Via USAspending.gov

Image via WikipediaOn January 17, the US Embassy in Kathmandu announced the return of the Peace Corps to Nepal after a seven year absence. The announcement coincided with an event hosted by Prime Minister Bhattarai at his office in Singha Durbar and by Ambassador DeLisi at his residence. According to the embassy, the first group of approximately 20 Peace Corps volunteers is scheduled to arrive in Nepal later this year:
"The U.S. Agency for International Development’s collaboration with Peace Corps will build on the strengths and strategies of the U.S. Government’s Feed the Future and Global Health Initiatives partnership with Nepal to reach and impact many more vulnerable Nepalese across the country. The volunteers will be trained as Agriculture and Nutrition Extensionists and will work with rural communities to improve food security and health of the Nepalese people in the context of the two Presidential Initiatives in Nepal."The photos from the two events can be found at Flickr. See also the embassy statement, and the Peace Corps announcement.
The Peace Corps is conducting an ongoing review of the security environment in Honduras, and has cancelled its next volunteer training class while this review is being conducted.
All 158 currently serving volunteers are safe and accounted for and will participate in a conference in January before returning to the United States on administrative leave. Peace Corps will review the safety and security climate in Honduras before continuing with volunteer operations.
“The safety and security of all Peace Corps volunteers is the agency’s highest priority,” said Peace Corps Director Aaron S. Williams. “During this time, we are going to conduct a full review of the program. We thank the people of Honduras for their strong support of Peace Corps over the years.”
"It has been two weeks since one of our volunteers here was shot in an assault on a bus, and this is the first e-mail that we have receive that really says anything. After two weeks of all of us volunteers e-mailing, texting, and calling each other talking about how we thought Peace Corps Honduras handled the situation with the injured volunteer, and what we thought was going to come of it all, it is nice to see some action being taken."As the incident was called "a tragic case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time," another PCV reacts:
"Where my problem comes in with all of this, in my opinion, is the fact that Peace Corps is treating this incident as if the volunteer had been in a car accident or something more along those lines - something that was completely out of Peace Corps or Honduras‘s control. But, no, she was on a bus… this is a matter of Honduras being the most dangerous country in the world (that is not currently in a war), but it is as if Peace Corps Honduras doesn’t want to own up to that. In one of the e-mials, admin said “If we learn anything that would result in a need to change policy or travel guidance we will communicate that straight away.” So, as a result of this accident, their response is that they might just need to make another policy change. It seems to me that this is their response to everything - make another rule or policy change that will help to avoid situations like this in the future, but for this particular incident, I don’t think there is really anything that can be done. People have to travel in and out of San Pedro Sula and/or La Esperanza. There is no way to avoid that - we already have been instructed to make sure and not travel at night, especially in and out of San Pedro or Tegus, and this volunteer was certainly not - it was noon on a Sunday.So statements and photos about the Peace Corps returning to Nepal when the first batch of volunteers are not even getting there until later this year, but nothing on the Peace Corps leaving Honduras when the departure of the 158 volunteers already occurred. Ow...
To make this situation worse, it was brought to volunteers attention the following day that there had actually been two other assaults on the same bus company over that week - but Peace Corps had not informed any volunteers of these incidents.
Image via WikipediaAs NATO foreign ministers gathered in Bonn last week to discuss the way forward in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai gave an interview to SPIEGEL about how much international involvement will be required following the 2014 withdrawal and about his rocky partnership with the United States. The interview was conducted by Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Reuter and touched on corruption in Afghanistan, specifically on the Bank of Kabul. Excerpts:
SPIEGEL: In the largest financial scandal of Afghanistan, surrounding the virtually bankrupt Bank of Kabul, your family too would seem to be involved. We have seen a protocol from former central bank head Abdul Qadir Fitrat who, in the presence of your brother, made clear that the bank was little more than a criminal organization and was close to collapse. It provided loans to fictitious companies and straw men. The bank managers invested in huge villas in Dubai. Why did nothing happen for a full year?
Karzai: We called in Fitrat and asked him and said we are hearing that there is something going wrong, but he said no. The Americans never told us about this. The bank didn't tell us.
SPIEGEL: But once the problems became apparent, why did your government prevent an audit of the bank by foreign experts?
Karzai: We believed a certain embassy was trying to create financial trouble for us. We felt the whole bank scam was created by foreign hands.
