Showing posts with label Budget. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Budget. Show all posts

Saturday, January 14, 2012

Senator Nelson's Reasonableness Test: US Should Bill Iraq for US Embassy Security

Last year, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, the 12th term Republican congressman from California's scenic 46th District and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee made the news when he called for Iraq to repay a portion of the "mega-dollars" that Washington has spent since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.  Mr. Rohrabacher for the record did not actually say we should ask for a repayment now but once "Iraq becomes a very rich and prosperous country..."

This past week, it was Nebraska's retiring Democratic Senator Ben Nelson turn at bill collection (TSB has a post on this here) Below is a letter sent by Senator Nelson to Secretaries Panetta and Clinton telling them that the Iraqi government should be responsible for shouldering the cost of US Embassy security in Iraq:

Dear Mr. Secretary and Madam Secretary:

As you know, the United States concluded its military mission in Iraq in 2011. With that end, the U.S. Department of State now assumes responsibility for the civilian mission, which I understand will be heavily reliant on private contractors for security. I support ensuring the success of our efforts in Iraq, but am concerned about continuing to provide assistance to Iraq’s government, with the total cost being borne by the United States.

As a nation, our government continues to look for ways to reduce spending and find efficiencies within the U.S. Department of Defense. Therefore, I believe it is completely reasonable and in line with our agreements with other nations for the Government of Iraq to pay for the security of our remaining State Department personnel.

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in November 2011, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke about the costs of retaining an American presence in Iraq. He noted that “in any nation in which [the United States is] present diplomatically, the first responsibility for security is the host nation.” Thus, if Iraq is unable to provide security for U.S. personnel, then the Iraqi government should pay for the cost of doing so – rather than our nation’s taxpayers. Therefore, I encourage your departments to enter into an agreement with the Iraqi government to underwrite the costs associated with our continued diplomatic presence there.

During that same hearing, I also asked General Dempsey whether it was possible to enter into an agreement with the Iraqi government for cost-sharing in order to continue providing for the security training of Iraqi troops and every other mission we might accept to help the country secure, stabilize and self-govern. General Dempsey responded that such agreements are possible and that there is always a negotiation on the cost and who will bear it.

I want to ensure that the burden of such operations is placed primarily on Iraq, in line with those agreements we share with other nations when we conduct multilateral or bilateral exercises around the world. The Iraqi government is more than capable of sharing or underwriting costs associated with a U.S. advise-and-assist presence, as the Iraqi economy continues to grow and government revenues are beginning to increase to that of pre-war levels.

While I understand there are many challenges facing the Government of Iraq, it is important for the United States to make it clear that we expect the new government to be responsible for shouldering the cost of security in their nation. I would, therefore, greatly appreciate learning from the Administration what agreements are being made with the Government of Iraq for further missions and how the cost of those missions will be covered. Thank you both for your consideration in this matter. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

E. Benjamin Nelson
United States Senator

It is true that the host country is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 22(2) says that "The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity."

One could argue that Syria did not lived up to its responsibility to prevent "impairment of its dignity" when it allowed a mob to attack our embassy in Syria in July last year. But other times, the local police protecting diplomatic and consular premises can pay dearly with their lives. During the February 2003 attack of the US Consulate in Karachi, for instance, the gunmen killed two police officers and wounded five other policemen in front of the consulate.  The 2008 American Embassy attack in Yemen resulted in 19 deaths and 16 injuries including six Yemeni policemen. 

Iraq is responsible for the protection of the US Mission in Iraq, just as the United States is responsible for the protection of all diplomatic premises within the United States. But while the host country is expected to provide the outermost security of diplomatic missions, it cannot be expected to provide guard services for the embassy compound. 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, of course, is like no other diplomatic mission in the world.  According to Stratfor's assessment of diplomatic security after the troops withdrawal,  there are some 16,000 personnel, 5,000 of whom are security contractors working inside our heavily fortified embassy and consulates in Iraq.  The remaining 11,000 include diplomats, intelligence officers and analysts, defense attaches, military liaison personnel and aid and development personnel.

If the Government of Iraq decides that it should have a corresponding number of personnel - 16,000 Iraqis -  attached to its embassy in Washington, D.C., how would that work?  Congress would be up in arms!

But perhaps the more tricky part is Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which says that "1) In the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mission, the receiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission; 2) The receiving State may equally, within similar bounds and on a nondiscriminatory basis, refuse to accept officials of a particular category."

With that number of personnel, there probably is a specific agreement in place. But let's just say that there is none and Senator Nelson gets his way and bill Iraq for the cost of diplomatic security in Iraq.  The Iraqi Government may just decide that 16,000 diplomatic, security and support personnel at U.S. Mission Iraq is a tad too much. Due to ongoing security challenges in the country, it may just decide that a, say 150-member US staff is all it could support. Which would actually save the US Government money, and would allow the State Department to reallocate its tight resources to other areas not considered the center of the bureaucratic universe.

 



 
 
 

Friday, October 21, 2011

US Funds 90% of Afghanistan's Total Security, Will Afghanistan Go Back to Rock-Paper-Scissor When US Leaves?

President Karzai Welcomes President Obama to KabulImage via Wikipedia"Chairman Karzai, I reaffirm to you today...Image via WikipediaSecretary Rice meets with Afghan President Ham...Image via WikipediaIn 2009, I wondered out loud in this blog -- Did we legally adopt Afghanistan while we were asleep? It's like Alan Harper of Three and a Half Men asking to stay in his brother's house, who then end up staying forever ( or at least, until his brother died). Only, in our case, it's the reverse; we're like the dead rich brother, before he died.

In August, I finally came to a sad conclusion that our pretend 51st state of Afghanistan is no longer a laughing matter. 

Do you know how bad is the state of our public schools in this country?  I've seen 5th graders who can't even spell, locate their state on the U.S. map, much less, do simple arithmetic when buying a chocolate bar.  If we want to be competitive in the 21st century, we need our limited money invested on the future of this country. But our public officials and politicians seem to think that our work in Afghanistan is essential to our future in the new century. So we pour money over there like there is no tomorrow. Saving Afghanistan means saving us? Right.

