while in a theater of operations, as well as the prevailing per diem rate for incidental expenses (IE).

Work Location:  The location of high-risk environments will be disclosed upon interview.

Interested? Check it out here. You have to locate each job vacancy using the location country drop down menu on its website.

A side note -- DOD has been using Blue Force Tracking (BFT) for years.  In 2006, Popular Science did a piece on BFT used in Iraq. Read "Winning-and Losing-the First Wired War."

Related articles

• You Can Legally Use GPS to Track Your Cheating Spouse Now [GPS] (gizmodo.com)
• Hudak vows to make sex offenders wear GPS devices (thestar.com)
• The Increasing Danger in GPS Jammer Usage (gpstrackingblog.wordpress.com)

DS Agents deployed to Iraq charged overpayment for overtime worked, State Dept demands repayment. Isn't that like working for free?

This is one of those cases that makes me simply want to -- well, puke.

These DS agents were sent to Iraq, according to court papers, "in support of State's attempt to establish a diplomatic presence in Iraq, after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime." They worked ungodly long hours under difficult conditions. They got paid for those hours worked. But see - there was a pay cap to how much you could earn over there. At that time, the pay cap was the $128,200 maximum available under level V of the Executive Schedule. Due to OT, these DS agents exceeded the maximum amount permitted.

So, the State Department basically slapped the agents head for not keeping track of their earnings and required the agents to pay back the "overpayment." In short, to give back all dollar amount in excess of  $128,200 per individual, even if those constitutes payment for hours already worked. Does that sound fair? Nope, but that's what happened. It was considered a "debt" that had to be collected. Subsequently, a law was passed to allow for a pay cap waiver for certain Feds. But the State Dept apparently refused to grant those waivers.

Below is what the Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSGB) reported to Congress in its annual report:

In Richard Lubow, et al. v. United States Department of State, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80830 (D.D.C. 2010), the Court vacated in part the decisions of the Department of State and the General Services Administration Contract Board of Appeals that denied pay claims by five individuals who were initially compensated for overtime hours worked in Iraq and then had those payments recouped on the grounds that to the extent that the pay exceeded the maximum pay that was permitted to be paid pursuant to 5 CFR Part 550, for 2004, it was paid contrary to law. The Department demanded repayment of the overpayment of wages and further declined to waive repayment of that debt.

The Court found that neither the Department nor the GSA Contract Board of Appeals had considered whether the provisions of the Emergency Supplemental Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005 (“Appropriations Act of 2005”), which permitted federal agencies to waive the pay cap for certain federal employees in calendar year 2005, up to a maximum of $200,000, applied to payments made to the plaintiffs (grievants) during pay period 25 of 2004, which sums were actually paid in January 2005. The Board of Contract Appeals did not consider the legislation because it had not yet been passed when it reached its conclusions. The court further found that there was no indication on the record that the State Department had taken the 2005 pay cap waiver into account when it determined whether and how much debt the plaintiffs owed the Department. The FSGB did not rule upon the issue because the argument was never asserted before the Board as a basis for finding that the debt was not valid, in part. The court remanded the cases to the State Department and the Board of Contract Appeals for further consideration taking into account the effects of the Department’s August 2005 waiver of the premium pay cap as it would apply to plaintiffs’ earnings in pay period 25 of 2004. No decision on the remand has been reported to the FSGB as of this date.

I did some digging, because dammit, this just doesn't sound right, does it?

Here are the five cases filed with the Foreign Service Grievance Board. You may use the numbers in bold below to search for the full documents in the FSGB unfriendly web:

FSGB No. 2006-033 | Grievant was assigned to [Named Post] from February [Year #1] until February [Year #2].  In November [Year #1], the Department notified grievant that his pay had reached or would shortly reach the statutory cap applicable to the total of base pay plus premium pay.  In April [Year #2], the Department notified him that of the total [Year #1] premium payments made to him, $10,514.98 ($10,669.69 minus a $154.71 Medicare payment) exceeded the cap and required reimbursement.

FSGB No. 2006-032 | Grievant was assigned to [Named Post] from January [Year #1] until December [Year #1].  In November [Year #1], the Department notified grievant that his pay had reached or would shortly reach the statutory cap applicable to the total of base pay plus premium pay.  In April [Year #2], the Department notified him that of the total [Year #1] premium payments made to him, $435.94 ($442.35 minus a $6.41 Medicare payment) exceeded the cap and required reimbursement.

FSGB No. 2006-031 | Grievant was assigned to [Named Post] from February [Year #1] until February [Year #2].  In November [Year #1], the Department notified grievant that his pay had reached or would shortly reach the statutory cap applicable to the total of base pay plus premium pay.  In April [Year #2], the Department notified him that of the total [Year #1] premium payments made to him, $5,702.69 ($5,786.60 minus an $83.91 Medicare payment) exceeded the cap and required reimbursement.

FSGB No. 2006-030 | Grievant was assigned to [Named Post] from February [Year #1] until February [Year #2].  In November [Year #1], the Department notified grievant that his pay had reached or would shortly reach the statutory cap applicable to the total of base pay plus premium pay.  In April [Year #2], the Department notified him that of the total [Year #1] premium payments made to him, $6,308.07 ($6,400.88 minus a $92.81 Medicare payment) exceeded the cap and required reimbursement.

