Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Karzai's Kabul Bank Scam Excuse --"Created by Foreign Hands"

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan (June 13, 2010) — Afghan...Image via WikipediaAs NATO foreign ministers gathered in Bonn last week to discuss the way forward in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai gave an interview to SPIEGEL about how much international involvement will be required following the 2014 withdrawal and about his rocky partnership with the United States. The interview was conducted by Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Reuter and touched on corruption in Afghanistan, specifically on the Bank of Kabul. Excerpts:

SPIEGEL: In the largest financial scandal of Afghanistan, surrounding the virtually bankrupt Bank of Kabul, your family too would seem to be involved. We have seen a protocol from former central bank head Abdul Qadir Fitrat who, in the presence of your brother, made clear that the bank was little more than a criminal organization and was close to collapse. It provided loans to fictitious companies and straw men. The bank managers invested in huge villas in Dubai. Why did nothing happen for a full year?
Karzai: We called in Fitrat and asked him and said we are hearing that there is something going wrong, but he said no. The Americans never told us about this. The bank didn't tell us.

SPIEGEL: But once the problems became apparent, why did your government prevent an audit of the bank by foreign experts?

Karzai: We believed a certain embassy was trying to create financial trouble for us. We felt the whole bank scam was created by foreign hands.

SPIEGEL: Which embassy?

Karzai: I will not go into details.

This is the same guy who wants $5 billion a year from the United States until 2024.  He must think that's a nice round bargain considering that we are going to spend $6.5 billion a year for the US Mission in Iraq after the military pulls out.






 
 
 

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

US Embassy Afghanistan: Sesame Street Goes to Kabul, But Where's Elmo?

Via US Embassy Kabul/FB | On November 30, 2011, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, joined by Deputy Minister of Education Patman and Dr. Charlotte Cole of Sesame Workshop, attended the launch of the Afghan version of Sesame Street, Baghch-e-SimSim, which was produced in cooperation with Tolo TV / Moby Group. The event was moderated by Tolo's Masood Sanjer, and featured muppets Grover (Kajkoal) and Ernie (Hadi) at the French Cultural Center Kabul, Afghanistan.

But where's Elmo?


Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr






 
 
 

Thursday, November 10, 2011

You’ve been in Afghanistan too long without R&R when ....

US National Guard Photo by Sgt Russell Lee Klika
A Ttwenty-something development worker in Afghanistan writes about when you know you’ve been in Afghanistan too long without R&R.

When…

--- you start using Afghan insults against other expats.
---you know the pricing scale for contract killings in your city.
---you don’t scream when you find a toenail in your bread, you just pick it out.
---you find it kind of gross but not at all weird when the hotel reception clerk is staring at full-screen photos of dismembered corpses on his computer when you check in.
---you know how to walk in a burqa like an Afghan woman.
---you have a list of people you’d love to send phony Taliban night letters, and that list is four whole pages long. Single-spaced.

Check out her full list here.




Monday, November 7, 2011

General Fuller, Didn't You Know That Keeping It Real in Afghanistan Can Get You Sacked?

Maj. Gen. Peter Fuller, deputy commander of the American-led NATO effort to train and equip Afghan security forces gave an interview to POLITICO last week.  He said lots of things in that interview that you and I already know, and that U.S. officials already think but won't admit publicly for obvious reasons. 

This is not the first time that President Karzai and "erratic" had been used in the same sentence.  Apparently, frustrated diplomats and foreign statesmen have called the president of Afghanistan "as erratic, emotional and prone to believing paranoid conspiracy theories." But no one gets fired for writing that in a cable.  Read this account here from the Guardian (WL coverage from the Guardian, you may go blind if read from a work computer).

I am pleased to see that a two-star general went on the record to say the things he said. I'm sorry he got sacked and may be forced to retire.  But you don't get to become a general by accident or by political connections, unlike some of our ambassadors.  He must know that what he said in the interview will be reported widely. I don't think he is naive enough to think that there will not be any career repercussions.  It's not like they're just kicking cans and this came up.  So, that leaves me thinking -- either his frustrations with his Afghan counterparts have become crazy bad, or he knew what's coming, but may have thought the flap is worth it if this gets some airing.  

I particularly like the "poke me in the eye with a needle," (ouchy!) and the "cod's on the menu today." There is a poem in there somewhere.
 
Via Politico:

The two-star general flashed irritation when he brought up Karzai’s recent remarks that Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in a war against the U.S., blasting the president’s comments as “erratic,” and adding, “Why don’t you just poke me in the eye with a needle! You’ve got to be kidding me … I’m sorry, we just gave you $11.6 billion and now you’re telling me, ‘I don’t really care’?”
[...]
Fuller recently involved Afghan generals in a strategic review of the U.S. mission and said that they didn’t understand the extent to which America is in economic distress.

“I said, ‘You guys are isolated from reality.’ The reality is, the world economy is having some significant hiccups. The U.S. is in this [too],” Fuller told POLITICO. “If you’re in a very poor country like Afghanistan, you think that America has roads paved in gold, everybody lives in Hollywood. They don’t understand the sacrifices that America is making to provide for their security. And I think that’s part of my job to educate ’em.”
[...]
In fact, the Afghan government made requests for F-16 fighter jets and tanks, even without the budget to use or maintain them, said Fuller. “I actually had someone senior tell me, ‘All I want to do is put them [tanks] on a flat bed and drive them around in a parade,” he said.
[...]
“You can teach a man how to fish, or you can give them a fish,” said Fuller. “We’re giving them fish while they’re learning, and they want more fish! [They say,] ‘I like swordfish, how come you’re giving me cod?’ Guess what? Cod’s on the menu today.”
Read in full here.

