Karzai's Kabul Bank Scam Excuse --"Created by Foreign Hands"

Image via WikipediaAs NATO foreign ministers gathered in Bonn last week to discuss the way forward in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai gave an interview to SPIEGEL about how much international involvement will be required following the 2014 withdrawal and about his rocky partnership with the United States. The interview was conducted by Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Reuter and touched on corruption in Afghanistan, specifically on the Bank of Kabul. Excerpts:

SPIEGEL: In the largest financial scandal of Afghanistan, surrounding the virtually bankrupt Bank of Kabul, your family too would seem to be involved. We have seen a protocol from former central bank head Abdul Qadir Fitrat who, in the presence of your brother, made clear that the bank was little more than a criminal organization and was close to collapse. It provided loans to fictitious companies and straw men. The bank managers invested in huge villas in Dubai. Why did nothing happen for a full year?

Karzai: We called in Fitrat and asked him and said we are hearing that there is something going wrong, but he said no. The Americans never told us about this. The bank didn't tell us.

SPIEGEL: But once the problems became apparent, why did your government prevent an audit of the bank by foreign experts?

Karzai: We believed a certain embassy was trying to create financial trouble for us. We felt the whole bank scam was created by foreign hands.

SPIEGEL: Which embassy?

Karzai: I will not go into details.

This is the same guy who wants $5 billion a year from the United States until 2024.  He must think that's a nice round bargain considering that we are going to spend $6.5 billion a year for the US Mission in Iraq after the military pulls out.

Related articles

• Karzai Demands U.S. Hand Over Afghan Banker (nytimes.com)
• Foreign hand in bank graft - Karzai (smh.com.au)
• Hamid Karzai 'to hold on to power in Afghanistan after 2014' (telegraph.co.uk)
• Foreigners fuelling corruption: Karzai (nation.com.pk)
• Afghan President Names New Central Bank Governor (abcnews.go.com)
• Hamid Karzai 'to stay in control of Afghanistan after 2014' (telegraph.co.uk)

 

 

 

US Embassy Afghanistan: Sesame Street Goes to Kabul, But Where's Elmo?

Via US Embassy Kabul/FB | On November 30, 2011, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, joined by Deputy Minister of Education Patman and Dr. Charlotte Cole of Sesame Workshop, attended the launch of the Afghan version of Sesame Street, Baghch-e-SimSim, which was produced in cooperation with Tolo TV / Moby Group. The event was moderated by Tolo's Masood Sanjer, and featured muppets Grover (Kajkoal) and Ernie (Hadi) at the French Cultural Center Kabul, Afghanistan.

But where's Elmo?

Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr

Related articles

• Sesame Street comes to Afghanistan (vancouversun.com)
• Afghan children ready to walk down Sesame Street (vancouversun.com)
• Sesame Street goes to Afghanistan (nation.com.pk)
• "Sesame Street" Makes its Way to Afghanistan (PHOTOS) (ibtimes.com)

 

 

 

Another Bloody Day in Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan

According to ISAF: "[T]he three incidents today included a vehicle-born improvised explosive device detonating in Kabul, causing a number of Coalition and civilian casualties; an individual wearing an Afghan National Army uniform apparently turned his weapon on Afghan and Coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, killing three ISAF service members and wounding several others; and a teenage girl carried out a suicide attack on a National Directorate of Security building in the eastern province of Kunar, killing herself  and wounding several NDS personnel."

Danger Room's Spencer Ackerman provides more details:

At least five U.S. troops and eight U.S. civilians in Kabul are dead on Saturday after a Taliban bomber targeted the lightly-armored bus transporting them through the Afghan capitol.

While details are still sketchy, the Taliban attack shows sophistication. The bus, known colloquially as a “Rhino,” is a slow transport vehicle built to withstand small arms fire. Its hull is V-shaped, like a Mine Resistant Ambushed Protected (MRAP) vehicle, so it can survive driving over a homemade bomb.

But insurgents evidently spotted two vulnerabilities with the Rhino. First, unlike troop convoys or patrols, Rhinos travel along a set, predictable route. Second, as ABC News notes, the buses are not built to survive a suicide car bomb detonating along its side. And the Rhino was reportedly escorted by a convoy of thickly-armored MRAPs, which indicates that the insurgents understand it to be the less-secure vehicle.

In the second incident, ISAF makes it sound as if the individual just put on an ANA uniform then proceeded to turn his weapon on Coalition forces.  The casualties were mostly Australian troops. The Australian has more details:

AFGHAN troops at a forward base have been disarmed and confined to barracks after a rogue Afghan soldier killed three Australians and wounded seven.

Australia's 1550 personnel in Afghanistan are on higher alert with concerns greatest among hundreds of instructors mentoring their Afghan counterparts in remote patrol bases.

The soldiers, a captain a corporal and a lance corporal whose names have not yet been released, and an Afghan interpreter were shot down during a parade at a patrol base at Shah Wali Kot in northern Kandahar Province yesterday morning, Afghan time.
[...]
The killer was wearing an Afghan National Army uniform.

Those who fired back at him included some of the wounded Australians. The killer was shot dead.

The local Afghan Army commander, General Abdul Hameed, said the rogue Afghan soldier had been in the army for three years.

"At around 8.30 this morning (3pm AEDT), an ANA soldier named Darwish who had been serving as an ANA soldier for the past three years opened fire on a group of Australian military officers, killing three of them,'' said Hameed.

In the third incident, another suicide bombing by a female teenager in Kunar province:

At least one civilian Afghan was killed and 7 others including five Afghan national police forces were killed after a female suicide bomber detonated her explosives near the Afghan National Directorate for Security building in eastern Kunar province on Saturday.

The incident took place around 11:00 am local time in Asadabad district, center of eastern Kunar province.

According to an Afghan security official speaking on a condition of anonymity said, at least two female suicide bombers were involved in today’s bombing, out of which one of them managed to detonate her explosives and the other one managed to escape the scene.

US Embassy Kabul released a statement to the media:

“We would like to express our deepest condolences to the families and friends of the ISAF soldiers and civilians and Afghan citizens who died during the suicide bombing attack in Kabul this morning. We mourn their loss but will continue their dedicated work on behalf of peace in this country and region. We also remember those lost or injured today in other incidents in Kunar and southern Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families.”

It looks like traffic is still the biggest problem in Kabul or, Afghanistan for that matter. Why, if that bus was not on the road, and if those people were not congregating at a parade or in their office, there would be no road/foot traffic; and if there were no road/foot traffic, there would not have been any attacks. 