FSGB No. 2006-029 | The Department concluded that grievant was “at fault” because he was aware of the premium pay cap and failed to track adequately the premium payments he received or take corrective action when his pay reached the cap. [Grievant], a Department of State (the Department, agency) Diplomatic Security Officer, appeals the Department’s denial of his request to waive the collection of $7,775.83 in premium pay that exceeded the applicable annual premium pay cap.

Each of the five grievants had in their record of proceeding with the FSGB the following:

"Grievant contested this decision and asked the Department to waive reimbursement under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 5584.  Grievant contended that he was not aware of the overpayment and that when he did become aware of it late in the calendar year, the Department did little to remedy the situation.  He attributed the error to Department inefficiency and stated that it was unfair and unjust for him to reimburse the government for work he performed in extraordinarily dangerous conditions.  He alleged that, even if he had been aware that he was reaching the pay cap, there was nothing he could do to reduce the premium pay owed to him.  Working the standard 40-hour workweek was not an option in [Named Post].  He also objected to the fact that a waiver of the premium pay cap was authorized for employees who served in [Year #2] in [Named Post], but not for those who served in [Year #1]."

In January 2010, the FSGB held that "The Department did not abuse its discretion in denying grievants a waiver of repayment of the premium payments they received for service in (country) in 2004 that exceeded the pay cap established by 5 CFR 550. (see Record of Proceeding | January 7, 2010 FSGB Nos. 2006-029, 030, 031, 032, 033). See the following overview.

Grievants were assigned to (country) in 2004.  In late November of that year, the Department notified them that the combined total of their basic and premium pay had reached or would shortly reach the cap imposed on such pay by 5 CFR 550.  In April of 2005, grievants were advised definitively that their pay had exceeded the cap, and they were directed to repay the excess premium payments. 

Grievants requested that the Department waive collection of the overpayment, citing the authority set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 5584.  The Department denied the request, advising grievants that they were “at fault” under the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 5584(b)(1), and thus, under the statutory criteria, a waiver could not be granted.  Grievants contested that decision in a grievance filed with the Department.  The Department denied the grievance and grievants appealed to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (Board).

In a decision issued July 28, 2008, the Board determined that grievants were not at fault for incurring the excess payments, and that the Department, therefore, was not precluded from granting the waiver.  The Board directed the Department to reconsider on the merits.  In its reconsideration, the Department determined that collection of the debts was not “against equity and good conscience” and would be “in the best interests of the United States” in accordance with the criteria established by the statute granting the Department waiver authority.  It again directed that grievants make repayment of the debts.  Grievants again appealed to the Board.

Grievants argued that it was unfair for the Department to require them to repay payments made to them for overtime actually worked under dangerous conditions when the Department, recognizing the inequity of such a situation, had raised the pay cap for those serving in Iraq in subsequent years.  The Department countered that the legislation authorizing the pay cap to be raised had only been passed the year after grievants’ service, and it did not apply retroactively.  It also contended that over thirty other employees in the same circumstances had been required to repay their debts and had done so, and that it would be inequitable not to require grievants to do so.

The Board found that the Department had applied the regulatory criteria and that there were equities on both sides.  It concluded, therefore, that the Department had not abused its discretion in denying the waiver.  The grievances were denied.

The lawsuit was subsequently filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  Although all FSGB docs posted online are stripped of grievant's names and other identifying info such as post's served, names of supervisors etc. the court document names the plaintiffs as Richard Lubow, Joseph Bopp, David Bennett, Frank Benevento and James Landis, each "a current or retired member of the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, deployed to Iraq as Foreign Service Specialists."

This lawsuit is about five DS agents but some thirty others who were affected by this policy opted to settle their "debts," which means, they essentially worked those hours free for Uncle Sam. In the warzone.

In August 2010, U.S. District Court Judge John Bates ordered that "the decisions of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Millete and the Board of Contract Appeals that plaintiffs owe a valid debt are REMANDED to the State Department and the Board of Contract Appeals, respectively, for additional consideration in light of the Department's August 2005 waiver of the premium pay cap, which the Department has applied to earnings for work performed in pay period 25 of 2004."

Approximately five years running to collect some $30,000 from these five agents; looks like that's the bounced around time for these cases inside the system. Don't tell me that Foggy Bottom does not have smarter eggs who can sort through this minor jungle. Dudes, it's not like these agents did not work their butts off over these "overpayments" "debts" their earned money. 

I have not seen any update on the status after the court ruling. Hopefully this had been settled favorably but I cannot underestimate enough the unreasonableness of a bureaucracy.

Oh, by the way -- how are we doing with collecting that $132 MILLION refund over the US Embassy construction in Iraq?