Then you read this GAO report that says that the United States have been responsible for 90% of funds that go to Afghanistan's security expenditures from 2006-2010. So we have propped up this government, underwrite most of its expenses and what happens when we leave? Is Hamid Karzai going back to rock-paper-scissor? No? So, then, does that mean we're going to stay until the Government of Afghanistan grows its revenue from 9% to 100%, or when it is able to pay for its own soldiers' salaries and its own electric fuel, etc. etc. , whichever happens first?

I am not against foreign aid or even military aid per se. But let's keep some perspective here. We're not running on a surplus. We have an exploding boomer population, we have dilapidated public infrastructures, and we have our future suffering through some major budget cuts right now.  

And we're stuck in the muck called Afghanistan. And this is for our own good? Excuse me if I don't drink that kool aid, sir. And I really would like us to leave and let them get on with their own nation building while we do ours at home. 

Excerpted from GAO's report on Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence:

Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures.
Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures more than doubled from solar year (SY) 2006 to 2010, growing from $5.5 billion to $14.3 billion, an increase of 160 percent. Over this 5-year period, about 79 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures of $54 billion were off budget.

Donor funding.
The United States and other donors funded about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010. In particular, donors funded on average 57 percent of on-budget expenditures and 100 percent of off-budget expenditures. Over this period, the United States provided 62 percent of estimated total public expenditures, while other donors provided 28 percent. The United States funded an estimated 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total security expenditures during this time period. The United States funded an estimated 39 percent of Afghanistan’s total non-security expenditures during SY2006 to 2010.

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues.
The domestic revenues of GIRoA grew by an average annual rate of 30 percent from SY2006 to 2010, increasing from an estimated total of $0.62 billion to $1.66 billion. Customs duties and taxes such as income and property taxes provided the largest share of domestic revenues. However, domestic revenues funded only about 9 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from SY2006 to 2010.


GAO _Afghan Donor Dependence | September 2011







Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Details: Costs to Deploy One Person to Afghanistan for One Year


Excerpted from SIGAR Audit-11-17 and State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

It typically costs the U.S. government between $425,926 and $570,998 to deploy a civilian employee to Afghanistan for a 1 year tour. Costs vary due to differences in salary, travel expenses, and whether an employee works in the Embassy or in field locations. This estimated range does not include agencies’ headquarters support costs for Afghanistan positions, 15 days of transitional leave or home leave if the employee will be deployed for another year-long tour in Afghanistan, and any other expenses that the deploying agency may incur in the process of transitioning the employees back to their previous jobs within the government, if applicable.

We constructed the total cost range estimate for deploying one position to Afghanistan based on the following expenses:


Salaries: Civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan are compensated for their work either by the U.S. government Civil Service General Schedule (GS)26 or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule. U.S. agencies told us that they prefer to deploy civilians with considerable background experience to Afghanistan. Therefore, agencies typically deploy civilians at the higher end of the U.S. government pay scale (GS 14 and FS 1). In budget planning, State uses the amount of $110,000 as base salary for either the civil service or the foreign service positions, and USAID uses the amount of $122,733 as base salary for their Afghanistan positions in general.

Danger Pay: Danger pay is additional compensation above basic salary for service at designated danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees. The U.S. government sets the danger pay level for Afghanistan at 35 percent of base salary (based on a standard 40 hour workweek) prorated for the number of days while deployed in Afghanistan. Danger pay compensation begins on the day of arrival in Afghanistan (the employee must be in country for 4 hours or more to qualify) and ceases on the day of departure for both permanent or temporary employees deployed to Afghanistan.
or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule.

Post Differential: Post differential is additional hardship pay over basic salary for employees deployed to serve at foreign areas where conditions or the environment differ substantially from conditions or the environment in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. State provides post differential for civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan at the maximum level of 35 percent of base salary. All civilian employees assigned for a 1 year tour, detailed, or on temporary duty to Afghanistan must spend 42 consecutive days at post before the post differential is activated; the differential is retroactive to the day the employee arrived at post.


Sunday Differential: The U.S. government provides full-time civilian employees in Afghanistan with additional compensation for hours of work on Sunday, as it is the start of the regular workweek at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Sunday premium pay is equal to 25 percent of the employee’s rate of basic salary for each of the 8 hours of Sunday work, which means 5 percent of base salary.

Overtime: The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines overtime pay as pay for hours of work officially ordered or approved in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek. Civilian employees in Afghanistan are entitled to overtime compensation depending on their position and level of appointment. USAID sets its personnel overtime at the rate of 25 percent of base salary. State sets overtime at 20 percent of base salary. USDA follows U.S.Mission policy and allows for civilians working in Kabul to work 35 hours of overtime per pay period and for civilians working in the field in Afghanistan to work 45 hours of overtime per pay period. The overtime compensation rate is an employee’s base salary and an additional percentage based on the employee’s GS level.

Special Differential: A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.


Separate Maintenance Allowance: The U.S. government provides this  allowance to assist a Foreign Service employee in meeting the additional expenses of supporting family members located outside the employee's foreign post of assignment. The U.S. government applies this allowance to Foreign Service employees working in Afghanistan. The maximum amount used to plan a position’s budget in Afghanistan is $17,300 for State and $12,516 for USAID. A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000.

Deployment Travel: The U.S. government pays for civilian employee travel to Afghanistan, primarily including airfare, hotel, meals and shipment of household effects. State estimates this cost at $25,000; USAID estimates it at $48,983.


Mandatory Afghanistan Training: State requires all civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan to attend Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training (at the cost of $3,895) and Afghanistan Familiarization training (at the cost of $960). Civilian personnel deployed to locations outside of the U.S. mission in Kabul receive extra training, including the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Orientation (at the cost of $960) and the Interagency Integrated Civilian-Military Training Exercise for Afghanistan (at the cost of $5,880). Some individual departments and agencies require additional specialized training for their employees deployed to Afghanistan; for example, Department of Justice civilian employees attend specialized training for their job assignments in Afghanistan.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) and Regional Rest Breaks (RRB): The U.S. government provides civilians deployed to Afghanistan designated rest breaks after they have spent a certain number of days in country. For R&R, the government pays travel costs for employees to return home for 22 days, including travel time. For RRB, the government pays to transport employees to regional locations for quick breaks, including 5 days of paid administrative leave and no more than a total of 7 days, including travel time. There are two options for taking these types of leave during a 1-year deployment: three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three RRBs. State estimates $21,000 per year for the cost of these breaks, while USAID estimates $5,785.


