Showing posts with label Af/Pak. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Af/Pak. Show all posts

Monday, October 24, 2011

Hamid Karzai, Our Man in Kabul -- Misinterpreted Once Again!

And it's a good thing! Because if this was not a "misinterpretation" that would make us real dummies with pet snakes in that neighborhood. 

Via HuffPo:

"If fighting starts between Pakistan and the U.S., we are beside Pakistan," Karzai said is an interview with private Pakistani television station GEO that aired Saturday. "If Pakistan is attacked and the people of Pakistan need Afghanistan's help, Afghanistan will be there with you."

Here is also a snippet of a video complete with finger wagging:





The LA Times has more:
President Hamid Karzai’s office on Monday sought to distance him from controversial remarks in a television interview aired over the weekend in which he asserted that Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in a hypothetical war against the United States. The presidential palace said the Afghan leader’s comments, made in an interview with the Pakistani television station Geo, had been “misinterpreted.”
[...]
A spokesman for Karzai, Siamak Herawi, said the president had not intended any slight to the Western governments that have spent billions of dollars shoring up the Afghan administration during the 10-year war that has claimed the lives of at least 1,817 American troops.

“The media misinterpreted [Karzai’s] speech,” he said, adding that the president had been trying to express solidarity with Pakistan for having taken in millions of Afghan refugees during decades of war and the subsequent rule of the Taliban movement.

Western military officials and diplomats publicly played down the significance of Karzai’s comments, even while privately expressing varying degrees of bafflement and dismay.
Read in full here.

As long as we continue willfully misinterpreting the smoke signals being sent from over there, we're good, right?






 


 
 
 

Monday, October 17, 2011

Thanks to a Hardworking Congress, Some Feds in the Garden Countries of I'Af/Pak to Lose Some Benefits

Stephen Losey of Federal Times reported last week that federal employees deployed to the I'Af/Pak region who are not in the Foreign Service have now lost numerous travel, medical and leave benefits because those benefits were not renewed by Congress after they expired Oct. 1. Excerpts:

The following benefits, which are available to Foreign Service officers, will no longer be available to non-Foreign Service personnel posted in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, according to the Office of Personnel Management:

  • Reimbursement of travel costs when going home on leave.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when obtaining necessary medical care when such care is not available locally.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when evacuating family members who are in imminent danger.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when transporting furniture and other personal effects when moving to another duty station.
  • Mandatory leave for employees who have returned home after a three-year deployment. Agencies also will no longer have the option to offer leave to employees who had served in a war zone for 18 months.
  • Medical examinations, mental health care, inoculations, vaccinations and other preventative care.
  • A death gratuity equal to one year's salary when an employee dies of injuries sustained while supporting military operations.
Read in full here.

I have not read the OPM notice but I am presuming that these changes applies to non-Foreign Service and non-Defense employees serving in those three priority countries.

The 2010 OIG review of US Embassy Pakistan indicates that there are some three dozens non-State and non-DOD personnel in that country (DEA: 16, FBI: 7, DHS: 4, BBG:1, DOE: 1, NAS: 8, Treasury: 1).

On the U.S. Embassy Iraq staffing -- well, trying to pin down the staffing number over there, is of course, rocket science and I simply do not have the brains for it. Also, with the military withdrawal and the embassy taking charge, a whole lot of big numbers are bring thrown around - 5,000 - 17,000.  Security people is a big component but not sure how many non-State/USAID and non-DOD personnel will continue to deploy in Iraq and our consulates there when all is said and done in 2011. 

Due to the recent "flavor of the month" in Afghanistan, the civilian uplift staffing picture there is a bit more clearer.  Seven civilian agencies (State/USAID excepted) account for about 26% of the total civilian uplift.  So all those folks, plus some three dozens in Pakistan and an undetermined number in Iraq will be affected by Congress' non-renewal of warzone benefits.

In short, if they need mental health care after service in the warzones, they're basically out of luck?

This will have an impact to the employees already deployed there, but may have a larger impact on recruitment of employees for the 2012 assignment and onward.


From SIGAR/State OIG

Below is an excerpt from the SIGAR/State OIG review of the civilian uplift in that country:
[...] State increased its civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan from 192 in January 2009, to 501 in March 2011—an increase of 309 personnel.

State has an additional 81 authorized full-time equivalent positions for the civilian uplift as of May 31, 2011, but the positions are currently unfilled. According to State officials from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), they will continue to place additional civilian personnel in these positions through fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

USAID had the second largest presence of any agency prior to the start of the uplift. USAID personnel increased from 85 in January 2009 to 307 as of March 2011, an increase of 222 personnel. USAID has an additional 80 authorized positions for Afghanistan that are currently unfilled. According to USAID officials, they will continue to place additional U.S. civilians in these positions in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

As of June 2011, the other seven civilian agencies with a presence in Afghanistan accounted for an increase of 189 personnel, or approximately 26 percent of the total civilian uplift. These agencies provide personnel at the request and direction of the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and State officials in Washington in order to meet the mission’s strategic goals. The Chief of Mission determines the number of authorized civilian uplift positions in consultation with each department.

DOJ accounted for an increase of 78 personnel, or 11 percent, of the total civilian uplift. The majority of these uplift personnel are employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration who work on mentoring and training Afghan law enforcement entities in an effort to promote the rule of law. In addition, they provide leadership and guidance in the conduct of bilateral counternarcotics investigations and operations. USDA has deployed 59 civilian uplift personnel as of June 2011, representing eight percent of the total civilian uplift. These employees primarily mentor Afghan government officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

The remaining five agencies account for approximately seven percent of the total civilian uplift. DHS personnel advise, mentor, and train Afghan border, customs, and related entities to enforce Afghan customs and immigration law. Treasury places technical experts at Afghan government ministries where they provide assistance in four areas: strengthening budget and financial accountability, combating economic crimes and corruption, building internal audit capacity and increasing non-tax revenues, and achieving debt relief and improving debt management. Transportation personnel advise officials at the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation on issues such as civil aviation law and surface transportation planning. HHS personnel work on health programs, such as programs to strengthen maternal and child health services in Afghanistan. Finally, Commerce personnel assist with efforts to promote Afghanistan’s economic development and trade. 