So -- traffic is still the biggest problem. I'm sure I won't have nightmares tonight. I'm sure of it ... goddammit!

Meanwhile, our go-to guy in It's Always Sunny in Kabul nudges us to see the big picture:

"Sure, some are going to argue that today’s incident in Kabul that killed 13 US troops is an indication of an escalating insurgency, but those sorts of people just don’t grasp the big picture: the insurgents are in Kabul because their freedom of movement is restricted everywhere else."

Related articles

• Thirteen American soldiers killed in bloody day across Afghanistan (telegraph.co.uk)
• Afghan troops disarmed over Diggers deaths (news.theage.com.au)
• Car suicide bomber targets NATO convoy in Afghanistan (cnn.com)
• Suicide bomber kills 13 US troops in Kabul (longwarjournal.org)
• Embassy response - 17 killed in Afghanistan (politico.com)

Secretary Clinton Visits Kabul: October 20, 2011

Via US Embassy Kabul/Flickr:

"U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton met with Afghan civil society leaders at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on October 20, 2011 to discuss the U.S. long term commitment to Afghan, the Strategic Partnership negotiations, and issues of transition in the run up to meetings in Istanbul and Bonn. The guests included human rights activists, particularly in the area of youth, women and minorities as well as advocates for the development of civil society and the education sector in Afghanistan."

The good news with these photos - we don't have to task our imagination for appropriate caption for each.

Created with Admarket's flickrSLiDR.
Photos from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr

Related articles

• In Kabul - Clinton arrives in Afghanistan (politico.com)
• Clinton in Kabul to push Afghan reconciliation (sfgate.com)
• Clinton Seeks 'Reality Check' on Afghan Future - Voice of America (news.google.com)
• Clinton in Kabul to Push Afghan Reconciliation (nytimes.com)

Photo of the Day: If this is over $50, I'll have to file a gift report

The photo below is from the photostream of the U.S. Embassy Kabul in Flickr. I don't know how many folks have their hands on the embassy's social media platforms. But for a while now, the photos uploaded to Flickr either have no captions or includes one caption for all the photos in the set. Which kind of defeats the purpose of having a photo gallery up, because viewers need to have some context on what they're looking at. 

The photo below, as well as all the 67 photos included in the set has the following caption:

The Acting Minister of Higher Education Sarwar Danish, together with NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Kolinda Grabar and U.S. Embassy Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy Eileen O'Connor, joined university chancellors and others at the Ministry of Higher Education in Kabul to celebrate the progress of the PAS-funded NATO SILK Afghanistan Program on Tuesday, Oct 11, 2011.(Department of State)

It does not matter that NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Kolinda Grabar is not in this photo. You get the idea; these folks were all there according to the caption.  During a big do on Silk Afghanistan.  I have no idea if this is a dressmaker's program or a silkworm propagation program either, hard to know without context, see?  The Silk Road? I really don't know.  Some 68 photos of smiling people but no photos of silk dressmakers or silkworm, or the Silk Road, for that matter, which is rather confusing to tell you the truth. 

The photo above shows the U.S. Embassy Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy Eileen O'Connor receiving a gift. I imagine she's saying, "Thank you very much for this gift; if this is over $50, I'll have to file a gift report."

Of course, that's probably not what she said to the gifter, but without context, we're left to our own imagination.

Our Man in Kandahar: From Shop Worker in Pakistan to General in Afghanistan, But Was He Ever Leahy Vetted?

In the current issue of The Atlantic, Matthieu Aikins writes a disturbing case of "our man in Kandahar," Brigadier General Abdul Raziq,  "well known as a warlord and suspected drug trafficker who had waged a brutal campaign against the Taliban."  According to Mr. Aikins, an independent journalist, General Raziq is not only a close ally of President Hamid Karzai  but has also been "mentored" by an American Special Forces team.  This past May, General Raziq was appointed by President Karzai as Acting Chief of Police for Kandahar province, an appointment that allowed him to remain in charge of Spin Boldak, a key trading town near the Pakistani border where an alleged massacre of civilians purported to be members of the Taliban occurred.

The piece is not a pretty read. It includes allegations of abuses, torture (with graphic photos) and extra-judicial killings as well as tribal feuds and cover-ups.  As well, it brings up questions of what our officials know over there. The article has a cast of characters that include a State Department official in Kandahar, State's DRL bureau and questions about the Leahy vetting.

U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McCrystal, International Security Forces commander,
walks alongside Afghan border patrol commander Col. Abdul Razziq
and Pakistani Lt. General Khalid Wynne at the Friendship Gate
border crossing, Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, Jan. 18, 2010.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II)

Excerpts:

Last fall, Raziq and his militia were given a starring role in the U.S.-led military offensive into Taliban-controlled areas west of Kandahar City, a campaign that boosted his prestige immensely. Mentored by an American Special Forces team, Raziq’s fighters won public praise from U.S. officers for their combat prowess. After the offensive, Raziq was promoted to brigadier general—a rank requiring a direct order from President Karzai—in a January ceremony at the governor’s mansion. As Ben Moeling, who was until July the State Department’s senior official in Kandahar province, explained to me at the time, the promotion was “an explicit recognition of his importance.”

Nor was that promotion the only evidence of Raziq’s continuing ascent. In May, when Karzai appointed him chief of police for Kandahar province, Raziq accepted only on the condition that he also remain in charge of Spin Boldak, the seat of his economic and tribal power. So, in a move that enabled him to retain both jobs, Raziq was appointed “acting” police chief in Kandahar.
[...]
Though Raziq has risen in large part through his own skills and ambition, he is also, to a considerable degree, a creation of the American military intervention in Afghanistan. (Prior to 2001, he had worked in a shop in Pakistan.) As part of a countrywide initiative, his men have been trained by two controversial private military firms, DynCorp and Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, at a U.S.-funded center in Spin Boldak, where they are also provided with weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment. Their salaries are subsequently paid through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, a UN-administered international fund, to which the U.S. is the largest contributor. Raziq himself has enjoyed visits in Spin Boldak from such senior U.S. officials as Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus.