Below is a brief bio:
As the Deputy Commander for Programs Maj. Gen. Peter Fuller is responsible for planning and executing resources in order to generate and sustain an Afghan Army of 195,000 and an Afghan Police Force of 157,000 by November 2012.

Fuller joined the NTM-A / CSTC-A team from the Program Executive Officer- Soldier.  A native of Andover, Md., Major General Fuller was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1980 after graduating from the University of Vermont with a Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science. He also holds: a Master of Science in Public Administration, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa.; a Master of Science in Military Arts and Sciences, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan; and a Master of Science in Resourcing of the National Security Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, District of Columbia.

His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit (with two oak leaf clusters); Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Army Meritorious Service Medal (with two oak leaf clusters); Army Commendation Medal (with oak leaf cluster); Southwest Asia Liberation Medal; Army Achievement Medal (with oak leaf cluster); National Defense Service Ribbon; Army Service Ribbon; Army Parachutist Badge; Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge; Army Staff Identification Badge; and the Overseas Ribbon.
Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman writes that "Getting fired from Afghanistan doesn’t necessarily end Fuller’s Army career. But that career will be in need of serious rehab if Fuller doesn’t opt to retire. All for saying something that a lot of people in the military quietly agree with — even if they know better than to tell it to a journalist."

Whether he gets his career rehabilitated or he gets retirement, I don't know. But it seems a certainty that his successor, too will need to educate the Afghans on the sacrifices that America is making to provide for their security. But he must do it gently and carefully so as not to offend their feelings, see?  It doesn't matter that they, too, offend our feelings.  I'm sure General Fuller's successor will get a couple of advice like, 1) stay away from loaded words like, "needle", "poke", "eye", "cod", "erratic", and a host of other words that are seen as inappropriate. Even if they're true. And 2) stay away from journalists, because they write stuff down.



Sunday, October 30, 2011

Another Bloody Day in Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan

According to ISAF: "[T]he three incidents today included a vehicle-born improvised explosive device detonating in Kabul, causing a number of Coalition and civilian casualties; an individual wearing an Afghan National Army uniform apparently turned his weapon on Afghan and Coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, killing three ISAF service members and wounding several others; and a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a National Directorate of Security building in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself  and wounding several NDS personnel."


Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman provides more details:
At least five U.S. troops and eight U.S. civilians in Kabul are dead on Saturday after a Taliban bomber targeted the lightly-armored bus transporting them through the Afghan capitol.
While details are still sketchy, the Taliban attack shows sophistication. The bus, known colloquially as a “Rhino,” is a slow transport vehicle built to withstand small arms fire. Its hull is V-shaped, like a Mine Resistant Ambushed Protected (MRAP) vehicle, so it can survive driving over a homemade bomb.

But insurgents evidently spotted two vulnerabilities with the Rhino. First, unlike troop convoys or patrols, Rhinos travel along a set, predictable route. Second, as ABC News notes, the buses are not built to survive a suicide car bomb detonating along its side. And the Rhino was reportedly escorted by a convoy of thickly-armored MRAPs, which indicates that the insurgents understand it to be the less-secure vehicle.
In the second incident, ISAF makes it sound as if the individual just put on an ANA uniform then proceeded to turn his weapon on Coalition forces.  The casualties were mostly Australian troops. The Australian has more details:
AFGHAN troops at a forward base have been disarmed and confined to barracks after a rogue Afghan soldier killed three Australians and wounded seven.

Australia's 1550 personnel in Afghanistan are on higher alert with concerns greatest among hundreds of instructors mentoring their Afghan counterparts in remote patrol bases.

The soldiers, a captain a corporal and a lance corporal whose names have not yet been released, and an Afghan interpreter were shot down during a parade at a patrol base at Shah Wali Kot in northern Kandahar Province yesterday morning, Afghan time.
[...]
The killer was wearing an Afghan National Army uniform.

Those who fired back at him included some of the wounded Australians. The killer was shot dead.

The local Afghan Army commander, General Abdul Hameed, said the rogue Afghan soldier had been in the army for three years.

"At around 8.30 this morning (3pm AEDT), an ANA soldier named Darwish who had been serving as an ANA soldier for the past three years opened fire on a group of Australian military officers, killing three of them,'' said Hameed.


In the third incident, another suicide bombing by a female teenager in Kunar province:
At least one civilian Afghan was killed and 7 others including five Afghan national police forces were killed after a female suicide bomber detonated her explosives near the Afghan National Directorate for Security building in eastern Kunar province on Saturday.

The incident took place around 11:00 am local time in Asadabad district, center of eastern Kunar province.

According to an Afghan security official speaking on a condition of anonymity said, at least two female suicide bombers were involved in today’s bombing, out of which one of them managed to detonate her explosives and the other one managed to escape the scene.
US Embassy Kabul released a statement to the media:

“We would like to express our deepest condolences to the families and friends of the ISAF soldiers and civilians and Afghan citizens who died during the suicide bombing attack in Kabul this morning. We mourn their loss but will continue their dedicated work on behalf of peace in this country and region. We also remember those lost or injured today in other incidents in Kunar and southern Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families.”

It looks like traffic is still the biggest problem in Kabul or, Afghanistan for that matter. Why, if that bus was not on the road, and if those people were not congregating at a parade or in their office, there would be no road/foot traffic; and if there were no road/foot traffic, there would not have been any attacks. 

So -- traffic is still the biggest problem. I'm sure I won't have nightmares tonight. I'm sure of it ... goddammit!

Meanwhile, our go-to guy in It's Always Sunny in Kabul nudges us to see the big picture:

"Sure, some are going to argue that today’s incident in Kabul that killed 13 US troops is an indication of an escalating insurgency, but those sorts of people just don’t grasp the big picture: the insurgents are in Kabul because their freedom of movement is restricted everywhere else."