Insider Quote: The Problems of Now, the Knee Jerk Variety Response

“Having been assigned to high threat posts and deployments for over eight years, I have seen the strengths and weaknesses inherent with using contractors versus agents. However, as in the case of Iraq, I have also seen the problems with using agents/contractors versus military protection details. Mismanagment and a lack of clear goals, coupled with the fact that the short length of the tour, inhibits any institutional knowledge from being generated. I would also point out that I feel many of DS's reactions and "solutions" to the problems have been short sighted and of a "knee jerk" variety. Often, it would seem that DS is reactionary in their thinking versus being proactive. It would appear that the problems of "now" are receieving the majority of the Department's attention, when some time and planning should be focused on what issues are going to be faced in the future. Many of the individuals making the decisions are from a generation that never faced situations like those that are currently threatening our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sadly, I think that the situation will get worse before it gets better. The nature of protection details are primarily reactionary but the planning that goes into managing these programs needs to be forward thinking.”

Diplomatic Security Agent #9
—p.104 Should the U.S. Department of State Continue to Use Private Security Contractors to Protect U.S. Diplomats?
June 2008 │140 pages PDF
By Special Agent Derek Dela-Cruz
(Master of Military Art and Science, Fort Leavenworth, KS)

We have a winner! QDDR beats Global Operation DSS series in showing up online

Global Operation, the "most compelling, hard-hitting crime drama on the web" based on the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) had a "red carpet" fund-raising event in Hollywood last month, but the webisode that was supposed to come out months ago has yet to make an appearance.

The State Department's QDDR that's supposed to come out months ago also has yet to make an official appearance.  But an unofficial draft QDDR apparently shared with lawmakers yesterday, Wednesday, appeared online at 6:55 PM EST the same day. The presentation is a good teaser, and the QDDR wins the red ribbon but we still are looking forward to reading the full report.    

You can read the document here. Marked NODIS for no distribution but is now obviously, ALLDIS.

Via Josh Rogin of The Cable -

The draft QDDR revealed
Wednesday, November 17, 2010 - 6:55 PM

The State Department on Wednesday sent lawmakers a draft version of the long-awaited Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the document that is meant to chart the long-term strategy for both State and USAID.

You can take a look at the document here (PDF).

"To advance American interests and values and to lead other nations in solving shared problems in the 21st century, we must rely on our diplomats and development experts as the first face of American power. We must lead through civilian power," states the draft, which is marked NODIS (meaning no distribution) but was obtained by the Washington Post.

The document also proposes a host of new organizations to be established within the State Department: These include an Office of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environmental Affairs, which will include a new Bureau of International Energy Affairs; a Special Coordinator for Sanctions and Illicit Finance; and an Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, which would include a new Bureau for Crisis and Conflict Operations. The current Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would be incorporated into this bureau.

Read the entire piece in The Cable here.






Related post:
Which one is going to make it online first -- State's QDDR or the Global Operation DSS series? | Sunday, June 6, 2010

Related articles

• Grading the QDDR with the Five 'A's (devex.com)
• Moving 'USAID Forward' (devex.com)
• Aid central in Clinton's new U.S. diplomatic plan (reuters.com)

Kabul Embassy Security Force contract now combined with Baghdad Embassy contract and WPPS II into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract

We've blogged about the Kabul Embassy Security Force last year (see below):

• POGO writes to Secretary Clinton about US Embassy Kabul Guards | Sep 02, 2009
• US Embassy Kabul: Camp Sullivan Goes Dry | Sep 03, 2009
• Lawsuit Filed Against US Emb Kabul Contractor AGNA | Sep 11, 2009

State's OIG recently released its performance review of the KESF contract. The following items stick out from the report:

• The Kabul Embassy Security Force (KESF), provided through a contract with ArmorGroup of North America (AGNA), has ensured the safety of chief of mission personnel in Kabul.

• The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) did not thoroughly scrutinize Nepalese guards hired by AGNA, allowing guards without experience, training, or background investigations to perform security duty.

• AGNA has employed Nepalese guards without verifiable experience, training, or background investigations in violation of its contract.

• OIG found that 57 percent of Nepalese guards lack a proven level of proficiency required by contract.

• Due to the guards’ low levels of English language proficiency, some supervisors are unable to adequately communicate with their subordinates, which could lead to serious problems during an emergency. OIG calculates that penalties totaling $6 million could be imposed on AGNA for posting guards without required English language proficiency.

• Because AGNA was unable to acquire a sample of an explosive commonly available in Afghanistan, DS changed the contract standards, allowing AGNA to end testing of this material by explosives detection canines. Since this particular explosive is readily available in Afghanistan, the lack of testing could put the embassy at risk.

• DS does not provide a sufficient number of U.S. Government-furnished weapons to the KESF. Currently, there are more guards than weapons, and the day-shift Nepalese guards are sharing weapons with their counterparts on the night shifts. Sharing weapons means that weapon sights are not calibrated to individuals, which affects firing accuracy. 

• OIG noted problems with firearms training that may undermine the readiness and professionalism of the guard force and potentially the security of Embassy Kabul. OIG visited an AGNA firing range, an area 10 miles outside of Kabul, to observe weapon requalification. An OIG team member with 15 years of military experience observed some guards repeatedly missing their mark due to improper breathing techniques and unadjusted sights. No instructors were correcting these deficiencies.

Oh dear! How do you instruct a guard to do something ... anything, in case of an attack of the embassy if he/she does NOT speak English or if the response to your every command could be something equivalent to no habla Englis or bistaari bhannus (please speak slowly). 