In public, American officials had until recently been careful to downplay Raziq’s alleged abuses. When I met with the State Department’s Moeling at his Kandahar City office in January, he told me, “I think there is certainly a mythology about Abdul Raziq, where there’s a degree of assumption on some of those things. But I have never seen evidence of private prisons or of extrajudicial killings directly attributable to him.”
[...]
Yet, as a 2006 State Department report shows, U.S. officials have for years been aware of credible allegations that Raziq and his men participated in a cold-blooded massacre of civilians, the details of which have, until now, been successfully buried. And this, in turn, raises questions regarding whether U.S. officials may have knowingly violated a 1997 law that forbids assistance to foreign military units involved in human-rights violations.
[...]
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—which put out the 2006 report citing Raziq’s alleged involvement in the massacre of civilians—is also the group responsible for overseeing compliance with the Leahy Amendment. Yet, incredibly, U.S. support for Raziq seems never to have triggered Leahy concerns. “No Leahy Amendment issues have come to me,” Ben Moeling, the State Department official in Kandahar, told me in January.

The question is whether Raziq’s apparent exclusion from Leahy vetting represents a baffling oversight, or a deliberate evasion. In August, WikiLeaks released hundreds of classified, Leahy-related cables from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that revealed that, from 2006 to 2010, the U.S. vetted thousands of Afghan security officials before training them. In one instance, on September 29, 2007, the embassy vetted 251 mid-level and senior officers in the Border Police. Raziq’s name was conspicuously absent.
[...]
Toward the end of 2009, senior ISAF officials reportedly thought about pushing for Raziq to be replaced. According to leaked cables, a high-level meeting was convened in Kabul, chaired by Deputy Ambassador Earl Wayne and Major General Michael Flynn, to discuss the problematic behavior of Raziq, among others. “Nobody, including his US military counterparts,” one cable noted, “is under any illusions about his corrupt activities.” Ultimately, however, General McChrystal, who was then the commander of ISAF and U.S. forces, decided that Raziq was too useful to cut loose, according to an article in The Washington Post. (McChrystal, through a spokesperson, declined to comment.) Cables also reveal that an American information-operations team even proposed a plan, “if credible,” for “the longer-term encouragement of stories in the international media on the ‘reform’ of Razziq.” (Note: WK link-do not read from USG workstation).
[...]
For his part, Raziq continues to deny all allegations of wrongdoing. “We have told the world and the media,” he said, “that if you have any proof regarding this matter, come and drag us to court.”
[...]
That has been America’s balancing act in Kandahar—weighing the allegations of abuse and criminality that have been raised regarding Raziq against his effectiveness as an ally in the war on the Taliban. Or, as Moeling told me back in January, before the most recent round of allegations: “At the moment, I think we have to take a look at what he’s been able to achieve. For us, trying to see the negative doesn’t really get us anywhere.”

Continue reading, Our Man in Kandahar.

The author was interviewed here by Democracy Now.

Section 551 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act for FY 2006, P.L. 109-102 (FOAA), includes a provision commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment that states:

"None of the funds made available by this act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice."

The Wikipedia entry for the Leahy Law points out the two amendments attached to DOD and State appropriations:

There are actually two different Leahy Laws. One is attached to the Defense Appropriations and the other is within the Foreign Operations Appropriations.^[7][8] The Foreign Operations Appropriations Leahy Law cover weapons funding and training, but the 2001 Defense Appropriations act Leahy Law only covers training. Both Leahy provisions have similar wording.
The Leahy Law version attached to the Foreign Operations Appropriations has no waivers,^[8] but the Leahy Law in the Defense Appropriations version can be waived if the Secretary of Defense determines that “extraordinary circumstances” require it.^[9]

According to a publicly available material, the State Department human rights vetting process under the Leahy Law follows these steps:

• The U.S. Embassy investigates unit/individual for human rights violation by reviewing files and database, including the Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES) database. (This database may have been superseded by the INVEST system used for Leahy Amendment vetting and overseen by the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).

• If derogatory information is found on an individual presented for vetting, the officer at post tasked with vetting will enter that information to the database.

• The embassy cables the regional bureau at the State Department with the search results and requests a similar review of the Department's files and databases.

• Information of the unit/individual is circulated to appropriate personnel at State, including the Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); Intelligence and Research (INR)' and Pol-Mil Affairs (PM) for review.

• If no credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureau sends a reply to post indicating that no credible derogatory information has been found and the individual/unit may participate in training/assistance.

• If credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureaus send a reply to post indicating that credible derogatory information has been found and the individual/unit may not participate in training/assistance. Any ongoing training/assistance will be terminated immediately.

If the State Department official in Kandahar was not in charge of Leahy vetting, then who was that person in the org chart?  Wasn't there anyone at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul who had this role in his/her work requirement statement?

Pardon me? They had a bad translator?

I'd hate to think that we looked the other way because "our man" was quite effective in the alleged killing of our alleged enemies.  Or is it like what our State Department official told the author, "trying to see the negative doesn’t really get us anywhere."

And seeing the positive would absolutely get us somewhere. Like win us this war. Of course, how dense of me.

Besides, really - what's an alleged torture or alleged civilian massacre here or there? It's just one more maze in this muck that we've wandered into and have so far refused to get out.  But we're still the good guys, right? And we're still fighting a good war, right?

Sleep tight, sweet bunnies!

Related articles

• The Rapid Rise Of America's Man In Kandahar (npr.org)
• 'Rags To Riches': America's Man In Kandahar (npr.org)
• Militants Assault U.S. Base in Eastern Afghanistan (nytimes.com)

PRT Laghman Inspects Projects from Air Due to "Unforgiving Terrain" and "Known Insurgent Activity"

According to its FB page, PRT Laghman which was founded in 2006 "executes counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and International Security Assistance Forces in Laghman Province, Afghanistan in order to assist the Laghman Provincial and District governments in securing the pop."

The PRT brings a wide variety of capabilities and skills to the fight; ranging from engineers, civil affairs experts, vehicle maintainers, medical personnel, administrative support and security forces. The team is aligned to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the provincial level.

Laghman Province, made up of six districts, is approximately the size of Rhode Island. The terrain is mostly mountainous, with three rivers forming a "Y" providing the main geographical features of the area.

Methar Lam, the capital city, sits at the confluence of the rivers - the middle of the "Y", and this is where the PRT's Forward Operating Base (FOB) is located.

The PRT's media outreach is handled by the RC-East Public Affairs team. The team assists with "the free and open reporting by the media through engagement with international, regional and local media in a planned, timely and accurate manner. Media opportunities, embeds, and interviews will be conducted wherever appropriate within the rules of operational security." [See RC-EAST PAO | Email: BagramMediaCenter@afghan.swa.army.mil | DSN: 318-431-4356]

The RC-East PA team recently posted in its blog about PRT Laghman's participation in air recon.  Some photos below:

So -- 10 years of war, and five years since the inception of this specific PRT and our PRT folks have to conduct their inspection of schools and roads (both presumably USG funded) by air because of the "unforgiving terrain" and "known insurgent activity in the area."