International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): ICASS is the principal means by which the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at its diplomatic and consular missions overseas. U.S. government agencies operating in Afghanistan pay ICASS charges for each of their civilian employees to benefit from services provided by the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, such as motor pool operations and vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services, and reception and telephone system services. ICASS fees range from $100,000 to $150,000 per person.


Residential Housing for Uplift Personnel: State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provides housing for the uplift personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Near East Asia and South and Central Asian Affairs Bureaus provided Overseas Building Operations (OBO) $41,616,000 to accommodate uplift personnel in Afghanistan. State budgets $45,000 for housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) for a single position in Afghanistan.


DOD Life Support in the Field: U.S. Force-Afghanistan provides security for uplift personnel located in the field in Afghanistan. DOD charges State $3,044 each month (or $101.47 per day) for each civilian deployed to a DOD-controlled provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan.


Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS): The U.S. agencies that establish a civilian presence at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person basis, to State to provide new, safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace vulnerable facilities currently occupied by the mission. The CSCS program charges the departments and agencies for each authorized or existing position in the U.S. diplomatic facilities and for each projected position above current authorized positions in new Embassy compounds. State estimates the CSCS costs for a Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is processed) at $22,657, Non-Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is not processed) at $8,803, and for
Non-Office Areas, such as housing, at $1,626.


Field Life Support Kits: The U.S. government issues kits to civilians deployed to work at field locations in Afghanistan, which include key life support supplies, such as satellite phones and protective equipment. State estimates the cost of these kits as $15,000.









Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Slash Non-Fiction: There Goes Diplomacy 3.0 But They Sure Ramps It Up in Iraq

Via WaPo's Walter Pincus on the State Dept. reeling from budget cuts

The Senate committee on Sept. 21 approved $44.6 billion for the core State, Foreign Operations budget for next year, which was $6 billion below the original request and $3.5 billion below the current level. The House subcommittee approved $39.5 billion, slashing the administration’s request by $11.2 billion, or 22 percent.

In describing the cut, the Republican draft report on the bill said it preserves national security priorities while making “necessary reductions in spending.”

Among the largest House subcommittee reductions was a nearly 20 percent cut in the funds that pay for Foreign Service officers and the civilians who support them. In justifying this action, the subcommittee report said it eliminated funds sought for 184 new staff because since 2008, some 1,622 Foreign Service officers and 1,001 civilians had been hired above attrition.
[...]
The House panel took an even bigger cut from the personnel budget for the Agency for International Development (AID), which saw its fiscal 2012 request dropped from $1.5 billion to $900 million. The report notes that 820 new Foreign Service officers have been added to AID since 2008.
Read in full here.

Diplomacy 3.0 is the State Department's ambitious multi-year hiring program that recognizes diplomacy as one of the three essential pillars of U.S. foreign policy: diplomacy, development, and defense.  But since most in Congress only recognizes the third pillar of U.S. foreign policy, I was just waiting for the other two shoes to fall.

And now there they are.

Tell me again -- how are we going to have a US Consulate Basra with 1200 employees  or a US Consulate Erbil with 1400 staffers the way this is going? (which would make these two diplomatic posts larger than most embassies anywhere in the world).  With less money available, State maybe forced to shuffle the deck, which probably means post-closures in other parts of the world not called Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Expect a new mothership cable to ALL POSTS urging posts and mission personnel to do more with less given this newest budget constraints. Unless you're in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, of course. But fear not, the way this is going, there will come a time when you'll me able to do everything with nothing.  Except on a diplomatic reception.

The Pulitzer Center on Crisis reporting recently had this update on the State Department's ramped up presence in Iraq:
The ongoing expansion of the diplomatic facilities—including two smaller outposts in Mosul and Kirkuk—is deeply controversial in Washington, where many lawmakers have questioned whether it makes sense for the U.S. to devote such an enormous percentage of the State Department's total budget to one country.
A Jan. 31 report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for instance, estimated that the State Department will spend $25-$30 billion in Iraq over the next five years. The panel said that U.S. diplomatic operations in Iraq in fiscal year 2012 will spike to at least $3 billion, roughly a quarter of the State Department's global operations budget. Other State initiatives here - like the large and growing Office of Security Cooperation—will push the fiscal 2012 numbers even higher.

It's far from clear that Congress is willing to spend that kind of money on Iraq, given the war's deep unpopularity at home. Lawmakers slashed State's fiscal year 2011 budget request by almost 20 percent, to $2.1 billion from the $2.6 billion originally requested. Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont told The Huffington Post earlier this month that he doesn't "know why [Iraq] has to be one of our highest priorities."

"I think we've reached the point in Iraq where whatever we're spending money on, we're throwing good money after bad," he told the Web site.
The Senator had a point, no sense throwing good money after bad.  Most especially if we don't have a lot of money, good or bad.  Anyways, perhaps Congress should write that in the appropriation bill -- the money for the State Department that must not/not be spent on Iraq. Of course, that's like the prohibition clause of no permanent bases in Iraq, Afghanistan  and elsewhere that we regularly see in those bills.









Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Project Unsustainable: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Need to be On Reality Teevee Now

Well, just about everything is reality teevee now, why not our reconstruction project centered on the Afghan National Security Forces?  The United States and donor countries are paying for it and it's kind of like the hollywoody equivalent of army and police training. There are well meaning good guys, and bad meaning bad guys, insurmountable challenges, military toys, guys learning to shoot straight, contractor reps on near heart attacks, and gazillions of money floating around for this or that. There's gotta be drama in all that, don't ya think?

And the best part is, this reality show may have better longevity prospects as teevee show goes, because hey, we might actually be in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (when we're supposed to leave).  If rumors are true that negotiations are underway for the United States to stay in Afghanistan until 2024, that would fit perfectly with the IMF's prediction that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.