You know, that contractor would have been better off hiring moi. Really.  (Please quit laughing, you'll hurt our feelings!)  We don't have any verifiable guard or police training, we'll admit that off the bat; and truth to tell -- we can't shoot straight.  But at least we speak some form of English and have never been known to play with our drinks or run around half neked.  

Below is part of Diplomatic Security's response to the review:   

During late summer of 2009, allegations of misconduct were brought to the Department’s attention and investigated jointly by DS and OIG. As a result of the investigation, 20 AGNA personnel, including its senior in-country management team were removed from the contract. DS also implemented the following measures: a DS Agent was assigned to live at the guard camp; an additional DS agent was designated as a COR to enhance RSO oversight; DS has established a personal services contractor (PSC) position (i.e. a direct government employee, not a third-party contractor) who will arrive in Kabul August 27 to further augment the RSO’s oversight responsibilities; DS introduced mandatory cultural awareness training and banned the consumption or possession of alcohol. A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance deficiencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract.

Details aside, the big picture question is still out there. What do you do when a contractor is unable to fulfill some parts of the contract?  Oh, we know you can kick them out, but then what? Start with the new who's also part of the old?

We really do hope that the new WPS contract works. Word has it that about 7,000 security folks are needed just for Iraq, and we presume that number is for PSD only and does not include the static embassy guards.


State OIG Report | Diplomatic Security Kabul Embassy Security Force

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DMW: Mental Health Treatment Still a Security Clearance Issue at State Department

We have recently posted an email from HRC to State Department employees on seeking help for mental health issues here.

The day after its release, the Concerned Foreign Service Officers issued the following statement (item below from CFSO volunteer blog, Dead Men Working):

WASHINGTON, Sept. 8 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Yesterday, presumably in response to a series of articles in the September issue of the Foreign Service Journal, Secretary of State Clinton issued an internal statement urging employees needing mental health treatment to get it, stating quite clearly that no Foreign Service Officer had ever lost a security clearance due to having sought mental health treatment. Concerned Foreign Service Officers wants to set the record straight.

Executive Order 12968 provides guidelines for the granting or revocation of a clearance. There are only thirteen criteria under which a security clearance can be revoked, and "seeking mental health treatment" is not one of them. Therefore, it is obvious that no official record would provide "seeking mental health treatment" as the justification for a revocation. Instead, the clearance would have been revoked under a guideline such as "mental disorders" or "personal conduct" and the record would reflect that fact. DS revocation letters are short, and unlike those of other agencies, rarely provide details. But there have been well-documented cases where the unmentioned "cause for concern" under the official guideline was the simple act of seeking mental health treatment and the biased reaction to it by DS adjudicators.

Concerned Foreign Service Officers believes that people who need mental health treatment or counseling should get it. But as long as DS continues to adjudicate security clearances without a real whole-person review, without verification of the facts, and without any real oversight, they do, and will continue to revoke security clearances of employees who obtain mental health treatment.

Active links added above. 


Related post:
Clinton issues note on mental health; seeking help a sign of maturity and professionalism | Sept 10

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On the Infamous Q21, PTSD (Again) and High Threat Unaccompanied Assignments

The OIG has released its inspection report dated July 2010 on  the State Department's support for high stress, high threat, unaccompanied posts.  Some interesting details excerpted below. I have also republished the full report in ScribD for easy access (read below).

The Stigma of Seeking Mental Health Care:

The Department of Defense, led by the Secretary of Defense, has undertaken a campaign to reduce or eliminate this stigma. The Department also has made an effort in the past but can do more. The Department, as have the Department of Defense and other federal government agencies, now exempts mental health consultations relating to service in a military combat environment (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan) from being reported on employees’ security clearance forms (it still has to be reported on medical clearance forms). That is just one, though important, step.

There is still a lack of clarity as to what employees must report on the security clearance form. For example, does a discussion between an employee and a health professional on how to manage stress have to be reported even if it does not involve diagnosis and treatment of a mental disorder? Opinions differ on that point. However, if such “preclinical” discussions have to be reported, that will ensure that fewer will take place, even if the Department is more successful than in the past in reducing the stigma. This would undercut the Department’s efforts to build resiliency among its employees.

The Department needs to address the overall issue of the stigma. The next step should be a message from the Department’s leadership to all employees making some of the following points (which have been made to the OIG team by MED and DS):

• The Department encourages its employees to seek mental health care. It is a positive act and a normal part of maintaining one’s health and preparedness.

• Employees could be more likely to put at risk their clearances and job performance when they do not seek such care.

• Only two employees have lost their security clearances over the past fi ve years because of mental health issues (which did not involve PTSD).

• Of the 517 cases concerning mental health issues that DS referred to MED during 2009, not one resulted in denial of a security clearance for mental health reasons.

Two years ago, we called for such a high level message from Secretary Rice in On the Infamous Q21, PTSD and the Wholeness of People in the Foreign Service(May 2008): 

Considering that State has its own clearance process and is a separate agency from DOD, I’m waiting for revised guidance for State Department personnel from Secretary Rice herself. Uhm, no offense intended; the guidance from “M” or “DGHR” or “DS” is fine but I don’t think that really cuts the cake here.