Related item:       
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift | September 8, 2011










Wednesday, August 3, 2011

NOC! NOC! Who's there? Ambassador Munter Stopped at Pakistani Airport Over NOC, What's Next?

The US reportedly lodged a strong protest with Pakistani authorities after ambassador Cameron Munter was stopped at the Benazir Bhutto International Airport and asked about a "no-objection certificate" for travelling outside Islamabad.  He was travelling to Karachi, and the officials were supposedly enforcing a rule that requires "all" foreign diplomats to have a "no-objection certificate" or NOC for travelling outside the capital city.

Over the weekend, VOA also reported that diplomatic sources said that the U.S. embassy in Islamabad received a letter from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry last month setting new limitations on when and how diplomats can move outside the capital. The Associated Press, which obtained a copy of the letter, says the communique requires all U.S. diplomats to apply for special permission to leave the city five days in advance.

Oh dear! Something to remember about frienemies, the claws are never too far away. Makes one wonder what's next?  Quarantine the embassy's diplomatic mail and require a "no objection certificate" for every box from Amazon.com? 

Below Ambassador Munter enjoying a camel ride in Karachi's Clifton Beach. I wonder if Pakistan will now post officials at the beaches to enforce this rule that requires all foreign US diplomats to have a "no-objection certificate."


Ambassador Munter at Clifton Beach on the Arabian Sea
in Karachi, Pakistan

Don't be surprise if things are not going to get better anytime soon. This rather expensive "ally" in South Central Asia is still sore for the Bin Laden kill. It will find a way to let our folks there know just how sore they are. Today it's the NOC, tomorrow, it will be something else; like -- permission to shake hands with a Pakistani national?

But there is a solution to this. It's called "reciprocity" or if you want it straight, a tit for tat. If Pakistan requires a NOC for any travel by US diplomats outside of Islamabad, the US can require the equivalent of a NOC for any travel by Ambassador Husain Haqqani and other Pakistani diplomats outside of Washington, D.C. Yes, including travels to Maryland and Virginia, of course. 

But an even simpler solution? Wrap up Afghanistan 2.0 and bring the troops home. No more logistics/supply chain to worry about, period.  Hamid Karzai can go ahead and do his own nation-building without the "occupiers" that he loves one day and hates the next. Pakistan can continue worrying about India and its regional headaches; and China will be there to provide the aspirin. 

Of course, our hawks in Congress would have a fit.  They are still ever willing to burn a hole in the U.S. Treasury's pocket. Hungry children in America, forgetaboutthem.  Talk your heads off about the debt ceiling; there is no such thing as a war ceiling if some of our folks in DC have their way. And just so you know, our job creators are hard at work in the war zones and in the wars of the future not yet drawn but already imagined.




 
 
 
 

Thursday, July 21, 2011

GPS Tracking for State Dept Staffers in the Danger Zones of Iraq, Af/Pak and Yemen

Wapo's Walter Pincus recently wrote about a new high-tech system to track U.S. staff on risky tours:

The State Department is installing advanced, classified security systems in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen to monitor staff movements in those countries where moving among local populations remains dangerous, according to department budget and contract documents.

The Blue Force Tracker system uses a small transmitter mounted on a vehicle, an aircraft or an individual that sends continuous signals to a Global Positioning System satellite and back to a computer in a secure command post. The command post computer shows precise locations within a 10-foot radius of tracked individuals, vehicles or aircraft on ever-changing map displays.

“This critical technology provides department personnel with the confidence to travel into highly dangerous areas, knowing there is an over-watch and a reaction capability to help them at the push of a button,” according to a State Department fiscal 2012 budget document presented to Congress. About $9.4 million was being sought to support the tracking system in Iraq next year.
No State Department official would discuss the systems on the record.

Read the whole thing here.


It's supposed to give staff confidence because the watchers will be able to pinpoint their location -- and give the State Department an "over-watch and a reaction capability to help them [(staff] at the push of a button."

So -- if we have another Raymond Davis incident in any of those four countries, this would allow for a quick extraction of personnel in danger, is that the idea? Because -- really, unless you can retrieve/extract the personnel in danger, pinpointing location is just that - a dot on the screen. 

The report did not say what type of GPS system this might be -- a wearable item like a watch, a smart phone with GPS locator, an implantable device more or less the size of rice, a waist-clip on GPS enabled thingee like a pager or I don't know -- a fake eye, a third eye, an earing, an anklet ....


If a GPS rice implant is available, that might be the best choice - nothing to remember, nothing to forget, nothing to misplace or pack or hide when you travel. And if you ever get into a tussle with overly excited security agents of the host country, nothing that may break (that Uncle Sam can then charged you with). Of course, since this is the government, they probably will have somebody check out your GPS rice implant every year for the annual inventory. Be prepared to be scanned like Ms. Kitty.

It does look like the Blue Force Tracker Program (BFT) is deploying into the hot zones of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen since Olgoonik Global Security, LLC is hiring Security Specialist IIs for all four countries; it says so online:

Subsidiary:     Olgoonik Global Security, LLC
Location:     Pakistan
Organization:     BFT
Requisition Number:     2010759

Overview:
The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Office of Security Technology (ST), is responsible for the Department's Blue Force Tracker Program (BFT). BFT utilizes GPS satellite tracking for personnel, vehicles and aircraft. It is designed to maximize visualization of designated assets traveling and conducting operations in hostile or hazardous areas.  This position will be responsible for working with DS/C/ST and Embassy personnel on-site and providing technical guidance on both the BFT tracker hardware and monitoring software.