Monday, October 24, 2011

Hamid Karzai, Our Man in Kabul -- Misinterpreted Once Again!

And it's a good thing! Because if this was not a "misinterpretation" that would make us real dummies with pet snakes in that neighborhood. 

Via HuffPo:

"If fighting starts between Pakistan and the U.S., we are beside Pakistan," Karzai said is an interview with private Pakistani television station GEO that aired Saturday. "If Pakistan is attacked and the people of Pakistan need Afghanistan's help, Afghanistan will be there with you."

Here is also a snippet of a video complete with finger wagging:





The LA Times has more:
President Hamid Karzai’s office on Monday sought to distance him from controversial remarks in a television interview aired over the weekend in which he asserted that Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in a hypothetical war against the United States. The presidential palace said the Afghan leader’s comments, made in an interview with the Pakistani television station Geo, had been “misinterpreted.”
[...]
A spokesman for Karzai, Siamak Herawi, said the president had not intended any slight to the Western governments that have spent billions of dollars shoring up the Afghan administration during the 10-year war that has claimed the lives of at least 1,817 American troops.

“The media misinterpreted [Karzai’s] speech,” he said, adding that the president had been trying to express solidarity with Pakistan for having taken in millions of Afghan refugees during decades of war and the subsequent rule of the Taliban movement.

Western military officials and diplomats publicly played down the significance of Karzai’s comments, even while privately expressing varying degrees of bafflement and dismay.
Read in full here.

As long as we continue willfully misinterpreting the smoke signals being sent from over there, we're good, right?






 


 
 
 

Secretary Clinton Visits Kabul: October 20, 2011

Via US Embassy Kabul/Flickr:

"U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton met with Afghan civil society leaders at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on October 20, 2011 to discuss the U.S. long term commitment to Afghan, the Strategic Partnership negotiations, and issues of transition in the run up to meetings in Istanbul and Bonn. The guests included human rights activists, particularly in the area of youth, women and minorities as well as advocates for the development of civil society and the education sector in Afghanistan."

The good news with these photos - we don't have to task our imagination for appropriate caption for each.

Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr

Friday, October 21, 2011

US Funds 90% of Afghanistan's Total Security, Will Afghanistan Go Back to Rock-Paper-Scissor When US Leaves?

President Karzai Welcomes President Obama to KabulImage via Wikipedia"Chairman Karzai, I reaffirm to you today...Image via WikipediaSecretary Rice meets with Afghan President Ham...Image via WikipediaIn 2009, I wondered out loud in this blog -- Did we legally adopt Afghanistan while we were asleep? It's like Alan Harper of Three and a Half Men asking to stay in his brother's house, who then end up staying forever ( or at least, until his brother died). Only, in our case, it's the reverse; we're like the dead rich brother, before he died.

In August, I finally came to a sad conclusion that our pretend 51st state of Afghanistan is no longer a laughing matter. 

Do you know how bad is the state of our public schools in this country?  I've seen 5th graders who can't even spell, locate their state on the U.S. map, much less, do simple arithmetic when buying a chocolate bar.  If we want to be competitive in the 21st century, we need our limited money invested on the future of this country. But our public officials and politicians seem to think that our work in Afghanistan is essential to our future in the new century. So we pour money over there like there is no tomorrow. Saving Afghanistan means saving us? Right.

Then you read this GAO report that says that the United States have been responsible for 90% of funds that go to Afghanistan's security expenditures from 2006-2010. So we have propped up this government, underwrite most of its expenses and what happens when we leave? Is Hamid Karzai going back to rock-paper-scissor? No? So, then, does that mean we're going to stay until the Government of Afghanistan grows its revenue from 9% to 100%, or when it is able to pay for its own soldiers' salaries and its own electric fuel, etc. etc. , whichever happens first?

I am not against foreign aid or even military aid per se. But let's keep some perspective here. We're not running on a surplus. We have an exploding boomer population, we have dilapidated public infrastructures, and we have our future suffering through some major budget cuts right now.  

And we're stuck in the muck called Afghanistan. And this is for our own good? Excuse me if I don't drink that kool aid, sir. And I really would like us to leave and let them get on with their own nation building while we do ours at home. 

Excerpted from GAO's report on Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence:

Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures.
Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures more than doubled from solar year (SY) 2006 to 2010, growing from $5.5 billion to $14.3 billion, an increase of 160 percent. Over this 5-year period, about 79 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures of $54 billion were off budget.

Donor funding.
The United States and other donors funded about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010. In particular, donors funded on average 57 percent of on-budget expenditures and 100 percent of off-budget expenditures. Over this period, the United States provided 62 percent of estimated total public expenditures, while other donors provided 28 percent. The United States funded an estimated 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total security expenditures during this time period. The United States funded an estimated 39 percent of Afghanistan’s total non-security expenditures during SY2006 to 2010.

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues.
The domestic revenues of GIRoA grew by an average annual rate of 30 percent from SY2006 to 2010, increasing from an estimated total of $0.62 billion to $1.66 billion. Customs duties and taxes such as income and property taxes provided the largest share of domestic revenues. However, domestic revenues funded only about 9 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010.


GAO _Afghan Donor Dependence | September 2011







Wednesday, October 19, 2011

"Hamsters on the Titanic" Now Showing "It's Always Sunny in Kabul"

I absolutely adore the blog, Hamsters on the Titanic, Dan in the 'Stan's blog out of Afghanistan. He's like the sage of Kabul with a strong dash of Stephen Colbert.  Now due to the multitude of sunny news coming out of Kabul, I can understand why the author has now changed the blog name to "It's Always Sunny in Kabul." Makes sense, right, since the worst problem they have over in Kabul is traffic.