I’d like to see the Department of State, at the highest level of the 7th Floor, affirm and strongly endorse the practice of seeking professional help to address all health related concerns, including mental health. The press guidance above only refers to service in Iraq and Afghanistan, but what about service in the rest of the FS hardship assignments? The emotional toll of constant moving and relocation coupled with dangerous and challenging assignments is not something that we can or should ignore.

We're a small fly in a thick soup, of course; that did not go anywhere.  Secretary Clinton as far as we are aware has not issued a message similar to Secretary Gates' message. 

This report by the way, notes that "In the past five years, 18 employees have been formally diagnosed with PTSD. Of these, 10 had served in posts other than Iraq or Afghanistan." So there are more posts at play here than just the war zones. 

Leadership and Stress:

In practically any conversation about the causes of stress and inefficiency in the Department or at overseas posts, the issue of inadequate leadership/management comes up. For some employees, this is a greater problem than danger and hardship. Good leadership can do a great deal to create high morale and effectiveness at difficult posts. Poor leadership, of course, can be a problem at any post or bureau, but it can be especially harmful at a high stress, high threat post. In the OIG survey, leadership problems were cited by 45 percent of the respondents as a source of stress for them or their colleagues. As noted above, this was less than the percentage citing danger, workload, and separation from families, but leadership problems generated more passionate comments than any other issue. That is probably because, unlike danger and separation, employees feel that something can and should be done about leadership.

This is not to say that poor management is widespread at high stress or more “normal” posts. In fact, OIG inspections have found that at a substantial majority of posts, the top leadership is doing fairly to very well. Also, inspections have found that inexperienced personnel have put an additional burden on top leadership as well as middle managers. (See section below on whether the right people are being assigned.) However, recent inspections have found too many cases of managers at the top and middle levels who cause unnecessary stress and inefficiency and thus impair the morale and smooth functioning of their post, bureau, office, or section.

Are the right people on the right bus?

The OIG survey asked whether the Department generally was assigning employees with the necessary skills, experience, and temperament to high stress, high threat posts. Over 60 percent of respondents said no. In their comments, those who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and answered in the negative made observations such as: there are too many people who are there just for the money, their next assignment, or to save a failing career. There are people who do not have the necessary experience or the mental and physical resiliency to be effective; such people make work more difficult for the others. There was a feeling that taking virtually anyone who volunteers has a negative impact on the post.

Lessons not learned, again:

Care should be taken in setting numerical staffing targets. A smaller, higher quality staff can usually do a better job. The OIG inspection of Embassy Baghdad found that many employees thought that staffing levels were too high as a result of the “civilian surge,” even taking into account the need to compensate for the absence of staff because of rest and recuperation leave (R&R) and other factors. The OIG inspection of Embassy Kabul found that the Baghdad experience was being repeated, with staff added before functions were identified and job descriptions developed.

An ALMOST “fitness for duty” policy:

OIG would support the Department’s developing a stronger “fitness for duty” policy that would be fair not just to the individual, but also to his or her colleagues, and that would maintain the effectiveness of a high stress, high threat post. Administrative and legal barriers, however, limit the Department’s options. In a recent review of the issue of physical fitness for high threat posts, the Department concluded that providing employees with the information to make an intelligent self-assessment of their capabilities was the best available means of handling this problem.

Finally, in Recycling News:

Care should also be taken in reviewing the skills and experience of employees hired under the 3161 authority for Iraq and Afghanistan, both for fi rst-time hires and re-hires. A number of people in the OIG survey expressed concern that 3161 employees who did not do very well in Iraq were being hired to go to Afghanistan, and many more thought that 3161 personnel in general needed greater knowledge of the objectives and operations of the Department and other government agencies to be effective in their jobs.

The original OIG report is posted here (OIG Report No. ISP-I-10-44 - Review of Support for High Stress, High Threat, Unaccompanied Posts - July 2010).

State Department/OIG Report of Inspection | Review of Support for Employees (Unaccompanied Posts)

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Did you hear about the RSO who wanted to know about all your Facebook contacts?

RSO, as in Regional Security Officer.  Apparently at one overseas post, the RSO has asked employees to inform the Security Office of all their Facebook contacts. Did you see that covered in the use of social media under 5 FAM 790?

If I were a paranoid RSO, I'd be thinking that Internet Russian spy sensation, Ana Chapman may have "friended" you guys in Facebook and you forgot about her. Check your Facebook contacts, pronto! 
 
Seriously, let's see what the new policy of using social media say about this?

5 FAM 792.5 Counterintelligence Awareness
(CT:IM-110; 06-10-2010)
All Department personnel or other U.S. Government representatives accessing Department social media sites in any capacity must be alert to the potential targeting of users for intelligence-gathering purposes. Department personnel must remain aware of their responsibilities as outlined in 12 FAM 260. Personnel must pay particular attention to the contact reporting requirements explained in 12 FAM 262.1

See -- did that say anywhere that you must report all your social media contacts?


Let's err on the side of caution and check out what 12 FAM 262.1 actually says on contact reporting requirements...