Afghanistan is in fact, playing a double game to suit its interest -- badmouthing the United States when it suits it's need and negotiating behind the lime lights to get the United States to stay to protect its interest.   If we're asked to stay beyond 2014, don't mistake it for true love; we have the juice, that's all (even if that juice was bought on credit); we're like the deep pocket sugar person that the dysfunctional individual with a sweet habit can't live with and can't live without - a very messy relationship.

DynCorp trainer with Afghan National Police recruits.
(U.S.Air Force photo cited by CWC)
In any case, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) cited Project Unsustainable above as a formidable example of potential waste in the U.S.-funded contracting for training of, and facilities construction for, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprising the Army, Border Police, and National Police. Excerpt below:
Between FY 2006 and FY 2011, Congress appropriated nearly $39 billion to set up and maintain the ANSF; the fiscal year 2012 budget request would add almost $13 billion to that total. Nearly half of the FY 2012 request—over $5 billion—would go toward clothing, equipping, and paying the ANSF.22

Prospects for the Afghan government’s sustaining the ANSF are dubious. The entire country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for FY 2011 is about $16 billion at the official exchange rate, and the national government’s domestic revenues are about $2 billion.23 The Afghan Ministry of Finance budget proposal for 2011-2012 indicates that given the increased security costs from the increase in size of the ANSF, the Afghan government is expected to continue to depend on donor grants for up to 30% of its operating budget.24

The outlook for sustaining the Afghan army and national police is complicated by several factors:

▪▪The ANSF, currently numbering about 305,000 personnel, is growing toward a newly authorized strength of 352,000, which will increase sustainment costs.

▪▪The Commission has received a preliminary U.S. military estimate of ANSF sustainment costs for just the period 2014-2017 in the neighborhood of $30 billion.

▪▪The International Monetary Fund has concluded that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.25

▪▪Donor-community support depends upon unpredictable political decisions that may be heavily influenced by severe fiscal pressure on most developed countries’ budgets.

In a similar vein, the Acting Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission, “The Government of Afghanistan has never had the financial resources to sustain ANP [Afghan National Police] salaries at either the current or projected levels.”

Besides spending billions on contracts to train, clothe, and equip the ANSF, the United States has also committed $11.4 billion since 2005 to build bases, police stations, border outposts, and other facilities for the ANSF. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded two contracts in 2010 for ITT Corporation to provide $800 million in operation-and-maintenance services for 663 ANSF facilities over a five-year period.

The Afghan government has already indicated that it cannot pay such costs from its resources.29 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission at its January 24, 2011, construction hearing that “the entire $11.4 billion [in construction spending] is at risk,” and “both contracts are expected to exhaust their funding well before [the end of ] their five-year performance period.”30

Anyway, if we end up spending the next 12-13 years in Afghanistan training its armed forces, I only have one request.  Please, please, please -- can we please have this on teevee 24/7, 365 days a year so we can watch this project continue to unfold in real time?  And if SIGAR needs to make arrests, can we do that with cameras rolling, too? Because why not?

Pardon me? Why do we need to see this 24/7, 365 days until the 2024 season? Um, silly -- so we can see on teevee just how stoopid we've all been in allowing a sugar old baby with a bad habit to play us this well.

Michele Bachmann's Soviet Union must be laughing its head off right now.




Related posts:
On to 2024: Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan -- Not/Not a Laughing Matter | Aug 22, 2011

Cops Kabul Edition: Building Afghanistan's National Police at $1.26 Billion | Jul 29, 2011

US Mission Afghanistan: Ambassador Crocker returns, assures everyone "There will be no rush for the exits..." and that's okay since our soldiers for 2023 will start kindergarten this fall | Tuesday, July 26, 2011 |

$6 Billion Later, Afghan Cops Aren't Ready to Serve | Diplopundit | Mar 22, 2010

Weapons Accountability in Afghanistan | Diplopundit | Feb 16, 2009




WASTED in Iraq and Afghanistan: $12 million every day for the past 10 years, true story!

The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has released its 240-page final report, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, ” this morning.

The full report is here. You can also download the report by section/chapter here. We're trying to read fast but we have interruptions, more on the details later. Quick excerpts below:

At least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much more will turn into waste as attention to continuing operations wanes, as U.S. support for projects and programs in Iraq and Afghanistan declines, and as those efforts are revealed as unsustainable.
[...]
Contract waste, fraud, and abuse take many forms:

▪▪An ill-conceived project, no matter how well-managed, is wasteful if it does not fit the cultural, political, and economic norms of the society it is meant to serve, or if it cannot be supported and maintained.

▪▪Poor planning and oversight by the U.S. government, as well as poor performance on the part of contractors, have costly outcomes: time and money misspent are not available for other purposes, missions are not achieved, and lives are lost.

▪▪Criminal behavior and blatant corruption sap dollars from what could otherwise be successful project outcomes and, more disturbingly, contribute to a climate in which huge amounts of waste are accepted as the norm.
[...]
The number of Department of Defense (Defense), Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has varied, but exceeded 260,000 in 2010. The contractor-employee count has at times surpassed the number of U.S. military personnel in the two countries. Most contractor employees are third-country nationals and local nationals; U.S. nationals totaled more than 46,000, a minority of those employed.
[...]
The United States will not be able to conduct large or sustained contingency operations without heavy contractor support. Avoiding a repetition of the waste, fraud, and abuse seen in Iraq and Afghanistan requires either a great increase in agencies’ ability to perform core tasks and to manage contracts effectively, or a disciplined reconsideration of plans and commitments that would require intense use of contractors.

Failure by Congress and the Executive Branch to heed a decade’s lessons on contingency contracting from Iraq and Afghanistan will not avert new contingencies. It will only ensure that additional billions of dollars of waste will occur and that U.S. objectives and standing in the world will suffer. Worse still, lives will be lost because of waste and mismanagement.

The Commission says $31 to $60 billion but also note that given the often chaotic environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a conservative estimate of the money that has been lost through contingency contracting. The Commission estimates that at the mid-range, waste and fraud during contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan averaged about $12 million every day for the past 10 years.

That's right.  An average of $12 million every day for the past 10 years.

Whiskey-Tango-Foxtrot -- how the heck do you spend $12 million a day? Read the report. It's a true story, real enough to make you weep!