Among other things, it requires that applicants have "Bachelor’s Degree plus seven years of experience preferred; High School Diploma plus 12 years of experience can substitute for a Bachelor’s Degree." Also the following:
Security Clearance:                                       
TOP SECRET Clearance with SCI Access Required
  • Must have a current US Government TOP SECRET Personnel Security Clearance and be able to qualify for SCI access
  • Must have a current US Government Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) (less than 4-1/2 years old) or be able to successfully complete a U.S. government administered Single Scope Background Investigation.
  • Must be a U.S. Citizen.
  • Must be eligible for and able to obtain and maintain required Security Clearance/access approvals.
Physical Demands:

The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met by an employee to successfully perform the essential functions of this position.  The employee must be able to stand, walk and sit for a prolonged period of time; use hands and/or fingers to handle or feel objects, tools or controls; operate office equipment; reach with hands and arms; climb stairs; balance; stoop; kneel; talk and hear. Specific vision abilities required by the job include close and distant vision.  The employee must occasionally lift and or move up to 50 pounds.  Medical conditions or physical impediments may disqualify candidates from overseas work where comprehensive medical care may be limited or unavailable, or where the condition or impediment would put the individual at unacceptable risk.  Duties may be performed in an active combat zone where the employee would be required to seek shelter. There may be stress, psychological and physical hardships, and the possibility of living in field conditions associated with this position.

Travel:

Overseas travel will be required up to 90% of the calendar year in high-threat areas.  Domestic travel may be required for training and program coordination.
Work Environment:  Full-time, 84-hour week usually under hazardous conditions when deployed in a theater of operations.  Personnel meeting the provisions of Department of State Standardized Regulations, Chapter 650 – Danger Pay Allowance, and performing in a location determined a hazardous duty area are eligible to receive danger pay up to 35% over basic compensation.

Living Environment:  Lodging, meals, medical and basic life support services will be provided while in a theater of operations, as well as the prevailing per diem rate for incidental expenses (IE).

Work Location:  The location of high-risk environments will be disclosed upon interview.
Interested? Check it out here. You have to locate each job vacancy using the location country drop down menu on its website.

A side note -- DOD has been using Blue Force Tracking (BFT) for years.  In 2006, Popular Science did a piece on BFT used in Iraq. Read "Winning-and Losing-the First Wired War."



Thursday, July 14, 2011

Afghanistan-Iraq-Pakistan Staffing Fills Up Fast But Pool of Volunteers Continues to Shrink; Longer Tours On the Table?

State OIG conducted an inspection of the  Office of the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/RAP) and the report was recently posted online. The inspectors conclude that the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) has built an organization that meets the Secretary’s challenge. Below are some items that you may find interesting:

AIP Staffing Priority Fills Up Fast

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan are the Department’s number one staffing priority. To further this goal, the Department now has two assignment seasons: June of each year for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and early fall for all other positions. This procedure, which allows the three priority missions to choose their candidates before the regular bidding season begins, has meant that a large percentage of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan positions are filled within a few months. By mid-March 2011, the bureau had filled 92 percent of the summer 2011 Afghanistan positions, 91 percent of the Iraq positions, and 95 percent of the Pakistan positions.

Af/Pak Staffing and Consequences
Staffing Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent Pakistan, is a challenge. The Department began the first of three phases in 2009 in what is termed a “civilian uplift.” This uplift was intended to increase the number of U.S. Government civilians from all agencies under Embassy Kabul chief of mission authority from 977 in 2009 to 1,396 in 2011, after which growth was projected to level off. These numbers are augmented by several hundred temporary duty employees. The Afghanistan and Pakistan desks and SCA/PPD aggressively recruit to fill these positions.

The Department is relying on a blended workforce – a mixture of Foreign Service, traditional Civil Service, 3161s, contractors, Presidential Management Fellows, interns, and retired diplomats – to staff both S/SRAP and the missions. Managing this blended workforce is a challenge. Also, as noted elsewhere, S/SRAP has a number of entry- level officers, many of whom have little if any previous experience either overseas or in the Department. Faced with a shortage of mid- level officers and having authority to hire new entry- level officers, the Bureau of Human Resources has been forced to fill mid- level positions in Washington with officers on their first or second tours, who require more training and supervision than experienced veterans. Even this source of stopgap staffing will be lost, if funding cuts force a reduction in the number of new officers hired. While the number of positions continues to increase, the pool of potential Foreign Service volunteers who have not yet served in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq continues to shrink (emphasis added).

Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have requested that the Department consider increasing the length of tours from 1 year to 18 months or 2 years. While this would improve continuity, many working with Foreign Service assignments say it would decrease the number of people willing to volunteer to work in these extremely challenging missions.

A number of Civil Service employees have expressed interest in serving in Afghanistan or Pakistan. However, assignment rules allow Civil Service staff to be assigned to Foreign Service positions only if no Foreign Service officer has bid on the position. This can sometimes mean that no one fills the job at all, if the Foreign Service bidder subsequently goes elsewhere after logging the bid. The assignments offices within the bureau and in the Bureau of Human Resources have worked to mitigate this problem. As the pool of Foreign Service personnel who have not served in these missions shrinks, it may be necessary to increase the opportunities for Civil Service employees to fill positions there.

The New, New Normal: From One-Year Tours to 18 Months, 24 Months ...
The 1-year tour-of-duty policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused a lack of continuity with contacts and impeded efforts to build personal relationships with members of the local media. This discontinuity is a challenge for the embassies’ public affairs sections. At times, the S/SRAP director of communications and the staff have reached out directly by telephone to set up media events for high- level visiting U.S. officials. During the inspection, such difficulties occurred when the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went to Pakistan to help resolve the Lahore incident described above.