12 FAM 262.1 Policy
(CT:DS-154; 04-12-2010)
a. The Department’s regulations have long required employees to report contacts with nationals of certain countries, due to both intelligence and terrorism concerns. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-12 issued specific instructions and mandated that all U.S. Government agencies implement similar programs. The following procedures meet the President’s requirement that those who serve in America’s most sensitive jobs work with security offices to guard against illegal or unauthorized access to classified or otherwise sensitive information.

b. All employees and contractors must report:

(1) Unofficial contact with a national from a country with critical
HUMINT threat posts listed on the Department’s Security
Environment Threat List (SETL) if the employee and/or critical
threat foreign national suggest, agree to, or actually have a second
meeting after an initial encounter. (The SETL is available on the
classified network via links on the Department’s Web site);

(2) Contact and/or association with a person or organization who the
employee knows or suspects advocate the unlawful overthrow of
the U.S. Government;

(3) Contact and/or association with a person whom the employee
knows or suspects is a member or supporter of foreign terrorist
organizations (FTOs), as designated by the Secretary of State (see
the list of FTOs);

(4) Unofficial contact with a person who the employee knows or
suspects is a member of a foreign intelligence agency, regardless of
nationality;

(5) Illegal or unauthorized access that is sought to classified or
otherwise sensitive information; or

(6) When the employee is concerned that he or she may be the target
of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.

c. This policy is not intended to limit or impair professional or personal
contacts. Its purpose is to protect the security of the United States and
its employees while ensuring the privacy of employees and their freedom
of association. Further, this policy seeks to ensure that security risks to
persons or to the U.S. Government are identified at the earliest possible
opportunity and deterred, and that protective steps are taken to avoid
compromise of U.S. employees and national security interests.
Employees are considered partners in the management of this regulation.

d. The term “contact” means all manner of personal or impersonal
communication and includes, but is not limited to, written, telephonic,
electronic mail, text messaging, chat room discussion or other social
media, facsimile, wire, and/or amateur radio.

I'm not making this up, dude! This is publicly available material  for anyone.

On closer reading - this also makes it abundantly clear that the regs have not thought out that part about the virtual nature of social media. For example, part of the new regs says: 

All employees and contractors must report ...
(1) Unofficial contact with a national from a country with critical HUMINT threat posts listed on the Department’s Security Environment Threat List (SETL) if the employee and/or critical threat foreign national suggest, agree to, or actually have a second meeting after an initial encounter.

Does online encounter in blogs, Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter, etceeetera -- count as initial encounter? Does online encounter counts as a meeting for purposes of "second meeting" described in this section? Given the networked nature of social media, if you are in a "critical HUMINT threat posts" does that indeed means reporting all the names in your Facebook account or your spouse's Facebook account? Or your kids', or grandma's?   

Oh, how tricky is that? 

On second thought, let's say for a moment that the RSO who wanted to know about all your Facebook contacts is on the right side of the regs --- post's 100 employees have approximately 100 Facebook contacts each, not counting other social media accounts. That's 1,000 10,000 names that the RSO shall have collected at the end of the day (sorry, misplaced my brain cells last night, thanks Chris)!). So ....

Who will have time to comb through the names or process such info into understandable boxes of data. The RSO, presumably. And while he/she is doing that, who will be doing his/her non-social media police duties?

Somebody might want to ask Diplomatic Security for clarification since they wrote this policy (it looks like -- in April this year).  But really, somebody over there who actually uses the various social media and not just looks through them ought to get a red pen and go through the regs once more. 

That said -- it may not be Ana Chapman, and this RSO may not have a real good reason for asking about those contacts last month but this week, he'll have an excellent argument. On June 22, Computer World reports how a fake femme fatale shows the risks of social networks.

Hundreds of people in the information security, military and intelligence fields recently found themselves with egg on their faces after sharing personal information with a fictitious Navy cyberthreat analyst named "Robin Sage," whose profile on prominent social networking sites was created by a security researcher to illustrate the risks of social networking.  

Image from ComputerWorld

Researcher Thomas Ryan who conducted the experiment said that he used a few photos to portray the fictional Sage on Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter as an attractive, somewhat flirty cybergeek, with degrees from MIT and a prestigious prep school in New Hampshire. He also said, "I wanted to see how much intel you could gather from a person just by lurking on a social networking site. I [also] wanted to see who was most susceptible to clicking. I wanted to see how fast this thing would propagate. One of the things I found was that MIT and St. Paul's [prep school] were very cliquey. If they don't remember seeing you, they are not going to click. You had less of a chance of penetrating those groups than the actual intel and security communities."

Read the whole thing here.    

Thomas Ryan will speak at the BlackHat Security Conference in Las Vegas (more eggs on the face next week) where he will point out that though his "28 day experiment, it became evident that the propagation of a false identity via social networking websites is rampant and viral. Much of the information revealed to Robin Sage violated OPSEC procedures."


Uh-oh!