Yesterday, he wrote about Afghanistan's new shiny toys, the special ones that kill and not because of bad paint from China:

According to General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Defense Minister: Finally, a ray of hope.
He however noted that for foiling the foreign invasions we need war planes, bombers, and air defense systems. He stressed that the only way for ensuring long-term security in Afghanistan is empowering the Afghan forces and there is no other alternative way that the territorial integrity and national sovereignty and national values of the country are defended.

In just two years, LTG Caldwell’s NTM-A has overcome illiteracy, massive desertions, killing US mentors, and alleged massacres by a favorite Border Police General and put together a fighting force that’s ready to move up to advanced military aircraft. That has got capable, affordable and sustainable written all over it.
Frankly, that worries me.  General Wardak want all these new shiny toys and I don't know which uncle will write the check. Please, don't let it be Uncle Sam.

Previously, the blogger also castigated the NYT reporter for being a "killjoy" and casting some "doubts about the ability of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to fully sustain itself and the new equipment it’s being issued." He writes:
LTG Caldwell was just recently a guest at the weekly ISAF press briefing, and I feel the need to share some of his quotes so the readers of Mr. Healy’s rainy day nonsense can really understand what’s going on here in Afghanistan:
“Over the last two years, we have been able to put in place schools, get the required trainers and actually train over 50,000 officers and noncommissioned officers that are now, today, in the Afghan Police, Army and Air Force,” said Caldwell.

See? NTM-A has put the required trainers into place. There is absolutely no requirement that there be trainees, as well. To expect that sort of unrealistic level of trainer/trainee ratio after the fact is just pointless, really. Obviously, too, the IG team wasn’t there on a training day. Otherwise, if 44% of sites weren’t doing any training at all, it would be really hard…even impossible…to actually train 50,000 people in the timeframe that LTG Caldwell is reporting. And, since I’ve come to realize that LTG Caldwell and the NTM-A are always right about what’s really happening here, well, I’d suggest the IG go back and count again. As to being “largely uneducated,” well sir:

During the last year and a half, 134,000 recruits have completed the mandatory literacy training that has been incorporated into their basic training requirements, Caldwell added.


As is well known among those that really care about the ANSF, they are absolutely required to be able to read at a first grade level. I don’t understand the concern: if that ANA soldier can now read at a first grade level, there should be no reason why he can’t understand training that a high school graduate in the United States would be able to comprehend.

"Must read" sections of the blog include the "Afghanistan Users Manual", "Bacon Wrapped Pork Chop", Tweet of the Day and Pic of the Day where he admitted exasperation over ISAF's photostream without captions (sounds familiar?) and recently reported the threat of teddy bears to Afghan toddlers:

SMOTHER
From It's Always Sunny in Kabul
ISAF’s Flickr stream doesn’t put any kind of descriptions on the photos is posts,
I’m forced to come up with my own. The point of pictures is to put up a caption
so we can have some context whereby we can know
what’s happening. Otherwise, I’m going to be forced
to report on the threat of teddy bears to Afghan toddlers.

Check out his blog here.




Monday, October 17, 2011

Thanks to a Hardworking Congress, Some Feds in the Garden Countries of I'Af/Pak to Lose Some Benefits

Stephen Losey of Federal Times reported last week that federal employees deployed to the I'Af/Pak region who are not in the Foreign Service have now lost numerous travel, medical and leave benefits because those benefits were not renewed by Congress after they expired Oct. 1. Excerpts:

The following benefits, which are available to Foreign Service officers, will no longer be available to non-Foreign Service personnel posted in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, according to the Office of Personnel Management:

  • Reimbursement of travel costs when going home on leave.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when obtaining necessary medical care when such care is not available locally.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when evacuating family members who are in imminent danger.
  • Reimbursement of travel costs when transporting furniture and other personal effects when moving to another duty station.
  • Mandatory leave for employees who have returned home after a three-year deployment. Agencies also will no longer have the option to offer leave to employees who had served in a war zone for 18 months.
  • Medical examinations, mental health care, inoculations, vaccinations and other preventative care.
  • A death gratuity equal to one year's salary when an employee dies of injuries sustained while supporting military operations.
Read in full here.

I have not read the OPM notice but I am presuming that these changes applies to non-Foreign Service and non-Defense employees serving in those three priority countries.

The 2010 OIG review of US Embassy Pakistan indicates that there are some three dozens non-State and non-DOD personnel in that country (DEA: 16, FBI: 7, DHS: 4, BBG:1, DOE: 1, NAS: 8, Treasury: 1).

On the U.S. Embassy Iraq staffing -- well, trying to pin down the staffing number over there, is of course, rocket science and I simply do not have the brains for it. Also, with the military withdrawal and the embassy taking charge, a whole lot of big numbers are bring thrown around - 5,000 - 17,000.  Security people is a big component but not sure how many non-State/USAID and non-DOD personnel will continue to deploy in Iraq and our consulates there when all is said and done in 2011. 

Due to the recent "flavor of the month" in Afghanistan, the civilian uplift staffing picture there is a bit more clearer.  Seven civilian agencies (State/USAID excepted) account for about 26% of the total civilian uplift.  So all those folks, plus some three dozens in Pakistan and an undetermined number in Iraq will be affected by Congress' non-renewal of warzone benefits.

In short, if they need mental health care after service in the warzones, they're basically out of luck?

This will have an impact to the employees already deployed there, but may have a larger impact on recruitment of employees for the 2012 assignment and onward.


From SIGAR/State OIG

Below is an excerpt from the SIGAR/State OIG review of the civilian uplift in that country:
[...] State increased its civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan from 192 in January 2009, to 501 in March 2011—an increase of 309 personnel.