I'm really not sure if the inspection is to see how the projects are having an impact on Afghan residents from the air or is it simply to check which projects have not yet been blown up?

There are good, rational reasons why aerial surveys bother greatly the Kabul Hipster of Hamsters on the Titanic. Read more here.

Details: Costs to Deploy One Person to Afghanistan for One Year

Excerpted from SIGAR Audit-11-17 and State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

It typically costs the U.S. government between $425,926 and $570,998 to deploy a civilian employee to Afghanistan for a 1 year tour. Costs vary due to differences in salary, travel expenses, and whether an employee works in the Embassy or in field locations. This estimated range does not include agencies’ headquarters support costs for Afghanistan positions, 15 days of transitional leave or home leave if the employee will be deployed for another year-long tour in Afghanistan, and any other expenses that the deploying agency may incur in the process of transitioning the employees back to their previous jobs within the government, if applicable.

We constructed the total cost range estimate for deploying one position to Afghanistan based on the following expenses:


Salaries: Civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan are compensated for their work either by the U.S. government Civil Service General Schedule (GS)26 or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule. U.S. agencies told us that they prefer to deploy civilians with considerable background experience to Afghanistan. Therefore, agencies typically deploy civilians at the higher end of the U.S. government pay scale (GS 14 and FS 1). In budget planning, State uses the amount of $110,000 as base salary for either the civil service or the foreign service positions, and USAID uses the amount of $122,733 as base salary for their Afghanistan positions in general.

Danger Pay: Danger pay is additional compensation above basic salary for service at designated danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees. The U.S. government sets the danger pay level for Afghanistan at 35 percent of base salary (based on a standard 40 hour workweek) prorated for the number of days while deployed in Afghanistan. Danger pay compensation begins on the day of arrival in Afghanistan (the employee must be in country for 4 hours or more to qualify) and ceases on the day of departure for both permanent or temporary employees deployed to Afghanistan.
or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule.

Post Differential: Post differential is additional hardship pay over basic salary for employees deployed to serve at foreign areas where conditions or the environment differ substantially from conditions or the environment in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. State provides post differential for civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan at the maximum level of 35 percent of base salary. All civilian employees assigned for a 1 year tour, detailed, or on temporary duty to Afghanistan must spend 42 consecutive days at post before the post differential is activated; the differential is retroactive to the day the employee arrived at post.


Sunday Differential: The U.S. government provides full-time civilian employees in Afghanistan with additional compensation for hours of work on Sunday, as it is the start of the regular workweek at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Sunday premium pay is equal to 25 percent of the employee’s rate of basic salary for each of the 8 hours of Sunday work, which means 5 percent of base salary.

Overtime: The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines overtime pay as pay for hours of work officially ordered or approved in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek. Civilian employees in Afghanistan are entitled to overtime compensation depending on their position and level of appointment. USAID sets its personnel overtime at the rate of 25 percent of base salary. State sets overtime at 20 percent of base salary. USDA follows U.S.Mission policy and allows for civilians working in Kabul to work 35 hours of overtime per pay period and for civilians working in the field in Afghanistan to work 45 hours of overtime per pay period. The overtime compensation rate is an employee’s base salary and an additional percentage based on the employee’s GS level.

Special Differential: A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.


Separate Maintenance Allowance: The U.S. government provides this  allowance to assist a Foreign Service employee in meeting the additional expenses of supporting family members located outside the employee's foreign post of assignment. The U.S. government applies this allowance to Foreign Service employees working in Afghanistan. The maximum amount used to plan a position’s budget in Afghanistan is $17,300 for State and $12,516 for USAID. A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.

Deployment Travel: The U.S. government pays for civilian employee travel to Afghanistan, primarily including airfare, hotel, meals and shipment of household effects. State estimates this cost at $25,000; USAID estimates it at $48,983.


Mandatory Afghanistan Training: State requires all civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan to attend Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training (at the cost of $3,895) and Afghanistan Familiarization training (at the cost of $960). Civilian personnel deployed to locations outside of the U.S. mission in Kabul receive extra training, including the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Orientation (at the cost of $960) and the Interagency Integrated Civilian-Military Training Exercise for Afghanistan (at the cost of $5,880). Some individual departments and agencies require additional specialized training for their employees deployed to Afghanistan; for example, Department of Justice civilian employees attend specialized training for their job assignments in Afghanistan.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) and Regional Rest Breaks (RRB): The U.S. government provides civilians deployed to Afghanistan designated rest breaks after they have spent a certain number of days in country. For R&R, the government pays travel costs for employees to return home for 22 days, including travel time. For RRB, the government pays to transport employees to regional locations for quick breaks, including 5 days of paid administrative leave and no more than a total of 7 days, including travel time. There are two options for taking these types of leave during a 1-year deployment: three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three RRBs. State estimates $21,000 per year for the cost of these breaks, while USAID estimates $5,785.


International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): ICASS is the principal means by which the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at its diplomatic and consular missions overseas. U.S. government agencies operating in Afghanistan pay ICASS charges for each of their civilian employees to benefit from services provided by the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, such as motor pool operations and vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services, and reception and telephone system services. ICASS fees range from $100,000 to $150,000 per person.


Residential Housing for Uplift Personnel: State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provides housing for the uplift personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Near East Asia and South and Central Asian Affairs Bureaus provided Overseas Building Operations (OBO) $41,616,000 to accommodate uplift personnel in Afghanistan. State budgets $45,000 for housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) for a single position in Afghanistan.


DOD Life Support in the Field: U.S. Force-Afghanistan provides security for uplift personnel located in the field in Afghanistan. DOD charges State $3,044 each month (or $101.47 per day) for each civilian deployed to a DOD-controlled provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan.


Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS): The U.S. agencies that establish a civilian presence at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person basis, to State to provide new, safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace vulnerable facilities currently occupied by the mission. The CSCS program charges the departments and agencies for each authorized or existing position in the U.S. diplomatic facilities and for each projected position above current authorized positions in new Embassy compounds. State estimates the CSCS costs for a Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is processed) at $22,657, Non-Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is not processed) at $8,803, and for
Non-Office Areas, such as housing, at $1,626.


Field Life Support Kits: The U.S. government issues kits to civilians deployed to work at field locations in Afghanistan, which include key life support supplies, such as satellite phones and protective equipment. State estimates the cost of these kits as $15,000.