The director of communications’ work for Senator Kerry’s visit was crucial to orchestrating and designing the media engagement plan in Lahore, which included a pooled television roundtable and a session with top Pakistani editors and columnists. The Urdu-speaking deputy director for outreach also got involved by telephone with the Pakistani media, to ensure successful media opportunities. In a society and in an industry where personal relationships are all- important, tours of duty longer than 12 months for the press attaché and public affairs section chief would be desirable, to give them time to build relationships and foster continuity. Already, Embassies Kabul and Islamabad encourage their chiefs of section and principal officers to commit to 2-year assignments; expanding this approach to apply to senior press officers and local language public spokespersons would be consistent with this already established model (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the officers would be more likely to make such a commitment if some accommodation were made to permit spouses to accompany them, at least on a case-by-case basis.
If Af/Pak principal officers and chiefs of sections have already been asked to commit to 2-year tours, the OIG recommendation that press officers extend their tours to 2 years is not a big leap.  Given the shrinking pool of volunteers to AIP assignments, how soon before this "model" will expand to the rest of the staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not a matter of if but when. 


Related item:
-06/30/11   Inspection of the Office of the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (ISP-I-11-48) June 2011  [474 Kb] 



Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Public Affairs Skills Gap: Shortage of Language Qualified Press Officers

Wikipedia (ويکيپېډيا) in Pashto using FreeFars...Image via WikipediaHere is one more nugget from the OIG review of the Af/Pak "bureau":

The January 27, 2011, arrest in Lahore, Pakistan, of an American official assigned to Embassy Islamabad drew attention to a public affairs skills gap. Not once during nearly 2 months that coincided with this inspection did a Pakistan-based American public affairs official engage the Urdu-speaking media in that local language about this issue. At the 2011 Global Chiefs of Mission Conference, the final report noted that effective engagement requires talented officers and “officers who can engage contacts in local languages with fluency.”3 Likewise, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review stated the intent to, “Make public diplomacy a core diplomatic mission by building regional media hubs staffed by skilled communicators to ensure that we can participate in public debates anywhere and anytime.”4 This is not the case –or at least not regularly – in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The result is that other voices, including those of extremists, go unchallenged by U.S. officials speaking local languages. Public opinion in Pakistan of Americans and U.S. policy has consistently been at relatively low levels, but that situation was gradually improving [REDACTED[ until the disruption of the Lahore incident. The Lahore incident is an aberration, but it illustrates how quickly – after months of implementing a well-designed strategic communication and public diplomacy strategy –an event can halt, and even temporarily reverse, progress.
[...]
[REDACTED]
[...]
Other direct-hire American staff at the U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan have a degree of competency in the main local languages (Urdu, Pashto, and Dari), but they may not have the high level of language competency needed to speak extemporaneously in a live television interview or as part of a round table. They may not be Department employees or part of the public affairs section or have press attaché skills. According to FSI, fewer than 120 active career and career-conditional employees can read and speak these hard languages at a competency level of 3 or greater. (See table below.) A native-speaker proficiency in a foreign language is measured at or near the 5 competency level. At the time of this inspection, there were 24 Department officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan serving at that highest level of proficiency in any of the three languages. Dari speakers at the 4 level or higher numbered six, two Pashto speakers; and 14 Urdu speakers. Four Dari speakers, one Pashto speaker, and five Urdu speakers spoke those languages at the highest level.

Recommendation 12: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop and implement a plan to recruit detailees or excepted Civil Service employees and place them in Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad press offices to serve as full-time, dedicated public spokespersons; these individuals must be U.S. citizens who are proficient in the local language(s) and have press officer training or experience. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 13: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Foreign Service Institute, should provide career public diplomacy officers with the training they need to communicate proficiently
in the designated local languages, so they can engage with the Afghan and Pakistani local language media at any time and in any place. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with DGHR and FSI)

Recommendation 14:
The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad, should examine the feasibility of developing a speakers bureau of experts who are proficient in Urdu, Pashto, or Dari, who can be detailed from their regular jobs to assist with outreach and engagement strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This speakers bureau should include whole-of-government agencies, as well as American citizens who do not work in government and who are fluent speakers of Urdu, Pashto, or Dari to participate in public outreach and other mission-sponsored public diplomacy activities. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with IIP, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad)

I do feel sorry for the six Pashto speakers in the whole State Department; Afghanistan and Pakistan will keep calling them back, never mind the one-year tours; it's called service need.

And the State Department still insists on not/not hiring for skills needed; perhaps thinking it can train itself out of this problem. Ten years from now, unless hiring policy gets smarter, and as more FS personnel reaches the mandatory retirement age of 65 -- we'll be rocking and talking about this same language gap.

FP's Stephen Walt in 2009 citing  DOD media relations officer Brian Lamar, wrote that the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California trains roughly 30 to 40 military personnel in Pashto each year but that most of them are enlisted men in military intelligence.

Even if we presume, for the sake of argument that the State Department trains six Pashto speakers a year, DOD has roughly six times that number every year.  How can we even think of a demilitarized U.S. foreign policy with this kind of numbers? The reality is -- our development and reconstruction folks in Afghanistan not only wear combat boots, they also have their own ATMs, and they speak the local language. So...








Snapshot: Af/Pak Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Strategy, Funding and Staffing

Via the OIG Review of the Af/Pak "Bureau" under the  Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP):

The Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy follows four pillars: expand media engagement, counter extremist voices, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties.