State has an additional 81 authorized full-time equivalent positions for the civilian uplift as of May 31, 2011, but the positions are currently unfilled. According to State officials from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), they will continue to place additional civilian personnel in these positions through fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

USAID had the second largest presence of any agency prior to the start of the uplift. USAID personnel increased from 85 in January 2009 to 307 as of March 2011, an increase of 222 personnel. USAID has an additional 80 authorized positions for Afghanistan that are currently unfilled. According to USAID officials, they will continue to place additional U.S. civilians in these positions in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

As of June 2011, the other seven civilian agencies with a presence in Afghanistan accounted for an increase of 189 personnel, or approximately 26 percent of the total civilian uplift. These agencies provide personnel at the request and direction of the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and State officials in Washington in order to meet the mission’s strategic goals. The Chief of Mission determines the number of authorized civilian uplift positions in consultation with each department.

DOJ accounted for an increase of 78 personnel, or 11 percent, of the total civilian uplift. The majority of these uplift personnel are employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration who work on mentoring and training Afghan law enforcement entities in an effort to promote the rule of law. In addition, they provide leadership and guidance in the conduct of bilateral counternarcotics investigations and operations. USDA has deployed 59 civilian uplift personnel as of June 2011, representing eight percent of the total civilian uplift. These employees primarily mentor Afghan government officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

The remaining five agencies account for approximately seven percent of the total civilian uplift. DHS personnel advise, mentor, and train Afghan border, customs, and related entities to enforce Afghan customs and immigration law. Treasury places technical experts at Afghan government ministries where they provide assistance in four areas: strengthening budget and financial accountability, combating economic crimes and corruption, building internal audit capacity and increasing non-tax revenues, and achieving debt relief and improving debt management. Transportation personnel advise officials at the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation on issues such as civil aviation law and surface transportation planning. HHS personnel work on health programs, such as programs to strengthen maternal and child health services in Afghanistan. Finally, Commerce personnel assist with efforts to promote Afghanistan’s economic development and trade. 


Related item:       
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift | September 8, 2011










Saturday, October 15, 2011

Our Man in Kandahar: From Shop Worker in Pakistan to General in Afghanistan, But Was He Ever Leahy Vetted?

In the current issue of The Atlantic, Matthieu Aikins writes a disturbing case of "our man in Kandahar," Brigadier General Abdul Raziq,  "well known as a warlord and suspected drug trafficker who had waged a brutal campaign against the Taliban."  According to Mr. Aikins, an independent journalist, General Raziq is not only a close ally of President Hamid Karzai  but has also been "mentored" by an American Special Forces team.  This past May, General Raziq was appointed by President Karzai as Acting Chief of Police for Kandahar province, an appointment that allowed him to remain in charge of Spin Boldak, a key trading town near the Pakistani border where an alleged massacre of civilians purported to be members of the Taliban occurred.

The piece is not a pretty read. It includes allegations of abuses, torture (with graphic photos) and extra-judicial killings as well as tribal feuds and cover-ups.  As well, it brings up questions of what our officials know over there. The article has a cast of characters that include a State Department official in Kandahar, State's DRL bureau and questions about the Leahy vetting.

U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McCrystal, International Security Forces commander,
walks alongside Afghan border patrol commander Col. Abdul Razziq
and Pakistani Lt. General Khalid Wynne at the Friendship Gate
border crossing, Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, Jan. 18, 2010.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II)
Excerpts:
Last fall, Raziq and his militia were given a starring role in the U.S.-led military offensive into Taliban-controlled areas west of Kandahar City, a campaign that boosted his prestige immensely. Mentored by an American Special Forces team, Raziq’s fighters won public praise from U.S. officers for their combat prowess. After the offensive, Raziq was promoted to brigadier general—a rank requiring a direct order from President Karzai—in a January ceremony at the governor’s mansion. As Ben Moeling, who was until July the State Department’s senior official in Kandahar province, explained to me at the time, the promotion was “an explicit recognition of his importance.”

Nor was that promotion the only evidence of Raziq’s continuing ascent. In May, when Karzai appointed him chief of police for Kandahar province, Raziq accepted only on the condition that he also remain in charge of Spin Boldak, the seat of his economic and tribal power. So, in a move that enabled him to retain both jobs, Raziq was appointed “acting” police chief in Kandahar.
[...]
Though Raziq has risen in large part through his own skills and ambition, he is also, to a considerable degree, a creation of the American military intervention in Afghanistan. (Prior to 2001, he had worked in a shop in Pakistan.) As part of a countrywide initiative, his men have been trained by two controversial private military firms, DynCorp and Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, at a U.S.-funded center in Spin Boldak, where they are also provided with weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment. Their salaries are subsequently paid through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, a UN-administered international fund, to which the U.S. is the largest contributor. Raziq himself has enjoyed visits in Spin Boldak from such senior U.S. officials as Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus.

In public, American officials had until recently been careful to downplay Raziq’s alleged abuses. When I met with the State Department’s Moeling at his Kandahar City office in January, he told me, “I think there is certainly a mythology about Abdul Raziq, where there’s a degree of assumption on some of those things. But I have never seen evidence of private prisons or of extrajudicial killings directly attributable to him.”
[...]
Yet, as a 2006 State Department report shows, U.S. officials have for years been aware of credible allegations that Raziq and his men participated in a cold-blooded massacre of civilians, the details of which have, until now, been successfully buried. And this, in turn, raises questions regarding whether U.S. officials may have knowingly violated a 1997 law that forbids assistance to foreign military units involved in human-rights violations.
[...]
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—which put out the 2006 report citing Raziq’s alleged involvement in the massacre of civilians—is also the group responsible for overseeing compliance with the Leahy Amendment. Yet, incredibly, U.S. support for Raziq seems never to have triggered Leahy concerns. “No Leahy Amendment issues have come to me,” Ben Moeling, the State Department official in Kandahar, told me in January.