Related articles

• US had 'frighteningly simplistic' view of Afghanistan, says McChrystal (guardian.co.uk)
• Whatever Happened to the Civilian Surge in Afghanistan? (time.com)
• Vanity, machismo and greed have blinded us to the folly of Afghanistan | Simon Jenkins (guardian.co.uk)
• Differing Data Shape Views of Afghan Surge (online.wsj.com)
• Not A Single Afghan Battalion Fights Without U.S. Help (wired.com)
• UN: Detainees tortured in Afghanistan (msnbc.msn.com)

US Embassy Kabul: We know duck and cover is hard, but clean up when you're done, okay?

Image via WikipediaWe heard about that shooting at an Embassy Annex from CBS shortly after it happened on September 25.

In an undated statement that I think came out on Monday, the U.S. Embassy Kabul gave a one-paragraph statement about the incident.  A "lone gunman" who happens to be a local employee was killed, a U.S. citizen civilian employee was killed, and another was wounded

The Kabul Nightingale told me that the the US Embassy Kabul Front Office (where all mission rivers run through) didn't officially tell the Embassy community about the death until two days after it happened. Because it's always good management practice to keep the truth from staffers who might get scared or get nightmares.

So presumably, if they had internet access over there, most of the staff had to read about what happened 700 hundred yards away, from the news outlets based in New York?

That shooting story broke wide on Monday, September 26. That same day, a Management Notice reportedly also went out reminding all employees that after a prolonged duck and cover scenario, they should clean up after themselves. Like clean and mop the place for the next duck and cover occupants?  What did you do there - have a party while doing the duck and cover.  Sheesh!

The Kabul Nightingale says that given that some people had to spend upwards of 10 hours, 10 hours, mind you, huddled in a tunnel with no access to food, water or restroom, mission members were pretty darn outraged. Outrage is understandable, have you ever tried to hold it in for 30 minutes? Gawd! That's the most awful experience; that's how purple people are made, even doing square roots in your head would not/not help. Take my word for it.

All I can say is if we could afford some $2 million dollars to put sod to green the front of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, I say, we certainly can afford portable potties inside the duck and cover tunnel, or something. 

But you know what requisition is like in the government. In the meantime, if you're heading there, you might need training on how to hold it in duck and hold.  Try the harder square roots.

Update: One of our blog pals who is at another post asked, "Wait, they built a duck and cover tunnel, without a potty?  Come on, even the commies know that bunkers need potties, kitchens, beds, etc.  Please tell me we're prepped for a siege, 'cause it could happen."

Um, sorry pal, I can't say they're prepped for a siege; I do agree that it could happen if that 20-hour embassy attack that was no big deal is any indication. The attack which lasted for 20 hours was conducted by 6 terrorists, now dead.  But can you imagine a more ambitious attack with a dozen or more terrorist, who presumably will plan on dying anyway?  I can. I can also imagine duck, cover and hold for 48 hours, can you?

Perhaps it is time for to the US Embassy in Kabul to issue employees Roadbag, a $5.40 German-made device that turns your pee to gel, just in case.  Also check out "America's Premier Preparedness Center" for their Pee Bags© at $7.99 + s&h per four pack you get liquid waste bags, pack of tissue and antiseptic hand wipe.

I'd personally prefer Roadbag, not Made in America, but quite frankly, I think the Germans get it.  Nothing to spill and clean up, see? Email this to your Front Office, please? 

Related articles

• U.S. Embassy in Kabul Sounds Attack Warning Alarm (foxnews.com)
• Two killed in attack on U.S. Embassy annex in Kabul (news.blogs.cnn.com)
• Afghan Employee Kills US Citizen in Embassy Annex (waronterrornews.typepad.com)
• Shooting at U.S.-run facility in Kabul (cbsnews.com)

US Embassy Kabul: Not Safe Even Inside the Bunker; One Amcit Killed, One Wounded by Afghan Employee

US Embassy Kabul Statement on the September 25 Evening Shooting Incident at an Embassy Annex:

"There was a shooting incident at an annex of U.S. Embassy Kabul in the evening of September 25.  The lone gunman, an Afghan employee, was killed.  The motivation for the attack is still under investigation. One U.S. citizen was killed and one wounded, who was evacuated to a military hospital with non-life threatening injuries. We mourn the loss of life in the incident, and express our heartfelt condolences to the families. The Embassy has resumed business operations."

CSMonitor has more on this attack:

"Sunday’s shooting could be of particular significance as it took place inside an area of the Embassy known to be used by the Central Intelligence Agency. It may also be the first time an Afghan working with a Western civilian organization killed his counterparts.

US officials have remained exceptionally tight-lipped about the incident, likely due to its potential link with the CIA. Intelligence officials have yet to offer any public comments and the Embassy issued only a brief statement confirming the shooting and saying, “The lone gunman, an Afghan employee, was killed. The motivation for the attack is still under investigation.”

Hamsters on the Titanic (Sure the deck's slanting, but this wheel is fun!) in And then they tried to blow up the CIA writes:

And it is on like Donkey Kong. Well, probably no more “on” than it was before insurgents apparently tried to blow up the Ariana Hotel, used by the CIA in Kabul. There was some gunfire in my neighborhood last night, which was probably related to a reported attempt by President Karzai to visit Rabbani’s home to pay final respects.

I don’t know if that gunfire was any kind of attack, or the ANSF attempting to disperse some kind of crowd, or what, but it doesn’t appear that there was an attack in my particular piece of the Kabul landscape. What did actually happen no one actually knows, since it all took place within the the confines of the Ariana.
[...]
Since the CIA compound is definitely a no-go zone for ANSF, they weren’t involved…at all. In fact, Afghan officials made that very clear to reporters last night, that they had no idea what was going on, and that reporters should ask ISAF. When ISAF was asked, they also said they had no idea, and that folks should contact the ANSF. Since no one’s involved, it has to be OGA. Still, great use of social media by NTM-A to say…nothing.

@NTMA_CSTCA
NTM-Afghanistan

"The insurgency has been turned back… and Afghan National Security Forces are increasingly strong and capable.

Gotta love that social media.


All I can say is if that lone gunman was a locally engaged staff (know as LES or more kindly, as Foreign Service Nationals), that is a scary thought.  That means even the bunker is no longer safe.  It may have an impact on job creation in US diplomatic and consular posts in Afghanistan.

And if that lone gunman was a locally engaged staff but was not a guard, this would even be more troubling, as how did he managed to get a weapon inside an annex that is presumably well-guarded given its purported occupants.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought all the local hire staff in Afghanistan already get a polygraph as part of their employment package. Of course, it's not like a poly is as good as the precogs of Minority Report.