To implement that strategy, Embassy Islamabad runs the Department’s largest bilateral exchange program, and Pakistan has the largest Fulbright program in the world. The public diplomacy budget for Pakistan grew from a base public diplomacy budget of approximately $1.5 million in FY 2009 to $58 million in FY 2010 for public diplomacy and strategic communications from Department and USAID funds, not counting strategic communication funds from the Department of Defense. Funds limited to public diplomacy that were spent in Pakistan in FY 2010 totaled $41.4 million (FY 2010 base of $1.6 million; FY 2009 supplemental, 2-year funds of $31.1 million; and FY 2010 supplemental regularization funding of $8.7 million). The FY 2011 budget request is for up to $110 million.

The public diplomacy budget in Afghanistan grew from a base public diplomacy budget of $1.5 million in FY 2009 to over $87.5 million in FY 2010 for public diplomacy and strategic communications from Department and USAID funds, not counting significant strategic communication funds from the Department of Defense. Funds used only for public diplomacy that were spent in Afghanistan in FY 2010 totaled $46.7 million (FY 2010 base $1.3 million; FY 2009 supplemental 2-year money $22.1 million; and FY 2010 supplemental regularization $23.3 million).

These budget increases at Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have been accompanied by a doubling of the number of public affairs officers at the two missions and by SCA/PPD staffing up to support grants management. Neither the S/SRAP unit nor SCA/PPD requires further staff augmentation to manage this increased workload.
Active links added above. Is the informational effect worth all that money?

Countering extremist voices in English is not the same as countering it in the local language or dialect.  Right there, the State Department has a problem not just in the Af/Pak super bureau but in US missions in the large swath of the world where English is not the principal language.

If extreme voices calls you a dog in American English, you should be able to call them back a dog in their language, and explain what kind of dog and why, even debate about it. No translators required, no mistranslation, no misunderstanding just what you mean. But if you can't speak their language ... well, um .... see why that's a problem?







Monday, May 16, 2011

US Mission Afghanistan: CODEL Kerry in Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul 05.14-15.2011

U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and Senator John Kerry (D-MA) visited Mazar-i-Sharif on Saturday, May 14, 2011. Senator Kerry also attended several events in Kabul on Sunday, May 15, 2011.

"Yes, there are insurgents coming across the border," Kerry (D-Mass.) said in Kabul. "Yes, they are operating out of North Waziristan and other areas of the sanctuaries. And yes, there is some evidence of Pakistan government knowledge of some of these activities in ways that is very disturbing. That will be without any question one of the subjects of conversation."

John Kerry - Washington Post


Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr



Wednesday, May 4, 2011

US Should Aim for an Afghanistan that is “good enough”

Richard HaassImage via Wikipedia Richard N. Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations over at a Senate hearing on Afghanistan talks about the Af/Pak problem bundled together in a messy knot: 

The Afghan-Pakistan tie is at the heart of U.S. policy and its limits. There is no way the United States will be able to persuade Pakistan to become a full partner in Afghanistan (and stop providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban) given Islamabad’s obsession with India and its view of Afghanistan as a critical source of strategic depth in its struggle with India. Even a solution to the Kashmir conflict would not change this – and there is no solution to Kashmir in the offing, certainly not in a time frame that would prove relevant to U.S. decision-making for Afghanistan.

At the macro or global level, Afghanistan is simply absorbing more economic, military, human, diplomatic, and political resources of every sort than it warrants. The $110-$120 billion annual price tag – one out of every six to seven dollars this country spends on defense – is unjustifiable given the budget crisis we face and the need for military (especially air and naval) modernization. The history of the 21st century is far more likely to be determined in the land areas and waters of Asia and the Pacific than it is on the plains and in the mountains of Afghanistan. We had also better be prepared for a number of future counterterrorist interventions (along the lines of Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen) in Libya and elsewhere in the Greater Middle East and Africa. We also need to make sure we have adequate forces for possible contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and conceivably with Iran. Afghanistan is a strategic distraction, pure and simple. Secretary of Defense Gates’s recent West Point speech makes a case for avoiding sending a large American land force into places like Afghanistan. I agree. But less clear is why we should continue to deploy a large number of soldiers there for the present and near future.
[...]
Strategy is about balancing means and ends, resources and interests, and the time has come to restore strategic perspective to what the United States is doing in Afghanistan.
[...]
We should not kid ourselves, though: there is unlikely to be a rosy future for Afghanistan any time soon. The most likely future for the next few years and possibly beyond is some form of a messy stalemate, an Afghanistan characterized by a mix of a weak central government, strong local officials, and a Taliban presence (supported out of Pakistan) that is extensive in much of the Pashtun-dominated south and east of the country. Resolution of the ongoing conflict by either military or diplomatic means is highly unlikely and not a realistic basis for U.S. policy. Walking away from Afghanistan, however, is not the answer. Instead, this country should sharply scale back what it is doing and what it seeks to accomplish, and aim for an Afghanistan that is “good enough” in light of local realities, limited interests, and the broad range of both domestic and global challenges facing the United States.
Read in full here.






Thursday, April 28, 2011

Officially In: President Obama's New "A" Team

"So, Leon Panetta at the Defense Department; David Petraeus at the CIA; Ambassador Crocker and General John Allen in Afghanistan -- these are the leaders that I’ve chosen to help guide us through the difficult days ahead.  I will look to them and my entire national security team for their counsel, continuity, and unity of effort that this moment in history demands.  And our people on the frontlines -- our brave troops, our outstanding intelligence personnel, our dedicated diplomats -- we’ll look to them for the leadership that success requires."

The transcript of the President's Remarks is here:







Af/Pak: Excuse me, sirs -- with strategeric friends like these, why do we need enemies?