Related items:

• Reporting Certain Contacts with Foreign Nationals | 12 FAM 274
  12 FAM 270 Security Reporting Requirements

• Counter-Intelligence | 12 FAM 262
  12 FAM 260 Counterintelligence

• Important information on revision of rules for reporting FOREIGN CONTACTS AND INTENT TO MARRY OR COHABIT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS | May 11, 2009

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Operation Coffee Country Update: Three Colombian Nationals Extradited to the United States to Face Alien Smuggling and Visa Fraud Charges

Image by Colombian Travels via Flickr

In June 2009, we posted this item here: "Operation Coffee Country" Nets Three for Smuggling and Visa Fraud.

Late last week, DOJ announced the extradition of the three Colombian nationals to the Unite States where they each face a maximum sentence of 25 years and a maximum fine of $250,000 for each of the three charges: conspiracy to commit alien smuggling for profit,  alien smuggling for profit, and conspiracy to commit visa fraud.

Three Colombian nationals have been extradited from Colombia to the United States on charges of conspiracy to smuggle aliens for profit, alien smuggling for profit, and conspiracy to commit visa fraud in connection with their alleged roles in an extensive and sophisticated visa fraud scheme through which they fraudulently procured visas from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. The extraditions were announced today by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr. of the District of Columbia; Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, U.S. State Department; and Director John Morton of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Heliber Toro Mejia, 52; Humberto Toro Mejia, 60; and Luz Elena Acuna Rios, 52; all of Bogotá, were charged in a three-count indictment returned by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia on Feb. 4, 2009. The defendants were arrested on June 2, 2009, by Colombian authorities in Bogotá on provisional arrest warrants in response to a U.S. government request for their arrest. The defendants have been in custody in Colombia since their arrest and prior to their extradition to the United States. Humberto Toro Mejia was arraigned in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia today and ordered detained by U.S. District Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. Heliber Toro Mejia and Luz Elena Acuna Rios were arraigned on July 14, 2010, and ordered detained by U.S. Magistrate Judge Alan Kay.

According to the indictment, the defendants were the leaders of an extensive and sophisticated visa fraud ring that profited by assisting otherwise inadmissible Colombian nationals in fraudulently procuring visas from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá. To support the visa applications of alien applicants, the defendants and other conspirators allegedly created fictitious backgrounds for the aliens and fraudulent supporting documentation, including paperwork that appeared to be official Colombian government-issued documents such as tax filings and birth and marriage certificates. The indictment alleges that the conspirators coached the aliens on how to pass the visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá by answering questions untruthfully. During the course of this conspiracy, which according to the indictment lasted between July 15, 2005, and March 20, 2007, more than 100 aliens are alleged to have fraudulently obtained or attempted to fraudulently obtain a U.S. visa. According to the indictment, many of those aliens who did obtain a fraudulently-procured visa used that visa to enter the United States.

If convicted, each defendant faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for conspiracy to commit alien smuggling for profit, 10 years in prison for alien smuggling for profit, and five years in prison for conspiracy to commit visa fraud. Each defendant is also subject to a maximum fine of $250,000 for each charge.

The charges are the result of “Operation Coffee Country,” a coordinated international investigation by the Diplomatic Security Service - Regional Security Office in Bogotá and the ICE Attaché’s Office in Bogotá. The Diplomatic Security Service - Criminal Investigations Division and the ICE Special Agent in Charge for Homeland Security Investigations in Washington, D.C. provided substantial assistance.

The government of Colombia, including the Colombian Department of Administrative Security and Colombian prosecutors, provided significant assistance and support during the investigation, arrest and extradition of the defendants. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá worked with their counterparts in Colombia to effect the extradition.

The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney James S. Yoon of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Frederick W. Yette of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. Significant assistance from the Office of International Affairs was provided by Trial Attorney Nicolette Romano.

An indictment is merely a formal accusation. It is not proof of guilt, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The entire announcement is here. 

DS Agent Arrested After Wife Reports Assault

Image via Wikipedia

HeraldNet reported June 25 that a federal agent was arrested for assault in the Snohomish County of Washington State. Excerpt:

The man was arrested June 17 for investigation of second-degree assault. Deputies seized 15 guns from the home, including his duty weapon, according to a police affidavit filed in Everett District Court.

He told investigators that he is an agent with the U.S. Department of State in Seattle. His wife told authorities that he is a diplomatic security officer.

Sheriff’s deputies were summoned to the couple’s house after the woman reported that she’d been assaulted during an argument.

Two children were home at the time of the incident, according to the report.

The woman told police that she and her husband were arguing when she slapped him across the face. She said he picked her up and threw her on the ground and then slammed her head against the floor several times before letting her go.

She said he discouraged her from calling 911, saying that if she summoned police, he would be fired from his job.

The woman complained of blurred vision and head pain. She was taken to Valley General Hospital and later transported to Providence Regional Medical Center in Everett where she was treated for a head injury and bruising to her face.
[...]
A court commissioner on Monday ordered him to stay away from his wife and children. The woman told the commissioner that since her husband returned from deployment to Afghanistan, he has been quick to anger.

She told police she believes he may be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder.

Read the whole thing here.


The report did say that "No charges have been filed against the 42-year-old man. The case is under review by the Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office." Email: prosecuting.attorney@co.snohomish.wa.us.

It looks like under Washington State laws, assault in the second degree is considered a class B felony, which means a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and $20,000 fine.