More scary thoughts about the bunker, I'm going to have nightmares tonight. 


 

Related articles

• US Embassy shooting in Kabul heightens concerns about Afghan security (csmonitor.com)
• Two die in Kabul embassy shooting (edition.cnn.com)
• American shot dead at 'CIA building' in Kabul (telegraph.co.uk)
• Afghan U.S. gov't employee kills 1 American (cbsnews.com)

Colton v. Clinton Goes to the Court of Appeals .... And Oh, Who Are We Going to See in Kabul Next, Wolf Blitzer?

Last year, the DC District Court Judge Richard J. Leon rejected FSO Elizabeth Colton's ADEA claims against Secretary of State Clinton and upheld the Foreign Service Act’s mandatory retirement provision.

The Court's decision included the following which bears repeating here:

"Colton's allegation that the Secretary of State's refusal to grant her an extension pursuant to § 4052(b) was a discriminatory act is unavailing. Although the mandatory retirement provision grants the Secretary the discretion to retain a person for up to five years past the mandatory retirement age if in the "public interest," there is no requirement that the Secretary do so.."

Dr. Colton had rotated out of Karachi in the middle of the district's great floods and was granted a one-year extension for an assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.   The Legal Times citing court records reported that on Aug. 4, the State Department told Colton via e-mail that her mandatory retirement had been postponed until Sept. 2011 and that she had been approved to serve as the information officer for the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. The local press reported her arrival in Egypt on September 2010 here. 

Dr. Colton was asked to jumped out of the water in Pakistan and was sent to Egypt where she jumped into the fire. Need we mention that she was at post before, during, and after the Egyptian Revolution like all other core embassy employees younger than her?  We know because we continue receiving the embassy press updates all that time.

That extension should run out just about now.   But I understand that the case has now gone to the Court of Appeals where Dr. Colton was granted until November 21, 2011, to file her appellant’s brief.

When she gets thrown out the airlock at 66 when that one-year extension is done, I supposed it just shows that there is no such thing as in the "public interest" when it comes to midlevel public diplomacy professionals even with the State Department's persistent staffing gaps in that cone, and despite the turmoil in the large swath of the Middle East.

As if to put emphasis on the notion of "public interest," (or lack thereof), which of course, the Director General of the Foreign Service and the State Department gets to interpret, just when and how that is at play -- we are happy to report that David Ensor, formerly of CNN and US Embassy Kabul and now of Voice of America has been replaced by former CNN/ABC correspondent Eileen O'Connor.

Yep, for the same position at the US Embassy in Kabul as Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy. See? Routine State Department job titles do not even cut the cake there.

Via the Potomac Flacks: "First reported in Politico’s “Playbook”, Eileen O’Connor has been named the new Communications Director and Director of Public Diplomacy at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, succeeding David Ensor.  O’Connor is currently Counsel in the law firm McDermott, Will and Emery.  She is a former CNN and ABC foreign correspondent, who over a 24-year career in journalism was based in London, Moscow, Tokyo and in Washington, DC."

Over a decade ago when the State Department's own State Magazine picked Dr. Colton as an interesting specimen among FSO newbies, the magazine writes:

Ms. Colton also worked as a journalist with firsthand experience abroad. She reported for Asia Week, a Reuters magazine, and was a London-based television producer for both NBC and ABC covering the Middle East and North Africa. In 1981, she won an Emmy for two ABC Nightly News pieces on Libya. Later she established Newsweek's Middle East bureau in Cairo. The Waterford, Va., resident's coverage of the Persian Gulf War prompted National Public Radio to offer her a job as its State Department correspondent.

Remember that group of Iraqi soldiers who surrendered to a journalist? You guessed it.

They gave up to NBC radio correspondent Liz Colton.

Read more about her in  Colton v. Clinton: Expeditionary Diplomat Booted Off Career Ladder, Too Old

Any how -- we are supposed to understand that there is no "public interest" in the extension of this career diplomat's tenure past the mandatory retirement age, no matter how excellent her service in the field of public diplomacy because she is too old?  Like I said before but let me say it again -- that super sucks!

No matter that she is serving in one of the top deficit cones in the Foreign Service? Ditto.

No matter that she is serving in the midlevel ranks where there occur the most staffing gaps? Ditto.

Should we, therefore, conclude that while there is no/no "public interest" for the State Department to extend its "oldies but goldies" employees who clearly have the chops, the hiring of sorta big name journalists for its big time public affairs shop in the war zone is/is in the country's "public interest?"

Like there isn't anyone in all of the State Department's career corps  qualified to run the US Embassy Kabul's press shop? What have they done to all the qualified career professionals in public affairs, throw them all out the airlock because they've turn 65?

I'm curious just how much taxpayer money goes to this kind of "public interest." 

And who, pray tell are we going to see in Kabul next, Wolf Blitzer? Presumably, Ms. O'Connor will have a one-year tour at the US Embassy Kabul. So for 2012-2013, can we please, please vote who we should have there next? 

   

Related articles

• Kabul Attack Underlines Importance of Embassy Security (pogoblog.typepad.com)
• Militants Attack U.S. Embassy in Kabul (atwar.blogs.nytimes.com)
• Wikileaks Cable: Kuwait Lobbied State Dept. on Behalf of Contractor that Bungled U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (pogoblog.typepad.com)

Attacks in Afghanistan: Afghan Jack Bauer and Eagle Four, Wheeere Are Yoooou?

Spencer Ackerman of Danger Room made a note of the video put out by NATO-OTAN on the US Embassy Kabul attack yesterday.

The video appears designed to undermine that propaganda effort. Soldiers, Marines and their Afghan and foreign counterparts work calmly — but fiercely in tandem to direct rifle fire against the insurgents. Message: We got this — even if the Taliban just shattered the sense that NATO and the Afghan government at least had the capitol locked down.

At least six people are dead and 19 wounded, mostly Afghans, in a fight that subsided mere hours ago. We’re unaware of any previous effort from the U.S. military that got video out to social media nearly as quickly.

The 20-hour long attack on the US Embassy in  Kabul which is apparently "not a very big deal" according to Ambassador Crocker quoted here by the BBC is just the latest in the growing trend of attacks in and around Kabul.