The question is whether Raziq’s apparent exclusion from Leahy vetting represents a baffling oversight, or a deliberate evasion. In August, WikiLeaks released hundreds of classified, Leahy-related cables from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that revealed that, from 2006 to 2010, the U.S. vetted thousands of Afghan security officials before training them. In one instance, on September 29, 2007, the embassy vetted 251 mid-level and senior officers in the Border Police. Raziq’s name was conspicuously absent.
[...]
Toward the end of 2009, senior ISAF officials reportedly thought about pushing for Raziq to be replaced. According to leaked cables, a high-level meeting was convened in Kabul, chaired by Deputy Ambassador Earl Wayne and Major General Michael Flynn, to discuss the problematic behavior of Raziq, among others. “Nobody, including his US military counterparts,” one cable noted, “is under any illusions about his corrupt activities.” Ultimately, however, General McChrystal, who was then the commander of ISAF and U.S. forces, decided that Raziq was too useful to cut loose, according to an article in The Washington Post. (McChrystal, through a spokesperson, declined to comment.) Cables also reveal that an American information-operations team even proposed a plan, “if credible,” for “the longer-term encouragement of stories in the international media on the ‘reform’ of Razziq.” (Note: WK link-do not read from USG workstation).
[...]
For his part, Raziq continues to deny all allegations of wrongdoing. “We have told the world and the media,” he said, “that if you have any proof regarding this matter, come and drag us to court.”
[...]
That has been America’s balancing act in Kandahar—weighing the allegations of abuse and criminality that have been raised regarding Raziq against his effectiveness as an ally in the war on the Taliban. Or, as Moeling told me back in January, before the most recent round of allegations: “At the moment, I think we have to take a look at what he’s been able to achieve. For us, trying to see the negative doesn’t really get us anywhere.”
Continue reading, Our Man in Kandahar.

The author was interviewed here by Democracy Now.

Section 551 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act for FY 2006, P.L. 109-102 (FOAA), includes a provision commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment that states:
"None of the funds made available by this act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice."

The Wikipedia entry for the Leahy Law points out the two amendments attached to DOD and State appropriations:
There are actually two different Leahy Laws. One is attached to the Defense Appropriations and the other is within the Foreign Operations Appropriations.[7][8] The Foreign Operations Appropriations Leahy Law cover weapons funding and training, but the 2001 Defense Appropriations act Leahy Law only covers training. Both Leahy provisions have similar wording.
The Leahy Law version attached to the Foreign Operations Appropriations has no waivers,[8] but the Leahy Law in the Defense Appropriations version can be waived if the Secretary of Defense determines that “extraordinary circumstances” require it.[9]

According to a publicly available material, the State Department human rights vetting process under the Leahy Law follows these steps:
  • The U.S. Embassy investigates unit/individual for human rights violation by reviewing files and database, including the Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES) database. (This database may have been superseded by the INVEST system used for Leahy Amendment vetting and overseen by the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).
  • If derogatory information is found on an individual presented for vetting, the officer at post tasked with vetting will enter that information to the database.
  • The embassy cables the regional bureau at the State Department with the search results and requests a similar review of the Department's files and databases.
  • Information of the unit/individual is circulated to appropriate personnel at State, including the Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); Intelligence and Research (INR)' and Pol-Mil Affairs (PM) for review.
  • If no credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureau sends a reply to post indicating that no credible derogatory information has been found and the individual/unit may participate in training/assistance.
  • If credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureaus send a reply to post indicating that credible derogatory information has been found and the individual/unit may not participate in training/assistance. Any ongoing training/assistance will be terminated immediately.

If the State Department official in Kandahar was not in charge of Leahy vetting, then who was that person in the org chart?  Wasn't there anyone at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul who had this role in his/her work requirement statement?

Pardon me? They had a bad translator?

I'd hate to think that we looked the other way because "our man" was quite effective in the alleged killing of our alleged enemies.  Or is it like what our State Department official told the author, "trying to see the negative doesn’t really get us anywhere."

And seeing the positive would absolutely get us somewhere. Like win us this war. Of course, how dense of me.

Besides, really - what's an alleged torture or alleged civilian massacre here or there? It's just one more maze in this muck that we've wandered into and have so far refused to get out.  But we're still the good guys, right? And we're still fighting a good war, right?

Sleep tight, sweet bunnies!






Friday, October 14, 2011

Mad at Kill al-Jubair Iranian Plot But Swept Under Rug the 2007 Teri Mangal Attack by Pakistanis That Killed/Wounded American Officials?


Yeah, the world is going to the dogs.

Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman recently posted about that bonkers story on the Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubair for $1.5 million. It's like Assassination 101 for Dummies.

"The wild story put out by the Justice Department about an Iranian assassination plot smells suspiciously like something passed through a bull’s digestive tract. But the U.S. should hope that it’s true. Because it makes Iran’s fiercest terrorist organization look like blithering idiots."
Continue reading You Should Hope the Crazy Iranian Bomb Plot Is True

I don't know if these charges will pan out, all I know is that there are currently 3,930,000 results (0.09 seconds) if you Google "Iran plot."

President Obama is quoted in the press saying, "There has to be accountability."

Secretary Clinton also had a lot to say about this: "This kind of reckless act undermines international norms and the international system. Iran must be held accountable for its actions."   More here.

I supposed what the Secretary of State means is that countries cannot go around assassinating diplomats and public officials in a foreign country because well, it's not done. And like she says, it undermines international norms.