 


Monday, August 22, 2011

On to 2024: Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan -- Not/Not a Laughing Matter

The Telegraph's Ben Farmer in Kabul is reporting that the United States and Afghanistan are close to signing a strategic pact which would allow thousands of U.S. troops to remain in that country until at least 2024.

The agreement would allow not only military trainers to stay to build up the Afghan army and police, but also American special forces soldiers and air power to remain.

The prospect of such a deal has already been met with anger among Afghanistan’s neighbours including, publicly, Iran and, privately, Pakistan.

It also risks being rejected by the Taliban and derailing any attempt to coax them to the negotiating table, according to one senior member of Hamid Karzai’s peace council.

A withdrawal of American troops has already begun following an agreement to hand over security for the country to Kabul by the end of 2014.

But Afghans wary of being abandoned are keen to lock America into a longer partnership after the deadline. Many analysts also believe the American military would like to retain a presence close to Pakistan, Iran and China.

Wait, WAIT a minute ... the same government who calls U.S. personnel in Afghanistan "occupiers" actually wants us to stay? Folks, this is not/not a healthy relationship. The somebodies need some serious therapy. Call meee! I got names to recommend.

Anyway, when I wrote this post, I did a screen grab of how much we've spent on the war in Afghanistan (see below from http://costofwar.com/en/). By the time you read this, the amount is higher, of course, because the cost just drips on like a leaky faucet. Where are the plumbers when you really need them, huh? .... drip ....drip...drip....drip....



I was thinking of soldiers for 2023 entering kindergarten this fall; miss by 12 months! Youngest members bore the heaviest cost in Iraq, and no doubt, in Afghanistan, too. More here

So if true that the United State and Afghanistan are kinda keen on continuing this dysfunctional marriage of inconvenience, at least until 2024, we may have to call Afghanistan our pretend 51st state until then.

I don't think this is an unfair description since Afghanistan is the destination of so much pork from the US Treasury.  It is a surprise that its economy has not been dolarized yet. And to think that the Afghans can't even vote! Just imagine how much more money is allocated over there if even half of its 29 million inhabitants can vote!

Meanwhile, the taxpayers of Detroit, Michigan which has the highest poverty rate (36.4%) among American cities with populations greater than 250,000 will pay $205.1 million for its share of the Afghanistan war spending for FY2011. For the same amount of money, the following could be provided:

    154,202 Children Receiving Low-Income Healthcare for One Year OR

    2,869 Elementary School Teachers for One Year OR

    3,905 Firefighters for One Year OR

    28,881 Head Start Slots for Children for One Year OR

    64,154 Households with Renewable Electricity - Solar Photovoltaic for One Year OR

    171,078 Households with Renewable Electricity-Wind Power for One Year OR

    26,764 Military Veterans Receiving VA Medical Care for One Year OR

    49,682 People Receiving Low-Income Healthcare for One Year OR

    3,200 Police or Sheriff's Patrol Officers for One Year OR

    17,590 Scholarships for University Students for One Year OR

    36,952 Students receiving Pell Grants of $5550


Now if we calculate the cost of war share based on FY2011 numbers, it looks like Detroit, Michigan will be in the hook for some $2.6663 billion for Afghanistan in the next 13 years.

A pretend 51st state is not/not a laughing matter. I think its time we get out of the pretend 51st state business and start rebuilding our real states.






 
 
 
 

Friday, August 5, 2011

US Congress on Super Stoopid Ride: Saving $16 Million at a Cost of $364 Million

As if the debt ceiling theater was not badly scripted and terribly acted enough. 

Congress went on vacay even as the partial shutdown of the Federal Aviation Administration deactivated some 74,000 employees (FAA, construction workers, etc) and resulted in a loss to the U.S. Treasury of some $30 million a day.

The CSMonitor reports on the newly announced deal that is good until next month when Congress returns to do a cha-cha:

Funding for the FAA expired on July 23, following nearly four years of short-term extensions. Both the House and the Senate have passed long-term FAA funding bills that clashed on partisan and parochial issues, such as rules that make it tougher to organize unions and subsidies to rural airports.

Since members of the House have already left town, the deal involves the Senate’s passing of a House measure extending funding for the FAA through Sept. 16, in a vote expected on Friday. The agreement also frees up $2.5 billion in federal grants for delayed construction projects. Congress will return to the outstanding issues in September.

Well, that's dumb, okay, but here is what's even more stupid, as stupid does it in Washington, D.C. Congress was trying to save money by defunding rural airports at the tune of $16 million. Funding for FAA expired on July 23, at a cost of some $30 million a day in lost revenue to the U.S. Treasury. So our elected representatives in Congress, so wise and smart managed to saved $16 million at a cost of $364 million in lost fees in the last couple of weeks.

In what other universe is this type of stupidity acceptable?

Dear U.S. Congress, the Chinese are falling off their chairs laughing at all of us, and why not?!  With this kind of elected representatives, what else can possibly go wrong? 






 
 
 
 

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Foreign Affairs Group Urges Expansion of Foreign Service, a Week Later, House Appropriations Committee Slashes State Dept/USAID Funding

The Foreign Affairs Council is a non-partisan umbrella group of eleven organizations concerned about U.S. diplomatic readiness. It recently released its fifth biennial assessment of the stewardship of the Secretary of State as a leader and manager.  The report which was released a week ago includes a notation that says "not all signatories agree with everything contained in this report, although they unanimously concur with all conclusions and recommendations."  Excerpts below:

An increase of 1,069 State positions during the tenure of Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001-2005) was more than absorbed by the civilian surges in Iraq and Afghanistan plus substantial increases in consular officers (more intensive scrutiny of visa applications to protect our frontiers) and in security officers (to protect others being deployed). Inaction on staffing during the tenure of Secretary Condoleezza Rice (2005-2009) left the foreign affairs agencies with huge deficits in the human resources needed to do what was asked of them in the post-9/11 international landscape. Secretary Rice did propose a robust budget for FY 2009 asking for about 1,000 new positions for State and 500 for USAID and obtained OMB approval for these increases. However, given that FY 2009 was a “lame duck" period for the Bush administration, it did not appear at the time that the budget request would prosper in the Congress and, in any case, would not be acted upon until well after Rice’s departure.
[...]
The FY 2009 appropriations bill added 992 new Foreign Service positions at State and 300 positions at USAID.
[...]
...[S]oon after taking office the Administration submitted a FY 2010 budget request that succeeded in adding 764 Foreign Service positions at State and 350 positions at USAID.
[...]
The FY 2009 and FY 2010 staffing increases that achieved a 17 percent expansion of the Foreign Service were a remarkable accomplishment for Secretary Clinton, President Obama and Congress. Yet, with most of the new employees being sent out just to fill existing vacant positions, Foreign Service staffing levels still fell far short of that needed to fully restore America’s diplomatic and development capacity.
[...]
[T]he Administration’s FY 2011 budget request (forwarded to Congress in February 2010) sought 410 new Foreign Service positions at State and 200 at USAID. One year later, with the FY 2011 budget still pending before Congress (and opposed by the Republican majority in the House), the Administration submitted its FY 2012 budget request seeking an additional 150 Foreign Service positions at State and 165 at USAID. Thus, as of May 2011, the combined FY 2011 and FY 2012 unmet Foreign Service staffing requests totaled 560 at State and 365 at USAID.
[...]
Unfortunately, when Congress belatedly passed the FY 2011 budget in April 2011, it did not include funds to hire additional personnel above attrition. Furthermore, as this FAC report goes to press, Congress appears poised to reject the Administration’s FY 2012 request to strengthen staffing at the State Department and USAID.

Resources for Staffing and Training

1. Secretary Clinton should pursue her budget proposal to strengthen diplomacy and development assistance by securing funding for an additional 1,250 Foreign Service positions at the State Department and 650 at USAID by FY 2014.

2. To achieve the above recommendation the Secretary should make completion of Development 3.0 the first priority. Small reductions in the various assistance program accounts would fund the personnel increases now pending without damaging the development effort.

3. The Secretary should use a portion of the new positions to complete the staffing of a Foreign Service training complement equal to 15 percent of core staffing in order to provide the professional education and training needed to raise the overall level of performance of the State Department and USAID.
The report is available here but seems to have slipped into a dark hole inside the beltway. Too dark to read there.

On Jul 26, the House Appropriations Committee released the fiscal year 2012 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill:
The bill includes a total of $39.6 billion in regular discretionary funding, which is $8.6 billion or 18% below last year’s level. Included in these reductions are cuts back to the fiscal year 2008 levels or below for certain operations and assistance accounts. The bill also includes $7.6 billion designated as Global War on Terror funding, which is $1.1 billion below the President’s request.
[...]
State Department Operations and Related Agencies – The bill contains a total of $11.9 billion in discretionary funding for operational costs of the State Department and related agencies – a decrease of $3.9 billion below last year’s level and a $3.1 billion below the President’s request. This includes funding for programs such as diplomatic and consular affairs, embassy security and operations, assessed contributions to international organizations, and international broadcasting. The bill also eliminates temporary pay raises for overseas officers.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Operations – The bill contains $1.04 billion for USAID – a reduction of $488 million from last year’s level and $705 million below the President’s request. The bill halts new hiring at USAID and stops expansion of facilities overseas associated with that hiring.

Global War on Terror – The bill includes Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding for efforts and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, GWOT funds will support security forces and police previously funded by the Department of Defense. GWOT funds will also support civilian programs in support of the military’s counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.
For the subcommittee draft text of the FY 2012 State and Foreign Operations Bill, please visit: http://appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FY12-SFOPS-07-25_xml.pdf.

This is a Republican-sponsored bill.  GOP members hold seven of the 11 seats on the House Appropriations State and Foreign Operations subcommittee. On July 27, the bill was reported to the Full Committee on voice vote.  The Full Committee markup is scheduled for August 3rd.

There are again talks about the elimination of "locality pay" and even the "F" word. Locality pay and furloughs sounds familiar; didn't we had these talks just months ago? But this will be a much larger drawn-out battle not just on staffing the Foreign Service but funding for diplomacy and foreign aid in 2012. Even if the State bill is "only one and a quarter percent of the overall budget."  Most foreign aid recipients do not vote; but of course, countries receiving US aid have their own lobbyists and presumably they will be working "all hands" and earning their pay in the months ahead.

The Cable's Josh Rogin reports that SFRC's Senator Kerry has also unveiled his bill on July 27 (apparently with no participation from Senator Lugar; not a good sign) that would fully fund the State Department and USAID operations at the level requested by the White House.  Josh notes that "nobody knows if those funds will be set aside for international affairs when the appropriators weigh in. And the ongoing negotiations over the debt ceiling could change the financial picture for State and USAID as well."

The text of Senator Kerry's bill is here, with an expanded summary here, and a fact sheet on the bill here.

So the duel is officially on.

If there is a compromise (oh dat dirty, dirty word), it will presumably be between the 18% mark. Senator Kerry will not get his full funding, and the GOP will not get its full 18% cuts. It is also conceivable that the State/USAID funding could become casualties in the "we're going to be the next banana republic debt ceiling" negotiations.


CNN reports that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already warned members of the House of Representatives that she "will recommend personally" that President Barack Obama veto a bill that would severely restrict State Department operations, international organizations and foreign assistance.

But what good is that warning when the debt ceiling catastrophe and its attendant side effects are heading our way like a Chinese bullet train?

2012! It's sooner than you think. Well now, where is John Cusack when you need him?





Tuesday, June 7, 2011

How to save money in Iraq? Withdraw the troops, send in the diplomats ... and get ready with the fire hoses

Via Federal Times:

The State Department's budget has already taken a hit in 2011, but it appears that its finances will be squeezed even tighter just as the department is trying to regain ground lost to the Pentagon over the past decade.

In the final budget resolution passed for 2011, Congress agreed to provide $48 billion for State and foreign operations. This marked an $8.4 billion reduction from the president's budget request. It was also $504 million less than the department received in 2010.

For 2012 spending, the House Appropriations Committee announced that it plans to cut $11 billion from the State Department and foreign operations budget request of $47 billion. This includes funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Meanwhile, it plans to cut only $9 billion from the Pentagon's requested budget of $671 billion, which includes $118 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Read in full here.