Back in August, the State Department released its annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Below is part of the entry under Afghanistan:

2010 Terrorist Incidents: IED attacks, direct and indirect fire, and suicide attacks increased in 2010. The increase in ISAF troop presence from 100,000 to 131,730 and their kinetic activities likely led insurgents to increase their activity. There was a 72 percent increase in total kinetic events, with IEDs representing 25 to 40 percent of this activity. According to ISAF, the total number of civilians killed in 2010 exceeded those in 2009, totaling more than 1,408; the vast majority of these deaths were caused by insurgent elements.
[...]
While insurgent activity occurred daily, high profile attacks included:   

• On February 26, 16 were killed, including nine Indian nationals, during an attack on two Indian guesthouses.

• On May 28, the Taliban destroyed one school and threatened two others in the Lakan area of Khost; the attackers demanded the release of certain detainees before they would allow the schools to reopen.

• On July 2, four were killed and 24 were wounded in an attack on the Kunduz office of Development Alternatives Incorporated.

• On August 7, Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami claimed responsibility for killing 10 members of a medical mission team in Badakhshan Province.

• On September 26, a British national who was kidnapped by insurgents was killed during a rescue attempt.
• On October 8, the Kunduz governor Engineer Mohammad Omar, was assassinated.

• On December 19, a suicide attack in Kabul killed five ANA officers.

Here's a list of attacks from January - June 2011, the list will be longer in next year's report.

Which makes me wonder where was Afghanistan's Jack Bauer or Eagle Four in all these?

Here is the blurb on "Eagle Four" via vimeo:

Eagle Four (Oqaab Chaar) is the first ever 13 part action/drama series shot entirely in Afghanistan. The series follows an elite Afghan Police Unit working to fight crime and insurgency amidst the chaos of war. The series was written and directed by Sean Lynch alongside a team of talented Afghan filmmakers and crew at TOLO TV.

I can't tell which one is supposed to be the Afghan Jack Bauer but watch the video:





EAGLE FOUR from Sean Lynch on Vimeo.


NPR notes in its report that television drama production is expensive anywhere, but neither the show's Afghan producers nor the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is willing to tell reporters how much the program costs. Um, I wonder why not....

U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden confirmed that the embassy provides funding for the program.

"We see this as an opportunity not only to help support the Afghan media sector, but hopefully also encourage a dialogue among Afghans about the role of the police in society and their growing capabilities," she said.

Hayden refused to say what it is costing U.S. taxpayers to fund the 13 episodes of this season's program. NPR has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the information.

Apparently US Embassy Kabul has also funded, in addition to "Eagle Four,"  a youth-oriented soap opera set at a Kandahar university and a reality show-style documentary about army life.

David Ensor who was Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan and now Director of the Voice of America recently gave the keynote speech at USIP's Media in Conflict: The Evaluation Imperative.

No transcript of that speech appears to be available online. But nextgov.com reported about the event and talked about "Eagle Four." Excerpts below:

The shows are all meant to serve some public policy function, Ensor told an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace on Friday. "Eagle Four," for example, is aimed at raising public respect for Afghan police officers, who are widely regarded as corrupt, while the youth-oriented soap opera focuses heavily on female students who would have been banned from attending university during Taliban rule.
[...]
While the shows have proved generally popular among the war torn nation's TV watchers, it's far from clear whether they've had any tangible policy effect, such as raising army enlistments or improving respect for public officials.

The embassy recently hired a consulting firm to gauge the programs' effectiveness, Ensor said, including through lengthy surveys of audience attitudes over time.
[...]
Ensor's total budget for media projects at the embassy, he said, was about $183 million over 18 months.

So there you are, some $183 million, not sure how much went to the production of these entertaining shows.  I'm still waiting for the result of NPR's FOIA request. I, too, would like to know how much taxpayer money was used to fund the 13 episodes of Eagle Four. 

Do you know? Or is that classified info we'd only find somewhere in the Internets? But ...but... it's entertainment news, what about the public interest?

Related articles

• Kabul attacks 'not a big deal' says US ambassador (guardian.co.uk)
• Taliban assault on Kabul ends after 20 hours (guardian.co.uk)
• Taliban attack Kabul, target U.S. embassy, NATO buildings (thestar.com)
• Gunmen attack US embassy in Kabul (independent.co.uk)
• No big deal? US ambassador's baffling response to Afghan assault (guardian.co.uk)
• The West is whitewashing the attack on Kabul (theglobeandmail.com)

Civilian Surge/Uplift in Afghanistan Costs Nearly $2 Billion So What Are You Complaining About? It's Not Exactly $2 BILLION!

SIGAR and the State Department OIG released last week their audit of the civilian surge, aka uplift in Afghanistan. The bad news is, the whole civilian shebang apparently costs the USG nearly $2 billion. The good news is, the whole civilian shebang costs the USG no more than $2 billion. Although don't hold your breath over that good news. The cost will certainly go up.

Excerpts below:

Since early 2009, U.S. agencies have nearly tripled the number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority at a cost of nearly $2 billion. The number of U.S. civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan increased from 320 in early 2009 to 1,040 personnel by June 2011. As the primary agency responsible for funding the civilian uplift and providing safe and functional working and living conditions for all agencies, the Department of State (State) incurred the majority of the $1.7 billion obligated to support the uplift, in addition to security costs.

Congress authorized State to transfer funds to other agencies to support operations in and assistance for Afghanistan, and SIGAR and State OIG found that State has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that State funds transferred to other agencies are used for their intended purposes. The Foreign Affairs Manual indicates that obligations should be supported by evidence of binding agreements in writing between U.S. agencies regarding the use of funds. In addition, government-wide internal control standards highlight the importance of agency monitoring to ensure funds are expended for their intended purposes. However, we found that State had neither established formal mechanisms with other agencies regarding their use of civilian uplift funds nor monitored how agencies spent funds and instead relied on informal communications such as emails and meetings. As a result, this increased the risk that funds would not be spent for their intended purpose. In one instance, we determined that the Department of Transportation (Transportation) did not know whether $3.5 million in State transfers were authorized for training or other purposes, and as a result Transportation cancelled plans to utilize the funding.

State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces significant challenges in planning to address these costs. First, the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan will likely lead to cost increases for State due to key military security functions that State will assume. Second, a legislative proposal to standardize pay and benefits for all civilians deployed to Afghanistan could also result in increased costs for civilian agencies. Third, the opening of two consulates in Afghanistan could increase costs due to security and housing requirements. Although officials in State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs have started planning to address the costs of supporting and sustaining the civilian presence in Afghanistan, they face a number of planning challenges, such as budget uncertainty and the absence of details on the expected size of the civilian presence in Afghanistan in coming years.