But wait, in 2007, a country did commit a reckless act like this.  And unlike this foiled plot, somebody was actually killed and three were wounded in that attack.

In 2007, Pakistanis were involved in an ambush in Teri Mangal that had left an American major killed and three American officers wounded. My understanding from the grapevine is that the only civilian in that party was a Department of State diplomat, a political advisor (POLAD) to two U.S. military brigades conducting counterinsurgency operations in the eastern provinces.  I do not know who were wounded in that attack.

And what did we do? The United States swept it. Under. A very thick rug. Thank you to a very strategeric George W. Bush and Condi Rice!

According to a recent report in the New York Times:
A group of American military officers and Afghan officials had just finished a five-hour meeting with their Pakistani hosts in a village schoolhouse settling a border dispute when they were ambushed — by the Pakistanis.

An American major was killed and three American officers were wounded, along with their Afghan interpreter, in what fresh accounts from the Afghan and American officers who were there reveal was a complex, calculated assault by a nominal ally. The Pakistanis opened fire on the Americans, who returned fire before escaping in a blood-soaked Black Hawk helicopter.

The attack, in Teri Mangal on May 14, 2007, was kept quiet by Washington, which for much of a decade has seemed to play down or ignore signals that Pakistan would pursue its own interests, or even sometimes behave as an enemy.
[...]
To this day, none of the governments have publicly clarified what happened, hoping to limit damage to relations. Both the American and Pakistani military investigations remain classified.
[...]
[J]ust as the American and Afghan officials were climbing into vehicles provided to take them the short distance to a helicopter landing zone, a Pakistani soldier opened fire with an automatic rifle, pumping multiple rounds from just 5 or 10 yards away into an American officer, Maj. Larry J. Bauguess Jr., killing him almost instantly. An operations officer with the 82nd Airborne Division from North Carolina, Major Bauguess, 36, was married and the father of two girls, ages 4 and 6.
[...]
Those who came under fire that day remain bitter about the duplicity of the Pakistanis. Colonel Kuchai remembers the way the senior Pakistani officers left the yard minutes before the shooting without saying goodbye, behavior that he now interprets as a sign that they knew what was coming.
Continue reading, Pakistanis Tied to 2007 Border Attack on Americans.

The American officer killed in that attack was Major Larry J. Baugess, Jr. .  His memorial
Major Larry J. Baugess, Jr. and his wife Wesley
Photo from army.mil
website explains that on May 14th, 2007, Major Larry J. Baugess, Jr. was killed in Pakistan after helping conduct a meeting to arbitrate a border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
He had been working with NATO and using international leadership skills on a global scale. He was a highly decorated soldier, a devoted family man, and an individual who would always give everyone he met encouragement and inspiration. He was the highest ranking officer from Wilkes County to die in service since the Civil War.

Larry is survived by his wife, Wesley, and two beautiful girls, Ryann and Ellie. He also leaves behind a younger brother, Terry; a younger sister, Laura; and his parents John and Martha.

Elsewhere online, it was reported that Major Larry J. Baugess, Jr. was killed in a small arms fire.  Did not say who fired the weapon, presumably the enemy; did not say it was a frienemy with a gun, a gun no doubt bought with our foreign military aid monies.

Last October, Fort Bragg dedicated the Baugess Child Development Center in his honor.

So --

We, the US of A, are officially mad as heck about this Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.  But where was our official wrath when American officials working for our government were actually killed and wounded by our frienemies?




Thursday, October 13, 2011

PRT Laghman Inspects Projects from Air Due to "Unforgiving Terrain" and "Known Insurgent Activity"

According to its FB page, PRT Laghman which was founded in 2006 "executes counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and International Security Assistance Forces in Laghman Province, Afghanistan in order to assist the Laghman Provincial and District governments in securing the pop."


The PRT brings a wide variety of capabilities and skills to the fight; ranging from engineers, civil affairs experts, vehicle maintainers, medical personnel, administrative support and security forces. The team is aligned to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the provincial level.

Laghman Province, made up of six districts, is approximately the size of Rhode Island. The terrain is mostly mountainous, with three rivers forming a "Y" providing the main geographical features of the area.

Methar Lam, the capital city, sits at the confluence of the rivers - the middle of the "Y", and this is where the PRT's Forward Operating Base (FOB) is located.

The PRT's media outreach is handled by the RC-East Public Affairs team. The team assists with "the free and open reporting by the media through engagement with international, regional and local media in a planned, timely and accurate manner. Media opportunities, embeds, and interviews will be conducted wherever appropriate within the rules of operational security." [See RC-EAST PAO | Email: BagramMediaCenter@afghan.swa.army.mil | DSN: 318-431-4356]

The RC-East PA team recently posted in its blog about PRT Laghman's participation in air recon.  Some photos below:

So -- 10 years of war, and five years since the inception of this specific PRT and our PRT folks have to conduct their inspection of schools and roads (both presumably USG funded) by air because of the "unforgiving terrain" and "known insurgent activity in the area."

I'm really not sure if the inspection is to see how the projects are having an impact on Afghan residents from the air or is it simply to check which projects have not yet been blown up?

There are good, rational reasons why aerial surveys bother greatly the Kabul Hipster of Hamsters on the Titanic. Read more here.





Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Details: Costs to Deploy One Person to Afghanistan for One Year


Excerpted from SIGAR Audit-11-17 and State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

It typically costs the U.S. government between $425,926 and $570,998 to deploy a civilian employee to Afghanistan for a 1 year tour. Costs vary due to differences in salary, travel expenses, and whether an employee works in the Embassy or in field locations. This estimated range does not include agencies’ headquarters support costs for Afghanistan positions, 15 days of transitional leave or home leave if the employee will be deployed for another year-long tour in Afghanistan, and any other expenses that the deploying agency may incur in the process of transitioning the employees back to their previous jobs within the government, if applicable.