At the highest level of the Iraq war which happened during the surge, the average monthly DOD obligations in Iraq peaked at $11.1 billion in FY2008. Note -- monthly obligations. Just roughly the same amount Congress plans to cut from the State Department annual, yearly, 12 month budget in FY2012. 


In the infinite wisdom of our elected representatives, given that we will "save" tons of money from the withdrawal of our troops in Iraq, we will "save tons more" by slashing the budget of the State Department -- because why not? Instead of DOD completing the job over there, we'll now have DOS doing the job for a lot less.  A lot less money and a lot less people and a lot less of everything!

Obviously, given the history of that made up controversy about the Iraq recruitment in 2007, State is anxious to show the flag. It will have personnel for Iraq, ready or not.  If it does not have enough folks, it will hire 3161 limited appointees to staff up the place.  It will have its own private army to protect our diplomats. It will have its own air fleet to shuttle our personnel from one end of the country to another. It will have its own life support personnel, presumably all contractors. It will be starting close to scratch on just about everything, from how to bring in food and other supplies, aircraft mechanics for its new air fleet to pest control guys.

But this is a gig set up to fail.

Congress holds the purse strings and the folks over there have never been particularly fond of these foreign affairs officers, as they are with the soldiers in their voting districts. One senator is opposed to the State Dept getting any of DOD's equipment or creating its own mini-army. Others are not happy about the projected growth of contractors working for State. What, you want our diplomats in Iraq armed with toothpicks? Make up your minds, dammit!

The State Department has never taken on a responsibility like this; there will be lots of hiccups even as demands for quick results go off the roof. Um, okay, hiccup is an understatement.

Personnel will continue to rotate on short-term, one year deployments, on voluntary basis.  At some point, this repeated deployments of an agency small enough its FSOs can all fit in an aircraft carrier, will have institutional consequences and personal repercussions.  Bench strength? What's that?

Iraq as a democracy in our own image is a foolish dream. The State Department will now be expected to be the firewall against its descent back into chaos. Be ready with the fire hoses ...

Um, sorry, Congress had just slashed the money for the fire hoses. 

In related news, the Commission on Wartime Contracting held a hearing yesterday with Ambassador Kennedy, the U/S for Management on the grilling stand. Below excerpted from WSJ:
Former Congressman Christopher Shays, a co-chairman of the commission, raised the possibility that contractors might have to use force to rescue diplomatic personnel caught in a roadside improvised explosive device attack, potentially leading to an overt combat role.

"If you have an IED and you need to get a medic to deal with the injuries that are outside the embassy and—and/or you are under fire and you have to shoot your way out to get back to safety—in either case, you have to get someone there to attend to the wounded and you have to aggressively use force or you have to aggressively use force to get out, why do you think that's not an inherently governmental function?" he asked Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy said he was comfortable with the distinction between the way the military used force, and the more defensive role of contract security.

"We fully understand that we still have challenges ahead as we carry out our diplomatic missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations where we rely on contingency contracting, but we believe we have instituted a sound foundation to carry us forward," Mr. Kennedy said.
That's supposed to be a comforting response? But what is he not saying?




Monday, June 6, 2011

Snapshot: State Dept Personnel Projections for FY2006-2014

The State Department's actual and projected numbers of Foreign Service and civil service personnel for fiscal years 2006 through 2014.

Extracted from GAO-11-241, Jan 25, 2011

Remains to be seen how close these projected numbers will be to the actual numbers authorized by Congress in the next fiscal years.



Tuesday, April 19, 2011

Wow! If I earn $50K a year, $4.42 of my taxes goes to international affairs and foreign aid

Say I'm married with one child and an annual income of $50,000. My total payroll and income taxes will be $4,085.00. Of that amount, $4.42 is the portion of my taxes that goes to funding development and humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and foreign affairs, embassies, and additional international affairs.

That's right.  $4.42

Holy crap! That's 1.7% of my taxes! Is that shocking or what? Apparently, 26.3% of my taxes also go to National Defense which I'm sure Congress will tell me is worth it, earmarks included.
 
The figure above makes the following assumptions -- 1) that my family contributes 2 percent of my wage income to a 401(k) or IRA, 2) do not itemize, and 3) claims the Saver's Credit, as well as the Making Work Pay and Child Tax Credits.

If you go here, you can select four other income levels and see the breakdown on where the tax dollars are spent.  If you have your actual tax return you can input your real numbers and generate your own receipt with a breakdown of where your taxes go.

In any case, if I break down the $4.42 figure above, I'm paying $1.82 to development and human assistance, which is definitely way cheaper than a Starbucks latte.

What can I actually buy with $1.82?  Let's see --  a Walgreen’s Diapers.  Or a potato/macaroni salad in Charleston, South Carolina which sells for $1.82. I can also get 4 Boxes of Raisin Bran Crunch for only $7.29 (and that's $1.82 per box)!

At least $1.04 of that $4.42 tax money will also go to security assistance.  But for $1.04, I can get Clorox Bleach (60-oz.) at Walgreens, or half a pound of sugar.  One Thin Crunch Mixed Nuts and White Chocolate Bar also sells for $1.04 in my grocery aisle.

The remaining $1.56 of that $4.42 tax money will, of course, go to foreign affairs, embassies, and additional international affairs. What can I buy with $1.56?  A can of sardines is available for that price.  I could also buy a jar of Skippy Peanut Butter or a 5-lb bag of flour.

Below is a receipt for a taxpayer earning $50K:




So, for the price of one crunchy Skippy Peanut Butter, you can march to any US Embassy or Consulate in over 250 places around the world and demand assistance.  Is $4.42 a good investment of your tax dollars?

Isn't that a tad cheap?






Stimson Center: Diplomacy and Foreign Aid Budget Deal Could Have Been a Lot Worse, FY2012 is Not Promising

On April 15 without much fanfare, President Obama signed into law the budget deal officially called H.R. 1473, the "Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011".

Dr. Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams of The Will and the Wallet (Budget Insights for Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy from the Stimson Center) has posted an analysis of the FY2011 CR yesterday. Check out their account-by-account data breakdown of the International Affairs budget here and here (pdf). Quick excerpts below:

"While the President did not get the diplomatic and foreign assistance money he asked for in the FY 2011 budget deal (his request was cut $8.3 billion), it could have been a lot worse. The House version of the FY 2011 budget would have cut nearly $5 billion more.