The report made it clear that "civilian uplift personnel are defined as U.S. government civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority after January 2009 to support the campaign for Afghanistan."

How much does it cost to send one government civilian to Afghanistan? Here's what SIGAR/OIG says:

Typically, the U.S. government spends between $425,926 and $570,998 to support the deployment of one U.S. government civilian to Afghanistan for a 1-year assignment. Actual agency costs vary depending on factors such as the salary level of the deployed employee, fees for life support services at the Embassy and in the field, and individual agencies overtime policies. These costs are broken down in table 1 and described in more detail in appendix II.

Back in June, I posted in this blog,  Afghanistan, the Way Forward -- You Know What's Coming -- Send In the Expeditionary Ones.  I don't think I'm so far off.  No talks on how many more civilians will be roped into going there but State officials have now confirmed to SIGAR/OIG that they expect their costs to increase as the military pulls out of Afghanistan.

State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in Afghanistan, and State faces challenges in planning for these contingencies. The U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, targeted for 2014, will likely lead to cost increases similar to those experienced by State after the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq. A legislative proposal to standardize pay and benefits for civilian uplift personnel from all agencies could also result in increased costs for civilian agencies, which have not consistently provided the same level of benefits that State accords its employees. Finally, the opening of two new consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan could increase costs. Although SCA officials have initiated planning to address these matters, they face a number of planning challenges.

State’s Undersecretary for Management's letter to DOD on April 7, 2010 was also cited in the report.  In that letter to DOD, the U/S for Management said that State would have “a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that was unprecedented in the history of the Department of State.”

He was referring to Iraq, of course, but that could easily apply to Afghanistan after the military "drawdown" in whatever shape or form in 2014. Which means, the State Department has some 2-3 years to get it right in Iraq before it has to go at it all over again in Afghanistan. My confidence in that prospect is overwhelming!

About those two consulates in Herat and Mazar?

Embassy management officials noted that two consulates were established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in 2011, and OBO has developed temporary facilities to initially house the consulates. According to OBO, the temporary Herat consulate was to have 20 desks and 30 beds; however, the plans were modified to accommodate 100 desks and 70 beds due to the civilian uplift. Similarly, the temporary Mazar-e-Sharif consulate was to have 20 desks, but the plans were redesigned to accommodate 37 desks. According to SCA officials, State has not yet determined whether permanent consulates will be established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. However, OBO officials told us these temporary consulates may be replaced by permanent consulates. If established, these posts could represent substantial additional costs for State. For example, according to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, State would have to pay for supplies and services, including food, motor pools, vehicle repair, air traffic control at the airport, crash and rescue, medical evacuation, and hospital services, among many others. The State official said that these items would likely constitute a significant cost increase.

So, something like 97 more personnel in both consulates not counting the XXX number of personnel all over Iraq in 2011? In 2012? In 2013? In 2014? In the year forever more. And there is of course, the rest of the world that needs staffing, too.

Assignments in Afghanistan are for one-year tours which beg the question on where are you going to get XXX number of people year in and year out to serve there in perpetuity?  



Related item:
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

Russian Ambassador to Kabul advices US not to pull out of Afghanistan precipitously but will never send troops over there (again)

Image via WikipediaThe Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Andrey Avetisyan was interviewed by Morning Edition co-host Renee Montagne. Apparently, Ambassador  Avetisyan was a young diplomat in Kabul during the Soviet Union's military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980's.

He has some advice for the United States -- to "not to pull out of Afghanistan precipitously." In the same interview, he  also says that "Russia prefers to learn from the mistakes of the past and we will never send our troops to Afghanistan."

Asked about the similarities between the current war in Afghanistan with the Soviet War in the 1980's, this is what the ambassador says:

Avetisyan: Similarities [are] those who decided to go into Afghanistan to fight terrorism hoped for several months — exactly like the Soviet Union, which didn't want to be involved here for so many years. But they were dragged deeper and deeper into this, and in a couple of years' time found themselves in the midst of internal conflict. So, fighting in Afghanistan is not what you think it's going to be. So, what is the end to this? Just withdraw? I think premature withdrawal now will bring a lot of problems, new internal war, new civil war to Afghanistan. It is a very dangerous thing just to put yourself a date, artificially calculated, and then withdraw. I don't think today the circumstances are right for withdrawal of the international forces and transition of responsibility for the security to the Afghan security forces. They're not yet ready.

The current war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. It'll be 10 years next month, and the Afghan security forces are "not yet ready." From 2011-2021, the Afghan security forces will be slightly ready.  From 2021-2031, the Afghan security forces will be slightly more ready. From 2031-2041, the Afghan security forces will be more or less ready. From 2041-2051, the Afghan security forces will be so-so ready. From 2051-2061, the Afghan security forces will be ready if only its troops desertion rate stops spiking up.

If we stop paying attention, this 10-year war can slowly just go on and on and on like a war to nowhere (the PR folks would say it's the journey not the destination).  Our children's children's children will be fighting this forever war as officials like Ambassador Avetisyan continues to give us their most kind advice to stay until the Afghans are ready. Or as our very own ambassador to Kabul scares us into staying or risk more attacks.  I'm sorry, drinking that Kool-Aid is no longer my cup of tea.


Montagne points out that after the Soviet Union withdrew its troops in the late '80s, in '89, it might have stayed committed to Afghanistan in terms of development and helping with development, but it was actually unable to, because the Soviet Union, pretty shortly after that, broke apart.  Ambassador Avetisyan's response:

Absolutely. The Soviet Union made a huge mistake sending troops to Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union paid a huge price for this mistake. Russia prefers to learn from the mistakes of the past and we will never send our troops to Afghanistan.

Apart from this, we are ready and already cooperating with Afghanistan on everything. We support the army and police, we support international coalition here, because we share the goals of fighting against terrorism and international crime. For us, drugs are even more important. Every year about 30,000 Russians die from Afghan heroin. Russia can't be involved in Afghanistan from a distance because we are members of the region. We are here. We can't go anywhere like many countries involved now can.

Read the whole thing here.





Related articles

• NPR: Russian Ambassador To US: Don't flee Afghanistan (ukforcesafghanistan.wordpress.com)
• US troops may stay in Afghanistan until 2024 (telegraph.co.uk)
• U.S. Envoy: America Must Stay In Afghanistan Or Risk Being Attacked Again (alan.com)
• Afghans anxious about exit of foreign troops (sfgate.com)
• Talks on new U.S.-Afghan pact strains relations (ctv.ca)