Also, folks in the State of Washington can get in trouble for interference with the reporting of domestic violence (RCW 9A.36.150). The wife was reportedly "discouraged" from calling 911. Not the same as "preventing" or "attempting to prevent" as enumerated below, but might still play out badly in court if this case gets there:

(b) Prevents or attempts to prevent the victim of or a witness to that domestic violence crime from calling a 911 emergency communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to any law enforcement official.

Beyond the possible immediate problems with the local court, the unnamed agent in this report could also be in trouble with his employer under the following regulations.

FAM 4370 which catalogs the List of Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action in the Foreign Service is careful to point out the guidelines set in 3 FAM 4130:

3 FAM 4130 sets forth guidelines for deciding an applicant's suitability for the Foreign Service and for taking disciplinary action against a Foreign Service employee. As explained in 3 FAM 4130, the attainment of foreign policy objectives requires the maintenance of the highest standards of conduct by employees of the Foreign Service. Because of the uniqueness of the Foreign Service, employees are considered to be on duty 24 hours a day and must observe especially high standards of conduct during and after working hours and when on leave or travel status. Accordingly the commission after work hours of many of the offenses listed here under "Conduct on the Job" would still be punishable if affecting the ability of the individual or the agency to carry out its responsibilities or mission. No action against a Foreign Service employee should be considered without a careful review of 3 FAM 4130.

So we went and looked up 3 FAM 4130 - the Standards for Appointment and Continued Employment. You may read it in full here. It does not include "domestic violence" but specifically mentions "spousal abuse" as an example of "Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct."

3 FAM 4139.14 Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct
(TL:PER-303; 11-08-1995)
(Uniform State/USAID/USIA)
(Applies to Foreign Service Employees)
Notoriously disgraceful conduct is that conduct which, were it to become
widely known, would embarrass, discredit, or subject to opprobrium the
perpetrator, the Foreign Service, and the United States. Examples of such
conduct include but are not limited to the frequenting of prostitutes,
engaging in public or promiscuous sexual relations, spousal abuse, neglect
or abuse of children, manufacturing or distributing pornography, entering
into debts the employee could not pay, or making use of one’s position or
immunity to profit or to provide favor to another (see also 5 CFR, Part 2635)
or to create the impression of gaining or giving improper favor.
Disqualification of a candidate or discipline of an employee, including
separation for cause, is warranted when the potential for opprobrium or
contempt should the conduct become public knowledge could be reasonably
expected to affect adversely the person’s ability to perform his or her own
job or the agency’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Evaluators must
be carefully to avoid letting personal disapproval of such conduct influence
their decisions.

The unnamed DS wife told the court that her husband had been to Afghanistan and also told police she believes he may be suffering from PTSD.

In a related note, the June 2010 issue of State Magazine, Ed Warner has an article entitled Unaccompanied Support | Department provides tangible, intangible benefits and I quote in part:

"The buzzword associated with some tours at unaccompanied posts is post-traumatic stress disorder, but Yun [MED Director Dr. Thomas Yun] said its incidence is low. That’s because PTSD is associated with being in life-threatening danger or witnessing someone in such danger, explained David Panakkal, acting director of MED’s Deployment Stress Management Program. Panakkal said health units at AIP posts [Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan] monitor for stress-related ailments on arrival, during and at the conclusion of the employee’s tour. While an employee can be medically evacuated if the emotional problem is big enough, he said problems can arise long after the employee returns home."

This is not totally off topic, but isn't it surprising to hear the MED Director quoted about PTSD's "incidence" as "low" without citing any statistics?  The State Department does not do post-deployment screenings as recommended by the GAO, so who is monitoring the employees after they return home?  I am actually curious how anyone could tell the "incident is low" is they are not tracking/evaluating employees after service in unaccompanied posts and the warzones?

[W]hile DOD requires medical screening of civilians before and following deployment, State requires screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. GAO recommended, among other things, that State establish post-deployment screening requirements and that DOD establish procedures to ensure its post-deployment screening requirements are completed. While DOD and State agreed, DOD has developed guidance establishing procedures for post-deployment screenings; but, as of April 2010, State had not provided documentation that it established such requirements.  

Finally, it is perhaps telling that the unnamed wife called 911 despite being warned that the husband/agent "would be fired from his job."  

KiroTV also has this news item posted in its website with additional details including allegations of prior shoving and kicking as well as a restraining order now taken against the agent which requires him to be at least 100 yards away from his wife.

Updated: 7/1/2010:
An astute Diplopundit reader just sent a quick addition, which I was not even aware of.  Under what's called the Lautenberg Amendment (officially called the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban ("Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence", Pub.L. 104-208,[1] 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)[2]), an amendment to the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 enacted by the 104th United States Congress in 1996), this agent could be in deep kimchi with his guns alone: 

"The act bans shipment, transport, ownership and use of guns or ammunition by individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, or who are under a restraining (protection) order for domestic abuse."

The agent in the news has not been charged or convicted of domestic violence, but since kirotv reports that there is a current restraining order against him, does that mean he can no longer use/carry/own even his officially issued weapon (or own any of the 15 guns seized from his home)?

Wonder if Diplomatic Security is investigating?