SPIEGEL: Which embassy?
Karzai: I will not go into details.
Image via WikipediaAccording to BBC News, Pakistani cable television operators have begun blocking the BBC's international news TV channel, BBC World News. This move was apparently due to a critical documentary broadcast entitled Secret Pakistan. Excerpts:
The BBC said it was deeply concerned by the move, and called for its channel to be speedily reinstated.Active link added above. Read in full here.
"We condemn any action that threatens our editorial independence and prevents audiences from accessing our impartial international news service," a BBC spokesperson said.
"We would urge that BBC World News and other international news services are reinstated as soon as possible."
The two-part BBC documentary questioned the country's commitment to tackling Taliban militancy.
[...]
The decision to block BBC World News and other international news channels comes after a media uproar in Pakistan over a Nato air strike that killed 24 Pakistani troops near the Afghan border at the weekend.
The All Pakistan Cable Operators Association announced on Tuesday that all foreign news channels airing "anti-Pakistan" content would be barred from Wednesday.
The operators called on the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) "to revoke the landing rights of foreign channels" if they are found to be "propagating" information harmful to the country.
[...]
Correspondents say it is not possible to see BBC World News in most Pakistani cities, with the ban expected to be extended to rural areas by Wednesday.
Cable Operators Association spokesman Khalid Arain said that no foreign anti-Pakistan channel would "ever" be broadcast in the country.
"We want to send them a strong message to stop this. If they don't stop this, then it is our right to stop them," he said.
Correspondents say the Pakistani government is likely to have put pressure on the operators to impose the ban.
from BBC: In May this year, US Special Forces shot and killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. Publicly Pakistan is one of America's closest allies - yet every step of the operation was kept secret from it.
Filmed largely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, this two-part documentary series explores how a supposed ally stands accused by top CIA officers and Western diplomats of causing the deaths of thousands of coalition soldiers in Afghanistan. It is a charge denied by Pakistan's military establishment, but the documentary makers meet serving Taliban commanders who describe the support they get from Pakistan in terms of weapons, training and a place to hide.This first episode investigates signs of duplicity that emerged after 9/11 and disturbing intelligence reports after Britain's forces entered Helmand in 2006.
from BBC: The second film in this timely and enthralling two-part documentary series reveals how Britain and America discovered compelling evidence that Pakistan was secretly helping the Taliban and concluded they had been double-crossed.
It tells the story of how under President Obama the US has waged a secret war against Pakistan. Taliban commanders tell the film makers that to this day Pakistan shelters and arms them, and helps them kill Western troops - indeed one recently captured suicide bomber alleges he was trained by Pakistani intelligence.Chillingly, the film also reveals that, based on some evidence, Pakistani intelligence stands accused of sabotaging possible peace talks. Pakistan denies these charges, but relations between Pakistan and America now verge on hostility.
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And it's a good thing! Because if this was not a "misinterpretation" that would make us real dummies with pet snakes in that neighborhood.
Via HuffPo:
"If fighting starts between Pakistan and the U.S., we are beside Pakistan," Karzai said is an interview with private Pakistani television station GEO that aired Saturday. "If Pakistan is attacked and the people of Pakistan need Afghanistan's help, Afghanistan will be there with you."
Here is also a snippet of a video complete with finger wagging:
President Hamid Karzai’s office on Monday sought to distance him from controversial remarks in a television interview aired over the weekend in which he asserted that Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in a hypothetical war against the United States. The presidential palace said the Afghan leader’s comments, made in an interview with the Pakistani television station Geo, had been “misinterpreted.”Read in full here.
[...]
A spokesman for Karzai, Siamak Herawi, said the president had not intended any slight to the Western governments that have spent billions of dollars shoring up the Afghan administration during the 10-year war that has claimed the lives of at least 1,817 American troops.
“The media misinterpreted [Karzai’s] speech,” he said, adding that the president had been trying to express solidarity with Pakistan for having taken in millions of Afghan refugees during decades of war and the subsequent rule of the Taliban movement.
Western military officials and diplomats publicly played down the significance of Karzai’s comments, even while privately expressing varying degrees of bafflement and dismay.
Image via Wikipedia
Image via Wikipedia
Image via WikipediaIn 2009, I wondered out loud in this blog -- Did we legally adopt Afghanistan while we were asleep? It's like Alan Harper of Three and a Half Men asking to stay in his brother's house, who then end up staying forever ( or at least, until his brother died). Only, in our case, it's the reverse; we're like the dead rich brother, before he died.
In August, I finally came to a sad conclusion that our pretend 51st state of Afghanistan is no longer a laughing matter.
Do you know how bad is the state of our public schools in this country? I've seen 5th graders who can't even spell, locate their state on the U.S. map, much less, do simple arithmetic when buying a chocolate bar. If we want to be competitive in the 21st century, we need our limited money invested on the future of this country. But our public officials and politicians seem to think that our work in Afghanistan is essential to our future in the new century. So we pour money over there like there is no tomorrow. Saving Afghanistan means saving us? Right.
Then you read this GAO report that says that the United States have been responsible for 90% of funds that go to Afghanistan's security expenditures from 2006-2010. So we have propped up this government, underwrite most of its expenses and what happens when we leave? Is Hamid Karzai going back to rock-paper-scissor? No? So, then, does that mean we're going to stay until the Government of Afghanistan grows its revenue from 9% to 100%, or when it is able to pay for its own soldiers' salaries and its own electric fuel, etc. etc. , whichever happens first?
I am not against foreign aid or even military aid per se. But let's keep some perspective here. We're not running on a surplus. We have an exploding boomer population, we have dilapidated public infrastructures, and we have our future suffering through some major budget cuts right now.
And we're stuck in the muck called Afghanistan. And this is for our own good? Excuse me if I don't drink that kool aid, sir. And I really would like us to leave and let them get on with their own nation building while we do ours at home.
Excerpted from GAO's report on Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence:
Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures.
Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures more than doubled from solar year (SY) 2006 to 2010, growing from $5.5 billion to $14.3 billion, an increase of 160 percent. Over this 5-year period, about 79 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures of $54 billion were off budget.
Donor funding.
The United States and other donors funded about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010. In particular, donors funded on average 57 percent of on-budget expenditures and 100 percent of off-budget expenditures. Over this period, the United States provided 62 percent of estimated total public expenditures, while other donors provided 28 percent. The United States funded an estimated 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total security expenditures during this time period. The United States funded an estimated 39 percent of Afghanistan’s total non-security expenditures during SY2006 to 2010.
Afghanistan’s domestic revenues.
The domestic revenues of GIRoA grew by an average annual rate of 30 percent from SY2006 to 2010, increasing from an estimated total of $0.62 billion to $1.66 billion. Customs duties and taxes such as income and property taxes provided the largest share of domestic revenues. However, domestic revenues funded only about 9 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010.
GAO _Afghan Donor Dependence | September 2011
I absolutely adore the blog, Hamsters on the Titanic, Dan in the 'Stan's blog out of Afghanistan. He's like the sage of Kabul with a strong dash of Stephen Colbert. Now due to the multitude of sunny news coming out of Kabul, I can understand why the author has now changed the blog name to "It's Always Sunny in Kabul." Makes sense, right, since the worst problem they have over in Kabul is traffic.
Yesterday, he wrote about Afghanistan's new shiny toys, the special ones that kill and not because of bad paint from China:
According to General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Defense Minister: Finally, a ray of hope.
He however noted that for foiling the foreign invasions we need war planes, bombers, and air defense systems. He stressed that the only way for ensuring long-term security in Afghanistan is empowering the Afghan forces and there is no other alternative way that the territorial integrity and national sovereignty and national values of the country are defended.Frankly, that worries me. General Wardak want all these new shiny toys and I don't know which uncle will write the check. Please, don't let it be Uncle Sam.
In just two years, LTG Caldwell’s NTM-A has overcome illiteracy, massive desertions, killing US mentors, and alleged massacres by a favorite Border Police General and put together a fighting force that’s ready to move up to advanced military aircraft. That has got capable, affordable and sustainable written all over it.
LTG Caldwell was just recently a guest at the weekly ISAF press briefing, and I feel the need to share some of his quotes so the readers of Mr. Healy’s rainy day nonsense can really understand what’s going on here in Afghanistan:
“Over the last two years, we have been able to put in place schools, get the required trainers and actually train over 50,000 officers and noncommissioned officers that are now, today, in the Afghan Police, Army and Air Force,” said Caldwell.