Moreover, some in the Congress could and do argue that compared to FY 2010, American’s foreign policy institutions and programs survived pretty well.  Compared to the base funding for FY 2010, the new appropriation cut only $781 million or two percent.

The administration sees it differently.  The White House includes in the FY 2010 total the funds that were appropriated in FY 2009, but rolled over into 2010 (so-called “forward funding”) and the supplemental funds voted in 2010 primarily for Iraq and Afghanistan.  The administration therefore starts from a higher level last year and argues that the new budget is a 12% cut from that base.
Click here for an account by account data breakdown of the 2011 CR relative to FY10 (pdf)
The disagreement over where to start counting will probably not be resolved.  But it is important to understand that overall US foreign policy funding has grown significantly over the past decade, essentially doubling from FY 2001 to FY 2010.  The new budget flattens that growth (or cuts it, depending on where you start).  And the process of strengthening our civilian statecraft is going to get harder as Congress and the White House focus in on controlling the deficit and the growth of the nation’s debt, a problem Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has called our number one national security threat."
Remember the much touted QDDR?
"Congress may be leery of strengthening the State Department’s capacity for more operational engagement in conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction and governance.  This capacity was a strong focus of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), but it was not well supported in the budget agreement.  Funds for both the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (the conflict prevention and resolution people) and the Complex Crises Fund (their operating funds) were cut significantly from the administration’s request."
Foreign policy still militarized? Absolutely.
"Congress also took a step backward in rebalancing the national security toolkit, effectively reinforcing the trend of the past decade to shift authority from State to Defense. In particular, the budget agreement reverses the previous congressional decision to ask State to take responsibility for counter-insurgency support in Pakistan, denying the State Department request for $1.2 billion for this program and providing $800 million in unrequested funding to the DOD for the same purpose."
Their conclusion is not hopeful.  
"The fiscal environment for FY 2012 is not promising for American civilian statecraft.  The House budget resolution passed last week would cut foreign policy funding (the International Affairs Budget function) 35% or $13.1 billion from the CR level provided for FY 2011.  While this level may grow in a Senate resolution, it is going to be increasingly difficult to “power up” the civilian diplomacy and foreign assistance agencies in the emerging budget environment.

Humanitarian and a modicum of development assistance are useful tools, but the challenges of the new century will demand a good deal more from America’s diplomats and assistance providers.  Moreover, as the defense budget shrinks, our civilian capabilities will grow in importance. It is penny-wise and pound-foolish to hammer the civilian foreign policy accounts, particularly where new capabilities need to grow."
Read in full here.

I think the last time State had it this bad was during the 1990's, when we were supposedly enjoying the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War.  Instead, we had rounds of embassy closures, hiring freezes, reduction in force particularly among locally engaged employees, and USIA was gobbled up into the State Department in 1999. The FY 2012 with the proposed deep cuts in the international affairs budget may be shaping up to be way, way worse.  And USAID could be on the line.    







Quickie: Why can’t the State Department get any love?

Author of Afghanistan Journal, Joshua Foust who writes at Need to Know in PBS and blogs at Registan.net has the answer.

Over the weekend, he wrote a piece at PBS on Gutting the State Department and what the proposed budget cuts say about the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Warning: It is quite a depressing read since our elected reps obviously have a love-hate relationship with State (they love you when they go on CODELs, they hate you when they have to justify your funding aka: foreign aid cents to their constituents).   Excerpts:


In the midst of an historic impasse over the 2012 funding of the federal government, Republicans and Democrats agreed to cut billions of dollars from the nation’s foreign policy budget. However, reading the list of what got cut (pdf) one agency is conspicuously missing: the Department of Defense. Most of the cuts to American foreign policy — nearly $8 billion — came from the State Department. What gives?
[...]
Some readers here may we aware that I’m not the biggest fan of USAID: I think we need to implement substantial reforms to the foreign-aid industrial complex. But you cannot reform an agency if you eviscerate its budget. If some of the middle-management and long-serving career officers are a problem at the State Department, as some ex-employees have attested in private, then cutting the budget doesn’t actually fix the problem. If, as Republicans allege, the State Department is ineffective, then cutting its budget doesn’t actually make the agency any more effective (and since government agencies are not a competitive market, it’s not like some better-designed organization will spring up filled with diplomatic entrepreneurs).

It’s no secret that many programs at the State Department are broken or severely handicapped. But it would be madness to think that cutting its budget right when a growing number of crises require strong diplomacy and smart civilian management.
[...]
A lot of critics point to a 2007 Town Hall meeting, in which a few Foreign Service Officers — diplomats — complained of being  stationed in Iraq. The event was hugely embarrassing for the department, but the derision levied at the entire agency seemed misplaced. After all, U.S. soldiers have committed crimes, they’ve whined in public and one even went to jail for refusing to deploy over his rejection of President Obama’s birth certificate. Yet, there is no widespread disgust at the military, or of the troops who serve.

Next time you’re at Target, take a look at the bumper stickers on the SUVs in the parking lot. In all likelihood, you’ll find a good half-dozen or more that say “Support the Troops” in one way or another. You will not find “Support the Diplomats” anywhere. [...] State Department has about 22,000. The DoD, in contrast, has nearly 450,000 employees stationed overseas, with 2.5 million more employees in the U.S.

So with no built-in constituency to argue for its interest, and an acutely lopsided share of the foreign policy budget (under 6 percent), it seems natural the State Department would face cuts first. It never really stood a chance. That doesn’t make it right, however. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been warning for years of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy — and he’s not alone. Even so, the relentless attacks on the civilian side of the foreign policy budget continue without much public outcry, while cuts to the growth rate of the Defense budget are met with howling and apocalyptic foreshadowing.

The $8.5 billion of cuts in the 2012 budget would be a rounding error in the DoD’s $671 billion budget. But in the State Department’s $47 billion budget, it is devastating. Until this dramatic imbalance in spending priorities is reversed — until both parties in Congress agree that our foreign policy should not be dominated by the military — this trend of gutting civilian programs will only get worse.

Read the whole thing here.

The 2007 Town Hall set-up to fail meeting -- oh yeah, whose idea was that again?