Map included in The United States Lacks Compre...Image via WikipediaYesterday, April 27, the Wall Street Journal's Matthew Rosenberg broke the story of Pakistan urging Afghanistan to ally itself with Islamabad, and Islamabad's BFF, Beijing. Just so you know, China has long been considered by Pakistan as its "all weather friend", except during calamitous floods and earthquakes when the US appears to be its main BFF. Quick excerpts below:

Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan's president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say.

The pitch was made at an April 16 meeting in Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who bluntly told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the Americans had failed them both, according to Afghans familiar with the meeting. Mr. Karzai should forget about allowing a long-term U.S. military presence in his country, Mr. Gilani said, according to the Afghans. Pakistan's bid to cut the U.S. out of Afghanistan's future is the clearest sign to date that, as the nearly 10-year war's endgame begins, tensions between Washington and Islamabad threaten to scuttle America's prospects of ending the conflict on its own terms.

With the bulk of U.S.-led coalition troops slated to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the country's neighbors, including Pakistan, Iran, India and Russia, are beginning to jockey for influence, positioning themselves for Afghanistan's post-American era.
[...]
Some U.S. officials said they had heard details of the Kabul meeting, and presumed they were informed about Mr. Gilani's entreaties in part, as one official put it, to "raise Afghanistan's asking price" in the partnership talks. That asking price could include high levels of U.S. aid after 2014. The U.S. officials sought to play down the significance of the Pakistani proposal. Such overtures were to be expected at the start of any negotiations, they said; the idea of China taking a leading role in Afghanistan was fanciful at best, they noted.
[...]
Pakistani officials say they no longer have an incentive to follow the American lead in their own backyard. "Pakistan is sole guarantor of its own interest," said a senior Pakistani official. "We're not looking for anyone else to protect us, especially the U.S. If they're leaving, they're leaving and they should go."
Active links added above. Read in full here.

On the same day, eight U.S. trainers and one contractor were killed by an Afghan air force officer.  Below is a statement from DOD: 
Eight International Security Assistance Force service members and an ISAF civilian died today following a shooting incident in Afghanistan’s capital of Kabul, military officials reported.

Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman, said ISAF has confirmed that the service members and civilian were Americans. Because next of kin had not yet been notified, he would not provide the service affiliations of the service members who were killed.

The shooter reportedly was an Afghan air force officer who was killed during the incident, Lapan said.

USA Today also reported that the Afghan pilot who killed nine U.S. trainers in Kabul came from the security force that has been more closely screened for insurgent sympathizers than any other force. If this does not spell trouble ...
More than nine in 10 members of the Afghan air force had undergone screening for criminal, drug and medical problems as part of program to weed out unfit recruits or Taliban infiltrators.

There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and 284,000 Afghan troops and police. President Obama has asked Congress for $12.8 billion to train and equip the Afghan security forces this coming fiscal year.

The attack is not the first of its kind, and it won't be the last, if we stay in that sand pit.

Then today, the Frontier Post reported that Pakistan rejected as baseless assertions the news that it is ‘lobbying Afghanistan’s president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S’. A denial from the Afghanistan Government should also be forthcoming, unless they want you all to sweat some more ...   

Well, of course, that WSJ report must be wrong! It must be ....because wait....don't we have a rather expensive strategic strategeric partnerships with these lovely folks? 

You know what I think every time I hear the word "partnership"? It reminds me of a marriage of convenience made in hell. You can spin it all you want, at the end of the day, you cannot/cannot buy love, and splitville is just a sigh away. Was there a signed  pre-nup? Yo! Every partnership needs one.  











Tuesday, March 8, 2011

US Embassy Kabul: SRAP Marc Grossman Holds Town Hall Meeting

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman holds a Town Hall meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on Saturday, March 5, 2011.


Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photo from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr


SRAP Grossman was in Pakistan yesterday and held meetings with President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. He reportedly also made a call on Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. According to dawn.com, President Zardari Zardari told SRAP Grossman that the two countries should not be “swayed by misperceptions and some isolated incidents that may be used by some to increase tensions and mistrust”. Prime Minister Gilani reportedly said during his meeting with the SRAP that Pakistan’s stance on the Davis issue is based on principles and there can be no negotiations around it.






Sunday, March 6, 2011

US Mission Pakistan: When is a good time for a post drawdown? Strategerically-speaking, like never....

The things going on in Pakistan are causing my nerves to go into hyper apprehensive disorder.  In January, a sitting governor was murdered by his own guard, and was showered with rose petals on his way to jail. This week, Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian politician and Pakistan's minister for minorities was shot dead in broad daylight. Bhatti's police guard was reportedly due to meet him at his office. The Guardian describes Mr. Bhatti as "an unassuming man with a gentle manner, was not the most powerful of Pakistan's politicians, nor the most prominent. But he was unquestionably among the bravest." His assasins fired about 25 bullets, at least 8 hit the minister. This report notes that "two hours after his death was confirmed, it was back to business for the country's boisterous TV channels, which focused instead on the cricket World Cup, political intrigue in the Punjab, and the fate of incarcerated CIA contractor Raymond Davis."

We love you not, we love you not, we love you not, and the CIA plot



The Guardian also reported that on TV Zaid Hamid, a rightwing commentator, said Bhatti's killing was part of a CIA plot to divert attention from the Davis affair.  And the chance that a good number in the local population would actually believe that the Bhatti killing is a CIA plot or that the CIA actually has some pull on the weather is not terribly nutty if you already believe that Pakistan has been sleeping with the enemy called the United States of America. Local reports say that religious parties have now condemned the murder of of Mr. Batti, and have already termed it a conspiracy "to divert the public opinion from the Raymond Davis issue and increase pressure on Islamabad for the release of the US spy."



It seems to me that the only things that have not yet been blamed on CIA plots are monsoon rains and earthquakes. But it's only a matter of time.