See? NTM-A has put the required trainers into place. There is absolutely no requirement that there be trainees, as well. To expect that sort of unrealistic level of trainer/trainee ratio after the fact is just pointless, really. Obviously, too, the IG team wasn’t there on a training day. Otherwise, if 44% of sites weren’t doing any training at all, it would be really hard…even impossible…to actually train 50,000 people in the timeframe that LTG Caldwell is reporting. And, since I’ve come to realize that LTG Caldwell and the NTM-A are always right about what’s really happening here, well, I’d suggest the IG go back and count again. As to being “largely uneducated,” well sir:
During the last year and a half, 134,000 recruits have completed the mandatory literacy training that has been incorporated into their basic training requirements, Caldwell added.
As is well known among those that really care about the ANSF, they are absolutely required to be able to read at a first grade level. I don’t understand the concern: if that ANA soldier can now read at a first grade level, there should be no reason why he can’t understand training that a high school graduate in the United States would be able to comprehend.
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| SMOTHER From It's Always Sunny in Kabul ISAF’s Flickr stream doesn’t put any kind of descriptions on the photos is posts, I’m forced to come up with my own. The point of pictures is to put up a caption so we can have some context whereby we can know what’s happening. Otherwise, I’m going to be forced to report on the threat of teddy bears to Afghan toddlers. |
Last month, the Government of Pakistan made yet another disaster declaration after massive flooding hit its Sindh Province. The floods which started in August at the beginning of the monsoon months have caused considerable damage with an estimated 434 civilians killed and with an estimated 5.3 million people and 1 ,524,773 homes affected.
On September 13, 2011, in response to the Government of Pakistan's disaster declaration on September 9, the United States according to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad has immediately begun providing a broad range of assistance to Sindh communities affected by this year's floods, including food supplies for more than 50,000 families, and safe drinking water, shelter, sanitation and hygiene supplies, and basic health care for thousands more:
Already, USAID-funded food packages have reached 23,000 families in seven districts of Sindh (Badin, Mirpurkas, Tando Muhammed Khan, Tando Allah Ya, Tharparker, Umarkot, and Hyderabad). This assistance was delivered by the International Organization for Migration. USAID also paid for nearly 60 trucks to deliver relief to affected areas and 1,000 plastic tarpaulins for shelter, and is financing other efforts to coordinate relief activities.In late September, the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar announced that Dr. Marilyn Wyatt, wife of U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter, visited an ongoing U.S. project to restore flood-damaged irrigation canals. In total, the U.S. is restoring 1000 flood-damaged canals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan as part of assistance to the areas affected by the 2010 floods.
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Dr. Marilyn Wyatt, wife of U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter Photo from US CG Peshawar |
The project is one of many undertaken by the U.S. government in cooperation with Pakistan to restore self-sufficiency to farmers affected by floods. Additional measures include providing seed, fertilizer, livestock feed, and medicine to more than 500,000 farmers in three provinces. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province alone, more than 400 irrigation canals in 12 districts have been restored, amounting to 12,000 kilometers.
This project funded by the American people is being implemented by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and Pakistani Provincial Disaster Management Authorities.
“We went to the warehouse on complaint of some residents of the sector and sealed the building as it was being constructed without approval of the CDA,” the authority`s Director General (Planning) Sarwar Sindhu said.
CDA officials said the warehouse was under construction and belonged to one Mehboob Elahi who had got changed the status of plot changed from industrial to warehouse a few months ago. Earlier, the place was used for a beverage factory.
Electronic media highlighted the issue throughout the day, saying that `a bunker or a hideout of Americans` had been sealed or raided.
“We had information that a building was being constructed in the industrial area in violation of CDA`s building laws on which we raided the building,” another official said.
"US embassy Spokesperson Mark Stroh denied these claims, saying that no “illegal activities” are underway in any warehouse or official residence of the US diplomats. “Our offices are operating in the capital city with the approval of foreign ministry,” he said.
Earlier, the US embassy lodged a strong protest with the Foreign Office over the seizure of one of its warehouses in sector I-9/3 by CDA and a police team for “violations of building laws”.
"A source privy to the developments confided to The Nation that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has directed the civic agency to consider building as a diplomatic facility and after fulfilling the defined rules in this regard it should be handed over to the embassy."
In the current issue of The Atlantic, Matthieu Aikins writes a disturbing case of "our man in Kandahar," Brigadier General Abdul Raziq, "well known as a warlord and suspected drug trafficker who had waged a brutal campaign against the Taliban." According to Mr. Aikins, an independent journalist, General Raziq is not only a close ally of President Hamid Karzai but has also been "mentored" by an American Special Forces team. This past May, General Raziq was appointed by President Karzai as Acting Chief of Police for Kandahar province, an appointment that allowed him to remain in charge of Spin Boldak, a key trading town near the Pakistani border where an alleged massacre of civilians purported to be members of the Taliban occurred.
The piece is not a pretty read. It includes allegations of abuses, torture (with graphic photos) and extra-judicial killings as well as tribal feuds and cover-ups. As well, it brings up questions of what our officials know over there. The article has a cast of characters that include a State Department official in Kandahar, State's DRL bureau and questions about the Leahy vetting.
Last fall, Raziq and his militia were given a starring role in the U.S.-led military offensive into Taliban-controlled areas west of Kandahar City, a campaign that boosted his prestige immensely. Mentored by an American Special Forces team, Raziq’s fighters won public praise from U.S. officers for their combat prowess. After the offensive, Raziq was promoted to brigadier general—a rank requiring a direct order from President Karzai—in a January ceremony at the governor’s mansion. As Ben Moeling, who was until July the State Department’s senior official in Kandahar province, explained to me at the time, the promotion was “an explicit recognition of his importance.”Continue reading, Our Man in Kandahar.
Nor was that promotion the only evidence of Raziq’s continuing ascent. In May, when Karzai appointed him chief of police for Kandahar province, Raziq accepted only on the condition that he also remain in charge of Spin Boldak, the seat of his economic and tribal power. So, in a move that enabled him to retain both jobs, Raziq was appointed “acting” police chief in Kandahar.
[...]
Though Raziq has risen in large part through his own skills and ambition, he is also, to a considerable degree, a creation of the American military intervention in Afghanistan. (Prior to 2001, he had worked in a shop in Pakistan.) As part of a countrywide initiative, his men have been trained by two controversial private military firms, DynCorp and Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, at a U.S.-funded center in Spin Boldak, where they are also provided with weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment. Their salaries are subsequently paid through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, a UN-administered international fund, to which the U.S. is the largest contributor. Raziq himself has enjoyed visits in Spin Boldak from such senior U.S. officials as Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus.
In public, American officials had until recently been careful to downplay Raziq’s alleged abuses. When I met with the State Department’s Moeling at his Kandahar City office in January, he told me, “I think there is certainly a mythology about Abdul Raziq, where there’s a degree of assumption on some of those things. But I have never seen evidence of private prisons or of extrajudicial killings directly attributable to him.”
[...]
Yet, as a 2006 State Department report shows, U.S. officials have for years been aware of credible allegations that Raziq and his men participated in a cold-blooded massacre of civilians, the details of which have, until now, been successfully buried. And this, in turn, raises questions regarding whether U.S. officials may have knowingly violated a 1997 law that forbids assistance to foreign military units involved in human-rights violations.
[...]
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—which put out the 2006 report citing Raziq’s alleged involvement in the massacre of civilians—is also the group responsible for overseeing compliance with the Leahy Amendment. Yet, incredibly, U.S. support for Raziq seems never to have triggered Leahy concerns. “No Leahy Amendment issues have come to me,” Ben Moeling, the State Department official in Kandahar, told me in January.
The question is whether Raziq’s apparent exclusion from Leahy vetting represents a baffling oversight, or a deliberate evasion. In August, WikiLeaks released hundreds of classified, Leahy-related cables from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that revealed that, from 2006 to 2010, the U.S. vetted thousands of Afghan security officials before training them. In one instance, on September 29, 2007, the embassy vetted 251 mid-level and senior officers in the Border Police. Raziq’s name was conspicuously absent.
[...]
Toward the end of 2009, senior ISAF officials reportedly thought about pushing for Raziq to be replaced. According to leaked cables, a high-level meeting was convened in Kabul, chaired by Deputy Ambassador Earl Wayne and Major General Michael Flynn, to discuss the problematic behavior of Raziq, among others. “Nobody, including his US military counterparts,” one cable noted, “is under any illusions about his corrupt activities.” Ultimately, however, General McChrystal, who was then the commander of ISAF and U.S. forces, decided that Raziq was too useful to cut loose, according to an article in The Washington Post. (McChrystal, through a spokesperson, declined to comment.) Cables also reveal that an American information-operations team even proposed a plan, “if credible,” for “the longer-term encouragement of stories in the international media on the ‘reform’ of Razziq.” (Note: WK link-do not read from USG workstation).
[...]
For his part, Raziq continues to deny all allegations of wrongdoing. “We have told the world and the media,” he said, “that if you have any proof regarding this matter, come and drag us to court.”
[...]
That has been America’s balancing act in Kandahar—weighing the allegations of abuse and criminality that have been raised regarding Raziq against his effectiveness as an ally in the war on the Taliban. Or, as Moeling told me back in January, before the most recent round of allegations: “At the moment, I think we have to take a look at what he’s been able to achieve. For us, trying to see the negative doesn’t really get us anywhere.”
"None of the funds made available by this act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice."
There are actually two different Leahy Laws. One is attached to the Defense Appropriations and the other is within the Foreign Operations Appropriations.[7][8] The Foreign Operations Appropriations Leahy Law cover weapons funding and training, but the 2001 Defense Appropriations act Leahy Law only covers training. Both Leahy provisions have similar wording.
The Leahy Law version attached to the Foreign Operations Appropriations has no waivers,[8] but the Leahy Law in the Defense Appropriations version can be waived if the Secretary of Defense determines that “extraordinary circumstances” require it.[9]
According to its FB page, PRT Laghman which was founded in 2006 "executes counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and International Security Assistance Forces in Laghman Province, Afghanistan in order to assist the Laghman Provincial and District governments in securing the pop."
The PRT brings a wide variety of capabilities and skills to the fight; ranging from engineers, civil affairs experts, vehicle maintainers, medical personnel, administrative support and security forces. The team is aligned to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the provincial level.
Laghman Province, made up of six districts, is approximately the size of Rhode Island. The terrain is mostly mountainous, with three rivers forming a "Y" providing the main geographical features of the area.
Methar Lam, the capital city, sits at the confluence of the rivers - the middle of the "Y", and this is where the PRT's Forward Operating Base (FOB) is located.
You almost feel sorry for the chickens on this one. Must point out that the most important person in the processing plant managed to cut himself during the plant opening as shown in the video below getting bandaged later on.
Well, just about everything is reality teevee now, why not our reconstruction project centered on the Afghan National Security Forces? The United States and donor countries are paying for it and it's kind of like the hollywoody equivalent of army and police training. There are well meaning good guys, and bad meaning bad guys, insurmountable challenges, military toys, guys learning to shoot straight, contractor reps on near heart attacks, and gazillions of money floating around for this or that. There's gotta be drama in all that, don't ya think?
And the best part is, this reality show may have better longevity prospects as teevee show goes, because hey, we might actually be in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (when we're supposed to leave). If rumors are true that negotiations are underway for the United States to stay in Afghanistan until 2024, that would fit perfectly with the IMF's prediction that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.
Afghanistan is in fact, playing a double game to suit its interest -- badmouthing the United States when it suits it's need and negotiating behind the lime lights to get the United States to stay to protect its interest. If we're asked to stay beyond 2014, don't mistake it for true love; we have the juice, that's all (even if that juice was bought on credit); we're like the deep pocket sugar person that the dysfunctional individual with a sweet habit can't live with and can't live without - a very messy relationship.
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| DynCorp trainer with Afghan National Police recruits. (U.S.Air Force photo cited by CWC) |
Between FY 2006 and FY 2011, Congress appropriated nearly $39 billion to set up and maintain the ANSF; the fiscal year 2012 budget request would add almost $13 billion to that total. Nearly half of the FY 2012 request—over $5 billion—would go toward clothing, equipping, and paying the ANSF.22
Prospects for the Afghan government’s sustaining the ANSF are dubious. The entire country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for FY 2011 is about $16 billion at the official exchange rate, and the national government’s domestic revenues are about $2 billion.23 The Afghan Ministry of Finance budget proposal for 2011-2012 indicates that given the increased security costs from the increase in size of the ANSF, the Afghan government is expected to continue to depend on donor grants for up to 30% of its operating budget.24
The outlook for sustaining the Afghan army and national police is complicated by several factors:
▪▪The ANSF, currently numbering about 305,000 personnel, is growing toward a newly authorized strength of 352,000, which will increase sustainment costs.
▪▪The Commission has received a preliminary U.S. military estimate of ANSF sustainment costs for just the period 2014-2017 in the neighborhood of $30 billion.
▪▪The International Monetary Fund has concluded that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.25
▪▪Donor-community support depends upon unpredictable political decisions that may be heavily influenced by severe fiscal pressure on most developed countries’ budgets.
In a similar vein, the Acting Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission, “The Government of Afghanistan has never had the financial resources to sustain ANP [Afghan National Police] salaries at either the current or projected levels.”
Besides spending billions on contracts to train, clothe, and equip the ANSF, the United States has also committed $11.4 billion since 2005 to build bases, police stations, border outposts, and other facilities for the ANSF. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded two contracts in 2010 for ITT Corporation to provide $800 million in operation-and-maintenance services for 663 ANSF facilities over a five-year period.
The Afghan government has already indicated that it cannot pay such costs from its resources.29 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission at its January 24, 2011, construction hearing that “the entire $11.4 billion [in construction spending] is at risk,” and “both contracts are expected to exhaust their funding well before [the end of ] their five-year performance period.”30
Image via WikipediaThe State Department has recently posted a solicitation for a contractor to "Enhance capacity of the South Sudan Ministry of Defense by providing a team of advisors, facilitating planning conferences, and procuring equipment." The place of performance is Juba, South Sudan. The period of performance for the resulting contract will be "a base period of 12 months plus three (3) twelve (12) month option periods."
Below are more details excerpted from the Statement of Work posted at fbo.gov:
Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Bureau of African AffairsNot only has the State Department got itself a new private army in Iraq, we now will also be training and mentoring the Ministry of Defense of the world's newest country.
South Sudan Armed Forces Transformation
Ministry Advisory and Training Team (MATT)
Statement of Work
During the last eight years, Sudan has been the highest-priority country in sub-Saharan Africa, and one of the highest U.S. priorities worldwide. The United States Government played a major role in brokering the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the twenty-year civil war between the government in Khartoum (Government of Sudan) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a southern Sudanese rebel movement. During his June 2005 visit to the United States, the SPLM Chairman John Garang appealed to administration and Congress for support to transform his guerrilla forces into a modern military. Among other initiatives, the support outlined in this request for proposal addresses this appeal.
In January 2011, as stipulated in the CPA, citizens of Southern Sudan voted in a referendum for independence from or unity with the North. The overwhelming majority chose independence; on 9 July 2011, the South became the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS). The Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan (USSES), with the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) at the U.S. Department of State, plans to continue assisting in the transformation of the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) from a largely guerrilla force to a military force operating under the RoSS’ Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The purpose of this Statement of Work (SoW) is to outline the requirements for advisors embedded in the South Sudan Minstry of Defense (MoD). The advisors will be managed by the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, and the U.S. Embassy in Juba. The purpose of the advisors is to provide support to the Minstry in the areas of policy planning, human resources, financial management, acquisition and procurement, military production, inspections, public affairs, and veterans affairs, or other functions as necessary, to enhance the Ministry’s ability to effectively manage the transformation of the South Sudan Armed Forces from a largely guerrilla force to a regular military operating under the MoD as the civilian authority within the RoSS. As part of this assistance, the U.S. Department of State will support the Management Advisory and Training Team (MATT) in Juba, South Sudan to provide training and mentorship to MoD management staff and leadership. The MATT will support the Ministry leadership, but will not be directly involved in the day to day decision making activities of the MoD. Advisors will assist MoD senior management and staff at all levels, in their role as mentors and trainers, to perform key functions at appropriate standards.
The USG will work with Ministry of Defense to identify counterparts for each of the advisors listed in this Statement of Work. Contractors will report to the Minister or their ministry counterparts, but might also work with other South Sudan civilian agencies as required.
The overarching purpose of this initiative is to support the MoD with advisors in nine areas; 1) Defense Policy, 2) Human Resources (2); 3) Military Production; 4) Civil-Military and Public Affairs; 5) Inspections; 6) Finance and Budget; 7) Acquisition, Procurement and Logistics, and 8) Veterans Affairs. [Note that support to Human Resources will include two positions; one to focus on personnel readiness and management, and the second to focus on force planning and resource allocation.] To that end, this program will focus on enhancing the overall effectiveness of the MoD staff and leadership by addressing fundamental weaknesses in existing MoD staff procedures and planning efforts, and strengthening the MoD staff and leadership to effectively manage the transitioning guerilla force into a regular military through supporting effective staff policies and procedures.
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PAKISTAN