We constructed the total cost range estimate for deploying one position to Afghanistan based on the following expenses:


Salaries: Civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan are compensated for their work either by the U.S. government Civil Service General Schedule (GS)26 or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule. U.S. agencies told us that they prefer to deploy civilians with considerable background experience to Afghanistan. Therefore, agencies typically deploy civilians at the higher end of the U.S. government pay scale (GS 14 and FS 1). In budget planning, State uses the amount of $110,000 as base salary for either the civil service or the foreign service positions, and USAID uses the amount of $122,733 as base salary for their Afghanistan positions in general.

Danger Pay: Danger pay is additional compensation above basic salary for service at designated danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees. The U.S. government sets the danger pay level for Afghanistan at 35 percent of base salary (based on a standard 40 hour workweek) prorated for the number of days while deployed in Afghanistan. Danger pay compensation begins on the day of arrival in Afghanistan (the employee must be in country for 4 hours or more to qualify) and ceases on the day of departure for both permanent or temporary employees deployed to Afghanistan.
or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule.

Post Differential: Post differential is additional hardship pay over basic salary for employees deployed to serve at foreign areas where conditions or the environment differ substantially from conditions or the environment in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. State provides post differential for civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan at the maximum level of 35 percent of base salary. All civilian employees assigned for a 1 year tour, detailed, or on temporary duty to Afghanistan must spend 42 consecutive days at post before the post differential is activated; the differential is retroactive to the day the employee arrived at post.


Sunday Differential: The U.S. government provides full-time civilian employees in Afghanistan with additional compensation for hours of work on Sunday, as it is the start of the regular workweek at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Sunday premium pay is equal to 25 percent of the employee’s rate of basic salary for each of the 8 hours of Sunday work, which means 5 percent of base salary.

Overtime: The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines overtime pay as pay for hours of work officially ordered or approved in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek. Civilian employees in Afghanistan are entitled to overtime compensation depending on their position and level of appointment. USAID sets its personnel overtime at the rate of 25 percent of base salary. State sets overtime at 20 percent of base salary. USDA follows U.S.Mission policy and allows for civilians working in Kabul to work 35 hours of overtime per pay period and for civilians working in the field in Afghanistan to work 45 hours of overtime per pay period. The overtime compensation rate is an employee’s base salary and an additional percentage based on the employee’s GS level.

Special Differential: A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.


Separate Maintenance Allowance: The U.S. government provides this  allowance to assist a Foreign Service employee in meeting the additional expenses of supporting family members located outside the employee's foreign post of assignment. The U.S. government applies this allowance to Foreign Service employees working in Afghanistan. The maximum amount used to plan a position’s budget in Afghanistan is $17,300 for State and $12,516 for USAID. A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.

Deployment Travel: The U.S. government pays for civilian employee travel to Afghanistan, primarily including airfare, hotel, meals and shipment of household effects. State estimates this cost at $25,000; USAID estimates it at $48,983.


Mandatory Afghanistan Training: State requires all civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan to attend Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training (at the cost of $3,895) and Afghanistan Familiarization training (at the cost of $960). Civilian personnel deployed to locations outside of the U.S. mission in Kabul receive extra training, including the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Orientation (at the cost of $960) and the Interagency Integrated Civilian-Military Training Exercise for Afghanistan (at the cost of $5,880). Some individual departments and agencies require additional specialized training for their employees deployed to Afghanistan; for example, Department of Justice civilian employees attend specialized training for their job assignments in Afghanistan.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) and Regional Rest Breaks (RRB): The U.S. government provides civilians deployed to Afghanistan designated rest breaks after they have spent a certain number of days in country. For R&R, the government pays travel costs for employees to return home for 22 days, including travel time. For RRB, the government pays to transport employees to regional locations for quick breaks, including 5 days of paid administrative leave and no more than a total of 7 days, including travel time. There are two options for taking these types of leave during a 1-year deployment: three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three RRBs. State estimates $21,000 per year for the cost of these breaks, while USAID estimates $5,785.


International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): ICASS is the principal means by which the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at its diplomatic and consular missions overseas. U.S. government agencies operating in Afghanistan pay ICASS charges for each of their civilian employees to benefit from services provided by the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, such as motor pool operations and vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services, and reception and telephone system services. ICASS fees range from $100,000 to $150,000 per person.


Residential Housing for Uplift Personnel: State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provides housing for the uplift personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Near East Asia and South and Central Asian Affairs Bureaus provided Overseas Building Operations (OBO) $41,616,000 to accommodate uplift personnel in Afghanistan. State budgets $45,000 for housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) for a single position in Afghanistan.


DOD Life Support in the Field: U.S. Force-Afghanistan provides security for uplift personnel located in the field in Afghanistan. DOD charges State $3,044 each month (or $101.47 per day) for each civilian deployed to a DOD-controlled provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan.


Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS): The U.S. agencies that establish a civilian presence at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person basis, to State to provide new, safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace vulnerable facilities currently occupied by the mission. The CSCS program charges the departments and agencies for each authorized or existing position in the U.S. diplomatic facilities and for each projected position above current authorized positions in new Embassy compounds. State estimates the CSCS costs for a Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is processed) at $22,657, Non-Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is not processed) at $8,803, and for
Non-Office Areas, such as housing, at $1,626.


Field Life Support Kits: The U.S. government issues kits to civilians deployed to work at field locations in Afghanistan, which include key life support supplies, such as satellite phones and protective equipment. State estimates the cost of these kits as $15,000.