In last week's piece in WaPo, Karin Brulliard quotes Aslam Hayat, 54, a construction worker who spoke after prayers at a mosque in Rawalpindi saying, "The Americans want to destroy Pakistan." [...] "That's why people like Davis are roaming all around the country, assigned with different tasks against our country."


WaPo also writes that "as outrage over the Davis shooting mounts, suggestions that all U.S. personnel are spies are feeding popular suspicion about the battery of American programs here and renewing reservations about the U.S. presence in general."


During Senator Kerry's visit to Lahore, the Express Tribune reported that a man introducing himself as a representative of the US Consulate called Waseem Shamshad, brother of Fahim Shamshad (one of the victims), on his mobile phone and asked if the family could meet with the senator.

“I told him that we do not want to meet with any US official because we consider them our enemies,” he said. “I want them to see that we will not accept a settlement.”
And he's not alone.


A Pew Research Survey indicates that only 17% of Pakistanis have a favorable view of the United States. Roughly six-in-ten (59%) Pakistanis also describe the U.S. as an enemy, while just 11% say it is a partner.

US public perception of Pakistan is equally low according to a Gallup poll on February 11.  Some 18 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Pakistan and 76 percent viewed it unfavorably. Only two other countries have lesser favorability ratings: Iran and North Korea.



One grand gamble and international obligations



Raza Rumi writing recently in Raymond Davis case: Bitter truths says that "this is now a battle between Pakistan’s elected and unelected institutions. Facts have been lost in the rhetoric and fiction prevails, regurgitating the narratives that we have weaved about ourselves and the rest of the world. Hate the US and blame it for all our weaknesses, even if it entails violating our international obligations."


Pakistan's weak elected institutions, and its international obligations.


Pakistan's weak institutions are dragging its feet on a dangerous gamble that time heals all wounds.  That may be a long wait and sometimes time may just make old wounds fester. Meanwhile, a Pakistani writer, Sabir Shah, in writing about US diplomats killed abroad since 1780 reminds us of American diplomats who perished in Pakistan:


Of these 111 US Foreign Service officials, who have were killed during their foreign postings, at least eight have met their deaths in an unnatural way in Pakistan.

These eight American Foreign Service personnel, who died unnaturally in Pakistan, are Sergeant Steven Crowley, US Army Warrant Officer Bryan Ellis, Arnold Raphel (US Ambassador to Pakistan), Brigadier General Herbert Wassom (Chief of the US military group in Pakistan), Gary Durell (a CIA communications technician), Jackie Van Landingham (a consulate secretary), Barbara Green (US Embassy Islamabad) and David Foy (a Facilities Maintenance Officer at the US Consulate Karachi).

While Sergeant Steven Crowley, a 20-year old Marine Security Guard was hit by a lethal bullet during the siege of the US Embassy in Islamabad on November 21, 1979, the burned corpse of a 30-year old US Army Warrant Officer, Bryan Ellis, was also recovered from his apartment on the same day.

Crowley and Ellis were killed a day after Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini had claimed that Americans were behind the November 20 takeover of the Grand Al-Haram Mosque at Makkah.

As soon as Khomeini’s claim was repeated in media on November 21, 1979 a group of enraged Pakistani students had stormed the 32-acre US Embassy at Islamabad. The rioters were also infuriated by incorrect radio reports that Washington had bombed the Grand Mosque at Makkah.

After bringing the embassy gate down, the mob fired gunshots and pelted stones at the building’s windows. As Ambassador Arthur Hummel Jr., was out of the building for lunch, Marine Steven Crowley was posted on the Embassy roof to assess the demonstration.

A corporal assigned to the Marine Security Guard Battalion Detachment in Islamabad, Crowley was shot by a sniper just above his left ear while he was doing his job.

Although the US Embassy staffers had organized themselves into groups by blood type similar to Crowley’s, in case a transfusion was needed, their injured colleague never actually regained consciousness.

At sunset, as the rioters had begun to disperse, Sergeant Lloyd Miller climbed the roof and brought down the body of Crowley over his shoulder. Within just two days, some 400 shocked US diplomats had flown out of Pakistan.

The Pakistani government had reportedly paid US $121 million to the US, as a cost to rebuild the Embassy compound, after having failed to prevent the incident.

Read this piece in full here.

Rumi's piece above is a cautionary tale on how an infuriated mob can turn into dangerous rampage based on rumors and incorrect information.  The mob attack happened in 1979 but it also highlights the limits of security even with a Marine detachment. Makes you appreciate more the finer points of the fortress embassies that we have now. But that's only 30% of the US diplomatic facilities worldwide.


Pakistan is responsible for the security outside US mission properties in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. Just as the USG is responsible for the foreign diplomatic facilities in the United States, including every chancery, consulate, or other office notified to the US government as diplomatic or consular premises in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.


I'm not a lawyer, but here's what's confusing -- if Pakistan cannot resolve the immunity issue under the same convention, how can one trust that it can and will abide by its security obligations under the same international agreement? And even if it wishes to, it appears not to have any control over its provincial bodies. What if one of its provincial governments simply decide that it does not have an obligation to provide perimeter security over USG or other foreign diplomatic facilities?  What happens then?
     


Christopher Hitchens in Slate notes rather grimly:
Not to mince words, then, Davis is a hostage. In addition to the usual sense of the word, he is a hostage to the Pakistani authorities who dare not—even if they wish—make an enemy either of the Islamist mobs or the uniformed para-state run by the intelligence services. He is also a hostage to the inability or unwillingness of the U.S. government to call things by their right names. [...] [T]hey all talk as if Pakistan were a country of law, and they all talk as if Pakistan were not a client state. Its client status, indeed, is what leads so many Pakistanis to detest America, without whose largesse and indulgence it would long ago have faced collapse. Thus to the final irony: We are denied leverage by the fact of the very influence for which we are hated.


So, a post drawdown in the stars?


In 2010, when the Office of the Inspector General reviewed the US Mission in Pakistan, it says that "Security for U.S. Government personnel is among the highest mission priorities. Especially in Peshawar, but also in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, official American and LE staff lives are put at risk every day. Mission leadership and Washington policymakers recognize and accept this risk in order to pursue vital national strategic and security priorities. The security situation also limits the mission’s efforts to monitor assistance and development projects; oversee contracts and grants; conduct broad public diplomacy outreach; and further the person-to-person exchanges across social, economic, and political lines that are the foundations of diplomacy." (italics added)


The same review reports that US Mission Pakistan had 640 U.S. direct-hire staff, 1,503 LE staff and a nonmilitary assistance in FY 2009 that totaled approximately $1.25 billion. The USAID office in Peshawar also managed and monitored $750 million FATA Development Program and is responsible for planning and managing more than $1 billion of new assistance for the NWFP. Peshawar’s consular district will receive a major portion of the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund ($400 million) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund ($700 million) before the end of FY 2011. Note that in October 2009, President Obama signed the five-year, $7.5 billion Kerry Lugar Berman bill which tripled non-military aid to Pakistan.


But the writer below could not wrap his head around so many US diplomats operating inside Pakistan:

"China is investing $20 billion in the next five years in Pakistan. China has thousands of its nationals working in Pakistan involved in billions of Dollars of infrastructure projects.  It has only 87 diplomats. Somethings is wrong with this pictures. Why does the US have so many diplomats. Either they are very inefficinet and cnnot run the embassies, or most of the people are not really diplomats."

So to recap quickly --

  • Restricted ability to work and operate in a country where Americans are largely viewed as enemies ...

  • Suggestions floated around that all U.S. personnel in the country are spies

  • Unnamed sources assumes that many Americans are "US Special Forces – including members of the covert Delta Force of the United States Army – and therefore are considered armed and dangerous."

  • Then there's the alleged connection between GPS chip recovered from Raymond Davis and  drone attacks in North Waziristan....

  • Jeff Stein writes about a "Ray Davis rescue" which was apparently called a 'mission impossible,' by a CIA veteran.  Nonetheless, speculating rescue scenarios will certainly bring the paranoia level in Pakistan to the crazy bad level.

  • Allegations elsewhere on a CIA plot (there it is again) to poison Raymond Davis to shut him up. The dogs apparently are tasting his food.

The kiss of death and the long way forward



Bruce Riedel, a former long-time CIA officer recently writes in the Daily Beast about what undeniably is the worst job in the world -- Marc Grossman's job.  In it he writes that "The United States is so unpopular in Pakistan today that its endorsement of a politician is the kiss of death."  Then there is this: 
[A jihadist, nuclear-armed Pakistan is a scenario that must be avoided at all costs. That means working with the Pakistan of today to try to improve its very spotty record on terrorism and proliferation. While many (on both sides of the U.S.-Pakistan dialogue) are pessimistic that cooperation/engagement between America and Pakistan will succeed, there is every reason to try, given the alternatives.
[...]
Pakistan is a complex and combustible society undergoing a severe crisis, which America helped create over the years. If it does not come to Pakistan's aid now, it may have to deal with an extremist Pakistan sooner rather than later, or witness a repeat of 9/11, this time originating from Pakistan. Even worse, a crisis in the subcontinent could lead to a nuclear war in South Asia. These all-too-possible nightmare scenarios should impel the United States to focus on the current state of Pakistan. It needs to do better in Pakistan. For Obama, 2011 may be the year of Pakistan.
Enough to scare your pants off?  I should note that Mr. Riedel also chaired President Obama's strategic review of policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009.


Strategerically-speaking, I don't think we'll be seeing any drawdown anytime soon. The Obama administration accepted the risks in 2009 with a civilian and an aid surge to Pakistan, it cannot just do a turnaround now.  Unless... well, that's the part that is worrisome. 

I noticed by the way, that all posts in Pakistan, except Peshawar are now running contests in their Facebook pages (with videocams, ipods and cricket set as prizes). And watch out U.S. Embassy Colombo FB
and American Center New Delhi FB -- ConGen Lahore and ConGen Karachi are both gunning actively running for the top spot in State's FB presence in South Central Asia.         


On a related note -- President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan has an op-ed in the March 6 issue of the Washington Post, available online here in which he writes in part:
Our nation is pressed by overlapping threats. We have lost more soldiers in the war against terrorism than all of NATO combined. We have lost 10 times the number of civilians who died on Sept. 11, 2001. Two thousand police officers have been killed. Our economic growth was stifled by the priorities of past dictatorial regimes that unfortunately were supported by the West.
[...]
Our desire to confront and deal with the menace in a manner that is effective in our context should not become the basis for questioning our commitment or ignoring our sacrifices.
[...]
We are committed to peaceful adjudication of the Davis case in accordance with the law. But it is in no one's interest to allow this matter to be manipulated and exploited to weaken the government of Pakistan and damage further the U.S. image in our country.

Similarly counterproductive are threats to apply sanctions to Pakistan over the Davis affair by cutting off Kerry-Lugar development funds that were designed to build infrastructure, strengthen education and create jobs. It is a threat, written out of the playbook of America's enemies, whose only result will be to undermine U.S. strategic interests in South and Central Asia. In an incendiary environment, hot rhetoric and dysfunctional warnings can start fires that will be difficult to extinguish.

Hitting all the keywords.  Obviously written for a special kind of audience inside the beltway.

I don't know about you but even after reading Mr. Zardari, my nerves remain in
hyper apprehensive disorder about this whole mess.

If I go over to Twitter for some charliesheen pills would that make me feel better?




Previous op-eds by
Mr. Zardari below: